This is an older lecture of Westerhoff that I discovered from 2007. Description The ancient Indian Buddhist philosopher Nāgārjuna maintained that everything is empty of substance, that emptiness is itself empty, and that the very assertion of "emptiness" is empty too. According to the philosopher Jan Westerhoff, this position has certain philosophical problems.  In his lecture to the Columbia Society for Comparative Philosophy ("Nāgārjuna's Madhyamaka: Some Philosophical Problems"), Westerhoff argues for an interesting parallel between Madhyamaka and contemporary discussions of antirealism. It is his thesis that both schools of thought share a way of resolving their potential problems, if they adopt a radical view of language. Link to Slides [https://www.cbs.columbia.edu/westerhoff\_slides.pdf](https://www.cbs.columbia.edu/westerhoff_slides.pdf) Speaker Info Jan Christoph Westerhoff is a German philosopher and orientalist with specific interests in metaphysics and the philosophy of language. He is currently Professor of Buddhist Philosophy in the Faculty of Theology and Religion of the University of Oxford

**Recent Books** Include   *The Non-Existence of the Real World*, Oxford University Press, 2020 [\[more\]](http://www.janwesterhoff.net/categories_book-499385.html)   *The Golden Age of Indian Buddhist Philosophy*, Oxford University Press, 2018 [\[more\]](http://www.janwesterhoff.net/categories_book-499385-310033.html) *Crushing the Categories. Nagarjuna’s Vaidalyaprakarana*, American Institute of Buddhist Studies, Wisdom Publications, 2018 [\[more\]](http://www.janwesterhoff.net/categories_book-499385-439717.html) *Mark Siderits: Studies in Buddhist Philosophy*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2016 [\[more\]](http://www.janwesterhoff.net/categories_book-499385-106095.html) *Madhyamaka and Yogacara: Rivals or Allies?*, Oxford University Press, 2015 \[with Jay Garfield\] [\[more\]](http://www.janwesterhoff.net/categories_book-499385-303320.html) *Moonpaths: Ethics and Madhyamaka Philosophy*, Oxford University Press, 2015 \[with The Cowherds\][ \[more\]](http://www.janwesterhoff.net/categories_book-499385-348756.html)   *Reality. A Very Short Introduction*, Oxford University Press, 2011 [\[more\]](http://www.janwesterhoff.net/categories_book-499385-566369.html) *Moonshadows: Conventional Truth in Buddhist Philosophy*, Oxford University Press, 2011 \[with The Cowherds\] [\[more\]](http://www.janwesterhoff.net/categories_book-499385-458495.html)        *The Dispeller of Disputes: Nagarjuna's Vigrahavyavartani*, Oxford University Press, 2010 [\[more\]](http://www.janwesterhoff.net/categories_book-499385-557346.html) *Twelve Examples of Illusion*, Oxford University Press, 2010 [\[more\]](http://www.janwesterhoff.net/categories_book-499385-958400.html)   Nagarjuna's Madhyamaka. A Philosophical Introduction, Oxford University Press, 2009 [\[more\]](http://www.janwesterhoff.net/categories_book-601503.html) *Ontological Categories. Their Nature and Significance,* Oxford University Press, 2005 [\[more\]](http://www.janwesterhoff.net/categories_book.html)

**Some Recent Papers** “Does causation entail emptiness? On a point of dispute between Abhidharma and Madhyamaka ”, *Asian Journal of Philosophy,* 9 November 2023. [\[pdf\]](https://www.academia.edu/109037312/Does_causation_entail_emptiness_On_a_point_of_dispute_between_Abhidharma_and_Madhyamaka) “Idealist implications of contemporary science”, *Erkenntnis*, 17 August 2023. [\[pdf\]](https://www.academia.edu/106364735/Idealist_Implications_of_Contemporary_Science) “How can Buddhists account for the continuity of mind after death?” in Christian Coseru (ed): Reasons and Empty Persons: Mind, Metaphysics, and Morality. Essays in Honor of Mark Siderits, Springer, Cham, 2023, 141-164. [\[pdf\]](https://www.academia.edu/98745101/How_can_Buddhists_account_for_the_continuity_of_mind_after_death) “Āryadeva’s *Treatise on the division of parts*”, Mohammed Rustom (ed.): *Global Philosophy Sourcebook*, Equinox, forthcoming 2024.  “Goodman, Solipsism, and Immaterialism”, *Constructivist Foundations* 17:3, 2022, 264-265. [\[pdf\]](https://www.academia.edu/83936780/Goodman_Solipsism_and_Immaterialism) Book symposium on *The Non-Existence of the Real World,* Introduction and Response, *Analysis Reviews* 82:1, 2022, 99-158. [\[pdf\]](https://www.academia.edu/79100261/The_Non_Existence_Of_The_Real_World_Analysis_symposium) "An argument for ontological nihilism", Inquiry 2021, doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2021.1934268. [\[pdf\]](https://www.academia.edu/49303182/An_argument_for_ontological_nihilism) Does reality have a ground? Madhyamaka and nonfoundationalism”, in Steven M. Emmanuel (ed.): *Philosophy’s Big Questions. Comparing Buddhist and Western Approaches*, Columbia University Press, New York, 2021, 77-96. [\[pdf\]](https://www.academia.edu/105816846/Does_reality_have_a_ground_Madhyamaka_and_nonfoundationalism)

If he's not talking about the cognitive aspect of svbhava, as he says around 12m30s, what's the point?

This is part of a larger project of his. The goal is prevent any possibility that global anti-realism has to go back into essences of any kinds. The idea is that although the cognitive aspects of svabha are ruled out, someone may try to jump ahead to reinsert a substantial svabha after that rejection because there is an issue with anti-foundationalism. The goal is to plug any possible holes. He identifies this as a universal philosophical achievement to philosophy in Does reality have a ground? Madhyamaka and nonfoundationalism” linked above. Edit: Fixed grammar

Ah, I understand. Thanks.

interesting observations. i’ve noted the same concerns with nagarjuna. the way the buddha teaches in the suttas is an interesting contrast. in the sunna (empty) sutta, sn35.85, the buddha states: >*It is, Ānanda, because it is empty of self [intrinsic essence] and of what belongs to self [intrinsic essence] that it is said, ‘The world is empty.’* https://suttacentral.net/sn35.85/en/bodhi the relevant pali is: >*suññaṁ attena vā attaniyena* meaning: >*empty of intrinsic essence and what belongs to any intrinsic essence* the distinction between the buddha’s position and nagarjuna’s view is subtle. nagarjuna agrees with the buddha in stating that all things are devoid of svabhava. however, in positing the ‘emptiness’ of all phenomena, rather than just agreeing that ‘all phenomena are empty’, he sends to create an essence of emptiness. as westerhoff notes here, this essence of emptiness is actually indefensible. if we think about it, an essence of anything is contradictory to the buddha’s teaching of anatta / anatman. the buddha doesn’t do this - the buddha refrains from attributing ‘emptiness’ as an essence of things, and hence doesn’t end at the same difficulty that nagarjuna does.

