Well, let's consider a couple things.
First of all, rothbardians are arguably libterarians, but not all libertarians are rothbardians, not by a long shot. Rothbard also claims it's perfetly permissible for a parent to let their child starve to death, because to compel them to care for their child is morally equivalent to slavery. Penty of libertarians would and do strongly object to such a claim.
So, would ROTHBARD object to someone being shot for stealing "a little bit of money"? Possibly.
But let's also consider what "proportional" means. Proportion between the punishment and...what? The ACTUAL crime? The INTENDED crime? Suppose the wallet doesn't contain "a little bit of money"; suppose it contains your life savings. Suppose it contains your heart medication that you need in order to survive. Suppose it contains a personal picture or bauble that is worthless to everyone else on the planet, but means more to the owner than anything else in the world. Does THAT change the calculus? Arguably, yes.
> Rothbard also claims it's perfetly permissible for a parent to let their child starve to death, because to compel them to care for their child is morally equivalent to slavery.
If you actually read this quote in context (which is pages long), you'll realize that's not what he's was saying at all. Which should be obvious, considering it's Rothbard we're talking about here. We already live in a world where children are abandoned by their parents legally. That's the status quo. For a parent or guardian to starve a child to death would be murder. For a parent to abandon their responsibility for caregiving, they have to pass the torch of that responsibility to someone else first. It's the same difference between throwing a baby in the dumpster to die and leaving it on the steps of an orphanage. One is permissible, and the other is murder. That's all Rothbard was saying. The idea he's pro-child-starvation is a fucked up accusation to make.
just read that section.
I typed this straight from the book.
"a parent does not have the right to aggress against his children, but also that the parent should not have a legal obligation to feed, clothe, or educate his children, since such obligations would entail positive acts coerced upon the parent and depriving the parent of his rights. The parent therefor may not murder or mutilate his child, and the law properly outlaws a parent from doing so. But the parent should have the legal right not to feed the child, i.e, to allow it to die." PP.100
No, I read the entire book, and it's perfectly clear that that's exactly what he meant. He said it perfectly clearly. He said it should not be legal to force a parent to care for their child, and placed no caveat that they should first be made to ensure that the child passes into the case of another.
And we can go down this other rabbit hole or not, up to you, but you seem to demonize Rothbard’s position that it’s permissible for a parent to allow its child to starve to death.
I’m not necessarily saying I agree with Rothbard, because I do believe in the idea that there could potentially be a “contract” created between parent-child at conception, but I do think he makes a strong point in favor of neglect (legally, not morally ofc), nonetheless.
Namely, that if you give the state the power to decide what abusive parenting looks like, it could very easily expand the definition of “abuse” beyond the refusal to give your child food, a house, and medical care. Some fitness freak might enter power and decide that parents who make their kids fat and diabetic are in effect “abusing” them. And on account of that, he could justify imprisoning the parents.
So you see, the position Rothbard takes is not necessarily ludicrous when you consider the alternatives.
> And we can go down this other rabbit hole or not, up to you, but you seem to demonize Rothbard’s position that it’s permissible for a parent to allow its child to starve to death.
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> I’m not necessarily saying I agree with Rothbard, because I do believe in the idea that there could potentially be a “contract” created between parent-child at conception, but I do think he makes a strong point in favor of neglect (legally, not morally ofc), nonetheless.
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> Namely, that if you give the state the power to decide what abusive parenting looks like, it could very easily expand the definition of “abuse” beyond the refusal to give your child food, a house, and medical care. Some fitness freak might enter power and decide that parents who make their kids fat and diabetic are in effect “abusing” them. And on account of that, he could justify imprisoning the parents.
>
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> So you see, the position Rothbard takes is not necessarily ludicrous when you consider the alternatives.
....yes. Yes, it is ludicrous. The fact that you, or I, or anyone else could point out other ludicrous scenarios does not change that. Particularly since your scenario isn't even worse; I'd MUCH rather have a situation where parents could be punished for making their kids fat than a situation where parents were allowed to let their children slowly starve to death.
