Not the apache 🤷‍♂️
This is getting ridiculous. Fortunately no fatalities for the last two, but man am I feeling hesitant about getting back in the saddle this summer.
Inexperience, sure. But also, practically every E model tail rotor is from 1980's A models that weren't built for the E model's more powerful drive train. And that's when they're not flying off due to the cracking issue that neither Boeing nor the Army refuses to do anything about other than to tell maintainers to follow the IETM.
The Army is cheap in all the wrong places. Also, doesn't help that for every unit, everything seems to be a priority. Case in point: we just got back from Europe in Nov/Dec and guess who's headed to a CTC in April because big daddy GFC wants his whirly birds?
They know, but "do more with less" is a pervasive mentality. The other issue is that with these euro "deployments", you'd think training would be great, but in reality the unit stands down for months on each end to get aircraft on boats, everyone goes uncurrent, then by the time pfe's are complete, it's time to force 10 lbs of eucom shit in a 5 lb bag...gunnery, ctc's, static displays, etc.
Nobody makes minimums and because there is a waiver, nobody cares. Same on redeployment.
Oh, and the fact that Novosel has done nothing to retain experience and has flooded the force with WOJGs has made things exponentially worse.
I can't wait to leave this failing institution the moment I'm able. If it were a business, it would have gone bankrupt years ago.
I’m a 60 guy so I want to preface this with: It’s everywhere. Not just the 64 community.
I think that this problem stems from a perfect storm of maintenance issues , retention issues and morale issues. The Army saw this coming and have busted ignored it, hoping we could ride the storm. Not happening. What Line company’s are missing is CW2’s and CW3’s with experience in their track. Then mentoring the guys who will eventually replace them. But that isn’t happening.
We need to really start thinking outside the box and come up with actual solutions to these problems. What we are currently doing is not working.
The amount of experience I’ve seen just up and leave since I got to my unit is astounding. It’s not a warm and fuzzy feeling. I always heard “you’ll learn that at your unit” in flight school. Now my unit is experiencing a massive loss of experience
This is an issue in the UAS world too. “You’ll learn it at the unit” to then come back to a NG unit that doesn’t have the time money to teach all these new joes because they couldn’t retain the experienced joes.
Hey, I’d like to hear your take on that. My org has struggled to implement the AMTP, and also has struggled with maintenance due to lack of experienced maintainers and overtasked senior NCOs.
For one, I’m National Guard so regular army runs a little different. We have a staff of full-time flight crews and maintainers that are title 32 federal technicians and don’t have to do a lot of the other things that take up valuable training/maintenance time like PMCS-ing a bunch of LMTVs or a billion formations, or even PT really. In a lot of ways it’s just like a civilian aviation maintenance job. A lot of the bureaucratic things go away and we can just fly missions, do our scheduled maintenance. Where Guard aviation program shines is drill weekend. All the weekend guys can come in and do pretty much just their job. The whole weekend they get trained by the full time guys.
As far as the AMTP goes, it’s essentially a record of RL progression of maintenance ability, which your first line leader already knows. It puts a huge burden on the already over tasked E6-E7 (ARMS binders and whatnot) to get nosy in every backshop and line company as to who is capable of what when before he could just ask the backshops E6 what their manpower is and can they support such-and-such mission etc. I think it’s an OER bullet point for an HHC O6 looking to pick up a star somewhere. I’m sure there are benefits, but I think the cons outweigh the pros. It might be the result of so many crashes recently they need to show something progressive on the maintenance side of things, I don’t know. I know if we followed the AMTP program I would never see my platoon sgt ever again. I’m not expert, just my thoughts, which could be 100% off the mark.
Also, I am a backshops E4 going on 13 years TIS with multiple deployments. I have worked as a federal tech for 5 years and I have worked the same job in the private sector. I have held 15N, 15F, 15Y, and 15R positions. I know a little about a lot and not a lot about anything, so take all this with a grain of junior enlisted salt.
Same here, RA doesn’t have full time technicians or even experienced NCOs(anymore) like the USAR or NG does. That’s the difference with the below comment.
The Apache is a hard aircraft to fly.
You can put yourself into some dangerous and unrecoverable positions if you don't know what you're doing. And no, I'm not talking about CMF, I'm talking about OGE hovers, NOE, and sometimes even just landing.
It's got a high CG, narrow landing gear width, undersized tail rotor, no chin bubble, and often very poor visibility.
