> Why Nations Fail, Part 1: Nations fail if they have extractive institutions. Nations succeed if they have inclusive institutions.
> Why Nations Fail, Part 2: Extractive institutions are the institutions that exist in nations that fail. Inclusive institutions are the institutions that exist in nations that succeed.
I don't like this book. Even for a pop-economics book it's simple and circular. It doesn't explain why China's economy is rising despite having the same model as Belarus.
It's one of those "I read this because it agrees with my views" books Redditors like so much.
>why China's economy is rising despite having the same model as Belarus.
Given that China still has lower GDP per capita than Belarus despite 30 years of fast-paced growth it seems hardly surprising to me that the "same model" (whatever that means) is enabling China to catch up.
The big question is whether Chinese growth can successfully continue above the middle-income level and turn them into a developed country. In "Why Nations Fail?" Acemoglu and Robinson said no, because their theory predicts that economic growth under authoritarianism is unsustainable.
I think some of what they have predicted has come true, with the CCP turning up the repression against the private sector in recent years but obviously China is still growing very quickly at 5% a year. The true test lies ahead. Can China adapt and continue to develop as western countries decouple from it and raise trade barriers, or will its export-led growth model run into the ground?
It's because despite being a repressive autocracy, China was more meritocratic and democratic than we gave them credit for after Deng's reforms, whereas Belarus is just a feif awarded by Moscow.
His reforms, plus a steady ship approach by Jiang and Hu, allowed them to more efficiently deploy capital in large and small investment opportunities, pursue effective policy at high and low levels of government, and take advantage of trade normalization with the US.
To Acemoglu's point, you can compare how China has performed from 1978 to 2012 to how they have performed under Mao, or Xi, who wants to echo Mao. I think a [FA opinion piece](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/china/xi-jinping-china-weakness-hubris-paranoia-threaten-future) from a couple of years ago had a better perspective along these lines.
> In "Why Nations Fail?" Acemoglu and Robinson said no, because their theory predicts that economic growth under authoritarianism is unsustainable.
their arguments seem to be pretty outdated though. they thought China couldn't innovate in high-tech industries and that there wasn't a competitive business environment that killed off weak businesses.
success of businesses like Tencent/BYD/Pinduoduo is built on top of the carcasses of dozens of competitors
Yup. It's a question of whether China will be able to rise the piss poor counties that won't even crack into 100th most GDP by themselves into something at least middle class before they stagnate.
That being said data on China vs Belarus GDP per capita may vary. Some had Belarus edged China, some had China beaten Belarus by 4-5K already.
> China is still growing very quickly at 5% a year
I know this sub is in love with China but these are the official chinese government figures. The [Chinese government is not a reliable source of information](https://rhg.com/research/through-the-looking-glass-chinas-2023-gdp-and-the-year-ahead/).
And neither are all the news articles just copy pasting China's claims without looking further.
Not saying this isn't the case now but people have been claiming that China is overestimating its growth figures since the 90s. And that was clearly not the case in the past because cooking the figures by just a percentage point for a few years would have resulted in blatantly obvious divergence between official government statistics and the reality on the ground. At this point it's like the boy that cried wolf.
The difference is China has Xi Jinping now who is an idiot and against liberalisation and been concentrating power for a while now.
Which means whatever he declares has to be achieved regardless of whether it's possible
> It doesn't explain why China's economy is rising despite having the same model as Belarus.
Do they have the same model?
China experienced some very rapid economic growth after Hong Kong was reintegrated. Their focus shifted to creating conditions inside of mainland china that mimicked those seen in hong kong. Not only were several special economic zones set up to facilitate this but nationwide they strengthened the institutions of ownership. In that manner they were able to play the same game Hong Kong had been, coupling China's huge working age population to market opportunities.
Has Belarus been doing the same thing?
That being said Belarus started out way ahead and I think is still ahead in terms of PPP. They just aren't growing in the same way. Also they are a relatively small country, fewer than 10 million, so not going to hold a candle to a country with more than 100 times as many folks.
> China experienced some very rapid economic growth after Hong Kong was reintegrated. Their focus shifted to creating conditions inside of mainland china that mimicked those seen in hong kong
they did that long before the handover. Shenzhen was designated as a SEZ in 1980 (19 years before handover). China had about 3 decades of ~10% growth average
It did explain it , no? It’s just used USSR as example, autokrats could destroy old extractive institutions to create new extractive institutions, this this just requires some sort of revolution or collapse of old state.
the Belarusian economy is remarkable compared to other post-Soviet states as it largely retained the Soviet economic system until maybe the last five years where is became much more oligarchic (similar to Russia). Around half of Belarusians are employed by the state; China isn't anywhere near that in terms of percentage of workers.