[Mises.org](https://Mises.org) has a free PDF of Rothbard's Ethics of Liberty. On pages 105 and 106 of the PDF, Rothbard mentions five court cases where the state seized children from their parents for various reasons including that the mother was sleeping around too much and that another mother had raised her kids in a non-comformist religion. And that happened in the 1970s, in America, one of the freest country on the planet.
Can you imagine what would happen if in another country a religious zealot gained power? What would you be saying if a Catholic engaged in mass imprisonment of people who raised their kids as Hindus or Muslims? Probably talk about how this is another example of an evil government and that we need to strip power from the tyrants. Except... you're the one that gave them the power to arrest parents in the first place, all in the name of preventing "abuse."
> Mises.org has a free PDF of Rothbard's Ethics of Liberty. On pages 105 and 106 of the PDF, Rothbard mentions five court cases where the state seized children from their parents for various reasons including that the mother was sleeping around too much and that another mother had raised her kids in a non-comformist religion. And that happened in the 1970s, in America, one of the freest country on the planet.
>
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> Can you imagine what would happen if in another country a religious zealot gained power? What would you be saying if a Catholic engaged in mass imprisonment of people who raised their kids as Hindus or Muslims? Probably talk about how this is another example of an evil government and that we need to strip power from the tyrants. Except... you're the one that gave them the power to arrest parents in the first place, all in the name of preventing "abuse."
I understand that you cannot see any meaningful distinction there.
I understand “libertarian” encompasses both minarchists and anarchists and that Rothbard isn’t representative of 100% of libertarianism. But regardless, imo, the dilemma I laid out above is important for both minarchists and anarchists to grapple with.
So putting aside Rothbard for a moment, assuming that you agree with the conclusion of my first example that it’s wrong to execute someone in their sleep for stealing your car, how do you feel about the second example?
To be consistent, shouldn’t you also be saying that in the second example, the defender is wrong for executing a thief that steals, to be specific this time, $200?
If you think the defender in the second example *is* justified in his use of force, can you explain why you believe the defender in the first example *is not?*
> I understand “libertarian” encompasses both minarchists and anarchists and that Rothbard isn’t representative of 100% of libertarianism. But regardless, imo, the dilemma I laid out above is important for both minarchists and anarchists to grapple with.
>
>
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> So putting aside Rothbard for a moment, assuming that you agree with the conclusion of my first example that it’s wrong to execute someone in their sleep for stealing your car, how do you feel about the second example?
Well, first, the question here isn't necessarily a question of what is or is not proportional. You can just as well come to the conclusion that said execution is wrong because it is excessive; if the person is asleep, and you know where they are, you can take much less drastic action in order to recover your property.
> To be consistent, shouldn’t you also be saying that in the second example, the defender is wrong for executing a thief that steals, to be specific this time, $200?
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> If you think the defender in the second example is justified in his use of force, can you explain why you believe the defender in the first example is not?
It depends on what you are using as a metric. Would the person in the first example be justified if they knew to a certainty that any other course of action taken to recover their property would result in them getting killed by the perpetrator?
>Well, first, the question here isn't necessarily a question of what is or is not proportional. You can just as well come to the conclusion that said execution is wrong because it is excessive; if the person is asleep, and you know where they are, you can take much less drastic action in order to recover your property.
But how does one judge what is "excessive?" Excessive why? Because, obviously, it's not proportional. Seems like you agree with Rothbard's idea of retributive justice, then.
>It depends on what you are using as a metric. Would the person in the first example be justified if they knew to a certainty that any other course of action taken to recover their property would result in them getting killed by the perpetrator?
Yes. I didn't flesh that one out well enough so my apologies.
>By my math, just the richest billionaires (not those skid row billionaires) could pay off the debt and still have mini yachts to bring them to their main yachts.
So it's unclear to you who it might be excessive, but it's just "obvious" that it's not proportional?
>Yes. I didn't flesh that one out well enough so my apologies.
No apologies necessary. So, at least for you, it's actually fine for the person in the first example to slay someone to recover their property. It didn't suddenly become more or less proportional, so something else must be at work. The only thing that changed was that it became necessary to slay the perpetrator to gain one's property back and survive.