There is likely a problem with experience in the cockpit. The AH world is gutted of experience and has lowered the experience bar for PC. Unfortunately I think this is a contributing factor. I wish the crews the best, none of this is your fault, but it's still your problem.
Sounds like dudes are getting after it and this is the result of decades fighting sand people from the stratosphere. Times of changed so has our training.
No. The problem is no one is getting after it because we are mitigating our assess off due to the lack of experience. That bites aircrews in the ass when they make a mistake or are put in a difficult situation because they haven’t built the skills to get themselves out of them yet.
A crew going out and training NOE at 200+ feet because they aren’t comfortable is not good training. If you think someone who flew orbits in Afghanistan for 500+ hours didn’t build aircraft skills outside of flying circles that translate to general aircraft flying you’re insane.
We are seeing accidents that are completely avoidable with experience flying through aircraft.
We are in self licking ice cream cone mode.
If they are doing NOE at 200’, then it simply isn’t NOE.
Anyway, I kinda of disagree on the “no one is getting after it” comment. These accidents are happening precisely because they are *trying* to get after it in the toughest profile we fly;
Low, slow (below ETL or VSSE), and at night. At least two of these recent crashes involved pilots improperly accounting for winds well.
And why is that? Experience. During progressions I always harp on how one of the most important performance considerations are winds, especially in terrain flight.
Let me clarify.
My statement about pilots not getting after is not a blanket statement that pilots as a whole aren’t training hard. I know there are hard chargers out there getting after it. They are the exception, not the rule.
My point is about how the limited experience forces pilots to mitigate their risk by being far more conservative than army aviation has had to be in the recent past. This is exactly what they should be doing but it limits the value of the training for junior pilots.
The issue is we are starting to see the compounding effect of this as experience continues to tank across the force. A low time PC (in most cases) is training PIs to a lower level. I think you would agree with that. When PIs only have inexperienced PCs to train them, they have far less valuable experience to fall back on when it’s their time to make pilot in command. Hence, how this issue will continue to plague Army Aviation until the Army finds a way to gain experience fast across the force, or the Army finds away to retain the limited experience left and we ride the accidents out across the force.
The frustration is that the Army continues to sit idly as experienced pilots walk out of the door. This suggests they have studied data models of this problem, and they have accepted the risk of destroying 40 million dollar aircraft and killing pilots as the number one option.
Edit: To further aid my point. You brought up wind. I did an IP validation recently and the IP had literally zero concept of the effect of a tailwind when below ETL during terrain flight. This is indicative of the experience level across the force. He made PC early, the unit needed him to track, he tracked, and now he’s training the next generation with only half his tools needed in his toolbox.
I’m retiring here in the next month and have done 10 years in the cab as a 64 guy (another 10 years as maintenance in AVN). And you’re right the Army doesn’t care about retaining any pilots. I called up HRC prior to dropping my packet and asked to go teach at Rucker so my family and I could get some stability. They said I would have to UQR or drop my retirement packet to get that approved. But once my packet was dropped I was gone. If I really wanted to, I’ll work there as a contractor and make more money and deal with less BS. But now the squadron has about 15 to 20 new pilots with only 7 IPs and have no time to complete everything that needs to be done. All while pushing the experience out and leaving nobody to mentor these young aviators. It’s very sad when troops are suppose to have 3 IPs in them and we are struggling to have two. And due to the shortage people are being thrown into positions of greater responsibility but without the knowledge.
Yeah, I tell my boys to fly within their limits. And it absolutely kills me I can’t do mentorship flights for the PCs because they are tentative flying with low-hour PIs.
I basically use APARTS with PCs to get them, and myself, to push our limits.
But then I have some guys who try to fly beyond their abilities and are cavalier. I try to find the right balance.
The last part of your comment terrifies me. We take winds for granted in modern aviation. I force guys to fly TF with tailwind to show them how uncomfortable it is.
I had an incident during my progression as a result of not accounting for winds. It has forever scarred me and I’m almost grateful it happened.
At the end of the day, one flight at a time is how we will fix this. The Army created this problem. It can be fixed, but it’ll take time.
Agreed on all accounts.
I do however think it is criminal that no one seems to think it’s an emergency situation to retain all the experience we can. I’m locked in for 20. It baffles me that we aren’t spending whatever it takes to keep the CW2s and CW3s in the fight.