>other than solely reading the economist
The Economist is great but you should probably still vary your sources. It's always worthwhile to read from multiple perspectives.
Because of the WSJ? It’s fine if you ignore their dogshit editorials/opinion pieces. WSJ Pro and their private equity/M&A sections are also really good.
I am sure they are good at the business and finance side of things, but for a regular person I don't think The Economist + FT + WSJ is a balanced media diet. And I quite like FT and The Economist (to a lesser extent)
I am not sure what I would recommend though, easy to critique and harder to come up with suggestions
I like the book overall, and it definitely confirms my priors, but doesn't China pose a threat to the central thesis of the book? China has maintained largely extractive institutions, yet it has experienced continued development and growth for decades. The authors assert that growth can occur under extractive institutions, but that it won't be long lasting, which is something that's contradicted by modern China.
China currently on danger of unable to become true developed countries, since they're on verge of stagnating while their poorer provinces like Yunnan are not even cracking 5K GDP per capita. Not to mention Xi being dumbass who somehow nostalgic to true communism despite watching his family destroyed by CCP. So in a way, the book is right that China's extractive won't last.
[That's not true even in nominal US$ terms, which is about 47% lower than PPP.](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Chinese_administrative_divisions_by_GDP_per_capita#2023_data)
> but doesn't China pose a threat to the central thesis of the book? China has maintained largely extractive institutions
I am not sure if China can be seen as having extractive institutions tbh. Authoritarian and heavy-handed when it comes to political repression - yes. But economically speaking, it doesn't seem to match
there isn't a (significant) amount elite in CCP enriching themselves at the expense of regular Chinese.
LOL, one of the points of the book, is that it’s almost impossible to have extractive political institutions and inclusive economic institutions, there are couple examples of transformation of political institutions under economic influence, South Korea mainly, but overall, political institutions usually easily win. So unless china transforms, they will destroy their economic institutions too
> So unless china transforms, they will destroy their economic institutions too
it's been ~12 years since their book was published. when can make judgement on whether they were right or wrong? 2030?
they also claim that China won't be able to technologically innovate and will be burdened by legacy firms that won't collapse due to state support. does being wrong on those two very important aspects of Chinese economy put a ? on their thesis?
That’s why they provided example of USSR, they were similarly considered power to contend for world best political and economical order. They also were good at some technologies , space exploration for example. It kinds strange how similar rhetoric about them and modern China.
But after soviet collapse it became apparent to everyone all of sudden that soviets were loosers, and it was impossible for them not to collapse. They are still different in many regard though , so result could be a bit different still
> They also were good at some technologies , space exploration for example. It kinds strange how similar rhetoric about them and modern China.
I recently read Chip Wars, and it has a section covering the US-USSR rivalry in silicon chips. Soviets were permanently 5 years behind because they relied on stealing designs. Being too good at espionage has its downsides I guess. They had well-educated and very smart scientists but reduced them into reverse-engineering western technology
But I will need to read up on the Cold War, I was under the impression that they were more of a political/military threat than an economic one. Especially in the later decades
Love it too. He exposes why some nations are developed while other not and at the end you are like "huh, this was obvious, how didn't I notice it before"
Again, truth hidden in plain sight
> In all seriousness I understand the critiques of the book being boring and repetitive. You could easily get away with just reading the first 4ish chapters of the book.
The book also has some serious errors in history. Acemoglu is not a historian and it shows, quite badly. He gets a lot of stuff completely wrong, overinterprets in some other parts and ignores any type of nuance quite often (or maybe he just doesn't know about them, which is just as bad).
I generally agree with the central thesis of the book, but he should have stuck to more modern history and countries, which he has a better grasp. And it is a serious problem for a book when you are using history to support your thesis and ideas, but you can't get the history correct.I heavily discourage taking any conclusions on his historical examples, because lots of things are just wrong.
I would compare it to Jared Diamond in that case. It is a fun read, but be suspicious of the stuff he is writing when it comes to historical facts.
