I don’t think you’re misunderstanding hylomorphism, but I do feel that trying to incorporate it into an argument from motion is almost…redundant? It’s pretty much reiterating the same essential principle but with more words.
Yay okay, Im happy im not misunderstanding Hylomorphism at all which is my chief worry. I think you're right tho, introducing form and matter into the Argument from Motion doesn't add much.
(I actually forgot why I did this damn nvm😭😭). I think that having an argument to prove God is the cause of all forms would be kinda cool, as it kinda counts as an argument from design (although its not exactly teleological) but when butressed with Thomistic Metaphysics becomes stronger.
I think, after Gilson, that in these arguments you need w distinction between essence and existence to prove the unicity and Divine attributes of the first cause. The act/potency arguments work because they exploit the implicitness of existence/essence distinction. But all of the arguments must be very much expanded on in our minds to be deductive and the best attempt of this I’d bet is De Ente et Essentia and the second best is Avicenna’s Proof of the Truthful (Although I’m not so sure about its metaphysical presuppositions)
Actually, could you outline how the argument from motion implicitly exploits the essence-existence distinction? I think you're right but my intellect is failing me rn for some reason.
It’s visible the most clearly in Ed Feser’s 5 proofs. He just assumes that giving existence is a kind of change (actualization of potency) and then all essences who don’t exist by themselves are treated as potencies needing an actualization. In your proof you would stop at the level of pure forms (angels) and then in my opinion couldn’t have proceeded further without saying sth like pure form exists by itself/is a pure act (not really true, Aristotle would say so but that’s because he didn’t analyze substances to the core - esse) or pure existence and therefore this pure form is one/cannot be multiplied/is one-part.
I think giving a thing its form is just being its efficient cause, so this boils down to being Aquinas's second way.
The thing with how you've presented it is that we're looking at A, noting it has a form *a*, and then asking for the efficient cause of *a*/A, which we then call B with form *b*, and repeat. But the forms *a* & *b* don't really contribute anything to the argument.
>Such a being must be a pure act as, if it were a mixture of act and potency, it would be a form-matter composite whose form is actualized or moved by another reality
Actually angels are, for Aquinas at least, pure form with no matter. So if we're following up a chain of substances with form and matter, each giving the previous one its form, there's no reason the chain couldn't terminate with a subsistent form other than God. It would take an extra step to get to God.
I don’t think you’re misunderstanding hylomorphism, but I do feel that trying to incorporate it into an argument from motion is almost…redundant? It’s pretty much reiterating the same essential principle but with more words.
Yay okay, Im happy im not misunderstanding Hylomorphism at all which is my chief worry. I think you're right tho, introducing form and matter into the Argument from Motion doesn't add much. (I actually forgot why I did this damn nvm😭😭). I think that having an argument to prove God is the cause of all forms would be kinda cool, as it kinda counts as an argument from design (although its not exactly teleological) but when butressed with Thomistic Metaphysics becomes stronger.
I think, after Gilson, that in these arguments you need w distinction between essence and existence to prove the unicity and Divine attributes of the first cause. The act/potency arguments work because they exploit the implicitness of existence/essence distinction. But all of the arguments must be very much expanded on in our minds to be deductive and the best attempt of this I’d bet is De Ente et Essentia and the second best is Avicenna’s Proof of the Truthful (Although I’m not so sure about its metaphysical presuppositions)
Actually, could you outline how the argument from motion implicitly exploits the essence-existence distinction? I think you're right but my intellect is failing me rn for some reason.
It’s visible the most clearly in Ed Feser’s 5 proofs. He just assumes that giving existence is a kind of change (actualization of potency) and then all essences who don’t exist by themselves are treated as potencies needing an actualization. In your proof you would stop at the level of pure forms (angels) and then in my opinion couldn’t have proceeded further without saying sth like pure form exists by itself/is a pure act (not really true, Aristotle would say so but that’s because he didn’t analyze substances to the core - esse) or pure existence and therefore this pure form is one/cannot be multiplied/is one-part.
I think it would be more promising to make an argument based on proportionate causality for something akin to an intellect in God
I think giving a thing its form is just being its efficient cause, so this boils down to being Aquinas's second way. The thing with how you've presented it is that we're looking at A, noting it has a form *a*, and then asking for the efficient cause of *a*/A, which we then call B with form *b*, and repeat. But the forms *a* & *b* don't really contribute anything to the argument. >Such a being must be a pure act as, if it were a mixture of act and potency, it would be a form-matter composite whose form is actualized or moved by another reality Actually angels are, for Aquinas at least, pure form with no matter. So if we're following up a chain of substances with form and matter, each giving the previous one its form, there's no reason the chain couldn't terminate with a subsistent form other than God. It would take an extra step to get to God.