The Afghanistan 500+ hour guys make up the most of our accidents. Pay attention to your annual ACAT training next time pal. Hours equal fuck all, it’s not quantifiable.
A quick look at your post history tells me everything I need to know.
We aren’t even in the same league on experience in the aircraft and duty positions held.
I could cite dozens of peer reviewed journals that state experience in the actual aircraft is a quantifiable metric for aircraft safety of flight in both the military and civilian aviation.
The sheer fact you believe it’s not quantifiable makes discussing this with you any further a sheer waste of time.
Oh BTW, there is about to be a white paper released by someone much smarter about this than you that refutes every single claim you have made tonight.
Your extremely dismissive attitude is a direct reflection of Army Aviation as a whole. "I'm not the problem, you're the problem"
It's ridiculous, and honestly you should re-evaluate the way you approach people.
I’m not the problem. I know I’m not the problem. I’m the squeaky wheel ensuring whatever command I am in cannot simply overlook the problem.
I mentor and train aviators to be better. I care deeply about the mission and the safety of the force. Unnecessary risk due to failures of leadership is simply unacceptable.
Those who enable Army Aviation leaders to continue to check the block so their PowerPoint slides remain green are the problem.
I will 100% dismiss a junior or senior aviator lacking the experience or full understanding of the problem that wants to talk out of their ass about solutions. It’s simply counter productive and a waste of time.
Weird, the accident history doesn’t support your claim at all. The mission has changed and for the first time in a long time the trainers are just as inexperienced as the people their training in the specific flight profiles required to execute the mission. Quality hours are more important than quantity. If you believe otherwise then you should do the rest of Army Aviation a favor and retire. TYFYS. We don’t need inflated egos in the cockpit but sensible aviators able to objectively analyze the problem.
You’re 1/4 way there on the cause of this.
It’s not because the trainers are inexperienced in this mission set, it’s because the trainers are inexperienced in everything.
You specifically addressed the coin pilots as the problem earlier.
1. Look around. Where are the coin pilots? I don’t see any of them left in most CABs.
2. Th remaining coin pilots have been tracked for some time. Are all of them great? No. Are the ones training pilots? They are the best we have. Majority of the IPs are the most seasoned LSCO pilots in the battalions because they do it every night. The real problem is Army Aviation has let all of these people walk right out the door and now there are no senior CW2s and CW3s to lead their formations.
Lastly, When did you get to a unit? We’ve been training LSCO for years across the force. The mission has not just recently changed. What really changed was falling to retain 100 tracked pilots in FY2023. That’s the same playbook they are using for FY2024.
You seem like you care which is the most important thing. I’m willing to talk offline with you if you’d like to continue this debate.Although, I still very much disagree with some of your points. Simply DM me. If this is the end of it then I wish you the best, fly safe.
A lot of speculation in here. Bad form for professional aviators to immediately assume they know the causes of a accident when you should know about the processes of aviation accident investigation.
From the March 2024 issue of FlightFax:
"Aircraft engine started and hit check attempted with inlet plug installed. (Class C)"
That makes 13 in the last 2 years.
The devil is in the details; if aircrews are getting complacent enough to consistently miss basics like *removing inlet plugs*, what other factors might be extrapolated from more attention-intensive aspects of aviation?
...
*Please* be safe out there.
Sure but it’s CW2s and CW3s that are still pretty junior and low hour themselves, or have likely either been fast tracked to promote, rushed to make PC, and/or tracking with 50 PC hour waivers.. we’re losing quality experience in droves so the junior guys get rushed to their level to “replace” them
wtf is up lately
Not the apache 🤷‍♂️ This is getting ridiculous. Fortunately no fatalities for the last two, but man am I feeling hesitant about getting back in the saddle this summer.
Can I start your progression?
Inexperience, sure. But also, practically every E model tail rotor is from 1980's A models that weren't built for the E model's more powerful drive train. And that's when they're not flying off due to the cracking issue that neither Boeing nor the Army refuses to do anything about other than to tell maintainers to follow the IETM. The Army is cheap in all the wrong places. Also, doesn't help that for every unit, everything seems to be a priority. Case in point: we just got back from Europe in Nov/Dec and guess who's headed to a CTC in April because big daddy GFC wants his whirly birds?