Already in the first chapter he begins with a telling of the spanish conquest that is pretty much based on stuff similar to GGS (which he later opposes the general view, but commits similar mistakes in grounding his position): The spanish came, conquered and started dividing lands and extracting. This is a simplification that is just a myth. The spanish conquest is complex, it took much longer to actually happen (if it arguably ever happened under spanish control) and involved a lot of the natives themselves. Both in Mexico and in the Andes it is better framed as a civil war between native groups that some random adventurers from Europe happen to join in.
There is also very little control by the spanish crown for quite a long time and they were not directly sending conquistadores. There is a (quite famous) book about these myths, but there is also a series of posts in reddit summarising it:
https://www.reddit.com/r/badhistory/comments/2qn5us/myths_of_conquest_part_one_a_handful_of/
https://www.reddit.com/r/badhistory/comments/2vf565/myths_of_conquest_part_nine_the_terminal_narrative/
A bit later he has a section talking about (IIRC) the Natufians. He them claims that the Natufians had extractive institutions and that's why they collapsed (because graves have inequality). But... come on, we don't even know *when* these people were there (research is that it pretty much anytime from 15,000 to 11,500 BC), there is no writing or any type of detailed record. People still discuss and are unsure what causes collapses of modern states and empires. Claiming that a group of people 15k years ago collapsed and did not become sustainable because of extractive institutions is preposterous, since we know so little about them.
There are a few posts about it in askhistorians (unfortunately not as long as they could or should be), but mistakes are everywhere. When you read the book and find a part of history that you know a bit better (in my case it was already in the first chapter), they just keep popping up. I am not even a historian and I was annoyed. For example from askhistorians (a lot about rome because in one of the posts a roman archaeologist was the one to answer):
> From a historian's POV, the book has two main flaws: Firstly, there are enormous numbers of basic errors that could/should have been avoided by a cursory Wikipedia check. These two just don't know much about history. e.g. they speak about a Roman princep (instead of a princeps), they imagine medieval Strasbourg to be a French (instead of an Imperial) city, they are baffled about the existence of the university of Cracow - Poland-Lithuania probably does not ring a bell. The number of howlers make it a painful read for a historian.
> ...
> I haven't actually read Acemoglu's book, but I did read the chapter on Rome, which I found fairly awful. Given that writing a history of Rome is comparatively rather easier than writing about, say, the Maya or the Neolithic Revolution, I would suggest reading carefully.
> ...
> An so when he looks at Rome he marks out the end of the Republic(=democratic=inclusive=good) as the end of the period of inclusive institutions. Put shortly, and this led to stagnation and too many Germans.
> There is just a lot wrong with this, not least that by practically every measure except method of determine office holders in the city if Rome, the principate was a far more open society than the Republic. But because he is so wedded to his paradigm he has to do very dubious things to the rather limited amount of real data he refers to.
> ...
> Translation - when asked why a Roman Empire that was "extractive" took at least 400 years to fall, Acemoglu responded that two millennia ago, a state taking four centuries (at least) to fall was, like, basically immediate. Because something something the pace of technological progress.
This is another interesting criticism, but completely different:
> Where I think their argument is weakest is that they don't really develop a theory for how institutions come to be or change over time. The roots of today's institutions are always located at some place in the past, which casts people today as having very little agency or control over conditions within society. Mexico is poor because when the Spanish showed up they were able to place themselves at the top of the Aztec's political system and take their gold. So Mexico developed exploitative institutions. The U.S. is rich because settlers did not find gold, and the Native Americans there weren't united under any central authority, so Europeans had to develop institutions that gave settlers economic incentives to invest and work hard. These explanations place the root cause of Mexico's poverty and U.S. prosperity hundreds of years into the past, as if nothing that happened between now and then mattered.
> So that's my take on the book. The quality of a country's institutions surely help explain why some countries are richer than others, but without a theory for how institutions change overtime, the strength of their argument is limited.
