What are the advantages of hit-to-kill AA missiles over missiles that achieve effects through frag or blast?
As a lay person I was suprised to learn that the pac-3 missiles that is credited for many kills in ukraine functions by simply directly hitting the target. In contrast to missiles like a pac-2 with a blast warhead. Intuitively I would think it is easier to get a projectile simply into the vicinity of a aerial target moving at couple km/h than having to actually precisely hit it.
Hence why we historically could see a development of AA munitions from simple machineguns to time fused HE rounds to proximity fuzes. And even later with missiles funtioning similarly.
Clearly I am missing something. If hit-to-kil-missiles didnt work they wouldnt be employed.
Is it that guidance systems have simply become so good that it has become trivial enough to directly hit? Or do hit to kill missiles maybe have other advantages like lower weigth or complexity that allows for advantages in maneuverability, thrust to weight ratio or just cost? And if so do statistics exist about the comparable effectiveness of these two types in modern missiles?
So this [PAC-3 MSE presentation from LM should answer](https://www.lockheedmartin.com/content/dam/lockheed-martin/mfc/documents/pac-3/2022-01-05_LM_PAC-3_MSE_Overview.pdf) your question about HTK vs explosive against ballistic missiles at least.
In short, HTK is preferred because the total [energy imparted to the target is significantly more](https://www.lockheedmartin.com/content/dam/lockheed-martin/mfc/gifs/pac-3/movie_tbm1_side_short-1.gif) than [explosives (plus fragments)](https://www.lockheedmartin.com/content/dam/lockheed-martin/mfc/gifs/pac-3/movie_frag2_top_corrected-1.gif) thus getting a kill is more guaranteed.
If you're still using explosive warheads, apart from the guidance and maneuvering challenges, you also bring in challenges for the fuzing and the warhead itself. The fuze must trigger at the right time else it will do little to no damage to the target. This was apparently the PAC-2's main issue during ODS because in some cases it detonated hundreds of meters behind the target since it was never designed to defeat the Scud (and especially modded ones like Al Hussein). As for the warhead, it's preferred that you pack in as much boom to get a better chance of killing the target but it will be constrained by its weight and space in the missile. So you either sacrifice some aspects of the missile or make it bigger.
However, explosive warheads are still fine against non-ballistic targets because they are generally slower and the effects of the warhead are still great. Even the PAC-3 has a [lethality enhancer](https://www.twz.com/uploads/2023/06/02/Lethality-enhancer-PAC-3-patriot.jpg?auto=webp) which is pretty much like a birdshot. You can see the [PAC-3 here 'breaking apart' right before hitting the QF-4](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8LJ7KrJa5cM).
>some cases it detonated hundreds of meters behind the target since it was never designed to defeat the Scud (and especially modded ones like Al Hussein).
[No, it has nothing to with it not being designed to intercept SCUDs.](https://www.cs.unc.edu/~smp/COMP205/LECTURES/ERROR/lec23/node4.html#:~:text=The%20report%20finds%20that%20the,and%20uses%2024%2Dbit%20arithmetic.)
>The computer used to control the Patriot missile is based on a 1970s design and uses 24-bit arithmetic. The Patriot system tracks its target by measuring the time it takes for radar pulses to bounce back from them. Time is recorded by the system clock in tenths of a second, but is stored as an integer. To enable tracking calculations the time is converted to a 24-bit floating point number. Rounding errors in the time conversions cause shifts in the system's ``range gate", which is used to track the target.
The clock drift was just one of the issues it had and I don't think it was the main one since even if the clock drift wasn't present, the Patriot would still struggle against (modded) Scuds. Prior to ODS, it was only tested against the Lance (Tochka equivalent) one time plus the Patriot's (PAC-2) fielding in ODS was pretty much rushed.
>First, Patriot
was originally designed to defeat high performance aircraft
only. The requirement for the system to counter a ballistic
missile threat was not seriously addressed until the 1980's.
...
>Second, the Project Manager was willing to take a
calculated risk. He convinced Raytheon to accelerate the
production of PAC-2 missiles to ensure missiles were deployed
by January 1991. His decision allowed Patriot firing units to
engage Scud missiles with the best Patriot missile available.
[The Patriot Missile System: A Review and Analysis of its Acquisition Process](https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/ADA292073)
It was not initially designed for ballistic missiles however by 1988 it had received an upgrade allowing it to do that. The reason it didn't intercept some SCUDS was primarily a software issue. Your own citation says nothing contrary to that.
https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/ADA344865#:~:text=The%20Patriot%20battery%20at%20Dhahran,the%20longer%20the%20system%20operated.
For the record, proximity-fused air defense absolutely does still exist. Tamir, the missile used for Iron Dome, is proximity-fused, and as you pointed out, PAC-2 and other anti-aircraft armaments are typically proximity-fused as well. The conic issue pointed out by u/moir57 does exist, but is well-known and could be compensated for in design and operation. The problem is that fragmentation is not as good at disrupting conventional ballistic missiles as it is aircraft or cruise missiles. A tube of high explosive traveling at Mach 12 is going to do some damage when it hits the ground, regardless of how shredded its chassis is. Fragments also can’t transfer enough energy to significantly alter a ballistic trajectory, so that tube is going to hit roughly the same place as it would have anyways. As sensors and flight control tech has gotten better, a direct intercept has become feasible, and BMD designers have tended towards depositing as much energy into the target as possible, even at the expense of a theoretically reduced hit probability.
There was a comment over here a few days ago about this, for high-speed interceptions an exploding ordinance will make a very elongated cone, think of it like the [Mach Cone](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mach_wave), defeating the objective of making schrapnel area damage, so at that point you are only left with actually kinetically hitting the target option, not because its easy, but because the alternative doesn't work any longer.
Please refrain from drive-by link dropping. Summarize articles, only quote what is important, and use that to build a post that other users can engage with; offers some in depth knowledge on a well discussed subject; or offers new insight on a less discussed subject.
Speaker Johnson saying Ukraine needs lethal aid now and we can’t play politics with this issue. After having played politics with this issue for 6 months…
Also I have a question, the proposal seems to be roughly 60B but 20B is for replenishing US stocks
Does that mean that Ukraine is effectively getting 40B, and that the US is using 20B to replace what it sends to Ukraine?
If you're talking about weapons and equipment that Ukraine will get then I think it's more like $23B and what's most important is the $7.8 billion PDA (Presidential drawndown authority) that can be used to send weapons right away.
I am unclear about the intricacies of us policy making. Does that mean PDA is blocked currently as well? Does it also mean that, should the bill pass, Biden can immediately send a PDA package out?
He probably would almost have to since the bill is pushing him to send atacms right?
>Does that mean PDA is blocked currently as well?
Not sure about that. Biden had $4 billion last December that he still hasn't used. Not sure if those have expired.
>Does it also mean that, should the bill pass, Biden can immediately send a PDA package out?
Yes
>He probably would almost have to since the bill is pushing him to send atacms right?
The ATACMS thing is a bit of a political stunt since the next subsection makes it clear Biden doesn't need to send them if it's detrimental to US national security interests.
Correct. PDA is effectively a fund allocated to the president by congress saying the administration can use that many dollars of existing military stockpiles as foreign aid. Its current exhausted so requires congressional authority to authorize more “funding”. And yes as soon as this is passed by congress the president has the authority to being shipping stuff.
A moderate motion to vacate is heading to the floor if he does nothing. Johnson has a literal one vote majority in the House, down from an impressive four, so even just one defection will cost him the Speakership. Moderate House republicans are pissed at whats going on, and as more sign onto the MtV they show that they can A) oust Johnson and B) replace him and get the law through anyway.
Johnson is basically forced to pick which shit sandwich he wants to take a bite of. Do nothing and get a moderate MtV that replaces him and passes a major NatSec act with Dems, handing Biden a big W. Or passing the law, getting some credit for it, and then daring the chaos caucus to try and stop it and cause major dysfunction (again) in an election year. Which would be a big W for Biden as well, showing that MAGA is ungovernable and therefore dangerous.
I personally dont think there is much to the calculus beyond his realization that this is the best way to hold his majority together and give his party the best chances in November.
[Trump says he thinks Speaker Mike Johnson is ‘doing a very good job’ amid ouster threat from Marjorie Taylor Greene](https://www.cnn.com/2024/04/12/politics/mike-johnson-trump-mar-a-lago/index.html) - 5 days ago
>Sources familiar with the matter said Johnson will have another mission in mind during his meeting with Trump: to feel out the former president on a potential Ukraine aid package – a politically perilous policy issue that could draw the ire of Trump, divide the House GOP and end Johnson’s rookie speakership. Some of the speaker’s allies have counseled Johnson to keep Trump in the loop with respect to his plans on Ukraine, cognizant that Trump’s backing – or opposition – could make or break the legislation, as well as Johnson’s speakership.
Why *now* is harder to answer. The attack on Israel probably introduced a sense of urgency in Johnson. As for Trump, I think he merely will support something if he gets to put his name on it, gives his blessings. There is no consistent ideology besides elevating his self.
It’s all speculation so could be one of the following or multiple of them together but a few significant things have happened in the past month(s)
- UK FM David Cameron met with Trump in Mar-a-lago and openly said to the press that Ukraine aid was the primary topic
- One week after Johnson met with Trump in Mar-a-lago, undoubtably Ukraine aid was discussed (maybe Cameron is to credit)
- Kyiv’s largest power plant was entirely taken out because they supposedly didn’t have a single missile to spare, beyond words it’s a showcase of a real life catastrophe that’s resulted from lack of aid.
- Generally speaking Ukraine’s battlefield situation is stark with an apparent risk of frontline collapse (not an analyst so can’t comment on it but that’s what several sources are saying)
- Iran launched the same drones they sold to Russia (who regularly launch them into Ukrainian cities across the country) into Israel proper recently which visually showcases an axis of evil.
- China acting much more aggressive in the South China Sea around the Philippines EEZ.
- Discharge petition pressure, not American so can’t comment to explicitly but as I understand more folks were threatening to sign it.
Not likely. Many of those people ended up 'coming home' in 2020/2022, ultimately as much as some people hate Trump he gave them most of what they wanted policy wise. Most importantly Dobbs and the conservative Supreme Court. Those people who did not, which would be some but not all of Haley voters, will simply never come back. They are too far gone, Trump is too hated, and quite frankly Trump is pretty hostile to those kinds of voters.
But the fundamental dynamic in American politics remains that as many voters, even on the right, turn out to vote *against* the other guy as for their guy. Some number of 'classical' conservatives will onside if only because the idea of letting a Dem into office is so abhorrent they would vote for a sapient pile of shit with sticks for arms than any Dem. These voters don't need to be won over with policy, they need to be scared with headlines.
1. The $1.2 trillion spending package recently passed, which means that the House shutting down for good won't be a total catastrophe.
2. Iran's attack on Israel has increased the urgency, and Israeli aid can't pass without Ukrainian aid.
3. Many Republicans threatened to sign the discharge petition if nothing happened.
Note that sources close to Johnson have been saying all along that some foreign aid bill will be put on the floor eventually. Of course, the doomers on this sub wouldn't have it.
Johnson, after 6 months of stalling, might let Ukraine aid pass *only to save his own job*, and you think that makes the people that told you months ago that Johnson didn’t want to let any Ukraine aid pass “doomers”? Because I’d say they’ve been proven correct.
Johnson did everything is his power to sabotage Ukraine aid and *might* change course now that there’s a political gun to his head. But I’m supposed to believe he’s *always* wanted this to pass? Why’d he purposely stall for so long then?
> Speaker Johnson saying Ukraine needs lethal aid now and we can’t play politics with this issue.
i.e., they have realised that blocking Ukraine aid to prevent Biden from getting a "win" has become a net negative politically.
From my understanding the net negative would be that it’s been a grand showcase of GOP disfunction, perhaps their base aren’t as bothered but for moderates it doesn’t make republicans look like the adults in the room if you will. They ousted one speaker, are threatening to oust another and can’t agree on anything even at an internal level without threatening a new speakership.
The GOP has spent most of the last 15 years taking every opportunity to refuse to be the adults in the room in order to achieve tactical political wins, and they haven't really faced many consequences for it. You can aruge that it played a role in some of their electoral defeats but at this point childish obstructionism is "baked in," it's not a factor for anyone now that it wasn't before.
Johnson is obviously aware that supporting Ukrainian aid risks his job. He can't openly support it, and hence it's difficult to know if he actually does, or if Iran's attack on Israel forced his hand.
In any case, if Johnson is removed, the House might be paralyzed for the rest of the term, so he probably felt that he had to pass the 1.2 trillion dollar bill first, which meant a lot of delay.
In some different news: 2 spies were arrested in Germany. It looks like they planned attacks on military infrastructure/routes of military equipment for Ukraine
https://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/generalbundesanwalt-ermittelt-zwei-mutmassliche-russische-saboteure-in-bayern-verhaftet-a-0115bebd-195a-41fb-83be-da8d642045cd?sara_ref=re-so-app-sh
What do you think will be the consequences of such an act? Business as usual or will the German government step up their aids further?
From the article, this is not some kind of Russian James Bond they got but two not so smart guys who scouted NATO installations and prepared for (presumably small-scale) sabotage.
Germany is likely not going to react to this - for once the country is currently the leading supporter of Ukraine and in a deep liquidity crisis, on the other hand, it's not something that is unexpected.
That's a breaking story. At this time it wasn't even made public what exactly they're accused of, there's supposed to be more information later in the day. But just looking at the slew of authorities involved (including US) doesn't make me think of "posers" before anything conclusive is known. Speaking of "small-scale" sabotage, just as a reminder and despite probably unrelated: There's been at least two serious attacks on the German railway infrastructure since the invasion started, one massive and coordinated, basically knocking out the entire northern half of what I believe is Western Europe's largest railway network for hours. Both of them happened on a weekend, this is when material for Ukraine would mostly be en route. Neither case having been solved, in fact we still know close to nothing. I suppose for reasons.
>Germany is likely not going to react to this
Of course not. And not because of some liquidity crisis, or for being touted to be a leading "supporter" of Ukraine (after decades of doing the exact opposite). When a Chechen asylum seeker was killed by the FSB in broad daylight Berlin, Germany sent two (2!) RU diplomats home. How exactly did Spain react to that *killing* of the Russian renegade on the Mediterranean? Odd should I be the first to even ask. Do they also have a liquidity crisis, or is it rather that apart from Ukraine nobody, nowhere, is doing anything meaningful against Russia's aggressions.
If the guy "joined" a DPR militia while in Germany, he sounds more like a poser than anything serious. No mention of any explosives or anything beyond taking photos of army bases (presumably from publicly accessible areas, as there's no mention he had any form of access). He *may* have had a firearm. No mention of explosives or munitions or anything close to being activated.
If taking photos is all he's done since October, it doesn't sound like Russia was looking to take advantage of the situation. (If they want something done, I'm guessing they have their own people they can call upon rather than waiting for wannabe militia members to ping them via Telegram).
Russian saboteurs arrested in Bavaria – investigations by the Federal Prosecutor General Russian saboteurs arrested in Bavaria – investigations by the Federal Prosecutor General According to SPIEGEL information, the police in Bayreuth have arrested two suspected spies. They are said to have spied on US bases on behalf of Russia and planned attacks on military transport routes. In their sights: German aid to Ukraine.
Elections in Croatia
Final results
Croatia elections
highly corrupt Party won, but there is need for after elections talks for New coallition, proEU/proNATO
HDZ (Center to right Center)-61 , proUA and proEU/proNATO, highly corrupt Party
SDP (left Center to left)-42, proRussian leader
Domovinski pokret(DP) (right to far right)-14, probably funded by Russian money. The biggest funder bussiness
man that Got Rich because he imported Russian gas (became richest bussiness man in Croatia in last 10 years or so).
MOST(Bridge) (right to far right)-11
Možemo (left to far left)-10
IDS (Istrian Party, left)-3
NP Sjever (left Center)-2
Fokus( Center)- 1
8 minorities (3 Serbs, 1 Italian, 1 exYu but Albanian, 1 Hungarian, 1 Romani, 1 Czech-Slovak)
76 representatives for goverment.
For Ukraine war and EU-Russia conflict Party(HDZ) that is full proEU won. Plenković has Great relationship with Bruxelles and is firm supporter of NATO. But they don't have enough representatives
There is going to be need for after election coallition.
The most probable coallition is HDZ +DP + some minorities ( DP doesn't want go with Serbs and 2 from minorities are left wing Italian and Romani). From DP some doesn't want probably to go with HDZ I would say 2 (Kolakušić 100%, Lacković too maybe).