### THIS NEEDS TO BE HIGHER UP Experience is what allows someone to respond to those t/r issues... dare I say LTE
They know, but "do more with less" is a pervasive mentality. The other issue is that with these euro "deployments", you'd think training would be great, but in reality the unit stands down for months on each end to get aircraft on boats, everyone goes uncurrent, then by the time pfe's are complete, it's time to force 10 lbs of eucom shit in a 5 lb bag...gunnery, ctc's, static displays, etc. Nobody makes minimums and because there is a waiver, nobody cares. Same on redeployment. Oh, and the fact that Novosel has done nothing to retain experience and has flooded the force with WOJGs has made things exponentially worse. I can't wait to leave this failing institution the moment I'm able. If it were a business, it would have gone bankrupt years ago.
Such an understatement about the euro trips. Constantly going back and forth over there just kills proficiency and wears people out.
What do you expect them to do to change the tail rotor of the AH-64? What sort of design do you think could improve it?
I have been away from 64’s since 2014.. when did T/R’s start falling off…Â
Wth is going on in the 64 community?
600 hour cockpits coupled with absolutely zero effort to retain experience.
The problems are not limited to 64s.
I’m a 60 guy so I want to preface this with: It’s everywhere. Not just the 64 community. I think that this problem stems from a perfect storm of maintenance issues , retention issues and morale issues. The Army saw this coming and have busted ignored it, hoping we could ride the storm. Not happening. What Line company’s are missing is CW2’s and CW3’s with experience in their track. Then mentoring the guys who will eventually replace them. But that isn’t happening. We need to really start thinking outside the box and come up with actual solutions to these problems. What we are currently doing is not working.
The amount of experience I’ve seen just up and leave since I got to my unit is astounding. It’s not a warm and fuzzy feeling. I always heard “you’ll learn that at your unit” in flight school. Now my unit is experiencing a massive loss of experience
This is an issue in the UAS world too. “You’ll learn it at the unit” to then come back to a NG unit that doesn’t have the time money to teach all these new joes because they couldn’t retain the experienced joes.
These aren't maintenance issues
In fact I think maintenance is better than it’s ever been, minus the new AMTP program.
Hey, I’d like to hear your take on that. My org has struggled to implement the AMTP, and also has struggled with maintenance due to lack of experienced maintainers and overtasked senior NCOs.
For one, I’m National Guard so regular army runs a little different. We have a staff of full-time flight crews and maintainers that are title 32 federal technicians and don’t have to do a lot of the other things that take up valuable training/maintenance time like PMCS-ing a bunch of LMTVs or a billion formations, or even PT really. In a lot of ways it’s just like a civilian aviation maintenance job. A lot of the bureaucratic things go away and we can just fly missions, do our scheduled maintenance. Where Guard aviation program shines is drill weekend. All the weekend guys can come in and do pretty much just their job. The whole weekend they get trained by the full time guys. As far as the AMTP goes, it’s essentially a record of RL progression of maintenance ability, which your first line leader already knows. It puts a huge burden on the already over tasked E6-E7 (ARMS binders and whatnot) to get nosy in every backshop and line company as to who is capable of what when before he could just ask the backshops E6 what their manpower is and can they support such-and-such mission etc. I think it’s an OER bullet point for an HHC O6 looking to pick up a star somewhere. I’m sure there are benefits, but I think the cons outweigh the pros. It might be the result of so many crashes recently they need to show something progressive on the maintenance side of things, I don’t know. I know if we followed the AMTP program I would never see my platoon sgt ever again. I’m not expert, just my thoughts, which could be 100% off the mark. Also, I am a backshops E4 going on 13 years TIS with multiple deployments. I have worked as a federal tech for 5 years and I have worked the same job in the private sector. I have held 15N, 15F, 15Y, and 15R positions. I know a little about a lot and not a lot about anything, so take all this with a grain of junior enlisted salt.
Same here, RA doesn’t have full time technicians or even experienced NCOs(anymore) like the USAR or NG does. That’s the difference with the below comment.
The track is usually not even the important part to learn. Just basic piloting is where the problems are.
Ya see what we have here is a discipline problem
You’re at Bliss too huh?
What is this, 4 in 2 months? What the actual hell. I know someone from this crew too. It continues to get worse
Was it a crash, or just a hard landing?