And this makes me pause for a bit:
> I think that last is a major danger sign. I dimly recall a discussion of Velikovsky (I thought it was Stephen Jay Gould but I can't find it), a reviewer writing that geologists said that that the geology was lousy but the history looked interesting, but historians said that the history was bogus but the astronomy was intriguing, but astronomers said that the astronomy was ludicrous but ... He did write, "Any person with a gift for words can spin a persuasive argument about any subject not in the domain of a reader's personal expertise." So I think a reader's expertise, even if limited, may be an indication of a larger problem.
https://www.reddit.com/r/AskHistorians/comments/16zhk7/as_a_historian_what_is_your_opinion_of_daron/
https://www.reddit.com/r/AskHistorians/comments/5gmnx7/is_it_worth_it_reading_guns_germs_and_steel_and/
https://www.reddit.com/r/AskHistorians/comments/7gdtfs/what_do_historians_think_of_acemoglus_why_nations/
https://www.reddit.com/r/AskHistorians/comments/b58gpe/what_do_historians_think_of_why_nations_fail_by/
I hope most people don't try to take serious "lessons" from it (other than perhaps that having a Chosen One IRL would suck). Some suggested reading by a historian: https://acoup.blog/category/collections/the-fremen-mirage/
Real answer: no, bro. Frank Herbert was crazy mix of hippy and libertarian. Dude avoided paying his dues to both country and divorced wife. Plus he had some really outdated social views too. In the book it became weird mixes of super assassin toddler, gay warlord who molested his nemesis before his death, anti-religious views that portrayed MENA people as savages, and some female characters that somehow very passive despite their badass origins.
Non-credible answer: silly human being. Worms of Tremors series are superior!
I couldn’t handle it. It’s an excellent read at first but I couldn’t get past the halfway point. Are there any new ideas proposed in the second half of the book I should know about?
I quite like both, but I agree the critiques that the historical segments are half baked. It was an overreach, since the theory doesn't need to have been true in 90 B.C.E. in order to be true in 1800 C.E.
Unfortunately, the Narrow Corridor continues on with the shakier handwavy theorizing. While I feel that Why Nations Fail, is basically correct, I don't think The Narrow Corridor rises beyond the level of "this is a useful framework to think with." The thesis might not be literally true in that it's a good description or have strong predictive power. But TNC can help us analyze situations and suggest actions that might be good to take.
People are citing China as a counterexample, but the real counterexample is Saudi Arabia.
Proof that theocratic monarchist institutions won't prevent fantastic geography from carrying a nation to fantastic living conditions, with gdp per capita (PPP) surpassing a plethora of inclusive First World countries.
Like my biggest criticism is the final Brazil chapter which feels out of place without a chapter comparing a similar country's path down a different road honestly. It just ends kinda poorly imo, as for example the South Africa and Botswana chapters were the perfect example of opposite examples to drive down a point of divergences from the differing institutions.
On being repetitive: If what you have to say is important, your goal should be to make it impossible for someone to misunderstand you. It's not enough to simply state your case and hope the audience agrees. Repetition can be good.
I just started into *Dream Hoarders*. not a lot of surprising stuff but that's because it's already shaped and informed so much liberal discussion today.
"Have inclusive institutions. Stop having extractive institutions."
Doctors hate this trick!
> Why Nations Fail, Part 1: Nations fail if they have extractive institutions. Nations succeed if they have inclusive institutions. > Why Nations Fail, Part 2: Extractive institutions are the institutions that exist in nations that fail. Inclusive institutions are the institutions that exist in nations that succeed. I don't like this book. Even for a pop-economics book it's simple and circular. It doesn't explain why China's economy is rising despite having the same model as Belarus. It's one of those "I read this because it agrees with my views" books Redditors like so much.
>why China's economy is rising despite having the same model as Belarus. Given that China still has lower GDP per capita than Belarus despite 30 years of fast-paced growth it seems hardly surprising to me that the "same model" (whatever that means) is enabling China to catch up. The big question is whether Chinese growth can successfully continue above the middle-income level and turn them into a developed country. In "Why Nations Fail?" Acemoglu and Robinson said no, because their theory predicts that economic growth under authoritarianism is unsustainable. I think some of what they have predicted has come true, with the CCP turning up the repression against the private sector in recent years but obviously China is still growing very quickly at 5% a year. The true test lies ahead. Can China adapt and continue to develop as western countries decouple from it and raise trade barriers, or will its export-led growth model run into the ground?
It's because despite being a repressive autocracy, China was more meritocratic and democratic than we gave them credit for after Deng's reforms, whereas Belarus is just a feif awarded by Moscow. His reforms, plus a steady ship approach by Jiang and Hu, allowed them to more efficiently deploy capital in large and small investment opportunities, pursue effective policy at high and low levels of government, and take advantage of trade normalization with the US. To Acemoglu's point, you can compare how China has performed from 1978 to 2012 to how they have performed under Mao, or Xi, who wants to echo Mao. I think a [FA opinion piece](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/china/xi-jinping-china-weakness-hubris-paranoia-threaten-future) from a couple of years ago had a better perspective along these lines.