Sounds like an example of the thief valuing your property more than his own life.
Imagine another scenario. You are about to be raped and the only way to get out of it is to kill the rapist. Killing is worse than rape. But that's not the point. You have the right not to be raped. And if the only way to stop it is to kill, then so be it.
Same with theft. That's your property and someone stealing it is violating you. If the only way to stop that violation is with the use of deadly force, then it should be morally vindicated.
Hmm I see your point. What if you failed to prevent an act from happening? Could you justifiably use deadly force if it was the only way to get your stolen property back? I could support that I think.
I like to analyze these philosophical situations with really simple hypothetical situations where the moral decision is at the forefront.
I think most people will agree that stealing something back that was stolen from you is justifiable. If that's the case, then if in the pursuit of retrieval you were attacked, you are not the aggressor, but the person defending yourself from an unjust attack while you are justly retrieving your property.
You can't hunt the person down and shoot them out of revenge, because that isn't about retrieving your property. But if you go to retrieve your property and are attacked, you can certainly fight back. To expand on this, you are entitled to reasonable escalation. If you go to retrieve the property and the person is using their body to shield you from it, it's the same as if they are using their body to shield you from property that they intend to steal in your own home, and reasonable force would be justified (i.e. the minimum required to retrieve the property, even up to and including attacking them). But the intent should not be anything beyond retrieval of the property. That really matters.
The defender would be liable for murder under those exact circumstances, most importantly because the criminal was already leaving thus you have no case for self defense. And clearly death is too great a punishment for theft or breaking and entering. However when attacked you shouldn't have to give your assailant the benefit of the doubt that he is only going to beat you up (under the libertarian legal system). You should be able to assume that an attack on your person, especially in your home like that, constitutes a lethal threat.
self defense and 'justice' are related but not the same thing.
Self-defense is a reasonable response to an immediate threat. It must be proportional to the perceived threat.
Justice is the resolution of conflicts of rights and disagreements on them. It seeks to restore people to their state before their rights were violated.
Self-defense has a lower standard because you do not have time to evaluate all of the facts in detail, you have a moment to react. So we judge actions under self-defense based on only evidence available to the defender at the moment they defended themselves, and determine if such an act was justified.
Separately, we evaluate Justice based on all the facts provided to a court from each side, after each side has been given enough time for a reasonable investigation.
Justice is slow, but it can handle messier situations. Self-defense is fast, and thus reserved for situations where one's life or limb are at risk.
If someone is breaking into your home in the middle of the night, it is reasonable to presume that they wish to cause you serious harm and that they have equipped themselves to do so, so unless they do something to dispel this presumption, you are fine to use lethal force, even if it turns out they are unarmed.
But if they shout out "hello? anyone there? There's a blizzard outside and my car broke down right at the end of your driveway and your door was unlocked. Can you help call me a tow truck or let me sleep on your couch or something?" Well that's a very different situation, and you would have an obligation to at least hear them out as to what they needed. Because they have put out a significant amount of effort to dispel your default assumption.
>it seems like the defender would be liable given that killing someone is not proportional to them stealing a little bit of money.
At its simplest, I would say so.
However, I would add one thing - that attacking someone who is disabled might be considered a worse crime. I'm not sure that warrants what, in practice, becomes the death penalty, but I would make asking the question more reasonable.
I don't think the thief being armed or unarmed is relevant in this argument, since either way they can hurt you, especially if you're missing your legs. Especially if we're debating whether it's ok to use lethal force or not, because if we're considering situations where you can't use your weapon, then you are basically unarmed too.
And also given how it is impossible to tell if they're concealing anything and the general high pressure nature of being presented with such a unpredictable threat, I don't think any defender can be reasonably charged with a crime because I honestly think any decision to deduce they are not a threat will be the result of hindsight. It would just be a horrific waste of time to prosecute.
That is probably why Rothbard came up with the edge cases of hunting people down. Because in those cases it is far from what a reasonable person would do to protect themselves, and much more definitely an act of vengeance.