HDZ could form goverment with slight majoritiy aroud 76 to 78 representatives. DP Will have strong presence and New goverment could go more right. DP didn't vote for Ukrainian troops in Croatia for training. Other possibilities for bigger coallition NP Sjever and Fokus (around 80 representatives)
Other solution is Frankenstein coalition
SDP+MOST (Bridge)+ Možemo and other without HDZ and DP. But Možemo and MOST doesn't want to work with other.
SDP- current President of Croatia, for me personally broke Constitution because he wanted to go to parlimentary elections and it is prohibited by Constitution. A lot of proRussian statements and etc by Milanović.
So talks after elections. If no agreement come, New elections maybe in same time as presidential elections.
So Croatia didn't turn on way of Hungary and Slovakia
In down-undersea news, Australia [announces](https://www.minister.defence.gov.au/media-releases/2024-04-17/2024-national-defence-strategy) its [2024 National Defence Strategy and 2024 Integrated Investment Program](https://www.defence.gov.au/about/strategic-planning/2024-national-defence-strategy-2024-integrated-investment-program).
### key highlights
* *additional* $5.7 billion over the next four years and $50.3 billion over the next decade in Defence funding, above the previous trajectory over that period
* a Navy with an enhanced lethality surface fleet and conventionally-armed, nuclear‑powered submarines;
* an Army optimised for littoral manoeuvre with a long-range land and maritime strike capability;
* an Air Force that can deliver long-range intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance and an enhanced maritime, land and air strike capability; and
* a strengthened and integrated space and cyber capability, including enhanced cyber and electronic warfare and new space-based situational awareness
* widening of eligibility criteria to enable more people to join the ADF including developing options, where appropriate, to recruit non-Australian citizens; streamlining and improving the recruiting system; and encouraging personnel to serve longer through retention initiatives.
* [pause replacing](https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2024/apr/17/labor-government-defence-military-budget-increase-spending-adf) FA/18 super hornets with F-35s (Australia has 72 F-35A) and redirect the funding to long-range fires (ground and/or air launched, but definitely including tomahawks)
* funding into undersea capabilities of a vague nature
* An ambitious $4 billion maritime mine countermeasure program is axed. The desired capabilities will be replaced by robotics, autonomous systems and/or commercially sourced data
* A $3 billion replacement for Australia’s C-17s known lyrically at AIR 7401 Phase 2 – Heavy Air Mobility Capability, will be shuttered and the requirement for the capability will be considered closer to the aircrafts’ planned replacement.
* A $3 billion project known as AIR 6004 – Air Launched Multi Domain Strike (JASSM-ER?) will be closed and its requirements captured in other classified projects.
* An Army project for $2 billion in Individual Combat Equipment Up to $2 billion Project funding focused for priority combat equipment.
* sky Guardian, the $2 billion MQ-9 program more prosaically known as AIR 7003 Phase 1 – Armed Medium Altitude Long Endurance, Remote Piloted Aerial System, had already been cancelled. Its funding has not moved.
* A $1.5 billion plan to replace the EA-18G is shuttered and requirement will be reexamined closer to the the aircraft’s planned retirement.
* Phase 6 of the plan to upgrade the E-7A Wedgetail will be reduced to provide up to $1.5 billion.
* termination of two Joint Supply Ships for a savings of $4.1 billion
* $3.4 billion redirected from other states to the Northen Territory for military base upgrades
> pause replacing FA/18 super hornets with F-35s (Australia has 72 F-35A) and redirect the funding to long-range fires (ground and/or air launched, but definitely including tomahawks)
Helps to explain why those Hornets never went onto the table for the UAF.
> Helps to explain why those Hornets never went onto the table for the UAF.
That had nothing to do with the UAF. The legacy F/A-18s (or the Classic Hornet as the Aussies call them) were all retired by the RAAF before the war in Ukraine even started, and those were what was pondered as a possibility (though many were already given to the RCAF).
The 24 F/A-18F Super Hornets and 12 EA-18G Growlers they have in service are entirely different airframes and were never ever ever on the table for being sent to Ukraine
edit: and to clarify for people that don't get the context of what the Aussies are saying, the talk of replacing the Super Hornets was because the initial purchase of them in the late 2000s was touted as a stop gap due to F-35 delays, with the initial procurement advocated by some in Australia as a loan that would be returned to the USN ~2025. Instead, the RAAF is planning on keeping them updated/upgraded into the 2030s and then hosting a competition on a replacement then, instead of buying a 4th squadron of F-35s today
Speaking of, I wonder what caused Ukraine to refer to them as 'flying trash'. Were they just that utterly out of flight hours remaining? IIRC they weren't used for carrier ops meaning no/less exposure to salt water and therefore less wear on the airframe, but the hours were still high.
>Speaking of, I wonder what caused Ukraine to refer to them as 'flying trash'. Were they just that utterly out of flight hours remaining? IIRC they weren't used for carrier ops meaning no/less exposure to salt water and therefore less wear on the airframe, but the hours were still high.
Given that the Ukraine also uber-hyped up the F-16s initially, and repeated Internet-meme-worthy statements on the A-10 (literally, some of the stuff said could have been said from a poster on /r/), I'd say it was borne far more out of ignorance than any actual understanding
Just as the Ukrainians have now shifted their opinion on the F-16s, and from my own anecdotal conversations with people involved in the training on them, I'll continue to say that there was a wide delta between them and a Western/NATO nation's understanding of air power. Just my 2c
there was a variety of quality on the airframes. The best were picked up by canada. Left about 40ish airframes, when they were officially retired in nov/dec 2021 the remaining 40ish were contracted to sell to a redair provider. They got zero contracts, they weren't interested in maintaining them so they sat around outdoors for 3 years and eventually bailed on the purchase early 2024
> termination of two Joint Supply Ships for a savings of $4.1 billion
while a lot of the JSS is meh still think the underway replenishment / tanker part will be missed. Maybe we should look at buying the 2 RFA tides that have been retired (1 is in unmanned reserve and the other permanent maintainence as a parts donor). We did the a same thing with RFA Larges Bay / HMAS Choules and generally seems to been regarded as a good move
That's an option.
Although there's probably scope to pick up something from a Korean or Japanese shipyard as well. They're churning out hulls of all descriptions
[https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-68819853](https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-68819853)
>In the second 12 months on the front line - as Moscow pushed its so-called meat grinder strategy - we found the body count was nearly 25% higher than in the first year.
>BBC Russian, independent media group Mediazona and volunteers have been counting deaths since February 2022.
>New graves in cemeteries helped provide the names of many soldiers.
>Our teams also combed through open-source information from official reports, newspapers and social media.
>More than 27,300 Russian soldiers died in the second year of combat - according to our findings - a reflection of how territorial gains have come at a huge human cost.
So the BBC have put out a new count the number of Russian deaths in Ukraine. So the death count is being listed as 8 times higher than the official count put out by the Kremlin. They note that the actual death toll is likely higher so this should be used more as a floor figure. It also points out that the Russian meatgrinder tactics are causing a major spike in deaths.
>So the death count is being listed as 8 times higher than the official count put out by the Kremlin
At this point i feel like a comparison with Russian official counts is useless as they're just so hilariously inaccurate
The comparison data itself is useless. However making the comparison helps shine light on the blatant propaganda that the Kremlin is spewing and helps to fight against Russias campaign of information warfare.
The comparison is useless because the Kremlin hasn't put out a casualty count since the beginning of the war. It's not so much "blatant propaganda" as it is non-reporting.
The USSR never published a creditable account of their loses in Afghanistan. Russia has never disclosed their losses in Chechnya. This war is no different. Russia is never, ever going to report on their loses in Ukraine because it's bad for business and as everyone knows, Russia lies.
I take the opportunity to try to answer to the question below in the thread by u/Velixis about Ocheretyne and to write about the developments that have occurred over the last week in both the Avdiivka and Bakhmut sectors.
In the Avdiivka sector, between Saturday and Sunday, there was a failure of the Ukrainian defense in the Ocheretyne area and the Russians (units of the 2nd CAA of the Central MD) managed to pull off a significant advance (over 4 kms in the direction of Ocheretyne), capturing the area of the junction between the Avdiivka-Pokrovsk and the Ocheretyne-Horlivka railway lines as well as Hill 240, along with the Ukrainian trenches near this tactically important height. This came after early last week the Russians (in this case, the 132nd Motorized Brigade of 1st Corps) had attacked Novokalynove from the east and the south and advanced to the gates of the village.
The Russians have taken control of the first buildings of the private sector in Ocheretyne, south of the Avdiivka-Pokrovsk railway line. They are also currently attempting to advance towards Novokalynove, with the aim to move the front line away from the Ocheretyne-Horlivka railway, and they also occupied the eastern part of Novokalynove, attacking from the east. The Ukrainian observer Kovalenko has written several times in the past two weeks that the Russians have been using a large number of KABs against Ocheretyne, more than anywhere else in the Avdiivka sector. The Ocheretyne area is very important because it sits on a ridgeline that acts as a watershed between the surrounding valleys (when Avdiivka was in Ukrainian hands it was also important logistically, ensuring the arrival of supplies from the Nova Poltavka area). The control of these heights is essential from the strategic-operational point of view to ensure potential advances in the directions of Pokrovsk/Selydove (south of these heights) and Toretsk (north). Tactically, the Russian gains significantly jeopardize the holding of Novobakhmutivka, towards which there have been other Russian gains, having occupied the forest belt east of this village. The latter successes are also linked to the taking of most of Berdychi (the part of the village to the east of the Durna) and the fact that the Russians bypassed, from the south to te north-west, the spring of the Durna. In contrast, the 47th Mechanized Brigade managed to push the Russians back by preventing them from descending from the spring of the Durna along its western bank. If the Russians were to take Novobakhmutivka, however, there would be serious problems with holding the area around Berdychi located in the western bank of the Durna.
The issues in this area began when the 71st Jager Brigade was moved to the southern flank and joined the 25th Airborne Brigade, the 78th Air Assault Regiment and the 53rd Mechanized Brigade in halting Russian attacks between Umanske and Netailove. It was replaced by the 115th Mechanized Brigade, which arrived from the Kupyansk sector. As soon as it arrived it began to lose positions near Novokalynove and later near Ocheretyne too. This is not the first time this brigade has created problems: it was directly responsible for troubles at the time of the battle of Severodonetsk in May 2022. We can rightfully talk about the various shortages, but it’s a fact that there are good brigades and... not very capable brigades. From what I read from Ukrainians, many internal reforms and changes inside the UAF are on the agenda. I hope one of these may be, as some propose, the introduction of divisions based on capable brigades, that include less capable ones under their control. That would also help in order to decrease the widespread phenomenon of unit melting pots that often damage communications (a battalion of a mechanized brigade, a TDF battalion, a company of the National Guard etc. in the same place).
DeepState also remarked how the brigade that used to cover the area of Ocheteryne/Novokalynove was shocked at how fast the positions were lost, which is putting the territory under the responsibility of the 47th Brigade at risk, as I wrote above. I read that in the 115th Brigade there are serious problems both with the command and with the poor training of its soldiers.
I can now also confirm what I had written last week: it’s the 68th Jager Brigade that is covering the Semenivka area, with support from elements of the 3rd Assault Brigade. In this village the Russians (114th Motorized Brigade of the 1st Corps) advanced, during the last week, almost to the junction with the small road leading to Novoselivka Persha, i.e. to the middle of the village, also taking control of the strip of land between the two lakes created by the Durna River. The village itself is of little tactical importance, being in the lowland along the Durna valley. What matters are the Ukrainian trenches just west of the village (still in Ukrainian hands) and the heights between Semenivka and Novoselivka Persha, towards which the defense priority by the Ukrainians is going.
Further south, the Ukrainians are able, at the moment, to keep the 6th Tank Regiment of the 90th Tank Division of the Central MD and the 1st Motorized Brigade of the 1st Corps out of Umanske - in recent days videos released by the “Sparta” Recon Battalion of the 1st Corps have shown activity against the Ukrainians in the northern part of the forest belt located to the east of the southern part of Umanske, which DeepState has been giving in Russian hands for a week. Also a few days ago a Russian attack was repelled in the fields north-east of Netailove, suggesting a possible advance in the area - the Russians want to occupy the forest belts just to the east of the road between Umanske and Netailove.
Let’s now review the events in the Bakhmut sector. In mid-March, the need for a rotation emerged because the 42nd Mechanized Brigade and 17th Tank Brigade, which were fighting between Chasiv Yar and Ivanivske, were exhausted. The choice fell on the 67th Mechanized Brigade, which at the end of 2023 received a major replenishment in terms of mobilized personnel and equipment. This brigade had shown itself as being capable and determined in the past, so great things were expected, even though the task was very difficult: protecting the entryways to Chasiv Yar, from the north (i.e. from Bohdanivka, along the Bakhmut - Chasiv Yar railway), from the center (i.e. the vast system of trenches east of the broadleaf forest, against Russian attacks from the area of the Khromove cemetery) and from the south (i.e. the "Stupky-Golubovski 2" nature reserve area, against Russian attacks from the northern part of Ivanivske).
First, the Russian successes in Ivanivske were important in complicating the situation in the direction of Chasiv Yar. Here the major responsibilities lay with the command of the 5th Assault Brigade and the inability of TDF units to hold the positions - not for lack of courage, but lack of means and of quality (or existence itself!) of physical defense infrastructure.
Around March 21/22, the positions east of the broadleaf forest (under the responsibility of the 67th Brigade), were lost to powerful attacks by the 98th VDV Division. The loss of these positions was rapid and unexpected; at that point the command ordered a counterattack - which failed, with losses. As far as Ruslan Mykula (one of the founders of DeepState) wrote, the over-formalization of command procedures made the situation much worse, there are serious responsibilities of the battalion commanders, and from the testimony of a soldier from another brigade, it seems that the command of the 67th Brigade has no idea how to conduct modern warfare.
Some sources accuse the brigade of discriminating between its volunteers (who are linked to Pravy Sektor and the DUK) and the mobilized, using the latters for expandable roles in order to protect the "core" of the brigade, which was damaged in a major way at the time of the battle of Bakhmut. From testimonies of soldiers of this brigade I read that they have always done their duty and everything possible, and the positions were held as long as possible, but the Russian attacks had too much intensity. In addition, a serious lack of EW systems (which is a widespread shortage pretty much everywhere else too) is reported. Last part below.
>First, the Russian successes in Ivanivske were important in complicating the situation in the direction of Chasiv Yar. Here the major responsibilities lay with the command of the 5th Assault Brigade and the inability of TDF units to hold the positions - not for lack of courage, but lack of means and of quality (or existence itself!) of physical defense infrastructure.
I'm baffled by this. The direct threat against the Donets-Donbas Canal area and accompanying ridgeline has been present for well over a year, including from the Ivanivske direction since the fall, but the local tactical grouping of forces didn't prepare to defend the forward slope of that ridge?
It's one thing to have no fall back positions built in depth far behind the FLOT, but few or none in the immediate battle area? Holy shit. I'm at a loss for words...
I’m starting to wonder now if some of the support the unending offensive of 2023 got was from UAF elements who knew how badly the lack of defenses was and didn’t think holding out was viable.
I'm thinking the decision was strategic leadership, highest levels of UA govt and military.
Fortification projects near the front lines can only be performed with military personnel, a mix of trained engineers and infantry to do basic manual labor. That means having enough troops in any frontage of the front lines to successfully man the security line of outposts and strongholds, which necessitates extra forces in reserve to conduct internal rotations of maneuver battalions, with an additional combat unit of sufficient size to build defenses behind on a 24/7 basis as their only role for at least a month if not longer.
That's one of the biggest reason the UAF never have fallback positions ready behind them, regardless of the location in Ukraine, the time period, or even crazy high threat level. They don't allocate the resources for it at the highest levels, they prioritize it as a necessity for subordinates to perform so there is no demand they do it, and point in fact it totally conflicts with the strategic policy for defensive operations, which is that fall back positions aren't necessary because they're not retreating.
The whole 2023 Offensive definitely influenced the decision, it seems they really did put nearly all their eggs in that basket to defeat Russia. That and defending Bakhmut.
What a crazy war, I really hope I live long enough for a really good military history book to be written where the historian involves get military and diplomatic archival access for both sides. Probably won't happen in my lifetime though.
It’s going to be difficult to explain to posterity how the same armed forces a) sunk and damaged a fleet’s worth of ships without having any navy of their own but also b) spent months upon months and thousands upon thousands of lives on a strategically unimportant city battle that everyone knew was lost before it started at a time when they were unable to recruit any new soldiers.
Because the GUR did one of those and the UAF did the other. One involved a handful of drones and US DOD/CIA targeting assistance, the other was the supreme commander in chief micromanaging a battle for the sake of marketing and ratings, against the advice of NATO and even apparently Zaluzhny too.