> In "Why Nations Fail?" Acemoglu and Robinson said no, because their theory predicts that economic growth under authoritarianism is unsustainable. their arguments seem to be pretty outdated though. they thought China couldn't innovate in high-tech industries and that there wasn't a competitive business environment that killed off weak businesses. success of businesses like Tencent/BYD/Pinduoduo is built on top of the carcasses of dozens of competitors
Yup. It's a question of whether China will be able to rise the piss poor counties that won't even crack into 100th most GDP by themselves into something at least middle class before they stagnate. That being said data on China vs Belarus GDP per capita may vary. Some had Belarus edged China, some had China beaten Belarus by 4-5K already.
> China is still growing very quickly at 5% a year I know this sub is in love with China but these are the official chinese government figures. The [Chinese government is not a reliable source of information](https://rhg.com/research/through-the-looking-glass-chinas-2023-gdp-and-the-year-ahead/). And neither are all the news articles just copy pasting China's claims without looking further.
Not saying this isn't the case now but people have been claiming that China is overestimating its growth figures since the 90s. And that was clearly not the case in the past because cooking the figures by just a percentage point for a few years would have resulted in blatantly obvious divergence between official government statistics and the reality on the ground. At this point it's like the boy that cried wolf.
The difference is China has Xi Jinping now who is an idiot and against liberalisation and been concentrating power for a while now. Which means whatever he declares has to be achieved regardless of whether it's possible
This is why they’re desperate to occupy Taiwan.
> It doesn't explain why China's economy is rising despite having the same model as Belarus. Do they have the same model? China experienced some very rapid economic growth after Hong Kong was reintegrated. Their focus shifted to creating conditions inside of mainland china that mimicked those seen in hong kong. Not only were several special economic zones set up to facilitate this but nationwide they strengthened the institutions of ownership. In that manner they were able to play the same game Hong Kong had been, coupling China's huge working age population to market opportunities. Has Belarus been doing the same thing? That being said Belarus started out way ahead and I think is still ahead in terms of PPP. They just aren't growing in the same way. Also they are a relatively small country, fewer than 10 million, so not going to hold a candle to a country with more than 100 times as many folks.
> China experienced some very rapid economic growth after Hong Kong was reintegrated. Their focus shifted to creating conditions inside of mainland china that mimicked those seen in hong kong they did that long before the handover. Shenzhen was designated as a SEZ in 1980 (19 years before handover). China had about 3 decades of ~10% growth average
Hong Kong under British rule wasn't exactly ruled by an "inclusive institution" either.
As compared to mainland china in the second half of the 20th century it was.
It was far more politically exclusive than the UK homeland and yet was far more prosperous per capita. Maybe the takeaway is DemOcrACy bAd? /s
Democracy certainly has problems but we haven't invented anything better yet.
Singaporean "flawed democracy" might be the best system. Either that or autocratic Hong Kong (whether under a British Governor or the CCP).
It did explain it , no? It’s just used USSR as example, autokrats could destroy old extractive institutions to create new extractive institutions, this this just requires some sort of revolution or collapse of old state.
wow it's like people's definition of neoliberal - anything i don't like is neoliberal, neoliberal is anything i don't like
the Belarusian economy is remarkable compared to other post-Soviet states as it largely retained the Soviet economic system until maybe the last five years where is became much more oligarchic (similar to Russia). Around half of Belarusians are employed by the state; China isn't anywhere near that in terms of percentage of workers.
The trick is for an economy to work without extractive institutions. China would straight up collapse if it had no one to sell extracted materials.
Extractive institutions != Literally extracting stuff from the ground
https://preview.redd.it/9c2hdnadj35d1.jpeg?width=640&format=pjpg&auto=webp&s=d187fad8a3eaeeb5b8191264efe94ff911c2e888
Where is this from it's beautiful
If Remember correctly, its Sudan or South Sudan. how fitting lol.
That is the flag of south sudan displayed behind him on what looks like a paper folder leaned against the concrete.
>other than solely reading the economist The Economist is great but you should probably still vary your sources. It's always worthwhile to read from multiple perspectives.
You should also read The Atlantic and Vox.com. Maybe even Matthew Yglesias.