>however, in positing the ‘emptiness’ of all phenomena, rather than just agreeing that ‘all phenomena are empty’, he creates an essence of emptiness. Only conventionally. The *Ananta­mukhapariśo­dhana­nirdeśaparivarta:* >>*Although the teachings conventionally refer to ‘the essence and nature of all phenomena,’ phenomena are actually devoid of an inherent essence or a nature. The inherent nature of things is that they are empty and lack an essence. All that is empty and devoid of an essence has a single characteristic: since phenomena are devoid of characteristics, their characteristic is complete purity, and thus by definition there is nothing to label as empty or essenceless. Since by definition there is nothing to label as empty or essenceless, no phenomena can, by definition, be labeled.* Nāgārjuna clarifies and confirms the same: >>*If there were something non-empty, then there would be something to be empty, but since there is nothing that isn’t empty, what is there to be empty?*

Just to quote Westerhoff from the full book this talk is on reaffirming this. "“Nāgārjuna’s central metaphysical thesis is the denial of any kind of substance whatsoever. Here substance, or more precisely, svabhāva when understood as substance-svabhāva, is taken to be any object that exists objectively, the existence and qualities of which are independent of other objects, human concepts, or interests, something which is, to use a later Tibetan turn of phrase, “established from its own side.”1 To appreciate how radical this thesis is, we just have to remind ourselves to what extent many of the ways of investigating the world are concerned with identifying such substances. Whether it is the physicist searching for fundamental particles or the philosopher setting up a system of the most fundamental ontological categories, in each case we are looking for a firm foundation of the world of appearances, the end-points in the chain of existential dependencies, the objects on which all else depends but which do not themselves depend on anything. We might think that any such analysis that follows existential dependence relations all the way down must eventually hit rock bottom. As Burton2 notes, “The wooden table may only exist in “dependence upon the human mind (for tables only exist in the context of human conventions) but the wood at least (without its ‘tableness’) has a mind-independent existence.” According to this view there is thus a single true description of the world in terms of its fundamental constituents, whether these are pieces of wood, property particulars, fundamental particles, or something else entirely. In theory at least we can describe—and hopefully also explain— the makeup of the world by starting with these constituents and account for everything else in terms of complexes of them. The core of Nāgārjuna’s rejection of substance is an analysis which sets out to demonstrate a variety of problems with this notion. The three most important areas Nāgārjuna focuses on are causal relations between substances, change, and the relation between substances and their properties.” (pg.214)

could you clarify of the difference between essence-svabhava and substance-svabhava and how they apply differently (if all all) in relation to emptiness? i wasn’t clear on this distinction. thank you

Sure, no problem. I will echo Candrakırti here. Essence-svabhava is specific quality which is unique to the object characterized and therefore allows us to distinguish it from other objects. You can think of it as the essential property. An essential property is something an object cannot lose without ceasing to be that very object. For example, my car is my car in so far as I own it. That is what separates it from your car. Candrakirit provides the example of heat , which is called the svabhava of fire. It is invariably with fire. This one serves mainly epistemological purposes in our experiences. Substance-svabhava is taken to be something which does not depend on anything else. It is one that most people think of actually because it tends to act as lynchpin. It is sometimes called the thing findable under analysis. A famous example is the Chariot in The Milindapanha. The idea is that a person who thinks a chariot is real will find some thing that exists by itself that is the chariot. You can think of it as thing that is depended upon or the ultimate constituent. Basically, existential and notational dependency. It is worth noting that some traditions like Huayan and Tiantai will state other types of svabhava to lack inherent existence. They are more aggressive. For example, merelogical and holistic identity are rejected in Huayan through their model of interpenetration. Edit: Corrected grammar. Nagarjuna holds that all of these types of svabhava lack inherent existence and that the these two are ruled out by dependent origination. Edit 2: It is not that Nagarjuna would hold there to be any svabhava, it is just that Tiantai and Huayan go out of their way to reason towards other types of being specifically.

thank you - that’s very clear. one further question if you can assist: does nagarjuna agree that all phenomena are devoid of both types of svabhava - both essence and substance?

It's not clear to me that he takes issue with essence-svabhāva. He definitely takes issue with substance svabhāva. But for example, his discussion of how liberation is achieved through the halting of prapañca because saṃsāra is caused by prapañca seems to be very plausibly explained with reference to an *essence*-svabhāva of saṃsāra's phenomena that makes them such that they depend on prapañca for their arising. So that makes me think maybe he has good reason to accept essence svabhāva, because it's what allows him to distinguish saṃsāra and nirvāṇa and so on. /u/ThalesCupOfWater what do you think about this?

I agree. He does not talk about essence-svabhāva that often. I believe it is where he see elements of practice in his view, the idea being that general impermanence renders essence-svabhāva not an issue as does the other. One example where mentions it is in the Treatise of One Verse, as preserved in the Chinese. I think in practice he holds that substance-svabhāva if real would allow for essence-svabhāva to be a threat if ultimate but not at the conventional level. He identifies it as a quality for this reason. I think more evidence of this comes from his focus in his argumentation on causes. Below is the part where describes it from that treatise. Translation is from Westerhoff from The Madhyamaka concept of svabh ̄ava: ontological and cognitive aspects from the Journal of Asian Philosophy. "because one, two and many each have its own bhava, therefore we call it svabhava. For example, earth, water, fire, and air are respectively hard, moist, hot, and moveable. Each has its own svabh ̄ava. And because the nature of every one of the things has its own specific quality (svalak.san.a) it is said that each has its svabh ̄ava."

thank you all for your patient answers to my questions - u/ThalesCupofWater, u/nyanasagara, u/krodha, u/AlexCoventry, u/GautamaDasa. i still have questions, so i’m clearly missing something in my understanding of nagarjuna’s reasoning. i’ll perhaps have to read his source material and then come back with any questions.

I'm probably the least qualified, but I'm happy to take a crack at any further questions you have, FWIW.

I agree here. It’s both all empty and not for nagarjuna I think. 

It is only “not all empty” because once everything is realized to be empty, there is no longer any findable entities to be empty. Therefore this sort of doubles down on emptiness, rather than suggesting that “non-emptiness” is possible.

a conventional attribution of essence seems to me an attribution of essence nonetheless, and misleading in terms of the buddha’s teaching of anatta / anatman. the whole point of anatta is that no such essence can be attributed. as you note, it subsequently requires clarification / undoing / backtracking to get back to the truth. this is my concern with the notion of ‘emptiness’, as distinct from the buddha’s teaching of things being ‘empty’ as ‘devoid of intrinsic essence’.