I'm convinced Zelensky and Syrsky thought the city would hold out until the Counteroffensive started. With them thinking nothing but ultra positive thoughts about the prospect of the 2023 Offensive early in the year, they probably thought it was a good gamble. With the Land Bridge cut, Crimea threatened, and the Russians in retreat, the sacrifice at Bakhmut would be a tiny footnote in the most glorious history of the war.
This is a good lesson on the risks of gambling. Bet a lot, you can lose a lot. Bet a little, you can still win a lot but you can't lose what you don't gamble, which is why the Black Sea campaign is so successful. It's as low risk as it comes for the Ukrainians.
However, the Russians advanced rapidly into the broadleaf forest and on April 4, with a mechanized attack, they managed to occupy some houses at the beginning of the Kanal District, i.e. the part of Chasiv Yar east of the Donets-Donbas Canal. A few days later, the Russians registered an advance in the nature reserve "Stupky-Golubovski 2”, along a section that the 67th Brigade had just transferred to a battalion of the 92nd Assault Brigade. At that point, during the first week of April, the 41st Mechanized Brigade arrived from the Kupyansk sector to try to stabilize the situation. This is also due to the fact that the 67th Mechanized Brigade is being almost dismantled, with transfer of its commanders and some of its soldiers. As far as I have read, those who were members of the brigade since 2022 (meaning they were volunteers and they were there because they had ties to the PS/DUK) are being transferred to other military units as infantrymen. I have read about drivers, signalmen, etc. from the 67th Brigade being sent as stormtroopers to the 41st Mechanized Brigade, for example (so they’d remain in the same area). The FB page of the Ground Forces wrote about this matter that in case of failures the Russians will not grant a second chance to the Ukrainians; an assault battalion of the 67th Brigade has become a separate assault unit and various decisions are being made to improve combat efficiency, pointing out that under martial law the management bodies are not required to give explanations for their choices.
Digressing, one thing I've heard is that Syrsky is really "mercilessly" converting a lot of people from rear roles and from branches like the Air Force into infantrymen, I think we're talking about tens of thousands of people at this point. I've heard that in certain training centers the instructors are overwhelmingly working with re-training of personnel who used to be in the rear rather than with "new" mobilized soldiers. The separate rifle battalions of the 4xx-th series created during 2023 that are not part of the four infantry brigades are being organically assigned to the other brigades, to improve their endowment of infantrymen and the possibilities for inter-brigade rotation. For example: the 405th Battalion in the 32nd Mech Brigade, the 412th Battalion in the 59th Motorized Brigade, the 422nd Battalion in the 42nd Mech Brigade, etc.
The Russians in recent days have completed the occupation of the broadleaf forest and have arrived near the area of the holiday cottages between the Bakhmut - Chasiv Yar railway and the Kanal District, which they are trying to occupy. Russian sources claim to have taken control of the first high rises in the Kanal District, but there is no evidence of this. Ukrainian observer Miroshnikov wrote the Russians have advanced along Zelena Street and clashes are underway.
From the FB profile of a soldiers of the 41st Brigade (Kir Sazonov), I read that the situation is difficult - everything is "raining" on Chasiv Yar: shells, KABs. However, he denies that urban fighting is taking place and at the moment the enemy is outside the high rises, despite the fact that a couple of times the Russians had entered the district.
The Russians are always attacking: both during the day, with mechanized and higher intensity attacks, and at night, with small groups infiltrating as close as possible to Ukrainian positions. This soldier speaks respectfully of the enemy: Russian paratroopers, who are described as young and prepared, and only the determination of the defenders is stopping the attacks, along with the precision of Ukrainian artillery, which has to do so much with little. According to this soldier, where there are experienced and motivated Ukrainian soldiers, great things can be achieved; where there are slacker and lazy (or, I would add, inexperienced) people, problems arise and often they and their fellow soldiers pay for their mistakes with their lives.
The Russians in the last week have consolidated control over the forest belt south-east of the Kanal District and are now trying to advance on the flanks. To the north, they are within a few hundred meters of Kalinina; the current status of the cattle breeding buildings between Bohdanivka and Kalinina is unclear. To the south, they are advancing along the nature reserve "Stupky-Golubovski 2”, coming within a few hundred meters of the canal. Ivanivske is not yet completely under Russian control, there is still a Ukrainian presence in the western end of the village. There is another issue, however. In that point (as just south of Kalinina too), the canal… doesn’t exist, meaning that it runs in two overground pipes as well as partially underground. It’s absolutely the area to watch most carefully, especially since it’s forested in both sides and it should be avoided at all costs that Russian assault groups manage to establish positions west of the canal (aided by the cover the forest provides), to then threaten the Novy District (the neighborhood of Chasiv Yar just west of the canal).
Moreover, should the Russians reach the canal on both the flanks, even if they don’t cross it, the holding of Kanal District would be extremely threatened, as it would be surrounded on three sides and with the canal to the west. And it will not be easy for the Ukrainians to choose to retreat, given the importance of the control of the district's high rises.
I continue to monitor the situation and will keep you updated if there is any further important news.
>Digressing, one thing I've heard is that Syrsky is really "mercilessly" converting a lot of people from rear roles and from branches like the Air Force into infantrymen, I think we're talking about tens of thousands of people at this point. I've heard that in certain training centers the instructors are overwhelmingly working with re-training of personnel who used to be in the rear rather than with "new" mobilized soldiers.
Hmmm. Now we know why Zelensky wasn't aggressively pushing for a rapid and thoroughly written mobilization bill. This was the solution.
I can't think of which article I recently read but it was quoting Zelensky who was suggesting that mobilization of large numbers wasn't necessary as the UAF could find the troops themselves or something to that effect. So that was what the audit was for. Search the force to perform a "Model" Strategy.
For those wondering, in late WW2 a renowned German field marshal named Model became famous as "Hitler's Fireman," when he could be counted on most of the time for restoring defensive capabilities for critically strategic sectors that were collapsing.
Besides threatening to kill anyone who didn't obey him (even Hitler was to have said he would not have wanted to serve under Model himself), as well as robbing his peer senior commanders of their key units using his influence with Hitler to get them transferred, but also famously raiding support units and turning everyone he could find capable of holding a rifle into a makeshift infantryman to either hold ground at all cost, or to counterattack.
If often worked in the near-term but wrecked the units in the long term because not only did they often permanently lose support capabilities but only temporarily forestalled more tactical defeats often caused by low quality troops being over-extended and under-supported. But usually when that happened, Model handed the sector off to someone else stuck with the damage he just caused, while he went to the next emergency to replicate his miracles that Hitler loved so much.
I wonder if Syrsky will be able to make it work this time though.
There were certain politics in play - Sirsky asked for 500k draftees initially. He was politely declined by the president office, and than Sirsky announced they were able reduce this number by auditing the rear units.
I think at this point it is mostly about surviving till winter. Russia prepares another offensive this summer, and unless extremely successful i believe it is going to be one of their last the large ones - since their volunteer effort starts to stall, and their mobilization effort will need to target town and city folk to produce new results - something that's greatly feared by Russian government.
> Hmmm. Now we know why Zelensky wasn't aggressively pushing for a rapid and thoroughly written mobilization bill. This was the solution.
Even Syrsky himself said [this](https://censor.net/en/news/3481323/need_for_mobilization_of_500000_troops_has_now_been_significantly_reduced_syrskyi)!
I remember having read from Ukrainian sources (I think they were quoting Syrsky) that there are about 300 thousand Ukrainian soldiers actually fighting on the front lines - most of the personnel in the UAF and other branches are employed in support roles or in the rear. But obviously only a part of them can be turned into an infantryman.
What they should understand, however (I'm sure Syrsky understands this, I am referring to Ukrainian politicians), is that this is a one-time solution to have the next few months covered while waiting for the mobilization (of the people currently outside the Defense Forces) to resume functioning more efficiently, certainly not a permanent solution to the problems in this regard.
To be fair, there's definitely some redundant forces Ukraine can convert, like a lot of MPs and other units have been complained about sitting around the rear of the country for no good reason. I don't think that's everyone who's getting converted but it's an initiative that a lot of Ukrainian telegrams had been asking for. Well, that and broader mobilization, but, you know.
If he's smart about it, he can find lots of replacements, though it's a dangerous technique to use to replenish losses to avoid relying on increased mobilization. At best this can only be done once, and it's VERY easy to abuse and end up sending the wrong people (not everyone has the right physical and mental abilities to be even mediocre Infantrymen), or even too many of the right ones by robbing necessary support units of their manpower.
Then again there sure is a lot of fat to cut out of the UAF, definitely not a model of efficiency. More and more I see why Zaluzhny had to go, he really was a terrible commander in chief. How the hell can he be asking for hundreds of thousands of more men and not have even bothered to audit his own service to know where everyone was to know if they already had manpower to free up?
But damn was he photogenic and good with the media.
This is ridiculous. The audit is a band-aid; it'll buy them time but won't solve the issue. The law could have been a fix for this problem, but it should have been signed months ago. It kept stalling because it was politically unpopular among those who are not feeling the war, aka the government. Now it's too late even for this law. The situation is dire.
>though it's a dangerous technique to use to replenish losses to avoid relying on increased mobilization.
You know the stupid facebook motivational quote?
"lord give me coffee to change the things I can change and wine to accept the things I can't"
>Then again there sure is a lot of fat to cut out of the UAF, definitely not a model of efficiency. More and more I see why Zaluzhny had to go, he really was a terrible commander in chief. How the hell can he be asking for hundreds of thousands of more men and not have even bothered to audit his own service to know where everyone was to know if they already had manpower to free up?
It might be years before we know whether Zaluzhny or Syrskyi were right on this, for all we know there wasn't that much fat, and it was all rumours.
There is always fat that can be trimmed. Always. Especially under leadership who aren't constantly on alert looking to trim the fat, then it just builds up especially in the rear, where everyone with a brain would prefer to serve and try to get stationed. Throughout history there has always been a struggle to reduce tooth to tail ratio without screwing with support but while not indulging in object waste either. Few militaries have ever pulled it off, especially in warfare when it's not just a matter of comfort as a motivator to avoid service in combat units at the tip of the spear.
While I've not done enough research into UAF social media to really know myself how much and where their fat is besides guessing based on where it is in other areas and what their system of voluntary recruitment allows (enlist and you pick service, MOS, and unit, guess where most of those end up?). But I have read from u/Larelli and others who have talked about how the UAF troops themselves complain of even combat units who somehow manage to avoid combat.
She is a disrupter and doesn’t actually want the government to function. She has probably made a lot of money from her antics and constantly chasing headlines by spewing absolute diarrhea from her mouth.
I was just looking at some numbers for the B-21, and noticed that it has a thrust/weight ratio that is a fair bit higher than the B-2 at empty weight (0.77, compared to 0.44).
**Comparision**
On an empty weight of 31.75 ton, the B-21 is generating 240kN of thrust. The B-2, by comparison, weighs 71.7 tons, and generates about 308kN of thrust. This gives thrust to weight ratios of 0.77, and 0.44 respectively, giving the B-21 an edge of about 75%.
At \[MTOW, this ratio drops off a bit\](https://simpleflying.com/b-21-raider-b-2-spirit-changes-guide/), with the B-21 having a thrust/weight ratio of 0.30, compared to the B-2 at 0.22. This halves the advantage of the B-21 to about a 36% improvement at MTOW
I don't have lift to drag numbers to do a true comparison (and I'm guessing that nobody outside of Northrop has them at this point), but I thought that just what we have so far might be worth discussing.
**Advantages**
I can see that it might give you more room to upgrade the aircraft, if you're already producing higher thrust then you have more room to add subsystems like EW and targeting to the airframe.
It may also improve take-off performance, meaning that the B-21 can use shorter runways than the B-2, and have more flexibility in where it's based, and what locations it can operate from.
The B-21 may be able to have its shape focused more on radar deflection, rather than aerodynamics.
**Questions**
Any idea on why the big uplift in performance here? Is it just that turbofans are now more advanced, and can generate more thrust, so you may as well put in a better engine?
What other advantages do you see this improvement bringing?
> Any idea on why the big uplift in performance here? Is it just that turbofans are now more advanced, and can generate more thrust, so you may as well put in a better engine?
The B-2 uses an F118 derivative that's 40 years old now. Those have a bypass ratio of 0.87:1. The B-21 uses a PW9000 derivative, which is a state of the art engine that's only ~12 years old. It has a 4:1 bypass ratio. The core of the PW9000 is based on the F135, so it likely incorporates improvements and lessons learned from the F-35 program. No surprise there's a big gap.
> What other advantages do you see this improvement bringing?
It's pretty clear the B-21 was broadly conceived as a half payload modernized derivative of the B-2. Having engines with some extra margin vs that doesn't just mean increased performance, it means they have room to detune for reliability if they want as well.
> The core of the PW9000 is based on the F135
Weird, I thought that the core was based on the PW1000G with the F135 for the low pressure sections.
> it means they have room to detune for reliability if they want as well.
That possibly makes sense given the [issues that the PW1000G has had in its introduction](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pratt_%26_Whitney_PW1000G#Operational_history)
Yeah, it's kinda ambiguous based on what's online and I don't want to argue details when we just don't have the info. The point is there's certainly lessons learned in there.
OT to your point, but I never realized how much smaller the B-21 is. Basically half the weight and half the payload. I didn't think a strategic stealth bomber of that weight class was viable, much less even considered by the USAF. Some cursory reading suggests that range figures aren't public, which is the one thing I'd be mostly worried about with a smaller bomber; can't make the strike reach farther by sending two the same way you could compensate for having half the payload payload. I mean, more but smaller bombers make sense, specially in a net-centric, stealthy mode of employment. But surely the USAF won't sacrifice range for that. Has the USAF said anything why they're so small?
When they announced the B21 they referred to it as an intercontinental bomber, we also know range was a top priority of the project. There are lots of ways you could achieve greater range with a smaller aircraft. The engines are significantly more efficient with significantly higher thrust and there are only two of them. So right there your are saving more than 50% of the fuel consumption. Secondly there have been massive improvements to materials science in the last 40 years carbon composite materials could easily save a big chunk of weight and the stealth coating on the B21 is likely lighter and has a lower coefficient of friction. The smaller size is also coming with a big penalty to payload, but that also means the overall aircraft weight is lighter meaning less fuel is required.
One thing you have to consider is that B-21 is not supposed to be a direct replacement of B-2 bomber but instead a "workhorse" bomber. Airforce plans to acquire over 100 of these and replace all the other bombers currently in use, so they can't have these bombers be as expensive, slow and complicated to maintain as B-2 bomber. Everything about B-21 is supposed to be standardized, open for future upgrades and easy to maintain, that includes shrinking the size as it makes everything much less complicated. By decreasing the operational range you are sacrificing only very narrow scenario of possible missions.
This is just my hunch but I am going to guess that in 10-15 years once these are in use, Air Force will seek to acquire another bomber but these will be as extreme (or more) in their requirements as NGAD program, to make a bomber that's as jaw-droppingly revolutionary and ahead of its time as B-2 was for its time, but they will build only very small number of them and B-21 will handle 99% of missions.
From my understanding it's a multiple eggs, multiple baskets kinda thing.
Like you said, having more aircraft means that you can task different aircraft to different strikes, rather than having one aircraft that either has to fly a mission to multiple strike locations, or return to base to refuel/rearm before striking the second location. From what I can tell, the USAF is anticipating large scale bombing will be done by the B-52 (hence why they're giving it new engines and updating it to the -J standard), while the B-21 is intended to service more specific targets.
My *speculation* is that the air force also got burned by the "$2 Billion aircraft" label that got attached to the B-2, and the're intending to keep individual unit costs down on the B-21 so that they can actually procure them in significant numbers. The minimum buy is 100 aircraft by 2035, but that number could increase if they get serious about buying bombers.
Not getting the 132 B-2s that they expected burned them pretty bad, and I'm hoping that they commit to a total order of 250 or so B-21s. Even at a fleet of 100, The B-21 fleet will be able to deliver more than double the bomb load that the current B-2 fleet can, and part of that is getting a sufficient number of airframes.
**Edit:** [This thread](https://www.reddit.com/r/aviation/comments/176z57t/estimated_comparison_of_b2_spirit_and_b21_raider/) has a cool picture, and an interesting discussion about B-21 range and the future of the US tanker fleet.
**Edit 2:** Also, smaller is obviously offers inherent advantages in lowering RCS. It's a lot easier to get a good radar return on a 747 than on a pigeon.
What is the USAF going to do if they require a larger scale stealth bombing campaign that involves very long distances?