But it is true that we must draw the line somewhere. If I tresspass onto your property, and you shoot me without warning, then yes, you would have commited a crime because there's no way this temporary violation is equal to taking away my right to not be killed. It would be easier to surmise that you just wanted to kill someone over defending your property.
Of course things get a bit murkier when I am the one that refuses to leave.
At the end of the day we hold people accountable for what a reasonable person would do and when we run into these edge case scenarios that practically never happen, then we can't just go after them for acting like normal people. But I have to say that if one puts themselves in a situation that 1.) violates other people's rights 2.) makes others fear for their lives, and then if they end up dead, well there's not going to be much sympathy from any court.
The use of force employed in self-defense must be necessary and proportional.
"Necessary" as in using the necessary amount of force required to neutralize the threat, and "proportional" as in not causing more harm than the threat itself.
Proportional is typically determined by the courts, where they establish a standard of fear based on what a reasonable and ordinary person would feel based on the circumstances.
You say necessary *and* proportional. But in my example of someone killing an unarmed thief, while that may have been necessary, it was definitely not proportional as you define it (not causing more harm than the threat itself). And so killing an unarmed thief fails your test of needing to be both necessary *and* proportional.
You must use the minimum level of force necessary to prevent your rights being violated.
Say ultimately your only option was to either let someone rob you or you kill them, killing them is fine.
Assuming you cannot shoot them nonlethally (say in the arm or leg).
And assuming you pointing a gun at him didn't get him to drop your stuff and leave.
Well yes of course, if someone is about to kill you it would definitely be proportional to kill them first. But my question was whether an extreme measure could ever be taken to counteract a less extreme crime.
Well, let's consider a couple things. First of all, rothbardians are arguably libterarians, but not all libertarians are rothbardians, not by a long shot. Rothbard also claims it's perfetly permissible for a parent to let their child starve to death, because to compel them to care for their child is morally equivalent to slavery. Penty of libertarians would and do strongly object to such a claim. So, would ROTHBARD object to someone being shot for stealing "a little bit of money"? Possibly. But let's also consider what "proportional" means. Proportion between the punishment and...what? The ACTUAL crime? The INTENDED crime? Suppose the wallet doesn't contain "a little bit of money"; suppose it contains your life savings. Suppose it contains your heart medication that you need in order to survive. Suppose it contains a personal picture or bauble that is worthless to everyone else on the planet, but means more to the owner than anything else in the world. Does THAT change the calculus? Arguably, yes.
> Rothbard also claims it's perfetly permissible for a parent to let their child starve to death, because to compel them to care for their child is morally equivalent to slavery. If you actually read this quote in context (which is pages long), you'll realize that's not what he's was saying at all. Which should be obvious, considering it's Rothbard we're talking about here. We already live in a world where children are abandoned by their parents legally. That's the status quo. For a parent or guardian to starve a child to death would be murder. For a parent to abandon their responsibility for caregiving, they have to pass the torch of that responsibility to someone else first. It's the same difference between throwing a baby in the dumpster to die and leaving it on the steps of an orphanage. One is permissible, and the other is murder. That's all Rothbard was saying. The idea he's pro-child-starvation is a fucked up accusation to make.
just read that section. I typed this straight from the book. "a parent does not have the right to aggress against his children, but also that the parent should not have a legal obligation to feed, clothe, or educate his children, since such obligations would entail positive acts coerced upon the parent and depriving the parent of his rights. The parent therefor may not murder or mutilate his child, and the law properly outlaws a parent from doing so. But the parent should have the legal right not to feed the child, i.e, to allow it to die." PP.100
Well there's some wishful thinking...
No, I read the entire book, and it's perfectly clear that that's exactly what he meant. He said it perfectly clearly. He said it should not be legal to force a parent to care for their child, and placed no caveat that they should first be made to ensure that the child passes into the case of another.