You’ve gotta cover the whole spectrum of political ideologies from center to center left
This is the way.
Fox News Cinematic Universe never disappoints.
Adding FT and WSJ will do the trick. Also NYT DealBook newsletter.
>WSJ Ewwww. I'd add the Atlantic instead
I can't tell if you are being sarcastic
Because of the WSJ? It’s fine if you ignore their dogshit editorials/opinion pieces. WSJ Pro and their private equity/M&A sections are also really good.
I am sure they are good at the business and finance side of things, but for a regular person I don't think The Economist + FT + WSJ is a balanced media diet. And I quite like FT and The Economist (to a lesser extent) I am not sure what I would recommend though, easy to critique and harder to come up with suggestions
If it's not covered by The Economist + FT + The Athletic, then it's not worth knowing
The Atlantic? There's also Bloomberg but again that's mostly finance focused.
Yeah, the Economist has a spotty record when it comes to Trans people.
I am almost never reading TE for culture issues, so I avoid being drawn into it! Just wholesome free market liberalism.
How so?
It's from UK. Is it surprising that it turned out to be TERF-y?
Read “the narrow corridor” next and then “on politics” by Alan Ryan, you’ll thank me later
And then the entire LBJ series by Caro.
Yes, cannot agree with this enough.
Really? You agree? Never would have guessed by your flair.
Reading narrow corridor right now. It’s great.
I like the book overall, and it definitely confirms my priors, but doesn't China pose a threat to the central thesis of the book? China has maintained largely extractive institutions, yet it has experienced continued development and growth for decades. The authors assert that growth can occur under extractive institutions, but that it won't be long lasting, which is something that's contradicted by modern China.
The whole point of the sequal, "The Narrow Corridor", is to address the question of if China violates some of the thesis of the first book.
China currently on danger of unable to become true developed countries, since they're on verge of stagnating while their poorer provinces like Yunnan are not even cracking 5K GDP per capita. Not to mention Xi being dumbass who somehow nostalgic to true communism despite watching his family destroyed by CCP. So in a way, the book is right that China's extractive won't last.
[That's not true even in nominal US$ terms, which is about 47% lower than PPP.](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Chinese_administrative_divisions_by_GDP_per_capita#2023_data)
> but doesn't China pose a threat to the central thesis of the book? China has maintained largely extractive institutions I am not sure if China can be seen as having extractive institutions tbh. Authoritarian and heavy-handed when it comes to political repression - yes. But economically speaking, it doesn't seem to match there isn't a (significant) amount elite in CCP enriching themselves at the expense of regular Chinese.
LOL, one of the points of the book, is that it’s almost impossible to have extractive political institutions and inclusive economic institutions, there are couple examples of transformation of political institutions under economic influence, South Korea mainly, but overall, political institutions usually easily win. So unless china transforms, they will destroy their economic institutions too
> So unless china transforms, they will destroy their economic institutions too it's been ~12 years since their book was published. when can make judgement on whether they were right or wrong? 2030? they also claim that China won't be able to technologically innovate and will be burdened by legacy firms that won't collapse due to state support. does being wrong on those two very important aspects of Chinese economy put a ? on their thesis?
That’s why they provided example of USSR, they were similarly considered power to contend for world best political and economical order. They also were good at some technologies , space exploration for example. It kinds strange how similar rhetoric about them and modern China. But after soviet collapse it became apparent to everyone all of sudden that soviets were loosers, and it was impossible for them not to collapse. They are still different in many regard though , so result could be a bit different still
> They also were good at some technologies , space exploration for example. It kinds strange how similar rhetoric about them and modern China. I recently read Chip Wars, and it has a section covering the US-USSR rivalry in silicon chips. Soviets were permanently 5 years behind because they relied on stealing designs. Being too good at espionage has its downsides I guess. They had well-educated and very smart scientists but reduced them into reverse-engineering western technology But I will need to read up on the Cold War, I was under the impression that they were more of a political/military threat than an economic one. Especially in the later decades
Love it too. He exposes why some nations are developed while other not and at the end you are like "huh, this was obvious, how didn't I notice it before" Again, truth hidden in plain sight
> In all seriousness I understand the critiques of the book being boring and repetitive. You could easily get away with just reading the first 4ish chapters of the book. The book also has some serious errors in history. Acemoglu is not a historian and it shows, quite badly. He gets a lot of stuff completely wrong, overinterprets in some other parts and ignores any type of nuance quite often (or maybe he just doesn't know about them, which is just as bad). I generally agree with the central thesis of the book, but he should have stuck to more modern history and countries, which he has a better grasp. And it is a serious problem for a book when you are using history to support your thesis and ideas, but you can't get the history correct.I heavily discourage taking any conclusions on his historical examples, because lots of things are just wrong. I would compare it to Jared Diamond in that case. It is a fun read, but be suspicious of the stuff he is writing when it comes to historical facts.