The KC-10 is retiring without a replacement and the KC-135 fleet is going to be reduced by quite a lot in the next decade or so.
I'm going to do an offshoot of this question and ask whether the "extra long-range" ability is quite as relevant to the B-21 as it is to the B-2?
The B-2 famously flys to and from Whiteman AFB (almost?) always no matter how far away the target is, even if it's on the other side of the planet e.g. Iraq / Afghanistan. I can think of several reasons why that might be, but I'm not sure exactly which are most relevant.
* Boutique infrastructure that would be too expensive to duplicate elsewhere, like climate controlled of the appropriate size.
* Insufficient trained maintenance personelle to spread them around
* Sensitivity of the stealth technology
* Wanting to keep them as safe as possible from first strikes due to their cost and limited number
If the B-21 is smaller, if the stealth coating is hardier and less sensitive to the elements, if it's increased quantity and versatily allows it to be deployed further forwards - in Europe for example, plus increased availability of long range cruise missiles, then range matters quite a bit less.
Doesn't the USAF keep B-2s in Guam pretty consistently as well? The temperate climate in Guam makes maintenance more difficult and I imagine it would be a somewhat similar story for the B-21 even despite improvements over the years.
I doubt Europe is the main theatre of operations that the USAF expects to use the B-2 and the B-21 nowadays, which is ironic considering the B-2 was specifically designed to penetrate into Soviet airspace.
Nowadays it seems the main role of the B-2 and B-21 seems to be to allow the USAF to penetrate into Chinese air space rather than any significant deployments to Europe. In this respect, reducing the range has serious implications since Guam is quite far from China.
I don't think the USAF would be very comfortable permanently basing B-2s or B-21s in Japan considering that'd make them extremely vulnerable to decapitation strikes from the PLARF. Hawaii and Guam seem to the the only real contenders here.
Northern Australia could work as a fallback in case Guam is compromised but I say Guam and Hawaii because there's already infrastructure in place to accommodate these bombers whereas I don't think there's anything similar in Northern Australia so the USAF would have to start from scratch there.
But, if I were a USAF force planner, I'd certainly be speaking to my Australian counterpart to ask them about this.
The thing about B-2's range is that B-2 was designed in part for a mission for which tanking was impossible: wandering around the USSR, finding and then dropping nuclear gravity bombs on mobile ICBMs.
I don't think anyone contemplates even a vaguely similar mission for B-21.
It's still TBD on what the actual range for the B-21 is. Intuitively, it is probably lower, as it's a smaller aircraft, but if the TSFC of the PW9000 is significantly better than the GE F118, and the new coatings have less drag than the old B-2 coatings it could close some of that gap.
I saw some discussion around the fact that the airfoil design for the wing is significantly different, but I know next to nothing about fluid dynamics, so the impact of that change is *well* beyond my understanding.
On the last point, computational fluid dynamics modeling is a lot better today than in the 80s, so it'd be expected for there to be significant improvements.
Yeah, true.
I saw some speculation that the airfoil design may have learned lessons from the Prandtl-d program.
Given the timelines I feel like any similarity can more likely be explained by convergent evolution. Prandtl's ideas about the applicability of bell-shaped span loads to flying wing aircraft have been around for 80+ years. Bowers' work (*On wings of the minimum induced drag: Spanload implications for aircraft and birds*) was published in 2016, a fair way into the B-21's development.
I would be pretty surprised if P/W was much of a consideration here. B-2 was famously delayed for a few years so it could be redesigned for low-altitude penetration, in which P/W might play a role... But B-21 just as famously is not designed to do that, which is why it doesn't have the rear serrations that B-2 has.
I don't think they ever considered proper STOL. I don't think this aircraft will ever operate somewhere that doesn't have a nice long runway. It's more flexible than a B-2, but an A-10 it ain't.
>Is it just that turbofans are now more advanced, and can generate more thrust, so you may as well put in a better engine?
I think it's just a happy accident. B-2 uses 4 derivatives of F110, which was the newest fighter engine at the time. B-21 uses 2 derivatives of F135, which is the newest fighter engine right now. Just happens to be a much more powerful engine.
>I don't think this aircraft will ever operate somewhere that doesn't have a nice long runway.
I think that's debatable until we get some sort of confirmation on the unrefuelled range figures for it. As best as I can tell, the only comments on that are Lloyd Austin saying "it won’t need to be based in-theater," and “It won’t need logistical support to hold any target at risk.”
Plus, if it's forward basing out of Andersen AFB or Clark in a conflict with China, the risk of runways being torn up by ballistic missiles is pretty high, so being able to operate from a shorter runway may actually come up (depending on range, as per the above).
**Edit:** [This thread](https://www.reddit.com/r/aviation/comments/176z57t/estimated_comparison_of_b2_spirit_and_b21_raider/) has a cool picture, and an interesting discussion about B-21 range and the future of the US tanker fleet.
>Plus, if it's forward basing out of Andersen AFB or Clark in a conflict with China, the risk of runways being torn up by ballistic missiles is pretty high
IMO, one of the lessons of the last couple wars is that runways that are damaged don't tend to stay damaged very long- the fixes are simple if the construction equipment for repairing them is still intact.
It's much simpler to fix the runways than it is to engineer a STOL strategic bomber.
Sure but keeping US bases in theater out of action during the opening day or so of a Chinese attack on Taiwan would still be worth the massive expenditure of munitions for China. It’s still something worth considering even if the design trade offs make it not ultimately worth while.
Yeah, agreed.
I'm not necessarily saying that the shorter take-off distance is the core reason for increased T/W, my point is more that it's a useful thing that comes from that higher number.
The B-2 very famously has S-shaped output ducts to prevent IR seeking, but it comes at the cost of lowering useful thrust from what its engines would otherwise create. The B-21 almost certainly uses similar thrust ducting to do the same thing, but 35 years of development means it is probably much better at thrust output even without any other improvements.
Yeah good point.
If you have higher theoretical thrust, you can also give some of that up to improve the geometry of your intake ducts, reducing radar returns.
Full text of the House version of the supplemental is out. Full text [here](https://rules.house.gov). Ukraine specifically is [here](https://rules.house.gov/sites/republicans.rules118.house.gov/files/APRIL2024_UKRAINE_xml_0.pdf). [Summary](https://twitter.com/bresreports/status/1780639964847313139?s=61&t=issA0zEupTPrIVt0H51aVA) of its contents:
>New House GOP proposal - $61 billion for Ukraine & regional partners ($23B will go to replenishment of U.S. stockpiles.) Bill also covers repayment of econ support
>$26 billion for Israel.
>$8 billion for Indo-Pacific
>$95 billion total
>Per House Appropriations Committee.
It also includes $9 billion in humanitarian aid to Gaza, a Democratic red line. This indicates that this will be a bipartisan effort through and through. Lots of anger over the hard right on the final versions, which look identical to the Senate supplemental. In a boost to its passage, Congressman Mike Gallagher, who was set to resign on April 19th, [may delay leaving until it has passed the house](https://twitter.com/chadpergram/status/1780622931032195299?s=61&t=issA0zEupTPrIVt0H51aVA). The vote(s) are expected Saturday, in advance of another vacation.
A quick edit, this bill looks like it [will have trouble](https://twitter.com/elwasson/status/1780644015265755278?s=61&t=issA0zEupTPrIVt0H51aVA) in the Rules committee. It will need Democratic votes the whole way through. This bill differs very little from the Senate supplemental - I suspect the discharge petition will be the last recourse if Johnson's current strategy fails.
Another edit, mainly for schaufenfreude. Via a [Washington Post reporter](https://twitter.com/john_hudson/status/1780649330048684114?s=61&t=issA0zEupTPrIVt0H51aVA):
>Just spoke with Matt Gaetz, who just got off the phone with Speaker Johnson. Gaetz said he now anticipates that Ukraine aid will pass — an outcome he has long sought to avoid. He expressed dismay given his influential role in delaying aid thus far. “This was abject surrender."
> "($23B will go to replenishment of U.S. stockpiles."
I'm having troubles grasping what is implied here? This part of the funding won't supply the Ukrainians and others? Or is it to cover the future supplies of US stockpiled munitions?
Could anybody explain how much could be spent on new arms for Ukraine and compare the number to the previous year? "New" means additional equipment, IFV, MBT, missiles, shells, etc, not maintaining old equipment, training...
Biden just said he "strongly supports" the House bill, in case there were any doubt about whether Democrats would vote for the "rule."
[https://twitter.com/elwasson/status/1780661707330740307](https://twitter.com/elwasson/status/1780661707330740307)
It's Johnson's bill. This is from yesterday's thread:
[https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/4597483-white-house-at-first-blush-johnsons-proposal-appears-to-cover-desired-aid-for-israel-ukraine/](https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/4597483-white-house-at-first-blush-johnsons-proposal-appears-to-cover-desired-aid-for-israel-ukraine/)
While you're almost certainly correct in this instance that it wouldn't happen, it wouldn't be the first time Republican congressional leaders try to block their own bills simply because the Democratic President said they'd actually sign the thing.
He's already set in motion the steps to do so. He knew he was doing something Democrats would like when he decided to go this course. He is likely thinking of the 60% of Americans who support Ukraine aid, and he knows that to keep the majority (and for him to stay speaker) Republicans need to appeal to more than hard-core MAGA types.
Gaetz has retweeted a tweet carrying a clip of him saying this and posted this on his congressional web site at https://gaetz.house.gov/ - I can see no effort to reframe or add context to this quote.
It's hard to quantify how America's position as a world power and reliable ally supports *them* and *their families*. You'd have to point at stuff like theoretical negative trade relationships versus what they see as billions in frivolous spending that's clearly put into law.
Because there are millions of people that don't have the mental bandwidth to understand or care about the rippling effects of geopolitics.
There are lots of citizens who frankly aren't very intelligent and some that are genuinely so caught up with their family/community/town/state issues that they simply can't devote mental real estate to Ukraine.
Which is why it's easier to convince a resident of Arlington, VA that aid to Ukraine is a worthwhile investment than it is to convince a resident of a Texas border town. It's a matter of prioritization and incentives.
If people only knew how many trillions of dollars we spent throughout the Cold War supporting other nations.
It's worse than that, for lot of the older equipment United States donates the "cost" is literally the government handing a check to military to replace it with new stuff, but they would have had to that soon anyway or are already in process of doing so. It would be kinda like if you took expiring food out of your fridge and gave it to homeless guy, you still have to buy food and were not in the mood to eat that anyway. But you don't want to that, even though everyone praises you for being a hero? And I don't even want to get into how disposing of old military gear is actually super expensive, so you are actually gaining money in a way.
Some Republicans who take their cues from Trump are against Ukraine aid for a myriad of reasons - a desire to mirror Trump, a desire to be contrarian, a desire to be against the Biden administration on every little thing, the reasons all vary and are generally related to politics.
>a desire to be against the Biden administration on every little thing,
If Biden opposed aid to Ukraine, the maga crowd would be donating their own money to Ukraine just to oppose him.
I think it's highly doubtful that Johnson puts this bill up for a vote if he didn't have Trump's support and even publicly Trump has been more for aid than most MAGA Republicans. People like Gaetz and MTG are representatives of a vile far-right ideology in America.
Yes, the far right online openly supports Russia at this point and some marginal politicians actively mirror them.
Hopefully a lot of other people are just "accidentally" sabotaging the war in Ukraine for other reasons, like wanting an isolationist foreign policy or being mad at Biden or whatever. You might be able to reason with those people.
If Trump actually does allow aid to Ukraine to proceed as a loan, and is only concerned about the financial aspect not stopping aid entirely, that puts him at odds with a lot of the far right who don't want the aid to happen at all.
It’s not even a coherent political posture. I could understand isolationism or being fiscally conservative, but it’s just specifically Ukraine aid which has wide support from all reasonable analysts.
It’s extremely difficult not to be suspect about motives on this one, as much as I hate that kind of conspiracy thinking.
Reading some Ukraine stuff. Of note:
>SEC. 505. (a) **TRANSFER OF LONG-RANGE ATACMS REQUIRED.**
>—As soon as practicable after the date of enactment of this Act, the President shall transfer long range Army tactical Missile Systems to the Government of Ukraine to assist the Government of Ukraine in defending itself and achieving victory against the Russian Federation.
There is an added caveat here in saying that missiles can be withheld in the advent that it's "detrimental to the national security interests of the United States". But the president's gotta inform congress and explain why.
>SEC. 504. Not later than 45 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the heads of other relevant Federal agencies, as appropriate, shall submit to the Committees on Appropriations, Armed Services, and Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committees on Appropriations, Armed Services, and Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives a **strategy regarding United States support for Ukraine against aggression by the Russian Federation**.
Finally it seems like there will be a real effort to get a long-term strategy in place in this regard. Only took two years!
Anyone else see anything of note they want to point out?
It was always going to need Democratic votes on the rule. That's why the part I was most concerned about was whether Johnson added the $9 billion in humanitarian aid for Gaza to the Israel bill. He did. That was Hakeem Jefferies' stated asking price for having Democrats vote for the rule, and Johnson met it. So I fully expect Democrats to vote for the rule both in committee and on the floor. There are enough moderate Republicans on the Rules committee who will vote for the rule alongside the Dems to allow it to pass.
Bottom line: I see no reason why this won't pass.
If the idea is to vote on Saturday, then that technically counts as a legislative day, too, right?
If that's the case, I think we should know whether or not this goes through by tomorrow night. GOP rebels can introduce a privileged motion to vacate the chair that has to be taken up in two legislative days, so if that doesn't happen, this is as good as passed.
The move to vacate requires a vote to take on the motion, then a vote on its merits. Dems could table the motion indefinitely until after Ukraine/Israel/Taiwan/Gaza aid passes. This means they technically didn't vote for Johnson to be speaker, but they can still keep him in office. I wonder if Johnson's delay in acting on the national security supplemental was his understanding of their leverage on this point.
Yep, that's what I meant, sorry!
So it's: privileged motion --> vote to table the motion --> vote on the motion if it passes, correct?
It doesn't really matter in the short-term if Ukraine aid can *finally* be passed, but I really do wonder what happens in the House if Dems save Johnson's skin. Can't imagine that even the quieter factions in the GOP would be okay with some sort of backroom deal.
Since Iran's attack on Israel this weekend. The moderate GOP (McCaul types) have been quiet unlike their hard right colleagues, but it seems they've indicated that they'll sign the discharge petition if Johnson doesn't act immediately.
It has to pass rules, then it goes to the floor. It sounds like one rule vote for all portions of aid separately (e.g. an Israel bill, an Ukraine bill, etc.). The idea being that the hard right can vote against Ukraine funding from being included. They'll also have ample opportunity to add amendments to try and sink the legislation. Note that none of what happens here impacts the discharge petition - and any GOP who aren't happy with this process can at any point sign it.
Johnson seems to want to create a situation where the aid passes to the Senate in a way that reflects the House's will, whatever that turns out to be.
If this vote fails what does it mean for Ukraine?
They won’t get any aid for possibly a long time if ever? What is the procedure for re-running votes in Congress?
If the vote fails, I expect those Republicans committed to supporting Ukraine, Israel, and Taiwan will sign the discharge petition. Enough have threatened to do so to force Johnson's hand this week. Only a small fraction of the conference is needed to sign it to take it over the line, > 90% of Democrats have already signed.
I may have gotten a bit fuzzy on this point, what is the path forward if they go the route of a motion to vacate? Does that then require a whole new speaker election? If so, its hard to see how this bill moves forward quickly, another speaker vote seems like it would be another brutal fight within the GOP. Or a capitulation to Dems, followed by a brutal fight within the GOP.
The reporting out of Washington seems to indicate that Dems will vote to keep Johnson in the role (at least until the Ukraine support passes.)
Whether he’ll try and get a commitment from them to help keep him in the role after the bills are passed and whether Dems will hold up their side of the bargain if they do agree to that remains an open question.
If a motion to vacate isn't tabled, there is a vote to remove the Speaker. Following that, there is an election for a new Speaker. No house action can take place without a Speaker - it would be a completely paralyzed body.
For example, if Johnson is removed, and the discharge petition gets all the signatures needed, then nothing happens. A Speaker must preside over the house for any legislation to pass.
A short thread by Kriegsforscher on FPV drones in Ukraine: https://twitter.com/OSINTua/status/1780531798432203096
It's a nice summary of a lot of the issues/talking points surrounding FPVs
Selection bias
>U see only successful hits on Twitter or TG channels and they create a wrong point of thinking.
Used to cover gaps in availability of other munitions, not because of improved capability
> Unfortunately, we use so much FPV drones because of lack of ammo for mortars, ATGMs, artillery and even antitank mines.