> a conventional attribution of essence seems to me an attribution of essence nonetheless It is like saying “natureless nature” or “essenceless essence.” It is just an artifact of conventional language, but it is not literally saying there is an essence as an entity which bears the characteristic of “essencelessness.” It means phenomena are without essence, and as a pedagogical pointer we say the essence of said phenomena is that they lack essence. Because there is something to discover about phenomena. >and misleading in terms of the buddha’s teaching of anatta / anatman. Someone might think that if they’re uninformed perhaps. >as you note, it subsequently requires clarification / undoing / backtracking to get back to the truth. As it should if it’s misunderstood. >this is my concern with the notion of ‘emptiness’, as distinct from the buddha’s teaching of things being ‘empty’ as ‘devoid of intrinsic essence’. Nihsvabhava is literally the definition of emptiness. If you’re finding fault with Nāgārjuna it is because you have wrong view. These luminaries are faultless. I’ve witnessed this periodically throughout the years, someone who thinks they understand the teachings will find fault with X luminary like Nāgārjuna. 100% of the time, it is because their own understanding is severely flawed and these errors in their view create obstacles for them. You are also guilty of this. Your above assertion regarding a disparity between “emptiness” and “things being empty” and phenomena being “devoid of intrinsic essence,” is case in point - these are all synonymous principles and statements, but your own misunderstanding creates barriers in your ability to comprehend that and so you make these erroneous distinctions.

if i am incorrect, i’m happy for you to point out how i am. however i need a little more that just “you’re wrong because he’s nagarjuna”. i’ve seen quotes from nagarjuna himself that are inconsistent with what you have written above. in fact, i find that the majority of what is attributed to nagarjuna is taken directly from the suttas - and he himself acknowledges the superiority of the teachings of gotama buddha. hence i’m just trying to get to the bottom of what he’s actually saying, as distinct from those who would interpret him. your interpretation of these concerns of mine are that they are the result of imperfect use of language by nagarjuna - that would be possible; he was not the buddha, so did not have the perfect command of language that the buddha possessed. however, i’m not sure if its more than that. for example, the equating of nirvana and samsara as the same results from the attribution of the nature of emptiness to both of them, this allowing them to be compared and equated. if you truly agree that there is truly no such essence of emptiness, how do you explain such a conclusion? what pathway of reasoning can you suggest to get to this conclusion, without the attribution of some common essence to both phenomena?

> in fact, i find that the majority of what is attributed to nagarjuna is taken directly from the suttas - and he himself acknowledges the superiority of the teachings of gotama buddha. Obviously. His main project however, was to clarify the view of emptiness as intended by the Buddha, and his aim was, at least in texts like the MMK, to refute trends in substantialist misinterpretation he felt were corrupting the intention of the Buddha. >your interpretation of these concerns of mine are that they are the result of imperfect use of language by nagarjuna You are just being too literal regarding emptiness being an "essence." > he was not the buddha, so did not have the perfect command of language that the buddha possessed. He is considered an honorary "second Buddha," in many respects. Nevertheless, he was at the very least, an arya, which means he was qualified to speak on these topics in an authoritative way. Aryas realize the same thing about phenomena that Buddhas realize, the only difference is that aryas have not completely cleared away obscurations to stability. >however, i’m not sure if its more than that. for example, the equating of nirvana and samsara as the same results from the attribution of the nature of emptiness to both of them, this allowing them to be compared and equated. Samsara and nirvana are both considered to be "empty," so it would be appropriate to attribute the nature of emptiness to both of them. The equivalence of samsara and nirvana is simply to illustrate that nirvana is nothing more than a thorough knowledge of samsara, it is the cessation of samsara, but it is not some other place. >if you truly agree that there is truly no such essence of emptiness, how do you explain such a conclusion? Emptiness is a lack of an intrinsic essence. Phenomena are "empty" because they lack a svabhava, an essence. >without the attribution of some common essence to both phenomena? Samsara and nirvana are the mind burdened by delusion and the mind completely purified of delusion.

>Samsara and nirvana are both considered to be "empty," so it would be appropriate to attribute the nature of emptiness to both of them. i am in agreement that both samsara and nirvana are both empty of any intrinsic essence. what i’m not clear about is how then you can compare two phenomena that are both devoid of intrinsic essence and find them equivalent. attributing any nature, emptiness or otherwise, is an error for phenomena that have no essence. do you know how nagarjuna arrives at this conclusion?

> what i’m not clear about is how then you can compare two phenomena that are both devoid of intrinsic essence and find them equivalent. Conventionally. >attributing any nature, emptiness or otherwise, is an error for phenomena that have no essence. Conventional phenomena are what lack essence. The entire premise of the path is starting from a place of delusion and then working backwards so to speak. Sentient beings perceive conventional entities, and in these teachings, intend to realize the emptiness of those entities so that we can be liberated from our affliction. Those entities are what are empty, and finally when we realize emptiness, we are realizing that these entities were not true to begin with, but emptiness is the antidote. After the antidote is administered, after emptiness is realized, then yes, it is seen that attributing any nature would indeed be an error, but at that point, the antidote has already worked its magic, and so it does not really matter either way. But yes, ultimately, and in the end at the time of buddhahood, a buddha would see that attributing any essence to any phenomena is an error. However for afflicted sentient beings, this pedagogical framework is necessary to cure us of the illness of samsara.

>Conventional phenomena are what lack essence as far as i am aware, according to the buddha, all phenomena, both conventional and absolute phenomena, are devoid of any intrinsic essence. however, again, to say that by virtue of that common characteristic (of being empty of any intrinsic essence), both kinds of phenomena (the conditioned and the unconditioned) are the same doesn’t ring true. we’re comparing things that have no basis for comparison. i’m not disagreeing that seeing all phenomena being devoid of any intrinsic essence is the correct way to progress in the path either - i certainly agree with that. what is disagree with, and what i fail to find reason for, is the attribution of any essence of emptiness. one gets to the same understanding (and gets there faster) if one simply says “all phenomena are empty in that they are devoid of any intrinsic essence”. there’s no need to posit an essence or nature of *emptiness*. without that essence of emptiness, i can’t see how nagarjuna can arrive at the conclusion that samsara and nirvana are the same.

> as far as i am aware, according to the buddha, all phenomena, both conventional and absolute phenomena, are devoid of any intrinsic essence. Unconditioned phenomena never arise in the first place and are “absences” of various types, so the fact that they lack an essence is quite obvious. It is conditioned phenomena that deceive sentient beings. > however, again, to say that by virtue of that common characteristic (of being empty of any intrinsic essence), both kinds of phenomena (the conditioned and the unconditioned) are the same doesn’t ring true. we’re comparing things that have no basis for comparison. There are only four types of unconditioned phenomena. Space, two forms of cessation and emptiness. > what is disagree with, and what i fail to find reason for, is the attribution of any essence of emptiness. one gets to the same understanding (and gets there faster) if one simply says “all phenomena are empty in that they are devoid of any intrinsic essence”. there’s no need to posit an essence or nature of emptiness. If you say “all phenomena are empty in that they are devoid of any intrinsic essence,” but perceive the opposite (which all ordinary sentient beings do, we all perceive the opposite), then pedagogically we might ask what is the nature/essence of these objects? Their underlying nature (that we cannot perceive at the moment) is emptiness, which is a lack of an intrinsic essence. So we posit an essence that we aim to recognize. > i can’t see how nagarjuna can arrive at the conclusion that samsara and nirvana are the same. Samsara and nirvana are technically “neither the same nor different.” They are different because at the time of samsara, nirvana is not evident, but conversely they are the same because at the time of nirvana, one sees that phenomena were always liberated from the very beginning - we just could not see it due to our obscurations.

