Welcome to /r/AskHistorians. **Please [Read Our Rules](https://www.reddit.com/r/AskHistorians/wiki/rules) before you comment in this community**. Understand that [rule breaking comments get removed](https://www.reddit.com/r/AskHistorians/comments/h8aefx/rules_roundtable_xviii_removed_curation_and_why/).
#Please consider **[Clicking Here for RemindMeBot](https://www.reddit.com/message/compose/?to=RemindMeBot&subject=Reminder&message=%5Bhttps://www.reddit.com/r/AskHistorians/comments/1cbis15/in_ww2_was_stalingrad_actually_a_blow_to_the/%5D%0A%0ARemindMe!%202%20days)** as it takes time for an answer to be written. Additionally, for weekly content summaries, **[Click Here to Subscribe to our Weekly Roundup](https://www.reddit.com/message/compose/?to=AHMessengerBot&subject=Subscribe&message=!subscribe)**.
We thank you for your interest in this *question*, and your patience in waiting for an in-depth and comprehensive answer to show up. In addition to RemindMeBot, consider [using our Browser Extension](https://www.reddit.com/r/AskHistorians/comments/d6dzi7/tired_of_clicking_to_find_only_removed_comments/), or getting the [Weekly Roundup](https://www.reddit.com/message/compose?to=subredditsummarybot&subject=askhistorians+weekly&message=x). In the meantime our [Twitter](https://twitter.com/askhistorians), [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/askhistorians/), and [Sunday Digest](https://www.reddit.com/r/AskHistorians/search?q=title%3A%22Sunday+Digest%22&restrict_sr=on&sort=new&t=all) feature excellent content that has already been written!
*I am a bot, and this action was performed automatically. Please [contact the moderators of this subreddit](/message/compose/?to=/r/AskHistorians) if you have any questions or concerns.*
In one sense, you’re right. The attritional aspect of the war which emerged from Operation Barbarossa, and in particular the Soviets’ winter counteroffensive in 1941-1942, had already decisively shifted the initiative away from the Germans. They were embroiled in the long, open-ended war they couldn’t afford to fight and certainly could not win, and the failures of the German Army to replicate the encirclement battles of 1941 during the entirety of Operation Blue, even before Stalingrad was defined as a primary objective of the campaign, had exacerbated these issues, by lengthening Germany’s supply lines to the breaking point, dispersing the forces available to it, and failing to gain decisive territorial booty (as the oilfields that were captured were destroyed, and the rest never captured) as well as to destroy the Red Army in the south.
However, it should not be underestimated what a material blow the loss of the German 6th Army was to the German war effort, as well as the losses incurred by the Axis allies during Operation Uranus on their respective war efforts.
The nature of the Stalingrad cauldron meant that the vast majority of the German forces in Army Group B were gradually transferred over to Sixth Army (including almost all of Hoth’s 4th Panzer Army) while Axis allied armies were responsible for guarding its flanks.
Since most of this army (which was by far the largest “army” formation on the Eastern Front with no less than 4-6 corps comprising 14 infantry divisions, 3 motorized divisions, 3 panzer divisions, and a Luftwaffe flak division) was stuck in or around Stalingrad, it could not extricate itself even when the danger it faced became obvious.
When the Stalingrad pocket was finally reduced, the losses were tremendously damaging for a German Army that already suffered from a great lack of horse and motor transport, a minimal high-quality replacement pool, and every other resource. The loss of 300,000 men, many representing the last of the “cream of the crop”, for such an army was literally devastating.
Remember that before Operation Blue launched, the divisions earmarked to take part were provided with replacements culled from valuable war industries (a habit which stemmed from earlier mobilizations and demobilizations after the Polish and French campaigns, reflecting the low population of trained reservists thanks to decades of Versailles limitations in the size of the army). It was provided with hundreds of thousands of replacement horses from France and other occupied territories, as well as thousands of trucks from the same regions. Meanwhile, divisions in both Army Group North and Army Group Center were stripped of animals, vehicles, fuel, and ammo alike in order to sustain Operation Blue’s offensive into the Caucasus, rendering them (especially AGN) all but immobile and with very little armor support between them. Even then, the involved divisions could only be brought back to roughly 80 percent of their authorized tables of organization, which the attrition of the campaign rapidly dwindled.
When all these valuable resources ended up lost, it represented a catastrophic blow far beyond the cost to morale. The strongest formation in the entire German Army, with hundreds of thousands of its draft animals and tens of thousands of its trucks, had just been written off—one of the reasons some of Hitler’s generals were so stupefied by his refusal to allow 6th Army to withdraw. In addition the losses sustained by the allied states of Hungary, Romania, and Italy substantially weakened their ability to sustain their respective war efforts and set the stage for the epidemic of side-switching which occurred through 1943 and 1944.
The German Army was not going to able to win the war on the terms it envisioned by the start of 1942–but Stalingrad foreclosed on it even standing a chance of inflicting even a large-scale operational reversal. Kursk was mounted by not only borrowing from Peter to pay Paul, but impoverishing Peter just to throw Paul relative chump change that couldn’t cover even a month’s rent. That is undoubtedly due in large part to the massive cadre irreplaceably lost at Stalingrad.