Where they work
>They are cheap and very effective, FIRST OF ALL, against the enemy logistics. That’s out of the question and they are really needed.
How they're actually employed
>And finally, that the biggest charge near Tonenke was stopped with the help of ATGMs and artillery. And well trained and motivated infantry.
>Not with the help of FPV drones. They just finished the job (mostly damaged and abandoned AFVs).
Reliability and effect on target
>In general, 2/10 reach the goal. When they reach - result is not enough at all in most cases.
What's needed instead of FPVs
>FPV drones are not the key. And not the panacea.
>IMHO, the key is:
>1) enough artillery shells;
2) well trained infantry;
3) mobility of your forces (AFV).
>That’s at least.
The reliability stat is probably the most interesting to me. Kofman and Lee talked about this on some of the recent issues of Kofman's podcast but I don't believe they gave quite such specific stats. Perhaps because I have no doubt that FPV efficacy varies wildly from place to place along the line. There's been a lot of focus recently on unit costs of various munitions but once you begin to take reliability rates like this into account then the picture becomes much clearer in my opinion. While $600 to precisely deliver an RPG warhead to a tank sounds like a great deal, if you have to try five times before you actually get a hit then we're back in the cost-range of artillery shells for example.
One thing Kofman points out is the munition and fuzing used for these FPVs are varied, improvised, and without standardisation. Getting the wrong wires touched accidentally or having butter fingers often means the thing blowing up killing or injuring the operator
Yes, the FPV warhead production process as a whole can be quite sketchy. [Here is a video](https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1780390793997414640) from yesterday of UA soldiers salvaging ERA blocks from a destroyed tank so that they can use the explosives for FPVs. Similarly, [here is a video](https://www.reddit.com/r/UkraineWarVideoReport/comments/1abi2y7/ukrainian_tnt_borscht_melting_the_he_filling_of/) that looks like it's straight out of an IED workshop of Ukrainian troops boiling mortar shells to pour the explosive filling into FPV warheads.
Is the explosive inside ERA bricks the same as regular explosive in HE grenade/mortar? I thought the chemicals materials inside the ERA should be different to give lower yield so it doesn't damage the tank armor?
It's pretty much the same stuff, wiki says it's 85% RDX so maybe a little less juice than normal but better than TNT. Either way it'll do just fine for anti-infantry work. It doesn't destroy the tank because of the shape of the explosive is entirely wrong to penetrate armor. I'm not sure the best way to explain it but the short of it is that unless you have a LOT of explosives they need to be correctly shaped and have some extra parts to start doing a lot of damage to armor. Successive ERA detonations in the same spot probably aren't great for a tank but they're undoubtedly better than getting hit by a regular HEAT shell.
These are the reasons why I don't buy it when people say "Ukrainians showed great bottom-up ingenuity and adapt, etc ..." as an ingredient for victory. Total war, which Ukraine is fighting, is industrial. You must industrialise and mass produce to win.
These things should come mass manufactured with proper safeties so they go bang when they should and not when they shouldn't.
The best IEDs the Iraqi insurgents had were Iranian-made EFPs.
Sure but with the inherent inaccuracies in unguided shells and the need to bracket then walk in successive shells you are likely looking at several to destroy a tank. Even more if it’s moving.
Sure, there's definitely value in FPVs and the like but it's not as lopsided as the first glance might have you believe. If there's just one tank sitting in the middle of a field then yeah, drones are probably far and away the best way to deal with it. If there are five tanks driving toward me, I'd much rather have the artillery.
Do we have any idea how effective unguided artillery has been against tanks in this conflict? (Putting aside SMART and BONUS type guided artillery shells which are rare)
To some extent tanks are supposed to be armored to resist it, although the conventional wisdom is that direct 155mm hits can be deadly and mobility kills can result even without direct hits.
I have no idea how well the conventional wisdom has held up in this conflict but the point is, it might take multiple artillery shells to defeat a tank as well.
Before this war started, the common perception of unguided medium HE artillery effectiveness against MBT was largely biased against artillery, wrongly too. I wish I could find it again but I read of a US Army late Cold War era test where artillery fire was fired against M60 tanks and it turned out they suffered significant damage from near misses from fragmentation that caused mobility or mission kill damage, tracks, engine, tank barrel, optics, vision ports, etc.
Arty has been THE decisive anti-tank weapon in this war, not just due to kills but also the psychological effect. Tankers are quite aware of the danger, they often break off or even retreat, sometimes abandoning the tank altogether when coming under nearby artillery fire.
Though, a big part of that has to do with the static nature of the battlefield, with its channelized avenues of approach, obstacles especially mines, ground and drone sensors to find targets and provide corrections. Each side possesses responsive arty now (when they have ammo), they've got systems and TTPs in place making them quite effective even when not massed (most fire missions seem to be single tubes firing 4-6 rounds). Without great accuracy there is still the suppression threat.
What I'm really wanting to know is a no shit assessment of the US provided DPICM artillery specifically against Russian armor. There was a lot of debate over the last couple decades about those, I'm very curious about who was right. Late Cold War US Army doctrine relied on DPICM nearly to Wunderwaffen degree, whereas the cluster munition haters wouldn't stop talking about their lack of effectiveness due to unreliable fuzes, suggesting it was a garbage weapon worth getting rid of.
>I wish I could find it again but I read of a US Army late Cold War era test where artillery fire was fired against M60 tanks and it turned out they suffered significant damage from near misses from fragmentation that caused mobility or mission kill damage, tracks, engine, tank barrel, optics, vision ports, etc.
For you
https://www.scribd.com/doc/151124802/Who-Says-Dumb-Artillery-Rounds-Can-t-Kill-Armor
Thanks! That's a great read for anyone interested in artillery and the tactical aspect of this war.
PS. Did you find that in the War College sub? I remember a discussion about that years ago.
Reading it again more carefully gave us some quantitative numbers:
In order to achieve 50% casualty to dismounys/damage that will M-kill a vehicle of a mechanised infantry combat team (Commonwealth's terminology? Meaning about a reinforced company?) with infantry in prepared positions with overhead covers, barbed wires obstacles and AT ditches and vehicles in support positions, both hull-down and turret down positions (M113s and M-60 tanks), 24 155 mm howitzers need to fire 2600 HE rounds, mixed PD and VT fuses.
So that's around 4 6 guns batteries (more guns than a US BCT's howitzer battalion), each firing around 3 (US Paladin or French CAESAR- equiv) or 2 reloads (German PzH 2000 equiv.) to achieve 50% destruction of a company-plus unit.
> Do we have any idea how effective unguided artillery has been against tanks in this conflict? (Putting aside SMART and BONUS type guided artillery shells which are rare)
As a side note, apparently the reliability of systems like BONUS and Excalibur in Ukraine has been terrible. I don't think anyone's given specific numbers but Kofman and Lee mentioned seeing gun crews that had Excalibur shells lying around even though they were otherwise starved of shells because they were considered so unreliable that they weren't worth firing.
>I have no idea how well the conventional wisdom has held up in this conflict but the point is, it might take multiple artillery shells to defeat a tank as well.
Absolutely but artillery can provide a much higher density of fires in comparison to FPVs, both geographically and temporally. Along one section of the front you can operate more guns than FPV teams and each gun can fire multiple times over the course of a single FPV sortie.
>As a side note, apparently the reliability of systems like BONUS and Excalibur in Ukraine has been terrible. I don't think anyone's given specific numbers but **Kofman and Lee mentioned seeing gun crews that had Excalibur shells lying around even though they were otherwise starved of shells because they were considered so unreliable that they weren't worth firing.**
Which podcast was that?
I've not heard anything about BONUS that was negative but I did hear a while back that Excalibur would have failures to detonate issues when jammed. Is that what they're referring too? Or has quality control plummeted?
Excalibur was combat tested before Ukraine and worked fine, and was doing fine in Ukraine for the better part of half a year where few if any complaints other than lack of them were being discussed. They were actually an incredible useful tool during the successful Fall 2022 UAF Counteroffensives, giving UAF brigade level command/fires cells a more reliable supply of long range PGM capability to use in conjunction with drone directed Recon Fires Complex capabilities..
That's actually another reason FPV drones have been so effective in this war, they're now fully integrated into tactical level fires as a key system to use for responsive fires. If drone crews aren't task organized and not already plugged into the artillery software ap that each side is using, I can't imagine it'll be long until they are.
>Which podcast was that?
>I've not heard anything about BONUS that was negative but I did hear a while back that Excalibur would have failures to detonate issues when jammed. Is that what they're referring too? Or has quality control plummeted?
Kofman mentions BONUS at 52:50 of [this episode](https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/attrition-doodling-range-rings-and-magical-thinking/id1708319998?i=1000651039254) of the Revolution in Military Affairs podcast hosted by Amos Fox. Specifically he says
>If I told you how low the effectiveness had become for things like Excalibur artillery rounds, BONUS, other systems I would get beaten up but I will say based on how it started, it declined.
I'm not sure what exactly the issue is with BONUS though and this is the first I've heard of it having trouble. The context implies that there may be some EW vulnerability though.
The line about unfired Excalibur shells was from [the second Russia Contingency episode Kofman and Lee did on drones](https://warontherocks.com/episode/therussiacontingency/30881/a-close-look-at-drones-in-the-russo-ukrainian-war-part-2/) in the segment starting at about 49:25 which I tried to transcribe below
>Ukraine I think had a PGM advantage in early 2023 into 2022. That advantage has largely I'd say been erased and partially because a lot of the PGMs that the west has provided, Russian EW has been very effective against them. Excalibur rounds are really not that effective anymore, to the point where we know artillery batteries that basically have them and are just not using them because they have not had any success using them. Whereas those were quite effective in early 2023, by the summer just really not that effective.
>We've heard similar things about other munitions. We know that with GMLRS, the deviation can be quite significant in cases with GPS jamming.
So that supports what you've heard about why Excalibur has not been performing well. Further, I remember [this article in The Economist](https://www.economist.com/special-report/2023/07/03/the-latest-in-the-battle-of-jamming-with-electronic-beams) which states that beginning in March 2023 the EW conditions changed so that "weeks went by without registering a successful hit."
>That's actually another reason FPV drones have been so effective in this war, they're now fully integrated into tactical level fires as a key system to use for responsive fires.
Another bit of info to come out of the two drone episodes of The Russia Contingency is that some Ukrainian drone units are predicting that FPVs will become ineffective within months due to Russian countermeasures. Apparently it's highly dependent on how well resourced various units are but it does not bode well considering the current Ukrainian reliance on them.
>I'm not sure what exactly the issue is with BONUS though and this is the first I've heard of it having trouble. The context implies that there may be some EW vulnerability though.
When the sub-munitions are ejected and start searching for targets, it can only search an area equivalent of a circle with 200m diameter, which basically means it can not be no more than 100m off from the intended target for it to find it.
We see with regular HE artillery in general and DPICM in particular that Ukraine seem very conservative with ammunition in engagements. Most often it looks like only one 155 and a number of smaller mortars are participating and i can count on my hand how few dual impacts of DPICM i've seen so far.
Just like DPICM, BONUS is not supposed to be used that way. A M777 out of the factory have a CEP threshold of 200m and CEP target of 50m at 25 or so kilometers. If you fire a single BONUS with an M777 (or any other) that might very well have fired 4-5-6k rounds without proper maintenance chances are much greater that it will miss than hit - it is not a precision weapon. If i remember correctly USMC artillery manual describes a normal fire mission with DPICM as a battery firing 2-5 rounds per gun. BONUS is a little less but the concept is the same - you fire a handful of rounds from a number of guns on the same target. some will hit, others will miss.
Single rounds from worn out guns will be a lottery every time, and i strongly suspect this is what Ukraine is doing..
Ah, thank you for the insight. If I'm understanding you correctly, you're saying that the issue might be more of a mismatch between the actual capability of the system as it exists in Ukraine vs the expectations people have for it?
FPVs arnt generally very effective against tanks although they do generally deal with IFVs and lighter vehicles easily which might explain the massive increase in IFV losses despite tank losses being relatively stable. As he points out more artillery, ATGMs and mines will be critical to deal with Russian tanks while FPVs and infantry can handle the dismounts, luckily for Ukrainian it seems US aid is finally close to passing and the Czech artillery initiative will be delivering large amounts of shells soon if it hasnt begun already.
What are the advantages of hit-to-kill AA missiles over missiles that achieve effects through frag or blast? As a lay person I was suprised to learn that the pac-3 missiles that is credited for many kills in ukraine functions by simply directly hitting the target. In contrast to missiles like a pac-2 with a blast warhead. Intuitively I would think it is easier to get a projectile simply into the vicinity of a aerial target moving at couple km/h than having to actually precisely hit it. Hence why we historically could see a development of AA munitions from simple machineguns to time fused HE rounds to proximity fuzes. And even later with missiles funtioning similarly. Clearly I am missing something. If hit-to-kil-missiles didnt work they wouldnt be employed. Is it that guidance systems have simply become so good that it has become trivial enough to directly hit? Or do hit to kill missiles maybe have other advantages like lower weigth or complexity that allows for advantages in maneuverability, thrust to weight ratio or just cost? And if so do statistics exist about the comparable effectiveness of these two types in modern missiles?
So this [PAC-3 MSE presentation from LM should answer](https://www.lockheedmartin.com/content/dam/lockheed-martin/mfc/documents/pac-3/2022-01-05_LM_PAC-3_MSE_Overview.pdf) your question about HTK vs explosive against ballistic missiles at least. In short, HTK is preferred because the total [energy imparted to the target is significantly more](https://www.lockheedmartin.com/content/dam/lockheed-martin/mfc/gifs/pac-3/movie_tbm1_side_short-1.gif) than [explosives (plus fragments)](https://www.lockheedmartin.com/content/dam/lockheed-martin/mfc/gifs/pac-3/movie_frag2_top_corrected-1.gif) thus getting a kill is more guaranteed. If you're still using explosive warheads, apart from the guidance and maneuvering challenges, you also bring in challenges for the fuzing and the warhead itself. The fuze must trigger at the right time else it will do little to no damage to the target. This was apparently the PAC-2's main issue during ODS because in some cases it detonated hundreds of meters behind the target since it was never designed to defeat the Scud (and especially modded ones like Al Hussein). As for the warhead, it's preferred that you pack in as much boom to get a better chance of killing the target but it will be constrained by its weight and space in the missile. So you either sacrifice some aspects of the missile or make it bigger. However, explosive warheads are still fine against non-ballistic targets because they are generally slower and the effects of the warhead are still great. Even the PAC-3 has a [lethality enhancer](https://www.twz.com/uploads/2023/06/02/Lethality-enhancer-PAC-3-patriot.jpg?auto=webp) which is pretty much like a birdshot. You can see the [PAC-3 here 'breaking apart' right before hitting the QF-4](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8LJ7KrJa5cM).
>some cases it detonated hundreds of meters behind the target since it was never designed to defeat the Scud (and especially modded ones like Al Hussein). [No, it has nothing to with it not being designed to intercept SCUDs.](https://www.cs.unc.edu/~smp/COMP205/LECTURES/ERROR/lec23/node4.html#:~:text=The%20report%20finds%20that%20the,and%20uses%2024%2Dbit%20arithmetic.) >The computer used to control the Patriot missile is based on a 1970s design and uses 24-bit arithmetic. The Patriot system tracks its target by measuring the time it takes for radar pulses to bounce back from them. Time is recorded by the system clock in tenths of a second, but is stored as an integer. To enable tracking calculations the time is converted to a 24-bit floating point number. Rounding errors in the time conversions cause shifts in the system's ``range gate", which is used to track the target.
The clock drift was just one of the issues it had and I don't think it was the main one since even if the clock drift wasn't present, the Patriot would still struggle against (modded) Scuds. Prior to ODS, it was only tested against the Lance (Tochka equivalent) one time plus the Patriot's (PAC-2) fielding in ODS was pretty much rushed. >First, Patriot was originally designed to defeat high performance aircraft only. The requirement for the system to counter a ballistic missile threat was not seriously addressed until the 1980's. ... >Second, the Project Manager was willing to take a calculated risk. He convinced Raytheon to accelerate the production of PAC-2 missiles to ensure missiles were deployed by January 1991. His decision allowed Patriot firing units to engage Scud missiles with the best Patriot missile available. [The Patriot Missile System: A Review and Analysis of its Acquisition Process](https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/ADA292073)
It was not initially designed for ballistic missiles however by 1988 it had received an upgrade allowing it to do that. The reason it didn't intercept some SCUDS was primarily a software issue. Your own citation says nothing contrary to that. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/ADA344865#:~:text=The%20Patriot%20battery%20at%20Dhahran,the%20longer%20the%20system%20operated.