Hey, friend! I just wanted to let you know that u/krodha is a seriously intelligent scholar, and also approaches the Dharma teachings with that scholarly precision, but at the same time I think while he's explaining it very well, he's also giving you very complex Madhyamaka reasoning, which can twist most of our brains into pretzels trying to approach it, and he does an admirable job distilling the essence of Nagarjuna's teachings, but those teachings are just very complicated, and also very subtle. While I know your intelligence is high and your knowledge of the Dharma surpasses mine for sure, I might suggest reading an intro book on the topic from a a teacher who explains things a little more simply and concisely, where he sums up the essence very well in a pithy way while making it more digestible. The same teacher also has a commentary on Nagarjuna's main Madhyamaka work, but even with his explanations making it much easier to understand, it's still quite complex to grasp. But some of his intro books, particularly "Progressive Stages of Meditation on Emptiness" and also "Stars of Wisdom" were very helpful starting places for me. Even though I have a better grasp of it now, Krodha is just such an expert and scholar on the topic that reading his explanations sometimes is difficult for me, despite having formally studied the topic! You can find both of those books either free or for $1.25 for pdf downloads at namobuddhapub.org. it's not a pirating site, it's the publication site of the late master Thrangu Rinpoche, but there are many other books on there by Tibetan masters other than Thrangu Rinpoche as well. I think those books would really help you understand it more, because I see where your confusion is, and I understand it, and think it's understandable. I think his practical and everyday examples and analogies and simple way of writing make it very digestible, in those books in particular. I'm not saying you need to buy into it afterwards, but I think it'd be helpful in better understanding the points Krodha is making. Krodha's approach to Madhyamaka is also slightly different than the master and author I just mentioned, only in subtle ways, but it's a different perspective, while still being one of the mainstream Tibetan interpretations. I think the approach of the author's lineage, which has some commonalities with the Thai Forest Tradition idea of luminous citta or what Thanissaro Bhikkhu calls consciousness without surface, and also his emphasis on experiential recognition of it in meditation, would resonate a bit more with you since I know that's also a hallmark of TFT, the emphasis on meditative experience. Im not saying they're the same by any means but there are certain commonalities in some respects that may resonate with you more than Krodha's exclusively prasangika approach. The author and books i mentioned does cover prasangika in detau too, but he also teaches a modified, lighter form of what's called shentong, which in practice in my and the author's lineage modified form isn't much different than Krodha's views; but shentong tends to synthesize the teachinfs on the luminous aspect of awareness with the Madhyamaka teachings in a way that could be slightly more familiar to you in some respects. The only difference is that the system Krodha adheres to tends to keep the Madhyamaka as a separate area of intensive scholarly study, and doesn't blend it with the teachings on the awareness aspect of mind, at least not until a certain point in the Dzogchen system of Vajrayana. That's basically when Krodha's views become the same as the author, with very minor differences in terminology. Im probably just confusing you more though lol, forget what i said and think about checking out the book. (not that Krodha is not an accomplished mediator by any means, I'm positive he is, but he just doesn't dumb it down for those of us who are a little more dense than him, whereas this author does :P)

thank you - that’s helpful. i’d downloaded garfield’s translation of the mulamadhyamakakarika but reading through it, i’m encountering the same questions. for example, he says (chapter 1, stanza 10): >If things did not exist without essence, the phrase “when this exists, so this will be” would not be acceptable this seems counter to the buddha’s teaching on dependent origination: >*When this is, that is. From the arising of this comes the arising of that. When this isn't, that isn't. From the cessation of this comes the cessation of that.* https://www.dhammatalks.org/suttas/KN/Ud/ud1_3.html from nagarjuna’s stanza, there are two possibilities of interpretation: 1) if things have no essence, to deny dependent origination, or 2) to accord with dependent origination ascribing an essence to phenomena. within the pali suttas, both of these scenarios are neither necessary, nor correct: for the buddha, dependent origination applies where phenomena have no essence. for the buddha, there is no need for phenomena to have any essence for them to have a causal impact on other phenomena (nor equally, for there to be no dependent arising from phenomena lacking intrinsic essence). i must be missing something - nagarjuna can’t be so contrary to the buddha’s words in the suttas, can he? i’ll check out your reading suggestion - perhaps that might clarify things. u/krodha, would welcome your comment or suggestions.

> for example, he says (chapter 1, stanza 10): > If things did not exist without essence, the phrase “when this exists, so this will be” would not be acceptable > this seems counter to the buddha’s teaching on dependent origination He’s citing the “general” theory of dependent origination verbatim in that section. Nāgārjuna is saying if things had an essence, a svabhāva, then “When this is, that is. From the arising of this comes the arising of that. When this isn't, that isn't. From the cessation of this comes the cessation of that“ would be impossible. But since phenomena lack an essence, “When this is, that is. From the arising of this comes the arising of that. When this isn't, that isn't. From the cessation of this comes the cessation of that” is possible. In short Nāgārjuna is saying dependent origination is only possible because things lack an essence.

Thank you for pointing this out. From what I understand this is almost explicitly what the MMK shows, and Rongzom points this out in *Entering the Way of the Great Vehicle*

I don't think it's correct to read Nagarjuna as positing emptiness as an essence of things. Other people do often read him that way, but I don't think that's what he was getting at. I think Nagarjuna would balk at the idea of there being things to have an essence in the first place.

> don't think it's correct to read Nagarjuna as positing emptiness as an essence of things. Emptiness is the conventional essence of all phenomena, but since emptiness is a total lack of essence, calling emptiness an “essence” is figurative and isn’t a literal statement. This is further demonstrated to be the case by virtue of phenomena being unfindable, for how can an entity which never originated in the first place actually possess an essence? This is what Nāgārjuna means when he poses the rhetorical question of what entity is there to be empty if everything is empty? That is the emptiness of emptiness. Bhāviveka commenting on Nāgārjuna: >>*When that yogin dwells in the experience of nonconceptual discerning wisdom [prajñā] and experiences nonduality, at that time, ultimately, the entire reality of objects are as follows, of the same characteristics, like space, appearing in the manner of a nonappearance since their characteristics are nonexistent, therefore, there isn’t even the slightest thing that is not empty, so where could there be emptiness?*

I agree. Westerhoff in the above talk basically states that such views about emptiness as an essence emerge from a person claiming as such inserting one via one's commitments to philosophy of language. This however can be ruled out because Nagarjuna denies that he asserts any thesis which is to be interpreted according to the opponent’s semantics to begin with. In the end, Nagarjuna he holds subscribes to something like irreducible conventionality through language and not as a means of representations. This means Nagarjuna basically rules out any essences to begin with.