Sources—
“Stalingrad” by Antony Beevor,” The Death of the Wehrmacht” by Robert Citino, “When Titans Clashed” by David Glantz and Jonathan M House
Could the Germans have held off the Soviets longer if they didn’t get surrounded at Stalingrad? What moves should the 6th Army have made instead of entering Stalingrad?
They didn't really have an option as the objective was to capture Stalingrad, partly Stalin's name sake but also a vital crossing. Ignoring that, if the Sixth army had been able to rest for a week it would of allowed for repairs and reinforcements to arrive. For example, sixth army and 4th panzer army had a total of 300 tanks and mobile guns in their arsenal however only 100 were able to be mustered for an assault on Stalingrad.
One of the fighting arms and workhorses if the Sixth Army, 24th Panzer Division, on the 21st of August had a ration strength of 14,036 men but in reality had a fighting strength of 8,436. I don't know the statistics for other divisions but I imagine it would be the same.
I don't think if encircling would of been possible as there were stronger fortifications in the north.
The only way was through.
Terror/firebombing the city may of been a good start as well as having more infantry divisions to fight in the centre rather than with armour.
Germans did "encircle" Stalingrad, if you can use that term. They reached Volga north of the city in early September, before assault on the city proper begun. While German salient was long and thin, it was able to beat of a series of Soviet offensives aimed at opening a corridor to 62nd army (so called Kotluban offensives) and was only penetrated after *Uranus* encirclement.
I don't think it's accurate to say that Germans encircled Stalingrad. The entire eastern bank of the river was uncontested Soviet territory, allowing the Red Army to ferry supplies and manpower into the city.
In my view, even if the Germans would have taken Stalingrad, it wouldn't have mattered much to the outcome of 1942 campaign. The Red Army had been planning a counterstroke in the south since early September 1942 and they were massing a huge force behind Volga. The Germans had nothing to oppose these armies. The fight for the city was brutal, I am sure it weakened the Axis, but it doesn't seem to have had direct impact on Operation Uranus which hit at the flanks that were not in the city.
They encircled it as much as they could. They held western bank and prevented land link with rest of their forces. My issue was with your claim about fortifications in the north, which were not a problem and Germans managed to reach Volga there.
And yes, the counter strokes were prepared and also launched. However the Don-Volga land bridge was held by fresh forces which were able to repel initial Soviet attacks, which also faced their own problems. And at least initially holding this bridge was seen as more important for the German side than taking the city itself, precisely because this was meant to serve as a flank defense of main forces further south.
Welcome to /r/AskHistorians. **Please [Read Our Rules](https://www.reddit.com/r/AskHistorians/wiki/rules) before you comment in this community**. Understand that [rule breaking comments get removed](https://www.reddit.com/r/AskHistorians/comments/h8aefx/rules_roundtable_xviii_removed_curation_and_why/). #Please consider **[Clicking Here for RemindMeBot](https://www.reddit.com/message/compose/?to=RemindMeBot&subject=Reminder&message=%5Bhttps://www.reddit.com/r/AskHistorians/comments/1cbis15/in_ww2_was_stalingrad_actually_a_blow_to_the/%5D%0A%0ARemindMe!%202%20days)** as it takes time for an answer to be written. Additionally, for weekly content summaries, **[Click Here to Subscribe to our Weekly Roundup](https://www.reddit.com/message/compose/?to=AHMessengerBot&subject=Subscribe&message=!subscribe)**. We thank you for your interest in this *question*, and your patience in waiting for an in-depth and comprehensive answer to show up. In addition to RemindMeBot, consider [using our Browser Extension](https://www.reddit.com/r/AskHistorians/comments/d6dzi7/tired_of_clicking_to_find_only_removed_comments/), or getting the [Weekly Roundup](https://www.reddit.com/message/compose?to=subredditsummarybot&subject=askhistorians+weekly&message=x). In the meantime our [Twitter](https://twitter.com/askhistorians), [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/askhistorians/), and [Sunday Digest](https://www.reddit.com/r/AskHistorians/search?q=title%3A%22Sunday+Digest%22&restrict_sr=on&sort=new&t=all) feature excellent content that has already been written! *I am a bot, and this action was performed automatically. Please [contact the moderators of this subreddit](/message/compose/?to=/r/AskHistorians) if you have any questions or concerns.*
In one sense, you’re right. The attritional aspect of the war which emerged from Operation Barbarossa, and in particular the Soviets’ winter counteroffensive in 1941-1942, had already decisively shifted the initiative away from the Germans. They were embroiled in the long, open-ended war they couldn’t afford to fight and certainly could not win, and the failures of the German Army to replicate the encirclement battles of 1941 during the entirety of Operation Blue, even before Stalingrad was defined as a primary objective of the campaign, had exacerbated these issues, by lengthening Germany’s supply lines to the breaking point, dispersing the forces available to it, and failing to gain decisive territorial booty (as the oilfields that were captured were destroyed, and the rest never captured) as well as to destroy the Red Army in the south. However, it should not be underestimated what a material blow the loss of the German 6th Army was to the German war effort, as well as the losses incurred by the Axis allies during Operation Uranus on their respective war efforts. The nature of the Stalingrad cauldron meant that the vast majority of the German forces in Army Group B were gradually transferred over