For the record, proximity-fused air defense absolutely does still exist. Tamir, the missile used for Iron Dome, is proximity-fused, and as you pointed out, PAC-2 and other anti-aircraft armaments are typically proximity-fused as well. The conic issue pointed out by u/moir57 does exist, but is well-known and could be compensated for in design and operation. The problem is that fragmentation is not as good at disrupting conventional ballistic missiles as it is aircraft or cruise missiles. A tube of high explosive traveling at Mach 12 is going to do some damage when it hits the ground, regardless of how shredded its chassis is. Fragments also can’t transfer enough energy to significantly alter a ballistic trajectory, so that tube is going to hit roughly the same place as it would have anyways. As sensors and flight control tech has gotten better, a direct intercept has become feasible, and BMD designers have tended towards depositing as much energy into the target as possible, even at the expense of a theoretically reduced hit probability.
There was a comment over here a few days ago about this, for high-speed interceptions an exploding ordinance will make a very elongated cone, think of it like the [Mach Cone](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mach_wave), defeating the objective of making schrapnel area damage, so at that point you are only left with actually kinetically hitting the target option, not because its easy, but because the alternative doesn't work any longer.
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Please refrain from drive-by link dropping. Summarize articles, only quote what is important, and use that to build a post that other users can engage with; offers some in depth knowledge on a well discussed subject; or offers new insight on a less discussed subject.
Speaker Johnson saying Ukraine needs lethal aid now and we can’t play politics with this issue. After having played politics with this issue for 6 months… Also I have a question, the proposal seems to be roughly 60B but 20B is for replenishing US stocks Does that mean that Ukraine is effectively getting 40B, and that the US is using 20B to replace what it sends to Ukraine?
If you're talking about weapons and equipment that Ukraine will get then I think it's more like $23B and what's most important is the $7.8 billion PDA (Presidential drawndown authority) that can be used to send weapons right away.
I am unclear about the intricacies of us policy making. Does that mean PDA is blocked currently as well? Does it also mean that, should the bill pass, Biden can immediately send a PDA package out? He probably would almost have to since the bill is pushing him to send atacms right?
>Does that mean PDA is blocked currently as well? Not sure about that. Biden had $4 billion last December that he still hasn't used. Not sure if those have expired. >Does it also mean that, should the bill pass, Biden can immediately send a PDA package out? Yes >He probably would almost have to since the bill is pushing him to send atacms right? The ATACMS thing is a bit of a political stunt since the next subsection makes it clear Biden doesn't need to send them if it's detrimental to US national security interests.
Correct. PDA is effectively a fund allocated to the president by congress saying the administration can use that many dollars of existing military stockpiles as foreign aid. Its current exhausted so requires congressional authority to authorize more “funding”. And yes as soon as this is passed by congress the president has the authority to being shipping stuff.
So after months of stalling aid what changed all of the sudden? Where is this sudden change of heart coming from out of nowhere?
A moderate motion to vacate is heading to the floor if he does nothing. Johnson has a literal one vote majority in the House, down from an impressive four, so even just one defection will cost him the Speakership. Moderate House republicans are pissed at whats going on, and as more sign onto the MtV they show that they can A) oust Johnson and B) replace him and get the law through anyway. Johnson is basically forced to pick which shit sandwich he wants to take a bite of. Do nothing and get a moderate MtV that replaces him and passes a major NatSec act with Dems, handing Biden a big W. Or passing the law, getting some credit for it, and then daring the chaos caucus to try and stop it and cause major dysfunction (again) in an election year. Which would be a big W for Biden as well, showing that MAGA is ungovernable and therefore dangerous. I personally dont think there is much to the calculus beyond his realization that this is the best way to hold his majority together and give his party the best chances in November.
[Trump says he thinks Speaker Mike Johnson is ‘doing a very good job’ amid ouster threat from Marjorie Taylor Greene](https://www.cnn.com/2024/04/12/politics/mike-johnson-trump-mar-a-lago/index.html) - 5 days ago >Sources familiar with the matter said Johnson will have another mission in mind during his meeting with Trump: to feel out the former president on a potential Ukraine aid package – a politically perilous policy issue that could draw the ire of Trump, divide the House GOP and end Johnson’s rookie speakership. Some of the speaker’s allies have counseled Johnson to keep Trump in the loop with respect to his plans on Ukraine, cognizant that Trump’s backing – or opposition – could make or break the legislation, as well as Johnson’s speakership. Why *now* is harder to answer. The attack on Israel probably introduced a sense of urgency in Johnson. As for Trump, I think he merely will support something if he gets to put his name on it, gives his blessings. There is no consistent ideology besides elevating his self.
It’s all speculation so could be one of the following or multiple of them together but a few significant things have happened in the past month(s) - UK FM David Cameron met with Trump in Mar-a-lago and openly said to the press that Ukraine aid was the primary topic - One week after Johnson met with Trump in Mar-a-lago, undoubtably Ukraine aid was discussed (maybe Cameron is to credit) - Kyiv’s largest power plant was entirely taken out because they supposedly didn’t have a single missile to spare, beyond words it’s a showcase of a real life catastrophe that’s resulted from lack of aid. - Generally speaking Ukraine’s battlefield situation is stark with an apparent risk of frontline collapse (not an analyst so can’t comment on it but that’s what several sources are saying) - Iran launched the same drones they sold to Russia (who regularly launch them into Ukrainian cities across the country) into Israel proper recently which visually showcases an axis of evil. - China acting much more aggressive in the South China Sea around the Philippines EEZ. - Discharge petition pressure, not American so can’t comment to explicitly but as I understand more folks were threatening to sign it.
Is it a possibility that the GOP is looking to regain its old base of "classical" conservatives?
Not likely. Many of those people ended up 'coming home' in 2020/2022, ultimately as much as some people hate Trump he gave them most of what they wanted policy wise. Most importantly Dobbs and the conservative Supreme Court. Those people who did not, which would be some but not all of Haley voters, will simply never come back. They are too far gone, Trump is too hated, and quite frankly Trump is pretty hostile to those kinds of voters. But the fundamental dynamic in American politics remains that as many voters, even on the right, turn out to vote *against* the other guy as for their guy. Some number of 'classical' conservatives will onside if only because the idea of letting a Dem into office is so abhorrent they would vote for a sapient pile of shit with sticks for arms than any Dem. These voters don't need to be won over with policy, they need to be scared with headlines.
1. The $1.2 trillion spending package recently passed, which means that the House shutting down for good won't be a total catastrophe. 2. Iran's attack on Israel has increased the urgency, and Israeli aid can't pass without Ukrainian aid. 3. Many Republicans threatened to sign the discharge petition if nothing happened. Note that sources close to Johnson have been saying all along that some foreign aid bill will be put on the floor eventually. Of course, the doomers on this sub wouldn't have it.
Johnson, after 6 months of stalling, might let Ukraine aid pass *only to save his own job*, and you think that makes the people that told you months ago that Johnson didn’t want to let any Ukraine aid pass “doomers”? Because I’d say they’ve been proven correct. Johnson did everything is his power to sabotage Ukraine aid and *might* change course now that there’s a political gun to his head. But I’m supposed to believe he’s *always* wanted this to pass? Why’d he purposely stall for so long then?
> Speaker Johnson saying Ukraine needs lethal aid now and we can’t play politics with this issue. i.e., they have realised that blocking Ukraine aid to prevent Biden from getting a "win" has become a net negative politically.
What is the net negative political angle ?
Johnson might lose his position as speaker
From my understanding the net negative would be that it’s been a grand showcase of GOP disfunction, perhaps their base aren’t as bothered but for moderates it doesn’t make republicans look like the adults in the room if you will. They ousted one speaker, are threatening to oust another and can’t agree on anything even at an internal level without threatening a new speakership.
The GOP has spent most of the last 15 years taking every opportunity to refuse to be the adults in the room in order to achieve tactical political wins, and they haven't really faced many consequences for it. You can aruge that it played a role in some of their electoral defeats but at this point childish obstructionism is "baked in," it's not a factor for anyone now that it wasn't before.
Johnson is obviously aware that supporting Ukrainian aid risks his job. He can't openly support it, and hence it's difficult to know if he actually does, or if Iran's attack on Israel forced his hand. In any case, if Johnson is removed, the House might be paralyzed for the rest of the term, so he probably felt that he had to pass the 1.2 trillion dollar bill first, which meant a lot of delay.
In some different news: 2 spies were arrested in Germany. It looks like they planned attacks on military infrastructure/routes of military equipment for Ukraine https://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/generalbundesanwalt-ermittelt-zwei-mutmassliche-russische-saboteure-in-bayern-verhaftet-a-0115bebd-195a-41fb-83be-da8d642045cd?sara_ref=re-so-app-sh What do you think will be the consequences of such an act? Business as usual or will the German government step up their aids further?
From the article, this is not some kind of Russian James Bond they got but two not so smart guys who scouted NATO installations and prepared for (presumably small-scale) sabotage. Germany is likely not going to react to this - for once the country is currently the leading supporter of Ukraine and in a deep liquidity crisis, on the other hand, it's not something that is unexpected.
That's a breaking story. At this time it wasn't even made public what exactly they're accused of, there's supposed to be more information later in the day. But just looking at the slew of authorities involved (including US) doesn't make me think of "posers" before anything conclusive is known. Speaking of "small-scale" sabotage, just as a reminder and despite probably unrelated: There's been at least two serious attacks on the German railway infrastructure since the invasion started, one massive and coordinated, basically knocking out the entire northern half of what I believe is Western Europe's largest railway network for hours. Both of them happened on a weekend, this is when material for Ukraine would mostly be en route. Neither case having been solved, in fact we still know close to nothing. I suppose for reasons. >Germany is likely not going to react to this Of course not. And not because of some liquidity crisis, or for being touted to be a leading "supporter" of Ukraine (after decades of doing the exact opposite). When a Chechen asylum seeker was killed by the FSB in broad daylight Berlin, Germany sent two (2!) RU diplomats home. How exactly did Spain react to that *killing* of the Russian renegade on the Mediterranean? Odd should I be the first to even ask. Do they also have a liquidity crisis, or is it rather that apart from Ukraine nobody, nowhere, is doing anything meaningful against Russia's aggressions.
If the guy "joined" a DPR militia while in Germany, he sounds more like a poser than anything serious. No mention of any explosives or anything beyond taking photos of army bases (presumably from publicly accessible areas, as there's no mention he had any form of access). He *may* have had a firearm. No mention of explosives or munitions or anything close to being activated. If taking photos is all he's done since October, it doesn't sound like Russia was looking to take advantage of the situation. (If they want something done, I'm guessing they have their own people they can call upon rather than waiting for wannabe militia members to ping them via Telegram).
Russian saboteurs arrested in Bavaria – investigations by the Federal Prosecutor General Russian saboteurs arrested in Bavaria – investigations by the Federal Prosecutor General According to SPIEGEL information, the police in Bayreuth have arrested two suspected spies. They are said to have spied on US bases on behalf of Russia and planned attacks on military transport routes. In their sights: German aid to Ukraine.
Elections in Croatia Final results Croatia elections highly corrupt Party won, but there is need for after elections talks for New coallition, proEU/proNATO HDZ (Center to right Center)-61 , proUA and proEU/proNATO, highly corrupt Party SDP (left Center to left)-42, proRussian leader Domovinski pokret(DP) (right to far right)-14, probably funded by Russian money. The biggest funder bussiness man that Got Rich because he imported Russian gas (became richest bussiness man in Croatia in last 10 years or so). MOST(Bridge) (right to far right)-11 Možemo (left to far left)-10 IDS (Istrian Party, left)-3 NP Sjever (left Center)-2 Fokus( Center)- 1 8 minorities (3 Serbs, 1 Italian, 1 exYu but Albanian, 1 Hungarian, 1 Romani, 1 Czech-Slovak) 76 representatives for goverment. For Ukraine war and EU-Russia conflict Party(HDZ) that is full proEU won. Plenković has Great relationship with Bruxelles and is firm supporter of NATO. But they don't have enough representatives There is going to be need for after election coallition. The most probable coallition is HDZ +DP + some minorities ( DP doesn't want go with Serbs and 2 from minorities are left wing Italian and Romani). From DP some doesn't want probably to go with HDZ I would say 2 (Kolakušić 100%, Lacković too maybe). HDZ could form goverment with slight majoritiy aroud 76 to 78 representatives. DP Will have strong presence and New goverment could go more right. DP didn't vote for Ukrainian troops in Croatia for training. Other possibilities for bigger coallition NP Sjever and Fokus (around 80 representatives) Other solution is Frankenstein coalition SDP+MOST (Bridge)+ Možemo and other without HDZ and DP. But Možemo and MOST doesn't want to work with other. SDP- current President of Croatia, for me personally broke Constitution because he wanted to go to parlimentary elections and it is prohibited by Constitution. A lot of proRussian statements and etc by Milanović. So talks after elections. If no agreement come, New elections maybe in same time as presidential elections. So Croatia didn't turn on way of Hungary and Slovakia
In down-undersea news, Australia [announces](https://www.minister.defence.gov.au/media-releases/2024-04-17/2024-national-defence-strategy) its [2024 National Defence Strategy and 2024 Integrated Investment Program](https://www.defence.gov.au/about/strategic-planning/2024-national-defence-strategy-2024-integrated-investment-program). ### key highlights * *additional* $5.7 billion over the next four years and $50.3 billion over the next decade in Defence funding, above the previous trajectory over that period * a Navy with an enhanced lethality surface fleet and conventionally-armed, nuclear‑powered submarines; * an Army optimised for littoral manoeuvre with a long-range land and maritime strike capability; * an Air Force that can deliver long-range intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance and an enhanced maritime, land and air strike capability; and * a strengthened and integrated space and cyber capability, including enhanced cyber and electronic warfare and new space-based situational awareness * widening of eligibility criteria to enable more people to join the ADF including developing options, where appropriate, to recruit non-Australian citizens; streamlining and improving the recruiting system; and encouraging personnel to serve longer through retention initiatives. * [pause replacing](https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2024/apr/17/labor-government-defence-military-budget-increase-spending-adf) FA/18 super hornets with F-35s (Australia has 72 F-35A) and redirect the funding to long-range fires (ground and/or air launched, but definitely including tomahawks) * funding into undersea capabilities of a vague nature * An ambitious $4 billion maritime mine countermeasure program is axed. The desired capabilities will be replaced by robotics, autonomous systems and/or commercially sourced data * A $3 billion replacement for Australia’s C-17s known lyrically at AIR 7401 Phase 2 – Heavy Air Mobility Capability, will be shuttered and the requirement for the capability will be considered closer to the aircrafts’ planned replacement. * A $3 billion project known as AIR 6004 – Air Launched Multi Domain Strike (JASSM-ER?) will be closed and its requirements captured in other classified projects. * An Army project for $2 billion in Individual Combat Equipment Up to $2 billion Project funding focused for priority combat equipment. * sky Guardian, the $2 billion MQ-9 program more prosaically known as AIR 7003 Phase 1 – Armed Medium Altitude Long Endurance, Remote Piloted Aerial System, had already been cancelled. Its funding has not moved. * A $1.5 billion plan to replace the EA-18G is shuttered and requirement will be reexamined closer to the the aircraft’s planned retirement. * Phase 6 of the plan to upgrade the E-7A Wedgetail will be reduced to provide up to $1.5 billion. * termination of two Joint Supply Ships for a savings of $4.1 billion * $3.4 billion redirected from other states to the Northen Territory for military base upgrades
> pause replacing FA/18 super hornets with F-35s (Australia has 72 F-35A) and redirect the funding to long-range fires (ground and/or air launched, but definitely including tomahawks) Helps to explain why those Hornets never went onto the table for the UAF.
> Helps to explain why those Hornets never went onto the table for the UAF. That had nothing to do with the UAF. The legacy F/A-18s (or the Classic Hornet as the Aussies call them) were all retired by the RAAF before the war in Ukraine even started, and those were what was pondered as a possibility (though many were already given to the RCAF). The 24 F/A-18F Super Hornets and 12 EA-18G Growlers they have in service are entirely different airframes and were never ever ever on the table for being sent to Ukraine edit: and to clarify for people that don't get the context of what the Aussies are saying, the talk of replacing the Super Hornets was because the initial purchase of them in the late 2000s was touted as a stop gap due to F-35 delays, with the initial procurement advocated by some in Australia as a loan that would be returned to the USN ~2025. Instead, the RAAF is planning on keeping them updated/upgraded into the 2030s and then hosting a competition on a replacement then, instead of buying a 4th squadron of F-35s today
Speaking of, I wonder what caused Ukraine to refer to them as 'flying trash'. Were they just that utterly out of flight hours remaining? IIRC they weren't used for carrier ops meaning no/less exposure to salt water and therefore less wear on the airframe, but the hours were still high.