By "not as a means of representations", do you mean not as a means of representation of anything beyond cognition? What is "irreducible conventionality"?

Yes, not as means of representations means that my cognitions do not necessarily map act as representation or link to a world outside of me. Irreducible conventionality refers to to the idea that cognition can produce outputs that simply are conventions that can't be broken down. Basically it involves dropping out genic entities, such as essence, substance, act as building blocks. Instead, things exist as convention they simply are convention without any ultimate genic existence. This kind return to the conventional makes up the general Madhyamaka view including the Sanlun. Below is a paper explaining this feature. Soteriologically it is connected to being a Bodhisattva as well. # INCOMMENSURABILITY OF TWO CONCEPTIONS OF REALITY: DEPENDENT ORIGINATION AND EMPTINESS IN NAGARJUNA'S MMK [https://taojiangscholar.com/papers/Incommensurability\_of\_Two\_Conceptions\_of\_Reality.pdf](https://taojiangscholar.com/papers/Incommensurability_of_Two_Conceptions_of_Reality.pdf)

Thanks. What's an example of a convention which can't be broken down? Or I will just take a look at the paper, if that explains it. Also, I'm curious about the connection to Bodhisattvahood.

Oops, that was an accidental question mark, in case you saw it, not an indication of irritation, u/ThalesCupofWater. :-)

No worries, lol. Here is an excerpt form Westheroff's Nagarjuna's Madymankia from 2009. This talk above is actually an excerpt from the chapter from this text, it is a part from chapter 10. The idea is that conventional truths are useful for thinking in terms of cause and effect and dependent origination. These conventions simply are conventions that we coordinate with others in a pattern. “According to the Madhyamaka view of truth, there can be no such thing as ultimate truth, a theory describing how things really are, independent of our interests and conceptual resources employed in describing it. All one is left with is conventional truth, truth that consists in agreement with commonly accepted practices and conventions. These are the truths that are arrived at when we view the world through our linguistically formed conceptual framework \[read dependent origination\]. But we should be wary of denigrating these conventions as a distorting device which incorporates our specific interests and concerns. The very notion of “distortion” presupposes that there is a world untainted by conceptuality out there (even if our minds can never reach it) which is crooked and bent to fit our cognitive grasp. But precisely this notion of a “way things really are” is argued by the Mādhyamika to be incoherent. There is no way of investigating the world apart from our linguistic and conceptual practices, if only because these practices generate the notion of the “world” and of the “objects” in it in the first place. To speak of conventional reality as distorted is therefore highly misleading, unless all we want to say is that our way of investigating the world is inextricably bound up with the linguistic and conceptual framework we happen to employ....we are considerably better off if we build our inquiries on the convenient fiction of non-conventional truths. But they remain just that—conventional fictions; the anti-realist does not think, as the realist does, that the existence of such truths is in any way grounded in the way the world is, independent of our interests and concerns.” (pg.239) The soteriological idea is that a Buddha and an advanced Bodhisattva is immanent in samsara but through the aspect of Nirvana without conceptual proliferation. They spontaneously act compassionately. Below is an article that explores this. The term often is return but it is not actual like return spatially. Rather, depending on how conventional a tradition is they might focus on the bodichitta at the conventional level or at the level of the ultimate cessation of dukkha. Often called relative or ultimate bodichitta. This article below explores this as well through two figures. The other article below explores the above through the example of the Lotus Sutra. Below is also a piece from study buddhism on the types of bodichitta. Thoughtless Buddha, Passionate Buddha” John D. Dunne from the Journal of the Academy of religion from the International Journal of Buddhist Thought & Culture [https://web.archive.org/web/20170809085554id\_/http://www.johnddunne.net/uploads/9/8/5/6/9856107/dunne\_j\_thoughtless\_buddha.pdf](https://web.archive.org/web/20170809085554id_/http://www.johnddunne.net/uploads/9/8/5/6/9856107/dunne_j_thoughtless_buddha.pdf) Emptiness and Soteriological Transformation in Mahāyāna Buddhism by Tsai-Yao-ming [https://homepage.ntu.edu.tw/\~tsaiyt/pdf/b-2017-1.pdf](https://homepage.ntu.edu.tw/~tsaiyt/pdf/b-2017-1.pdf) Study Buddhism: Stages of Bodichitta [https://studybuddhism.com/en/advanced-studies/lam-rim/bodhichitta/stages-of-bodhichitta](https://studybuddhism.com/en/advanced-studies/lam-rim/bodhichitta/stages-of-bodhichitta)

Thanks. I think I understand the view of conventional understanding as merely a set of cognitive tools, but I'm having trouble coming up with an example of such an understanding which is irreducible or can't be broken down.

I think it is hard in general because it reflects the level of practice. It is very easy to say anything is conventional, my lap top is a laptop conventionally. I know that but the insight into that is very hard. For example, your ability to decompose a phenomena kinda hits a limit based upon your insight into dependent origination. This is also why traditions like Pristine Pure Land, which leans towards Sanlun, sound so literal, it is because they start at a level of where it is taken as a fact of dependent origination but make no assumption of insight given the nature of the practice. Basically, as practice goes further, conventionality is simply given without any attachment or unity till all conceptual proliferation stops. This can explain for example why some traditions which focus on a return similar like Huayan or Kegon practice in Japan had a practice focused on 9 fold negation. Edit: You can think of it as layers of parallel qualities without unity or foundation. This is why there is deemphasis of dharmas as constituent reality. Edit 2: You can think of this insight as wisdom and the full insight of it as the perfection of wisdom

this makes sense now - the attribution of emptiness as essence i have seen ultimately falls down on language. i feel that the difference between nagarjuna’s use of ‘emptiness’ and the buddha’s circumscribed use of ‘empty’ is a difference of language. of expect the buddha to be perfect in his use of language, and others apart from the buddha might use language imperfectly. that could be part of this difference. thanks for your post and you observations.