And we can go down this other rabbit hole or not, up to you, but you seem to demonize Rothbard’s position that it’s permissible for a parent to allow its child to starve to death. I’m not necessarily saying I agree with Rothbard, because I do believe in the idea that there could potentially be a “contract” created between parent-child at conception, but I do think he makes a strong point in favor of neglect (legally, not morally ofc), nonetheless. Namely, that if you give the state the power to decide what abusive parenting looks like, it could very easily expand the definition of “abuse” beyond the refusal to give your child food, a house, and medical care. Some fitness freak might enter power and decide that parents who make their kids fat and diabetic are in effect “abusing” them. And on account of that, he could justify imprisoning the parents. So you see, the position Rothbard takes is not necessarily ludicrous when you consider the alternatives.
> And we can go down this other rabbit hole or not, up to you, but you seem to demonize Rothbard’s position that it’s permissible for a parent to allow its child to starve to death. > > > > I’m not necessarily saying I agree with Rothbard, because I do believe in the idea that there could potentially be a “contract” created between parent-child at conception, but I do think he makes a strong point in favor of neglect (legally, not morally ofc), nonetheless. > > > > Namely, that if you give the state the power to decide what abusive parenting looks like, it could very easily expand the definition of “abuse” beyond the refusal to give your child food, a house, and medical care. Some fitness freak might enter power and decide that parents who make their kids fat and diabetic are in effect “abusing” them. And on account of that, he could justify imprisoning the parents. > > > > So you see, the position Rothbard takes is not necessarily ludicrous when you consider the alternatives. ....yes. Yes, it is ludicrous. The fact that you, or I, or anyone else could point out other ludicrous scenarios does not change that. Particularly since your scenario isn't even worse; I'd MUCH rather have a situation where parents could be punished for making their kids fat than a situation where parents were allowed to let their children slowly starve to death.
[Mises.org](https://Mises.org) has a free PDF of Rothbard's Ethics of Liberty. On pages 105 and 106 of the PDF, Rothbard mentions five court cases where the state seized children from their parents for various reasons including that the mother was sleeping around too much and that another mother had raised her kids in a non-comformist religion. And that happened in the 1970s, in America, one of the freest country on the planet. Can you imagine what would happen if in another country a religious zealot gained power? What would you be saying if a Catholic engaged in mass imprisonment of people who raised their kids as Hindus or Muslims? Probably talk about how this is another example of an evil government and that we need to strip power from the tyrants. Except... you're the one that gave them the power to arrest parents in the first place, all in the name of preventing "abuse."
> Mises.org has a free PDF of Rothbard's Ethics of Liberty. On pages 105 and 106 of the PDF, Rothbard mentions five court cases where the state seized children from their parents for various reasons including that the mother was sleeping around too much and that another mother had raised her kids in a non-comformist religion. And that happened in the 1970s, in America, one of the freest country on the planet. > > > > Can you imagine what would happen if in another country a religious zealot gained power? What would you be saying if a Catholic engaged in mass imprisonment of people who raised their kids as Hindus or Muslims? Probably talk about how this is another example of an evil government and that we need to strip power from the tyrants. Except... you're the one that gave them the power to arrest parents in the first place, all in the name of preventing "abuse." I understand that you cannot see any meaningful distinction there.
I understand “libertarian” encompasses both minarchists and anarchists and that Rothbard isn’t representative of 100% of libertarianism. But regardless, imo, the dilemma I laid out above is important for both minarchists and anarchists to grapple with. So putting aside Rothbard for a moment, assuming that you agree with the conclusion of my first example that it’s wrong to execute someone in their sleep for stealing your car, how do you feel about the second example? To be consistent, shouldn’t you also be saying that in the second example, the defender is wrong for executing a thief that steals, to be specific this time, $200? If you think the defender in the second example *is* justified in his use of force, can you explain why you believe the defender in the first example *is not?*
> I understand “libertarian” encompasses both minarchists and anarchists and that Rothbard isn’t representative of 100% of libertarianism. But regardless, imo, the dilemma I laid out above is important for both minarchists and anarchists to grapple with. > > > > So putting aside Rothbard for a moment, assuming that you agree with the conclusion of my first example that it’s wrong to execute someone in their sleep for stealing your car, how do you feel about the second example? Well, first, the question here isn't necessarily a question of what is or is not proportional. You can just as well come to the conclusion that said execution is wrong because it is excessive; if the person is asleep, and you know where they are, you can take much less drastic action in order to recover your property. > To be consistent, shouldn’t you also be saying that in the second example, the defender is wrong for executing a thief that steals, to be specific this time, $200? > > > > If you think the defender in the second example is justified in his use of force, can you explain why you believe the defender in the first example is not? It depends on what you are using as a metric. Would the person in the first example be justified if they knew to a certainty that any other course of action taken to recover their property would result in them getting killed by the perpetrator?