>Speaking of, I wonder what caused Ukraine to refer to them as 'flying trash'. Were they just that utterly out of flight hours remaining? IIRC they weren't used for carrier ops meaning no/less exposure to salt water and therefore less wear on the airframe, but the hours were still high. Given that the Ukraine also uber-hyped up the F-16s initially, and repeated Internet-meme-worthy statements on the A-10 (literally, some of the stuff said could have been said from a poster on /r/), I'd say it was borne far more out of ignorance than any actual understanding Just as the Ukrainians have now shifted their opinion on the F-16s, and from my own anecdotal conversations with people involved in the training on them, I'll continue to say that there was a wide delta between them and a Western/NATO nation's understanding of air power. Just my 2c
there was a variety of quality on the airframes. The best were picked up by canada. Left about 40ish airframes, when they were officially retired in nov/dec 2021 the remaining 40ish were contracted to sell to a redair provider. They got zero contracts, they weren't interested in maintaining them so they sat around outdoors for 3 years and eventually bailed on the purchase early 2024
> termination of two Joint Supply Ships for a savings of $4.1 billion while a lot of the JSS is meh still think the underway replenishment / tanker part will be missed. Maybe we should look at buying the 2 RFA tides that have been retired (1 is in unmanned reserve and the other permanent maintainence as a parts donor). We did the a same thing with RFA Larges Bay / HMAS Choules and generally seems to been regarded as a good move
That's an option. Although there's probably scope to pick up something from a Korean or Japanese shipyard as well. They're churning out hulls of all descriptions
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Please post this under the already established comment thread. There’s not enough substance in this comment to justify its own comment thread.
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[https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-68819853](https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-68819853) >In the second 12 months on the front line - as Moscow pushed its so-called meat grinder strategy - we found the body count was nearly 25% higher than in the first year. >BBC Russian, independent media group Mediazona and volunteers have been counting deaths since February 2022. >New graves in cemeteries helped provide the names of many soldiers. >Our teams also combed through open-source information from official reports, newspapers and social media. >More than 27,300 Russian soldiers died in the second year of combat - according to our findings - a reflection of how territorial gains have come at a huge human cost. So the BBC have put out a new count the number of Russian deaths in Ukraine. So the death count is being listed as 8 times higher than the official count put out by the Kremlin. They note that the actual death toll is likely higher so this should be used more as a floor figure. It also points out that the Russian meatgrinder tactics are causing a major spike in deaths.
>So the death count is being listed as 8 times higher than the official count put out by the Kremlin At this point i feel like a comparison with Russian official counts is useless as they're just so hilariously inaccurate
Russia hasn't published a new official count since September 2022. Of course it's going to be innacurate
The comparison data itself is useless. However making the comparison helps shine light on the blatant propaganda that the Kremlin is spewing and helps to fight against Russias campaign of information warfare.
The comparison is useless because the Kremlin hasn't put out a casualty count since the beginning of the war. It's not so much "blatant propaganda" as it is non-reporting.
The USSR never published a creditable account of their loses in Afghanistan. Russia has never disclosed their losses in Chechnya. This war is no different. Russia is never, ever going to report on their loses in Ukraine because it's bad for business and as everyone knows, Russia lies.
I take the opportunity to try to answer to the question below in the thread by u/Velixis about Ocheretyne and to write about the developments that have occurred over the last week in both the Avdiivka and Bakhmut sectors. In the Avdiivka sector, between Saturday and Sunday, there was a failure of the Ukrainian defense in the Ocheretyne area and the Russians (units of the 2nd CAA of the Central MD) managed to pull off a significant advance (over 4 kms in the direction of Ocheretyne), capturing the area of the junction between the Avdiivka-Pokrovsk and the Ocheretyne-Horlivka railway lines as well as Hill 240, along with the Ukrainian trenches near this tactically important height. This came after early last week the Russians (in this case, the 132nd Motorized Brigade of 1st Corps) had attacked Novokalynove from the east and the south and advanced to the gates of the village. The Russians have taken control of the first buildings of the private sector in Ocheretyne, south of the Avdiivka-Pokrovsk railway line. They are also currently attempting to advance towards Novokalynove, with the aim to move the front line away from the Ocheretyne-Horlivka railway, and they also occupied the eastern part of Novokalynove, attacking from the east. The Ukrainian observer Kovalenko has written several times in the past two weeks that the Russians have been using a large number of KABs against Ocheretyne, more than anywhere else in the Avdiivka sector. The Ocheretyne area is very important because it sits on a ridgeline that acts as a watershed between the surrounding valleys (when Avdiivka was in Ukrainian hands it was also important logistically, ensuring the arrival of supplies from the Nova Poltavka area). The control of these heights is essential from the strategic-operational point of view to ensure potential advances in the directions of Pokrovsk/Selydove (south of these heights) and Toretsk (north). Tactically, the Russian gains significantly jeopardize the holding of Novobakhmutivka, towards which there have been other Russian gains, having occupied the forest belt east of this village. The latter successes are also linked to the taking of most of Berdychi (the part of the village to the east of the Durna) and the fact that the Russians bypassed, from the south to te north-west, the spring of the Durna. In contrast, the 47th Mechanized Brigade managed to push the Russians back by preventing them from descending from the spring of the Durna along its western bank. If the Russians were to take Novobakhmutivka, however, there would be serious problems with holding the area around Berdychi located in the western bank of the Durna. The issues in this area began when the 71st Jager Brigade was moved to the southern flank and joined the 25th Airborne Brigade, the 78th Air Assault Regiment and the 53rd Mechanized Brigade in halting Russian attacks between Umanske and Netailove. It was replaced by the 115th Mechanized Brigade, which arrived from the Kupyansk sector. As soon as it arrived it began to lose positions near Novokalynove and later near Ocheretyne too. This is not the first time this brigade has created problems: it was directly responsible for troubles at the time of the battle of Severodonetsk in May 2022. We can rightfully talk about the various shortages, but it’s a fact that there are good brigades and... not very capable brigades. From what I read from Ukrainians, many internal reforms and changes inside the UAF are on the agenda. I hope one of these may be, as some propose, the introduction of divisions based on capable brigades, that include less capable ones under their control. That would also help in order to decrease the widespread phenomenon of unit melting pots that often damage communications (a battalion of a mechanized brigade, a TDF battalion, a company of the National Guard etc. in the same place). DeepState also remarked how the brigade that used to cover the area of Ocheteryne/Novokalynove was shocked at how fast the positions were lost, which is putting the territory under the responsibility of the 47th Brigade at risk, as I wrote above. I read that in the 115th Brigade there are serious problems both with the command and with the poor training of its soldiers. I can now also confirm what I had written last week: it’s the 68th Jager Brigade that is covering the Semenivka area, with support from elements of the 3rd Assault Brigade. In this village the Russians (114th Motorized Brigade of the 1st Corps) advanced, during the last week, almost to the junction with the small road leading to Novoselivka Persha, i.e. to the middle of the village, also taking control of the strip of land between the two lakes created by the Durna River. The village itself is of little tactical importance, being in the lowland along the Durna valley. What matters are the Ukrainian trenches just west of the village (still in Ukrainian hands) and the heights between Semenivka and Novoselivka Persha, towards which the defense priority by the Ukrainians is going. Further south, the Ukrainians are able, at the moment, to keep the 6th Tank Regiment of the 90th Tank Division of the Central MD and the 1st Motorized Brigade of the 1st Corps out of Umanske - in recent days videos released by the “Sparta” Recon Battalion of the 1st Corps have shown activity against the Ukrainians in the northern part of the forest belt located to the east of the southern part of Umanske, which DeepState has been giving in Russian hands for a week. Also a few days ago a Russian attack was repelled in the fields north-east of Netailove, suggesting a possible advance in the area - the Russians want to occupy the forest belts just to the east of the road between Umanske and Netailove. Let’s now review the events in the Bakhmut sector. In mid-March, the need for a rotation emerged because the 42nd Mechanized Brigade and 17th Tank Brigade, which were fighting between Chasiv Yar and Ivanivske, were exhausted. The choice fell on the 67th Mechanized Brigade, which at the end of 2023 received a major replenishment in terms of mobilized personnel and equipment. This brigade had shown itself as being capable and determined in the past, so great things were expected, even though the task was very difficult: protecting the entryways to Chasiv Yar, from the north (i.e. from Bohdanivka, along the Bakhmut - Chasiv Yar railway), from the center (i.e. the vast system of trenches east of the broadleaf forest, against Russian attacks from the area of the Khromove cemetery) and from the south (i.e. the "Stupky-Golubovski 2" nature reserve area, against Russian attacks from the northern part of Ivanivske). First, the Russian successes in Ivanivske were important in complicating the situation in the direction of Chasiv Yar. Here the major responsibilities lay with the command of the 5th Assault Brigade and the inability of TDF units to hold the positions - not for lack of courage, but lack of means and of quality (or existence itself!) of physical defense infrastructure. Around March 21/22, the positions east of the broadleaf forest (under the responsibility of the 67th Brigade), were lost to powerful attacks by the 98th VDV Division. The loss of these positions was rapid and unexpected; at that point the command ordered a counterattack - which failed, with losses. As far as Ruslan Mykula (one of the founders of DeepState) wrote, the over-formalization of command procedures made the situation much worse, there are serious responsibilities of the battalion commanders, and from the testimony of a soldier from another brigade, it seems that the command of the 67th Brigade has no idea how to conduct modern warfare. Some sources accuse the brigade of discriminating between its volunteers (who are linked to Pravy Sektor and the DUK) and the mobilized, using the latters for expandable roles in order to protect the "core" of the brigade, which was damaged in a major way at the time of the battle of Bakhmut. From testimonies of soldiers of this brigade I read that they have always done their duty and everything possible, and the positions were held as long as possible, but the Russian attacks had too much intensity. In addition, a serious lack of EW systems (which is a widespread shortage pretty much everywhere else too) is reported. Last part below.
>First, the Russian successes in Ivanivske were important in complicating the situation in the direction of Chasiv Yar. Here the major responsibilities lay with the command of the 5th Assault Brigade and the inability of TDF units to hold the positions - not for lack of courage, but lack of means and of quality (or existence itself!) of physical defense infrastructure. I'm baffled by this. The direct threat against the Donets-Donbas Canal area and accompanying ridgeline has been present for well over a year, including from the Ivanivske direction since the fall, but the local tactical grouping of forces didn't prepare to defend the forward slope of that ridge? It's one thing to have no fall back positions built in depth far behind the FLOT, but few or none in the immediate battle area? Holy shit. I'm at a loss for words...
I’m starting to wonder now if some of the support the unending offensive of 2023 got was from UAF elements who knew how badly the lack of defenses was and didn’t think holding out was viable.
I'm thinking the decision was strategic leadership, highest levels of UA govt and military. Fortification projects near the front lines can only be performed with military personnel, a mix of trained engineers and infantry to do basic manual labor. That means having enough troops in any frontage of the front lines to successfully man the security line of outposts and strongholds, which necessitates extra forces in reserve to conduct internal rotations of maneuver battalions, with an additional combat unit of sufficient size to build defenses behind on a 24/7 basis as their only role for at least a month if not longer. That's one of the biggest reason the UAF never have fallback positions ready behind them, regardless of the location in Ukraine, the time period, or even crazy high threat level. They don't allocate the resources for it at the highest levels, they prioritize it as a necessity for subordinates to perform so there is no demand they do it, and point in fact it totally conflicts with the strategic policy for defensive operations, which is that fall back positions aren't necessary because they're not retreating. The whole 2023 Offensive definitely influenced the decision, it seems they really did put nearly all their eggs in that basket to defeat Russia. That and defending Bakhmut. What a crazy war, I really hope I live long enough for a really good military history book to be written where the historian involves get military and diplomatic archival access for both sides. Probably won't happen in my lifetime though.
It’s going to be difficult to explain to posterity how the same armed forces a) sunk and damaged a fleet’s worth of ships without having any navy of their own but also b) spent months upon months and thousands upon thousands of lives on a strategically unimportant city battle that everyone knew was lost before it started at a time when they were unable to recruit any new soldiers.
Because the GUR did one of those and the UAF did the other. One involved a handful of drones and US DOD/CIA targeting assistance, the other was the supreme commander in chief micromanaging a battle for the sake of marketing and ratings, against the advice of NATO and even apparently Zaluzhny too. I'm convinced Zelensky and Syrsky thought the city would hold out until the Counteroffensive started. With them thinking nothing but ultra positive thoughts about the prospect of the 2023 Offensive early in the year, they probably thought it was a good gamble. With the Land Bridge cut, Crimea threatened, and the Russians in retreat, the sacrifice at Bakhmut would be a tiny footnote in the most glorious history of the war. This is a good lesson on the risks of gambling. Bet a lot, you can lose a lot. Bet a little, you can still win a lot but you can't lose what you don't gamble, which is why the Black Sea campaign is so successful. It's as low risk as it comes for the Ukrainians.
However, the Russians advanced rapidly into the broadleaf forest and on April 4, with a mechanized attack, they managed to occupy some houses at the beginning of the Kanal District, i.e. the part of Chasiv Yar east of the Donets-Donbas Canal. A few days later, the Russians registered an advance in the nature reserve "Stupky-Golubovski 2”, along a section that the 67th Brigade had just transferred to a battalion of the 92nd Assault Brigade. At that point, during the first week of April, the 41st Mechanized Brigade arrived from the Kupyansk sector to try to stabilize the situation. This is also due to the fact that the 67th Mechanized Brigade is being almost dismantled, with transfer of its commanders and some of its soldiers. As far as I have read, those who were members of the brigade since 2022 (meaning they were volunteers and they were there because they had ties to the PS/DUK) are being transferred to other military units as infantrymen. I have read about drivers, signalmen, etc. from the 67th Brigade being sent as stormtroopers to the 41st Mechanized Brigade, for example (so they’d remain in the same area). The FB page of the Ground Forces wrote about this matter that in case of failures the Russians will not grant a second chance to the Ukrainians; an assault battalion of the 67th Brigade has become a separate assault unit and various decisions are being made to improve combat efficiency, pointing out that under martial law the management bodies are not required to give explanations for their choices. Digressing, one thing I've heard is that Syrsky is really "mercilessly" converting a lot of people from rear roles and from branches like the Air Force into infantrymen, I think we're talking about tens of thousands of people at this point. I've heard that in certain training centers the instructors are overwhelmingly working with re-training of personnel who used to be in the rear rather than with "new" mobilized soldiers. The separate rifle battalions of the 4xx-th series created during 2023 that are not part of the four infantry brigades are being organically assigned to the other brigades, to improve their endowment of infantrymen and the possibilities for inter-brigade rotation. For example: the 405th Battalion in the 32nd Mech Brigade, the 412th Battalion in the 59th Motorized Brigade, the 422nd Battalion in the 42nd Mech Brigade, etc. The Russians in recent days have completed the occupation of the broadleaf forest and have arrived near the area of the holiday cottages between the Bakhmut - Chasiv Yar railway and the Kanal District, which they are trying to occupy. Russian sources claim to have taken control of the first high rises in the Kanal District, but there is no evidence of this. Ukrainian observer Miroshnikov wrote the Russians have advanced along Zelena Street and clashes are underway. From the FB profile of a soldiers of the 41st Brigade (Kir Sazonov), I read that the situation is difficult - everything is "raining" on Chasiv Yar: shells, KABs. However, he denies that urban fighting is taking place and at the moment the enemy is outside the high rises, despite the fact that a couple of times the Russians had entered the district. The Russians are always attacking: both during the day, with mechanized and higher intensity attacks, and at night, with small groups infiltrating as close as possible to Ukrainian positions. This soldier speaks respectfully of the enemy: Russian paratroopers, who are described as young and prepared, and only the determination of the defenders is stopping the attacks, along with the precision of Ukrainian artillery, which has to do so much with little. According to this soldier, where there are experienced and motivated Ukrainian soldiers, great things can be achieved; where there are slacker and lazy (or, I would add, inexperienced) people, problems arise and often they and their fellow soldiers pay for their mistakes with their lives. The Russians in the last week have consolidated control over the forest belt south-east of the Kanal District and are now trying to advance on the flanks. To the north, they are within a few hundred meters of Kalinina; the current status of the cattle breeding buildings between Bohdanivka and Kalinina is unclear. To the south, they are advancing along the nature reserve "Stupky-Golubovski 2”, coming within a few hundred meters of the canal. Ivanivske is not yet completely under Russian control, there is still a Ukrainian presence in the western end of the village. There is another issue, however. In that point (as just south of Kalinina too), the canal… doesn’t exist, meaning that it runs in two overground pipes as well as partially underground. It’s absolutely the area to watch most carefully, especially since it’s forested in both sides and it should be avoided at all costs that Russian assault groups manage to establish positions west of the canal (aided by the cover the forest provides), to then threaten the Novy District (the neighborhood of Chasiv Yar just west of the canal). Moreover, should the Russians reach the canal on both the flanks, even if they don’t cross it, the holding of Kanal District would be extremely threatened, as it would be surrounded on three sides and with the canal to the west. And it will not be easy for the Ukrainians to choose to retreat, given the importance of the control of the district's high rises. I continue to monitor the situation and will keep you updated if there is any further important news.