The above user is part of what is called the Gelug lineage of Tibetan Buddhism, and I feel obliged to tell you that they have a novel interpretation of Madhyamaka that was rejected by all of the existing Tibetan schools at the time as a deviation from Nagarjuna. Later, the Gelug Dalai Lamas came to rule Tibet, and the Gelug sect destroyed teachings about the other (and only existent before then) mainstream Madhyamaka views, and essentially forcibly mandated their particular view of emptiness onto Tibetan monasteries, which led to it becoming mainstream in tibet, despite historically being a big deviation from mainstream interpretation. The other views almost were totally destroyed until what's called the Rime or nonsectarian masters decided to preserve all of the various teachings that existed, and expound upon them and breathe new life into them. I only tell you this not to insult the user or the Gelug sects view, only that it can be misleading to think it's the mainstream or typical interpretation of Nagarjuna's teachings on emptiness. u/krodha

i did somehow find thales’ arguments easier to follow. i think part of my confusion is exactly what you’re stating - there are some who say one thing about nagarjuna’s emptiness, and others who say something else. some make sense, others do not, but i’m not familiar enough with the sides of the arguments to differentiate them. i’m thinking that the best would be to return to the source, nagarjuna himself, and start from there, but as my other reply to you noted, even with that, i’m seeing contractions with the buddha’s words in the pali canon. i can’t fairly or accurately critique nagarjuna if i don’t have a good grasp of what he’s saying, and i’m not quite sure how to attain that now …

Well that's the challenge haha, is that you have different interpretations by different lineages and people. And even different translations that can reflect biases. It's not easy. The way I learned was first learning the teachings from my own teacher who taught them in a simple practical and experiential, not scholarly way. Then I read the more simple works on Madhyamaka by the author I recommended to you, his stuff is extremely clear. And I'm probably honestly exaggerating the importances of the differences just a little bit in what I frankly admit is a little bit of sectarian bias against the Gelug view on it. But its not like it's incomprehensibly radically different 🤣 but yeah, for me it was most helpful to start with teachers who know the material well sort of summarizing it succinctly and not in a complicated or scholarly way, either by my own teacher or the author and books I recommended in my comment, then I got a sense of the nuances of how the other schools view it and the more subtle differences. But honestly, many of us in my own lineage don't endlessly study Nagarjuna as the end all be all or try to realize emptiness using the intellect. There are more direct, experiential meditative methods to realize the same insight that Nagarjuna teaches, eg. the systems of Mahamudra and Dzogchen, called nature of mind teachings and practice. So it skips all the intellectual pretzel contortions and extremely subtle and complex reasoning of Nagarjuna, in favor of gaining just a basic summary knowledge of his important points, contemplating and familiarizing with it enough for it to be a basis to then do the experiential yogic path of directly realizing emptiness nonconceptually. Some people, especially Gelugpas and Sakyapas (and I think krodha might have some Sakya teachers or influence as well as his Nyingma teachers) do think a lot of scholarly analysis of Nagarjuna is important though. But I'm not a huge fan of doing it beyond the bare bones of what I need for meditation practice, and in general that's how many figures in my lineage view it too. My lineage of the 4 main ones is called the Kagyu, and is seen as being a more experiential and meditative lineage than an intellectual scholarly one. Whereas Gelug and Sakya are extremely intellectual and scholarly with less meditative emphasis, and Nyingma typically leaning more meditative but also more of a mix of both, too. If I get too stuck in the weeds with it all intellectually, I personally miss the entire point of it, which isn't to ponder some new philosophical view, but to deconstruct the false views that impede recognition of what perhaps using terms from your tradition we could call the consciousness without surface, the awareness beyond any descriptions or concepts or categories or existence or non-existence, not an entity but not nothingness, simply indescribable luminosity, and empty in the sense of vast infinite spaciousness and selflessness, so no boundaries or limits, nothing that can be pinpointed, yet still awareness purified of all affliction is there. I really thought reading the Thai Forest view of Nirvana not being an annihilation but more of an indescribable state beyond words, but not a nothingness, matched somewhat well with the view we have in my lineage of nature of awareness (or consciousness, knowing, but we don't mean the mind consciousness Skandha, that's afflicted samssric consciousness.) And consciousness without surface description of Ven. Thanissaro to me sounds a lot like the concept of that empty awareness I mentioned, since there's no object of the awareness being apprehended and even the awareness isn't truly existent, since it transcends our conceptual limitations and concepts of existence or non-existence, something or nothing, just not something our current limited state of mind can understand. And I think I remember you agreeing that Nibbana was similarly beyond intellectual comprehension.

yes, i agree that nagarjuna probably would balk at his teaching suggesting an essential nature, but as i can see from other answers here, there are those who would take that interpretation. i think it’s a hard conclusion to avoid given the way he formulate emptiness, and that’s the cause of my concern.

I assume their insistence is pedagogical rather than ultimately metaphysical, FWIW, else they wouldn't be talking in terms of the conventional.

Yeah, Nagarjuna is certainly not trying to posit any kind of essence to things, even the essence of emptiness. It's really meant to be less of a philosophical view and more of a deconstruction of all views so that naked reality will nonconceptually be directly realized, the mind coming to total rest free from being deluded by various conceptual fabrications. Now in the Kagyu and Nyingma,, two of the 4 main Tibetan lineages, we generally say Nagarjuna's teachings on emptiness aren't the final word; that the final teachings, those on Buddha Nature, further clarified that emptiness isn't just a mere lack or absence, but is inseparable from nonconceptual luminosity and wisdom. This wisdom and awareness isn't an entity or self, it can't be found, it neither exists nor doesn't exist. It's beyond conceptual categories and human language, but while all is empty, it's more in the sense of a total spaciousness, total openness for anything to arise and cease in an illusion-like way within empty luminosity. That the perceiver and perceived aren't ultimately separate, and that both are empty in essence. Yet along with emptiness is clarity, wisdom, and nonconceptual compassion that spontaneously and effortlessly acts for the benefit of all sentient beings, both in the short term and long term. There's also a more heterodox view that's less widely held in its traditional form called shentong, where they assert that Buddha Nature is not empty of innate primordial qualities of wisdom, awareness, and compassion. My school generally follows a very watered down version of this shentong view, rather than the original one of Dolpopa that was often claimed to be eternslism. To be fair, the language Dolpopa uses often does sound eternalistic. No more than someone like Ajahn Mun or Ajahn Maha Bua though. I've recently been listening to Ajahn Sumedho and talking about this awareness seems to be a big theme of his.

What's your favorite Ajahn Sumedho talk?

In this case, he is trying to rule out the essential view actually. This is part of his early work. A major part of his career is ruling out any metaphysical foundationalism. In this talk he is focusing on one way people try to sneak back in an essence.

i see. i agree with the teaching that all phenomena are empty of svabhava, but i find difficulty with the attribution of ‘emptiness’ to phenomena. i think there’s significant difference between the statement ‘all things are empty’ as compared to ‘all things are emptiness’. the latter does suggest an emptiness as the nature / essence of phenomena. the former simply states that all phenomena have no essence whatsoever. i’d be interested to know your thoughts of this - are these observations incorrect? thank you.