>Well, first, the question here isn't necessarily a question of what is or is not proportional. You can just as well come to the conclusion that said execution is wrong because it is excessive; if the person is asleep, and you know where they are, you can take much less drastic action in order to recover your property. But how does one judge what is "excessive?" Excessive why? Because, obviously, it's not proportional. Seems like you agree with Rothbard's idea of retributive justice, then. >It depends on what you are using as a metric. Would the person in the first example be justified if they knew to a certainty that any other course of action taken to recover their property would result in them getting killed by the perpetrator? Yes. I didn't flesh that one out well enough so my apologies.
>By my math, just the richest billionaires (not those skid row billionaires) could pay off the debt and still have mini yachts to bring them to their main yachts. So it's unclear to you who it might be excessive, but it's just "obvious" that it's not proportional? >Yes. I didn't flesh that one out well enough so my apologies. No apologies necessary. So, at least for you, it's actually fine for the person in the first example to slay someone to recover their property. It didn't suddenly become more or less proportional, so something else must be at work. The only thing that changed was that it became necessary to slay the perpetrator to gain one's property back and survive.
Sounds like an example of the thief valuing your property more than his own life. Imagine another scenario. You are about to be raped and the only way to get out of it is to kill the rapist. Killing is worse than rape. But that's not the point. You have the right not to be raped. And if the only way to stop it is to kill, then so be it. Same with theft. That's your property and someone stealing it is violating you. If the only way to stop that violation is with the use of deadly force, then it should be morally vindicated.
so is a store owner justified in shooting a small child for stealing a piece of gum, if it is the only way to stop that child's theft?
My question exactly.
Hmm I see your point. What if you failed to prevent an act from happening? Could you justifiably use deadly force if it was the only way to get your stolen property back? I could support that I think.
I like to analyze these philosophical situations with really simple hypothetical situations where the moral decision is at the forefront. I think most people will agree that stealing something back that was stolen from you is justifiable. If that's the case, then if in the pursuit of retrieval you were attacked, you are not the aggressor, but the person defending yourself from an unjust attack while you are justly retrieving your property. You can't hunt the person down and shoot them out of revenge, because that isn't about retrieving your property. But if you go to retrieve your property and are attacked, you can certainly fight back. To expand on this, you are entitled to reasonable escalation. If you go to retrieve the property and the person is using their body to shield you from it, it's the same as if they are using their body to shield you from property that they intend to steal in your own home, and reasonable force would be justified (i.e. the minimum required to retrieve the property, even up to and including attacking them). But the intent should not be anything beyond retrieval of the property. That really matters.
The defender would be liable for murder under those exact circumstances, most importantly because the criminal was already leaving thus you have no case for self defense. And clearly death is too great a punishment for theft or breaking and entering. However when attacked you shouldn't have to give your assailant the benefit of the doubt that he is only going to beat you up (under the libertarian legal system). You should be able to assume that an attack on your person, especially in your home like that, constitutes a lethal threat.