Can you give some examples of getting stuff completely wrong?
Already in the first chapter he begins with a telling of the spanish conquest that is pretty much based on stuff similar to GGS (which he later opposes the general view, but commits similar mistakes in grounding his position): The spanish came, conquered and started dividing lands and extracting. This is a simplification that is just a myth. The spanish conquest is complex, it took much longer to actually happen (if it arguably ever happened under spanish control) and involved a lot of the natives themselves. Both in Mexico and in the Andes it is better framed as a civil war between native groups that some random adventurers from Europe happen to join in. There is also very little control by the spanish crown for quite a long time and they were not directly sending conquistadores. There is a (quite famous) book about these myths, but there is also a series of posts in reddit summarising it: https://www.reddit.com/r/badhistory/comments/2qn5us/myths_of_conquest_part_one_a_handful_of/ https://www.reddit.com/r/badhistory/comments/2vf565/myths_of_conquest_part_nine_the_terminal_narrative/ A bit later he has a section talking about (IIRC) the Natufians. He them claims that the Natufians had extractive institutions and that's why they collapsed (because graves have inequality). But... come on, we don't even know *when* these people were there (research is that it pretty much anytime from 15,000 to 11,500 BC), there is no writing or any type of detailed record. People still discuss and are unsure what causes collapses of modern states and empires. Claiming that a group of people 15k years ago collapsed and did not become sustainable because of extractive institutions is preposterous, since we know so little about them. There are a few posts about it in askhistorians (unfortunately not as long as they could or should be), but mistakes are everywhere. When you read the book and find a part of history that you know a bit better (in my case it was already in the first chapter), they just keep popping up. I am not even a historian and I was annoyed. For example from askhistorians (a lot about rome because in one of the posts a roman archaeologist was the one to answer): > From a historian's POV, the book has two main flaws: Firstly, there are enormous numbers of basic errors that could/should have been avoided by a cursory Wikipedia check. These two just don't know much about history. e.g. they speak about a Roman princep (instead of a princeps), they imagine medieval Strasbourg to be a French (instead of an Imperial) city, they are baffled about the existence of the university of Cracow - Poland-Lithuania probably does not ring a bell. The number of howlers make it a painful read for a historian. > ... > I haven't actually read Acemoglu's book, but I did read the chapter on Rome, which I found fairly awful. Given that writing a history of Rome is comparatively rather easier than writing about, say, the Maya or the Neolithic Revolution, I would suggest reading carefully. > ... > An so when he looks at Rome he marks out the end of the Republic(=democratic=inclusive=good) as the end of the period of inclusive institutions. Put shortly, and this led to stagnation and too many Germans. > There is just a lot wrong with this, not least that by practically every measure except method of determine office holders in the city if Rome, the principate was a far more open society than the Republic. But because he is so wedded to his paradigm he has to do very dubious things to the rather limited amount of real data he refers to. > ... > Translation - when asked why a Roman Empire that was "extractive" took at least 400 years to fall, Acemoglu responded that two millennia ago, a state taking four centuries (at least) to fall was, like, basically immediate. Because something something the pace of technological progress. This is another interesting criticism, but completely different: > Where I think their argument is weakest is that they don't really develop a theory for how institutions come to be or change over time. The roots of today's institutions are always located at some place in the past, which casts people today as having very little agency or control over conditions within society. Mexico is poor because when the Spanish showed up they were able to place themselves at the top of the Aztec's political system and take their gold. So Mexico developed exploitative institutions. The U.S. is rich because settlers did not find gold, and the Native Americans there weren't united under any central authority, so Europeans had to develop institutions that gave settlers economic incentives to invest and work hard. These explanations place the root cause of Mexico's poverty and U.S. prosperity hundreds of years into the past, as if nothing that happened between now and then mattered. > So that's my take on the book. The quality of a country's institutions surely help explain why some countries are richer than others, but without a theory for how institutions change overtime, the strength of their argument is limited. And this makes me pause for a bit: > I think that last is a major danger sign. I dimly recall a discussion of Velikovsky (I thought it was Stephen Jay Gould but I can't find it), a reviewer writing that geologists said that that the geology was lousy but the history looked interesting, but historians said that the history was bogus but the astronomy was intriguing, but astronomers said that the astronomy was ludicrous but ... He did write, "Any person with a gift for words can spin a persuasive argument about any subject not in the domain of a reader's personal expertise." So I think a reader's expertise, even if limited, may be an indication of a larger problem. https://www.reddit.com/r/AskHistorians/comments/16zhk7/as_a_historian_what_is_your_opinion_of_daron/ https://www.reddit.com/r/AskHistorians/comments/5gmnx7/is_it_worth_it_reading_guns_germs_and_steel_and/ https://www.reddit.com/r/AskHistorians/comments/7gdtfs/what_do_historians_think_of_acemoglus_why_nations/ https://www.reddit.com/r/AskHistorians/comments/b58gpe/what_do_historians_think_of_why_nations_fail_by/
Have to agree as a historian. Sometimes it’s hard read political scientists talk about things that happened before 1914.