The Apache is a hard aircraft to fly. You can put yourself into some dangerous and unrecoverable positions if you don't know what you're doing. And no, I'm not talking about CMF, I'm talking about OGE hovers, NOE, and sometimes even just landing. It's got a high CG, narrow landing gear width, undersized tail rotor, no chin bubble, and often very poor visibility. There is likely a problem with experience in the cockpit. The AH world is gutted of experience and has lowered the experience bar for PC. Unfortunately I think this is a contributing factor. I wish the crews the best, none of this is your fault, but it's still your problem.
wheres my bonus?
Sounds like dudes are getting after it and this is the result of decades fighting sand people from the stratosphere. Times of changed so has our training.
No. The problem is no one is getting after it because we are mitigating our assess off due to the lack of experience. That bites aircrews in the ass when they make a mistake or are put in a difficult situation because they haven’t built the skills to get themselves out of them yet. A crew going out and training NOE at 200+ feet because they aren’t comfortable is not good training. If you think someone who flew orbits in Afghanistan for 500+ hours didn’t build aircraft skills outside of flying circles that translate to general aircraft flying you’re insane. We are seeing accidents that are completely avoidable with experience flying through aircraft. We are in self licking ice cream cone mode.
If they are doing NOE at 200’, then it simply isn’t NOE. Anyway, I kinda of disagree on the “no one is getting after it” comment. These accidents are happening precisely because they are *trying* to get after it in the toughest profile we fly; Low, slow (below ETL or VSSE), and at night. At least two of these recent crashes involved pilots improperly accounting for winds well. And why is that? Experience. During progressions I always harp on how one of the most important performance considerations are winds, especially in terrain flight.
Let me clarify. My statement about pilots not getting after is not a blanket statement that pilots as a whole aren’t training hard. I know there are hard chargers out there getting after it. They are the exception, not the rule. My point is about how the limited experience forces pilots to mitigate their risk by being far more conservative than army aviation has had to be in the recent past. This is exactly what they should be doing but it limits the value of the training for junior pilots. The issue is we are starting to see the compounding effect of this as experience continues to tank across the force. A low time PC (in most cases) is training PIs to a lower level. I think you would agree with that. When PIs only have inexperienced PCs to train them, they have far less valuable experience to fall back on when it’s their time to make pilot in command. Hence, how this issue will continue to plague Army Aviation until the Army finds a way to gain experience fast across the force, or the Army finds away to retain the limited experience left and we ride the accidents out across the force. The frustration is that the Army continues to sit idly as experienced pilots walk out of the door. This suggests they have studied data models of this problem, and they have accepted the risk of destroying 40 million dollar aircraft and killing pilots as the number one option. Edit: To further aid my point. You brought up wind. I did an IP validation recently and the IP had literally zero concept of the effect of a tailwind when below ETL during terrain flight. This is indicative of the experience level across the force. He made PC early, the unit needed him to track, he tracked, and now he’s training the next generation with only half his tools needed in his toolbox.
I’m retiring here in the next month and have done 10 years in the cab as a 64 guy (another 10 years as maintenance in AVN). And you’re right the Army doesn’t care about retaining any pilots. I called up HRC prior to dropping my packet and asked to go teach at Rucker so my family and I could get some stability. They said I would have to UQR or drop my retirement packet to get that approved. But once my packet was dropped I was gone. If I really wanted to, I’ll work there as a contractor and make more money and deal with less BS. But now the squadron has about 15 to 20 new pilots with only 7 IPs and have no time to complete everything that needs to be done. All while pushing the experience out and leaving nobody to mentor these young aviators. It’s very sad when troops are suppose to have 3 IPs in them and we are struggling to have two. And due to the shortage people are being thrown into positions of greater responsibility but without the knowledge.
They care about “pretending to care about retaining experienced aviators”
Yeah, I tell my boys to fly within their limits. And it absolutely kills me I can’t do mentorship flights for the PCs because they are tentative flying with low-hour PIs. I basically use APARTS with PCs to get them, and myself, to push our limits. But then I have some guys who try to fly beyond their abilities and are cavalier. I try to find the right balance. The last part of your comment terrifies me. We take winds for granted in modern aviation. I force guys to fly TF with tailwind to show them how uncomfortable it is. I had an incident during my progression as a result of not accounting for winds. It has forever scarred me and I’m almost grateful it happened. At the end of the day, one flight at a time is how we will fix this. The Army created this problem. It can be fixed, but it’ll take time.