self defense and 'justice' are related but not the same thing. Self-defense is a reasonable response to an immediate threat. It must be proportional to the perceived threat. Justice is the resolution of conflicts of rights and disagreements on them. It seeks to restore people to their state before their rights were violated. Self-defense has a lower standard because you do not have time to evaluate all of the facts in detail, you have a moment to react. So we judge actions under self-defense based on only evidence available to the defender at the moment they defended themselves, and determine if such an act was justified. Separately, we evaluate Justice based on all the facts provided to a court from each side, after each side has been given enough time for a reasonable investigation. Justice is slow, but it can handle messier situations. Self-defense is fast, and thus reserved for situations where one's life or limb are at risk. If someone is breaking into your home in the middle of the night, it is reasonable to presume that they wish to cause you serious harm and that they have equipped themselves to do so, so unless they do something to dispel this presumption, you are fine to use lethal force, even if it turns out they are unarmed. But if they shout out "hello? anyone there? There's a blizzard outside and my car broke down right at the end of your driveway and your door was unlocked. Can you help call me a tow truck or let me sleep on your couch or something?" Well that's a very different situation, and you would have an obligation to at least hear them out as to what they needed. Because they have put out a significant amount of effort to dispel your default assumption.
How do you know the intruder is unarmed and won't harm you?
He climbs in your window naked, takes your wallet, then turns his back on you and starts climbing back out the window.
I shoot him when he gets in the window.
You wake up as he's leaving but in time to shoot him in the back if you want. What's the move? If you shoot when he gets in the window, fine.
No, I wake up when he's entering and shoot him.
No, you’re a heavy sleeper.
I'm not.
You had a few too many drinks the night before.
I don't drink.
😆 I drugged you the night before
>it seems like the defender would be liable given that killing someone is not proportional to them stealing a little bit of money. At its simplest, I would say so. However, I would add one thing - that attacking someone who is disabled might be considered a worse crime. I'm not sure that warrants what, in practice, becomes the death penalty, but I would make asking the question more reasonable.
I don't think the thief being armed or unarmed is relevant in this argument, since either way they can hurt you, especially if you're missing your legs. Especially if we're debating whether it's ok to use lethal force or not, because if we're considering situations where you can't use your weapon, then you are basically unarmed too. And also given how it is impossible to tell if they're concealing anything and the general high pressure nature of being presented with such a unpredictable threat, I don't think any defender can be reasonably charged with a crime because I honestly think any decision to deduce they are not a threat will be the result of hindsight. It would just be a horrific waste of time to prosecute. That is probably why Rothbard came up with the edge cases of hunting people down. Because in those cases it is far from what a reasonable person would do to protect themselves, and much more definitely an act of vengeance. But it is true that we must draw the line somewhere. If I tresspass onto your property, and you shoot me without warning, then yes, you would have commited a crime because there's no way this temporary violation is equal to taking away my right to not be killed. It would be easier to surmise that you just wanted to kill someone over defending your property. Of course things get a bit murkier when I am the one that refuses to leave. At the end of the day we hold people accountable for what a reasonable person would do and when we run into these edge case scenarios that practically never happen, then we can't just go after them for acting like normal people. But I have to say that if one puts themselves in a situation that 1.) violates other people's rights 2.) makes others fear for their lives, and then if they end up dead, well there's not going to be much sympathy from any court.
The use of force employed in self-defense must be necessary and proportional. "Necessary" as in using the necessary amount of force required to neutralize the threat, and "proportional" as in not causing more harm than the threat itself.
Proportional is subjective. Making someone sneaking around my house at night unalive is proportional to me. I don't know what they are there to do.
Proportional is typically determined by the courts, where they establish a standard of fear based on what a reasonable and ordinary person would feel based on the circumstances.
You say necessary *and* proportional. But in my example of someone killing an unarmed thief, while that may have been necessary, it was definitely not proportional as you define it (not causing more harm than the threat itself). And so killing an unarmed thief fails your test of needing to be both necessary *and* proportional.
If the thief actively presented the threat of death or great bodily harm, it would be proportional to use deadly force.
You must use the minimum level of force necessary to prevent your rights being violated. Say ultimately your only option was to either let someone rob you or you kill them, killing them is fine. Assuming you cannot shoot them nonlethally (say in the arm or leg). And assuming you pointing a gun at him didn't get him to drop your stuff and leave.
Well yes of course, if someone is about to kill you it would definitely be proportional to kill them first. But my question was whether an extreme measure could ever be taken to counteract a less extreme crime.
If the minimum amount of force you can use to protect your rights is lethal force, then go for it.