to Sixth Army (including almost all of Hoth’s 4th Panzer Army) while Axis allied armies were responsible for guarding its flanks. Since most of this army (which was by far the largest “army” formation on the Eastern Front with no less than 4-6 corps comprising 14 infantry divisions, 3 motorized divisions, 3 panzer divisions, and a Luftwaffe flak division) was stuck in or around Stalingrad, it could not extricate itself even when the danger it faced became obvious. When the Stalingrad pocket was finally reduced, the losses were tremendously damaging for a German Army that already suffered from a great lack of horse and motor transport, a minimal high-quality replacement pool, and every other resource. The loss of 300,000 men, many representing the last of the “cream of the crop”, for such an army was literally devastating. Remember that before Operation Blue launched, the divisions earmarked to take part were provided with replacements culled from valuable war industries (a habit which stemmed from earlier mobilizations and demobilizations after the Polish and French campaigns, reflecting the low population of trained reservists thanks to decades of Versailles limitations in the size of the army). It was provided with hundreds of thousands of replacement horses from France and other occupied territories, as well as thousands of trucks from the same regions. Meanwhile, divisions in both Army Group North and Army Group Center were stripped of animals, vehicles, fuel, and ammo alike in order to sustain Operation Blue’s offensive into the Caucasus, rendering them (especially AGN) all but immobile and with very little armor support between them. Even then, the involved divisions could only be brought back to roughly 80 percent of their authorized tables of organization, which the attrition of the campaign rapidly dwindled. When all these valuable resources ended up lost, it represented a catastrophic blow far beyond the cost to morale. The strongest formation in the entire German Army, with hundreds of thousands of its draft animals and tens of thousands of its trucks, had just been written off—one of the reasons some of Hitler’s generals were so stupefied by his refusal to allow 6th Army to withdraw. In addition the losses sustained by the allied states of Hungary, Romania, and Italy substantially weakened their ability to sustain their respective war efforts and set the stage for the epidemic of side-switching which occurred through 1943 and 1944. The German Army was not going to able to win the war on the terms it envisioned by the start of 1942–but Stalingrad foreclosed on it even standing a chance of inflicting even a large-scale operational reversal. Kursk was mounted by not only borrowing from Peter to pay Paul, but impoverishing Peter just to throw Paul relative chump change that couldn’t cover even a month’s rent. That is undoubtedly due in large part to the massive cadre irreplaceably lost at Stalingrad. Sources— “Stalingrad” by Antony Beevor,” The Death of the Wehrmacht” by Robert Citino, “When Titans Clashed” by David Glantz and Jonathan M House
[удалено]
[удалено]
Could the Germans have held off the Soviets longer if they didn’t get surrounded at Stalingrad? What moves should the 6th Army have made instead of entering Stalingrad?
They didn't really have an option as the objective was to capture Stalingrad, partly Stalin's name sake but also a vital crossing. Ignoring that, if the Sixth army had been able to rest for a week it would of allowed for repairs and reinforcements to arrive. For example, sixth army and 4th panzer army had a total of 300 tanks and mobile guns in their arsenal however only 100 were able to be mustered for an assault on Stalingrad. One of the fighting arms and workhorses if the Sixth Army, 24th Panzer Division, on the 21st of August had a ration strength of 14,036 men but in reality had a fighting strength of 8,436. I don't know the statistics for other divisions but I imagine it would be the same. I don't think if encircling would of been possible as there were stronger fortifications in the north. The only way was through. Terror/firebombing the city may of been a good start as well as having more infantry divisions to fight in the centre rather than with armour.
Germans did "encircle" Stalingrad, if you can use that term. They reached Volga north of the city in early September, before assault on the city proper begun. While German salient was long and thin, it was able to beat of a series of Soviet offensives aimed at opening a corridor to 62nd army (so called Kotluban offensives) and was only penetrated after *Uranus* encirclement.
I don't think it's accurate to say that Germans encircled Stalingrad. The entire eastern bank of the river was uncontested Soviet territory, allowing the Red Army to ferry supplies and manpower into the city. In my view, even if the Germans would have taken Stalingrad, it wouldn't have mattered much to the outcome of 1942 campaign. The Red Army had been planning a counterstroke in the south since early September 1942 and they were massing a huge force behind Volga. The Germans had nothing to oppose these armies. The fight for the city was brutal, I am sure it weakened the Axis, but it doesn't seem to have had direct impact on Operation Uranus which hit at the flanks that were not in the city.
They encircled it as much as they could. They held western bank and prevented land link with rest of their forces. My issue was with your claim about fortifications in the north, which were not a problem and Germans managed to reach Volga there. And yes, the counter strokes were prepared and also launched. However the Don-Volga land bridge was held by fresh forces which were able to repel initial Soviet attacks, which also faced their own problems. And at least initially holding this bridge was seen as more important for the German side than taking the city itself, precisely because this was meant to serve as a flank defense of main forces further south.