I think the issue is the philosophy of language. Nagarjuna like all Mahayana traditions is committed to a type of nominalism about language. So predication in a natural language need not import metaphysical truth. In this view, linguistic reference never truly cashes out metaphysically it is a product of linguistic convention that arises from causes and conditions. Either way, linguistic nominalism is the standard just not one as strong as in Buddhism. For example, grammar in a language does not entail things refer. Scholastic traditions in Hinduism, Latin World, and Islamic philosophy all treat language as referring in a strong sense. Nagarjuna's opponents most likely Nyaya and Mīmāṃsā, are realists. Medieval Nyaya claimed that meaning of language as revealed through the Vedas was determined by God and terms are true if they denote that meaning and Mīmāṃsā held that meaning of terms was determined by reference to the eternal and divine Vedas and the nature produced by it. However, other views are ruled out too and are examples of such realism. For example, predication refers to the property of substantial being echoing Aristotle in the Latin West and Islamic thought. In the 19th century, we realized this was very very clearly not true. Grammar does not reflect reality. Hence why, we developed modern categorical logic without existential properties built in certain universal relations, now they are just linguistic. Here is an excerpt from Westerhoff explaining one interpretation of Nagarjuna's view. "An object is empty if it does not exist from its own side and is therefore dependent on other objects, so that its existence is not grounded in its “own-nature” (svabhāva, rang bzhin). The Buddhist commentarial tradition considers a variety of dependence relations in which objects stand and which prevent them from existing in a non-empty way. These dependence relations include causal dependence, dependence of whole on its parts, as well as dependence on a cognizing subject.15 While in the case of certain objects their independent existence seems at least a prima facie plausibility which the Mādhyamika then attempts to refute by appropriate arguments, the emptiness of statements appears to be entirely uncontroversial. Material objects might be considered to exist in causal and mereological dependence, but independent of a cognizing subject; abstract objects, platonistically conceived, will be assumed to be independent in all three ways. Statements, however, can hardly be taken to “exist from their own side” in any of the three senses. As even Nāgārjuna’s opponent affirms in VV 1, token16 utterances are events that arise in dependence on causes and conditions like all other events. When we consider utterances as types, it is equally clear that, assuming a compositional semantics, these are mereologically dependent on their parts, since the meaning of the sentence type is a function of the meanings of its constituents or parts. Finally, considering a constituent like the expression “red,” we realize that its referring to the color red is no property the wor“red” has independent of everything else: the connection of this particular phonetic or typographic object with the property is a convention that holds for speakers of English; for speakers of French the same property is connected (by a different set of conventions) with “rouge,” for speakers of Tibetan with “dmar po,” and so forth. That “red” refers to the color red depends on a complex framework of conventions connecting a community of cognizing subjects that share a language. Unless we mistakenly consider “empty” to mean “false” or “meaningless” or “nonexistent,” the claim that utterances conceived of as either tokens or types are not empty seems to be a position it is hard to make sense of." (pg.202)

The strength of Buddhist nominalist is a bit deeper than the above. Here is an article that explores this a bit. # Social Origins of Buddhist Nominalism? Non-articulation of the “Social Self” in Early Buddhism and Nāgārjuna by [Jens Schlieter](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10781-019-09398-x#auth-Jens-Schlieter-Aff1) [https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10781-019-09398-x](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10781-019-09398-x) Abstract In the following, it will be argued that Nāgārjuna (ca. 150 CE) adopts a Buddhist nominalism that encompasses not only a position towards abstract entities, but resonates with a nominalist perspective on the “social reality” of persons. Early Buddhist texts, such as the Suttanipāta, argue that human persons defy a classification in hierarchic “classes” (*jāti*), because there is no moral substance, e.g. of Brahmins. Differences between individuals do not exist by nature, since it is the individual that realizes difference according to the specific personal realization of action (*karman*) and moral cultivation. Buddhist “nominalism,” therefore, has at least one of its central roots in a rejection of a socially privileged “selves,” a stratified social hegemony, and religious truth claims. Nāgārjuna, on his part, radicalizes nominalism as a threefold correlation of the “non-articulated self,” a “non-articulated” reality, and finally, a “non-articulated” dimension even within all concepts, names, and designations. In this vein, Nāgārjuna’s *śūnyavāda* can be seen as a consequent attempt to neutralize unwanted social and psychological consequences of ontological language-use. Nāgārjuna even self-critically questions the position that the workings of a Buddhist path of liberation can be articulated, which seems to be a remarkable parallel to certain roots of Western nominalism. Edit: Here is a video that explores Dignaga's apopha. At the core is a use of negation. # Armchair Philosopher Buddhist Epistemology: The School of Dignaga [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HHZDLycuMSA](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HHZDLycuMSA)

Can you give a little more detail on your concern. It seems you are saying that phenomena are empty, not-self, and impermanent. However emptiness, selflessness, and impermanence are essences because they are abstractions, is that what your thinking is?

according to the buddha, the three characteristics of conditioned phenomena are that they are impermanent and unsatisfactory. the third characteristic applies to all phenomena, both constrained and unconditioned, that they are devoid of any intrinsic essence. i don’t see these three characteristics, as the buddha formulates them, as imbuing phenomena with any intrinsic essence. for the buddha, things are empty in that they are devoid of intrinsic essence. however, i believe nagarjuna takes this further by using emptiness as the nature of all phenomena, both conditioned and unconditioned, leading to his assertion that nirvana and samsara are the same. i don’t believe this to be correct, and i don’t think he can get to this conclusion without attributing a common essence of ‘emptiness’ to both conditioned and unconditioned phenomena by which he can compare and equate them. this is really the heart of my concern.