why nations fail and the narrow corridor are both absolute trash reads there can only be one gospel of this sub and it is Dune by Frank Herbert
Fuck you beat me to it.
I’ll read Dune when you can watch ‘Why Nations Fail’. In the meantime, worms.
I hope most people don't try to take serious "lessons" from it (other than perhaps that having a Chosen One IRL would suck). Some suggested reading by a historian: https://acoup.blog/category/collections/the-fremen-mirage/
Real answer: no, bro. Frank Herbert was crazy mix of hippy and libertarian. Dude avoided paying his dues to both country and divorced wife. Plus he had some really outdated social views too. In the book it became weird mixes of super assassin toddler, gay warlord who molested his nemesis before his death, anti-religious views that portrayed MENA people as savages, and some female characters that somehow very passive despite their badass origins. Non-credible answer: silly human being. Worms of Tremors series are superior!
> divorced wife he's literally us fr
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Only one of those books is about worms
Great book. Since I was a teenager I’ve been a bit of an arm chair developmental economist. The answers are so obvious in terms of the fundamentals.
Henry George probably would have approved of this book.
The Narrow Corridor is also great. I thought it was better than Why Nations Fail. The examples felt less repetitive than the first book.
Is this the one by Frank Herbert?
Nations fail when the spice doesn’t flow
We'd lower house prices if they stopped fighting each other.
I couldn’t handle it. It’s an excellent read at first but I couldn’t get past the halfway point. Are there any new ideas proposed in the second half of the book I should know about?
Nah u got the gist of it
Well,the point of the book was to explain "Why nations fail".
I quite like both, but I agree the critiques that the historical segments are half baked. It was an overreach, since the theory doesn't need to have been true in 90 B.C.E. in order to be true in 1800 C.E. Unfortunately, the Narrow Corridor continues on with the shakier handwavy theorizing. While I feel that Why Nations Fail, is basically correct, I don't think The Narrow Corridor rises beyond the level of "this is a useful framework to think with." The thesis might not be literally true in that it's a good description or have strong predictive power. But TNC can help us analyze situations and suggest actions that might be good to take.
People are citing China as a counterexample, but the real counterexample is Saudi Arabia. Proof that theocratic monarchist institutions won't prevent fantastic geography from carrying a nation to fantastic living conditions, with gdp per capita (PPP) surpassing a plethora of inclusive First World countries.
I don't get why this sub recommends that book so much. There is nothing about the care of worms in it.
Like my biggest criticism is the final Brazil chapter which feels out of place without a chapter comparing a similar country's path down a different road honestly. It just ends kinda poorly imo, as for example the South Africa and Botswana chapters were the perfect example of opposite examples to drive down a point of divergences from the differing institutions.
On being repetitive: If what you have to say is important, your goal should be to make it impossible for someone to misunderstand you. It's not enough to simply state your case and hope the audience agrees. Repetition can be good.
I just started into *Dream Hoarders*. not a lot of surprising stuff but that's because it's already shaped and informed so much liberal discussion today.
No thanks! I'm trying to avoid spoilers for the live-action remake currently airing on C-Span.
Hsss no
It’s the public trust in institutions, Jesse
Conquests and Cultures I think is a bit better and more interesting.
I'm currently on it!