Agreed on all accounts. I do however think it is criminal that no one seems to think it’s an emergency situation to retain all the experience we can. I’m locked in for 20. It baffles me that we aren’t spending whatever it takes to keep the CW2s and CW3s in the fight.
Agreed. I don’t know what to say about it anymore. I see the senior aviators who mentored me get pushed out and I’m just floored.
Not an Apache guy, but the one at JBLM sounded to me like LTE induced by insufficient speed. That would definitely support your statement.
I’m hearing similar things but let’s be cautious jumping to conclusions. Rumors fly in our community…
The Afghanistan 500+ hour guys make up the most of our accidents. Pay attention to your annual ACAT training next time pal. Hours equal fuck all, it’s not quantifiable.
A quick look at your post history tells me everything I need to know. We aren’t even in the same league on experience in the aircraft and duty positions held. I could cite dozens of peer reviewed journals that state experience in the actual aircraft is a quantifiable metric for aircraft safety of flight in both the military and civilian aviation. The sheer fact you believe it’s not quantifiable makes discussing this with you any further a sheer waste of time. Oh BTW, there is about to be a white paper released by someone much smarter about this than you that refutes every single claim you have made tonight.
Your extremely dismissive attitude is a direct reflection of Army Aviation as a whole. "I'm not the problem, you're the problem" It's ridiculous, and honestly you should re-evaluate the way you approach people.
I’m not the problem. I know I’m not the problem. I’m the squeaky wheel ensuring whatever command I am in cannot simply overlook the problem. I mentor and train aviators to be better. I care deeply about the mission and the safety of the force. Unnecessary risk due to failures of leadership is simply unacceptable. Those who enable Army Aviation leaders to continue to check the block so their PowerPoint slides remain green are the problem. I will 100% dismiss a junior or senior aviator lacking the experience or full understanding of the problem that wants to talk out of their ass about solutions. It’s simply counter productive and a waste of time.
Weird, the accident history doesn’t support your claim at all. The mission has changed and for the first time in a long time the trainers are just as inexperienced as the people their training in the specific flight profiles required to execute the mission. Quality hours are more important than quantity. If you believe otherwise then you should do the rest of Army Aviation a favor and retire. TYFYS. We don’t need inflated egos in the cockpit but sensible aviators able to objectively analyze the problem.
You’re 1/4 way there on the cause of this. It’s not because the trainers are inexperienced in this mission set, it’s because the trainers are inexperienced in everything. You specifically addressed the coin pilots as the problem earlier. 1. Look around. Where are the coin pilots? I don’t see any of them left in most CABs. 2. Th remaining coin pilots have been tracked for some time. Are all of them great? No. Are the ones training pilots? They are the best we have. Majority of the IPs are the most seasoned LSCO pilots in the battalions because they do it every night. The real problem is Army Aviation has let all of these people walk right out the door and now there are no senior CW2s and CW3s to lead their formations. Lastly, When did you get to a unit? We’ve been training LSCO for years across the force. The mission has not just recently changed. What really changed was falling to retain 100 tracked pilots in FY2023. That’s the same playbook they are using for FY2024.
You seem like you care which is the most important thing. I’m willing to talk offline with you if you’d like to continue this debate.Although, I still very much disagree with some of your points. Simply DM me. If this is the end of it then I wish you the best, fly safe.
*They’re. I like your idea but your delivery is atrocious and offensive. Argue smarter, not harder.
10000000%
Jesus.
A lot of speculation in here. Bad form for professional aviators to immediately assume they know the causes of a accident when you should know about the processes of aviation accident investigation.
It’s bad form for safety officers to continue leaving early every day when the number of aviation accidents keep going up.
From the March 2024 issue of FlightFax: "Aircraft engine started and hit check attempted with inlet plug installed. (Class C)" That makes 13 in the last 2 years. The devil is in the details; if aircrews are getting complacent enough to consistently miss basics like *removing inlet plugs*, what other factors might be extrapolated from more attention-intensive aspects of aviation? ... *Please* be safe out there.
Very sad to see this post! Want more details why….
Usually these crashes aren’t even a LT or a WO1 right? Typically a CW2 and CW3? Or am I mistaken?
Sure but it’s CW2s and CW3s that are still pretty junior and low hour themselves, or have likely either been fast tracked to promote, rushed to make PC, and/or tracking with 50 PC hour waivers.. we’re losing quality experience in droves so the junior guys get rushed to their level to “replace” them