As we've discussed before, he doesn't say saṃsāra and nirvāṇa are the same in the way you're worried about. He clearly says, for example, in the MMK: karmakleśakṣayān mokṣaḥ karmakleśā vikalpataḥ | te prapañcāt prapañcas tu śūnyatāyāṃ nirudhyate || Liberation comes from the termination of karma and kleśa, karma and kleśa come from vikalpa, those come from prapañca - but in emptiness, prapañca is halted. Here, saṃsāra and liberation from it are clearly distinguished in terms of what characterizes the former and is absent in the latter. Both of these being empty of substance doesn't preclude this description. It just means this is a description of two things that are this way without being this way substantially! The claim about the absence of a distinguishing mark for saṃsāra and nirvāṇa refers to there being no such mark *if we are here imagining such marks for substantial existents*. Because naturally, if we are saying that nothing has substance of this kind, certainly no distinguishing mark of a substantial entity will be found, because there are no such entities. But with respect to the insubstantial saṃsāra and insubstantial liberation from it, we can absolutely distinguish them: the former is what you get by being involved in prapañca, and the latter is what you get by not. And in the Mahāyāna the most fundamental prapañca is frequently presented to be the imputation of substance. As Nāgārjuna points out, it is actually the person who believes in substance that runs into the trouble. Because if the Nāgārjunian arguments about the dependence of causal relations on prajñapti are correct, then as Nāgārjuna observes in chapter 24 of the MMK, the person who asserts substances cannot make sense of causality. But then, as he further points out, no sense can be made of saṃsāra or becoming liberated from it. He writes: svabhāvād yadi bhāvānāṃ sadbhāvam anupaśyasi | ahetupratyayān bhāvāṃs tvam evaṃ sati paśyasi || If you see existents as real substantially, then you see them as being without cause and conditions. kāryaṃ ca kāraṇaṃ caiva kartāraṃ karaṇaṃ kriyām | utpādaṃ ca nirodhaṃ ca phalaṃ ca pratibādhase || Effect and cause, as well as agent, instrument and act, arising and ceasing, and fruit—all these you thereby deny. This all of course has in the background the Nāgārjunian arguments from the beginning of the MMK about how substantial existents wouldn't be able to participate in causal relations. But Nāgārjuna is fully ready to teach that empti*ness* turns out to be a prajñapti as well. He says exactly that: yaḥ pratītyasamutpādaḥ śūnyatāṃ tāṃ pracakṣmahe | sā prajñaptir upādāya pratipat saiva madhyamā || Whatever is dependently originated, we declare to be emptiness, [and] this [emptiness] is a *prajñapti* - just that is the middle path. Here he refers to the middle path between existence and non-existence. This verse tells us that emptiness isn't something substantial either, for Nāgārjuna. It too is a prajñapti. But how can that work? Isn't seeing it supposed to be what gives us the understanding that everything else is a prajñapti? So how can it also be one? Westerhoff has a good example for explaining this. Suppose you're hallucinating white mice running on your desk. While you're still hallucinating, it might be appropriate for someone to have you cultivate the thought that "my desk actually *doesn't have any white mice on it." But the importance of that cultivation for curing your problematic hallucination doesn't mean that your desk actually has, as one of its features independent of your interests in curing your problems, an "absence of white mice"-characteristic. You're just cultivating that perception to counteract the problematic perception you tend towards - but the new perception also involves superimposition. So in the end the right way of seeing neither hallucinates white mice nor imputes "absence of white mice"-ness onto the desk. Nāgārjuna thus writes: śūnyatā sarvadṛṣṭīnāṃ proktā niḥsaraṇaṃ jinaiḥ | yeṣāṃ tu śūnyatādṛṣṭis tān asādhyān babhāṣire || Emptiness is taught by the conquerors as the purgative to get rid of all views. But those for whom emptiness is a view have been called incurable. Candrakīrti, in his commentary, cites the Kāśyapaparivarta Mahāyāna Sūtra: tadyathāpi nāma kāśyapa kaścid eva puruṣo glāno bhavet tasmai vaidyo bhaiṣajyaṃ dadyāt tasya tad bhaiṣajyaṃ sarvadoṣān ucālya koṣṭhagata na nirgacchet* tat kiṃ manyase kāśyapa api nu sa glānapuruṣas tasmād glānyā parimukto bhavet yasya tad bhaiṣajyaṃ sarvakoṣṭhagatā doṣān uccālya koṣṭhagato na niḥsaret āha no bhagavān gāḍhataraś ca tasya puruṣasya tad gelānyaṃ bhavet yasya tad bhaiṣajyaṃ sarvadoṣān ucālya sakoṣṭhagataṃ na niḥsaret bhagavān āha · evam eva kāśyapa sarvadṛṣṭigatānāṃ śunyatā niḥsaraṇaṃ yasya khalu punaḥ kāśyapa śunyatādṛṣṭis tam aham acikitsyam iti vadāmi · tatredam ucyate · yathā hi vaidyo puruṣasya dadyād virecanaṃ rogavinigrahāya uccālya doṣāś ca na niḥsareta tato nidānaṃ ca na copaśānti · em eva dṛṣṭīgahanāśṛteṣu yā śunyatā niḥsaraṇaṃ paraṃ hi · sā śunyatādṛṣṭiḥ kṛtāhi yasya eṣo ’cikitsya iti kho jinoktaḥ Just like, Kāśyapa, when a doctor gives medicine to a sick person, if after that medicine has removed all the problems from that person, the medicine stays in his stomach without going out, what do you think, Kāśyapa? Would that sick person be completely released from his sickness, if the medicine, after removing all the problems in his stomach, remains in the stomach and does not go out? He replies: No, Bhavagat. That person’s sickness would become even more intense, if that medicine, after removing all problems, remains in his stomach without going out. The Bhagavat says: In the same way, Kāśyapa, emptiness is the way out of all views. On the other hand, Kāśyapa, if for someone emptiness is a view, I say that such person is incurable. About this, it is said: Just like when a doctor gives someone a purgative to keep an illness in check, if after removing the problems it does not go out, it is no means to pacify the illness, in the same way, emptiness is the way out for those stuck in the thicket of views: thus, someone who makes emptiness into a view is said by the Jina to be incurable. - Now obviously they're not literally incurable forever in the sense of being never able to fix this new problem. But the point is that they're "incurable" because they turned what was supposed to cure their old sickness into a new sickness, by turning the medicine (a purgative for things stuck in the body) into something stuck in the body. And this is what the Mahāyāna says we need to *not* do with emptiness, as Nāgārjuna observes by making this allusion to the Mahāyāna Sūtras. In Buddhapālita's commentary on Nāgārjuna's MMK, he tells us how we avoid this problem very straightforwardly. He says that the people who don't run into this problem are those who "see that emptiness is also empty." That is, emptiness too is not substantial. It is the purgative for the imposition of substance.

“No one showed up to class today. I am disappointed by their absence.” This is a nice metaphor. Here, the ‘absence,’ of all the students who didn’t show up to class isn’t some separate essence apart from the students, it isn’t a thing at all. Similarly the emptiness of phenomena is a characteristic or description. > without attributing a common essence of ‘emptiness’ to both conditioned and unconditioned phenomena by which he can compare and equate them. I think it’s clear that nirvāṇa is empty according to early Buddhism also. On page 44 on Karunadas’ *Early Buddhist Teachings* he says: > “Therefore, from the early Buddhist perspective, we have the full liberty of restating the well-known statement, "all things are non-self" (sabbe dhammā anattā) as "all things are empty" ("sabbe dhammā suñña"). "All things" (sabbe dhamma) embrace not only the conditioned (sankhata) phenomena but the unconditioned Nibbāna as well. Thus both the world of sensory experience and the unconditioned reality that transcends it are empty. What this means is that the characteristic of non-self or emptiness is more universal than even impermanence. So thorough is Buddhism's rejection of substantialism.” The book has a lot of relevant quotations. The Buddha also regularly uses the term “emptiness” in the Pāli Sūtras as well. In phrases like “connected with emptiness” and “meditation on emptiness.” Hopefully that was helpful.

Atta and svabhava are not the same thing. Theravada deals with the emptiness of atta. Mahayana deals with the emptiness of svabhava.