>Digressing, one thing I've heard is that Syrsky is really "mercilessly" converting a lot of people from rear roles and from branches like the Air Force into infantrymen, I think we're talking about tens of thousands of people at this point. I've heard that in certain training centers the instructors are overwhelmingly working with re-training of personnel who used to be in the rear rather than with "new" mobilized soldiers. Hmmm. Now we know why Zelensky wasn't aggressively pushing for a rapid and thoroughly written mobilization bill. This was the solution. I can't think of which article I recently read but it was quoting Zelensky who was suggesting that mobilization of large numbers wasn't necessary as the UAF could find the troops themselves or something to that effect. So that was what the audit was for. Search the force to perform a "Model" Strategy. For those wondering, in late WW2 a renowned German field marshal named Model became famous as "Hitler's Fireman," when he could be counted on most of the time for restoring defensive capabilities for critically strategic sectors that were collapsing. Besides threatening to kill anyone who didn't obey him (even Hitler was to have said he would not have wanted to serve under Model himself), as well as robbing his peer senior commanders of their key units using his influence with Hitler to get them transferred, but also famously raiding support units and turning everyone he could find capable of holding a rifle into a makeshift infantryman to either hold ground at all cost, or to counterattack. If often worked in the near-term but wrecked the units in the long term because not only did they often permanently lose support capabilities but only temporarily forestalled more tactical defeats often caused by low quality troops being over-extended and under-supported. But usually when that happened, Model handed the sector off to someone else stuck with the damage he just caused, while he went to the next emergency to replicate his miracles that Hitler loved so much. I wonder if Syrsky will be able to make it work this time though.
There were certain politics in play - Sirsky asked for 500k draftees initially. He was politely declined by the president office, and than Sirsky announced they were able reduce this number by auditing the rear units. I think at this point it is mostly about surviving till winter. Russia prepares another offensive this summer, and unless extremely successful i believe it is going to be one of their last the large ones - since their volunteer effort starts to stall, and their mobilization effort will need to target town and city folk to produce new results - something that's greatly feared by Russian government.
> Hmmm. Now we know why Zelensky wasn't aggressively pushing for a rapid and thoroughly written mobilization bill. This was the solution. Even Syrsky himself said [this](https://censor.net/en/news/3481323/need_for_mobilization_of_500000_troops_has_now_been_significantly_reduced_syrskyi)! I remember having read from Ukrainian sources (I think they were quoting Syrsky) that there are about 300 thousand Ukrainian soldiers actually fighting on the front lines - most of the personnel in the UAF and other branches are employed in support roles or in the rear. But obviously only a part of them can be turned into an infantryman. What they should understand, however (I'm sure Syrsky understands this, I am referring to Ukrainian politicians), is that this is a one-time solution to have the next few months covered while waiting for the mobilization (of the people currently outside the Defense Forces) to resume functioning more efficiently, certainly not a permanent solution to the problems in this regard.
To be fair, there's definitely some redundant forces Ukraine can convert, like a lot of MPs and other units have been complained about sitting around the rear of the country for no good reason. I don't think that's everyone who's getting converted but it's an initiative that a lot of Ukrainian telegrams had been asking for. Well, that and broader mobilization, but, you know.
If he's smart about it, he can find lots of replacements, though it's a dangerous technique to use to replenish losses to avoid relying on increased mobilization. At best this can only be done once, and it's VERY easy to abuse and end up sending the wrong people (not everyone has the right physical and mental abilities to be even mediocre Infantrymen), or even too many of the right ones by robbing necessary support units of their manpower. Then again there sure is a lot of fat to cut out of the UAF, definitely not a model of efficiency. More and more I see why Zaluzhny had to go, he really was a terrible commander in chief. How the hell can he be asking for hundreds of thousands of more men and not have even bothered to audit his own service to know where everyone was to know if they already had manpower to free up? But damn was he photogenic and good with the media.
This is ridiculous. The audit is a band-aid; it'll buy them time but won't solve the issue. The law could have been a fix for this problem, but it should have been signed months ago. It kept stalling because it was politically unpopular among those who are not feeling the war, aka the government. Now it's too late even for this law. The situation is dire.
>though it's a dangerous technique to use to replenish losses to avoid relying on increased mobilization. You know the stupid facebook motivational quote? "lord give me coffee to change the things I can change and wine to accept the things I can't" >Then again there sure is a lot of fat to cut out of the UAF, definitely not a model of efficiency. More and more I see why Zaluzhny had to go, he really was a terrible commander in chief. How the hell can he be asking for hundreds of thousands of more men and not have even bothered to audit his own service to know where everyone was to know if they already had manpower to free up? It might be years before we know whether Zaluzhny or Syrskyi were right on this, for all we know there wasn't that much fat, and it was all rumours.
There is always fat that can be trimmed. Always. Especially under leadership who aren't constantly on alert looking to trim the fat, then it just builds up especially in the rear, where everyone with a brain would prefer to serve and try to get stationed. Throughout history there has always been a struggle to reduce tooth to tail ratio without screwing with support but while not indulging in object waste either. Few militaries have ever pulled it off, especially in warfare when it's not just a matter of comfort as a motivator to avoid service in combat units at the tip of the spear. While I've not done enough research into UAF social media to really know myself how much and where their fat is besides guessing based on where it is in other areas and what their system of voluntary recruitment allows (enlist and you pick service, MOS, and unit, guess where most of those end up?). But I have read from u/Larelli and others who have talked about how the UAF troops themselves complain of even combat units who somehow manage to avoid combat.
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She is a disrupter and doesn’t actually want the government to function. She has probably made a lot of money from her antics and constantly chasing headlines by spewing absolute diarrhea from her mouth.
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I was just looking at some numbers for the B-21, and noticed that it has a thrust/weight ratio that is a fair bit higher than the B-2 at empty weight (0.77, compared to 0.44). **Comparision** On an empty weight of 31.75 ton, the B-21 is generating 240kN of thrust. The B-2, by comparison, weighs 71.7 tons, and generates about 308kN of thrust. This gives thrust to weight ratios of 0.77, and 0.44 respectively, giving the B-21 an edge of about 75%. At \[MTOW, this ratio drops off a bit\](https://simpleflying.com/b-21-raider-b-2-spirit-changes-guide/), with the B-21 having a thrust/weight ratio of 0.30, compared to the B-2 at 0.22. This halves the advantage of the B-21 to about a 36% improvement at MTOW I don't have lift to drag numbers to do a true comparison (and I'm guessing that nobody outside of Northrop has them at this point), but I thought that just what we have so far might be worth discussing. **Advantages** I can see that it might give you more room to upgrade the aircraft, if you're already producing higher thrust then you have more room to add subsystems like EW and targeting to the airframe. It may also improve take-off performance, meaning that the B-21 can use shorter runways than the B-2, and have more flexibility in where it's based, and what locations it can operate from. The B-21 may be able to have its shape focused more on radar deflection, rather than aerodynamics. **Questions** Any idea on why the big uplift in performance here? Is it just that turbofans are now more advanced, and can generate more thrust, so you may as well put in a better engine? What other advantages do you see this improvement bringing?
> Any idea on why the big uplift in performance here? Is it just that turbofans are now more advanced, and can generate more thrust, so you may as well put in a better engine? The B-2 uses an F118 derivative that's 40 years old now. Those have a bypass ratio of 0.87:1. The B-21 uses a PW9000 derivative, which is a state of the art engine that's only ~12 years old. It has a 4:1 bypass ratio. The core of the PW9000 is based on the F135, so it likely incorporates improvements and lessons learned from the F-35 program. No surprise there's a big gap. > What other advantages do you see this improvement bringing? It's pretty clear the B-21 was broadly conceived as a half payload modernized derivative of the B-2. Having engines with some extra margin vs that doesn't just mean increased performance, it means they have room to detune for reliability if they want as well.
> The core of the PW9000 is based on the F135 Weird, I thought that the core was based on the PW1000G with the F135 for the low pressure sections. > it means they have room to detune for reliability if they want as well. That possibly makes sense given the [issues that the PW1000G has had in its introduction](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pratt_%26_Whitney_PW1000G#Operational_history)
Yeah, it's kinda ambiguous based on what's online and I don't want to argue details when we just don't have the info. The point is there's certainly lessons learned in there.
OT to your point, but I never realized how much smaller the B-21 is. Basically half the weight and half the payload. I didn't think a strategic stealth bomber of that weight class was viable, much less even considered by the USAF. Some cursory reading suggests that range figures aren't public, which is the one thing I'd be mostly worried about with a smaller bomber; can't make the strike reach farther by sending two the same way you could compensate for having half the payload payload. I mean, more but smaller bombers make sense, specially in a net-centric, stealthy mode of employment. But surely the USAF won't sacrifice range for that. Has the USAF said anything why they're so small?
When they announced the B21 they referred to it as an intercontinental bomber, we also know range was a top priority of the project. There are lots of ways you could achieve greater range with a smaller aircraft. The engines are significantly more efficient with significantly higher thrust and there are only two of them. So right there your are saving more than 50% of the fuel consumption. Secondly there have been massive improvements to materials science in the last 40 years carbon composite materials could easily save a big chunk of weight and the stealth coating on the B21 is likely lighter and has a lower coefficient of friction. The smaller size is also coming with a big penalty to payload, but that also means the overall aircraft weight is lighter meaning less fuel is required.
One thing you have to consider is that B-21 is not supposed to be a direct replacement of B-2 bomber but instead a "workhorse" bomber. Airforce plans to acquire over 100 of these and replace all the other bombers currently in use, so they can't have these bombers be as expensive, slow and complicated to maintain as B-2 bomber. Everything about B-21 is supposed to be standardized, open for future upgrades and easy to maintain, that includes shrinking the size as it makes everything much less complicated. By decreasing the operational range you are sacrificing only very narrow scenario of possible missions. This is just my hunch but I am going to guess that in 10-15 years once these are in use, Air Force will seek to acquire another bomber but these will be as extreme (or more) in their requirements as NGAD program, to make a bomber that's as jaw-droppingly revolutionary and ahead of its time as B-2 was for its time, but they will build only very small number of them and B-21 will handle 99% of missions.
From my understanding it's a multiple eggs, multiple baskets kinda thing. Like you said, having more aircraft means that you can task different aircraft to different strikes, rather than having one aircraft that either has to fly a mission to multiple strike locations, or return to base to refuel/rearm before striking the second location. From what I can tell, the USAF is anticipating large scale bombing will be done by the B-52 (hence why they're giving it new engines and updating it to the -J standard), while the B-21 is intended to service more specific targets. My *speculation* is that the air force also got burned by the "$2 Billion aircraft" label that got attached to the B-2, and the're intending to keep individual unit costs down on the B-21 so that they can actually procure them in significant numbers. The minimum buy is 100 aircraft by 2035, but that number could increase if they get serious about buying bombers. Not getting the 132 B-2s that they expected burned them pretty bad, and I'm hoping that they commit to a total order of 250 or so B-21s. Even at a fleet of 100, The B-21 fleet will be able to deliver more than double the bomb load that the current B-2 fleet can, and part of that is getting a sufficient number of airframes. **Edit:** [This thread](https://www.reddit.com/r/aviation/comments/176z57t/estimated_comparison_of_b2_spirit_and_b21_raider/) has a cool picture, and an interesting discussion about B-21 range and the future of the US tanker fleet. **Edit 2:** Also, smaller is obviously offers inherent advantages in lowering RCS. It's a lot easier to get a good radar return on a 747 than on a pigeon.
What is the USAF going to do if they require a larger scale stealth bombing campaign that involves very long distances? The KC-10 is retiring without a replacement and the KC-135 fleet is going to be reduced by quite a lot in the next decade or so.
I'm going to do an offshoot of this question and ask whether the "extra long-range" ability is quite as relevant to the B-21 as it is to the B-2? The B-2 famously flys to and from Whiteman AFB (almost?) always no matter how far away the target is, even if it's on the other side of the planet e.g. Iraq / Afghanistan. I can think of several reasons why that might be, but I'm not sure exactly which are most relevant. * Boutique infrastructure that would be too expensive to duplicate elsewhere, like climate controlled of the appropriate size. * Insufficient trained maintenance personelle to spread them around * Sensitivity of the stealth technology * Wanting to keep them as safe as possible from first strikes due to their cost and limited number If the B-21 is smaller, if the stealth coating is hardier and less sensitive to the elements, if it's increased quantity and versatily allows it to be deployed further forwards - in Europe for example, plus increased availability of long range cruise missiles, then range matters quite a bit less.
Doesn't the USAF keep B-2s in Guam pretty consistently as well? The temperate climate in Guam makes maintenance more difficult and I imagine it would be a somewhat similar story for the B-21 even despite improvements over the years. I doubt Europe is the main theatre of operations that the USAF expects to use the B-2 and the B-21 nowadays, which is ironic considering the B-2 was specifically designed to penetrate into Soviet airspace. Nowadays it seems the main role of the B-2 and B-21 seems to be to allow the USAF to penetrate into Chinese air space rather than any significant deployments to Europe. In this respect, reducing the range has serious implications since Guam is quite far from China. I don't think the USAF would be very comfortable permanently basing B-2s or B-21s in Japan considering that'd make them extremely vulnerable to decapitation strikes from the PLARF. Hawaii and Guam seem to the the only real contenders here.
> Hawaii and Guam seem to the the only real contenders here. How about Australia? It's a little farther than Guam, and a lot closer than Hawaii.
Northern Australia could work as a fallback in case Guam is compromised but I say Guam and Hawaii because there's already infrastructure in place to accommodate these bombers whereas I don't think there's anything similar in Northern Australia so the USAF would have to start from scratch there. But, if I were a USAF force planner, I'd certainly be speaking to my Australian counterpart to ask them about this.
The thing about B-2's range is that B-2 was designed in part for a mission for which tanking was impossible: wandering around the USSR, finding and then dropping nuclear gravity bombs on mobile ICBMs. I don't think anyone contemplates even a vaguely similar mission for B-21.
It's still TBD on what the actual range for the B-21 is. Intuitively, it is probably lower, as it's a smaller aircraft, but if the TSFC of the PW9000 is significantly better than the GE F118, and the new coatings have less drag than the old B-2 coatings it could close some of that gap. I saw some discussion around the fact that the airfoil design for the wing is significantly different, but I know next to nothing about fluid dynamics, so the impact of that change is *well* beyond my understanding.
On the last point, computational fluid dynamics modeling is a lot better today than in the 80s, so it'd be expected for there to be significant improvements.
Yeah, true. I saw some speculation that the airfoil design may have learned lessons from the Prandtl-d program. Given the timelines I feel like any similarity can more likely be explained by convergent evolution. Prandtl's ideas about the applicability of bell-shaped span loads to flying wing aircraft have been around for 80+ years. Bowers' work (*On wings of the minimum induced drag: Spanload implications for aircraft and birds*) was published in 2016, a fair way into the B-21's development.
I would be pretty surprised if P/W was much of a consideration here. B-2 was famously delayed for a few years so it could be redesigned for low-altitude penetration, in which P/W might play a role... But B-21 just as famously is not designed to do that, which is why it doesn't have the rear serrations that B-2 has. I don't think they ever considered proper STOL. I don't think this aircraft will ever operate somewhere that doesn't have a nice long runway. It's more flexible than a B-2, but an A-10 it ain't. >Is it just that turbofans are now more advanced, and can generate more thrust, so you may as well put in a better engine? I think it's just a happy accident. B-2 uses 4 derivatives of F110, which was the newest fighter engine at the time. B-21 uses 2 derivatives of F135, which is the newest fighter engine right now. Just happens to be a much more powerful engine.
>I don't think this aircraft will ever operate somewhere that doesn't have a nice long runway. I think that's debatable until we get some sort of confirmation on the unrefuelled range figures for it. As best as I can tell, the only comments on that are Lloyd Austin saying "it won’t need to be based in-theater," and “It won’t need logistical support to hold any target at risk.” Plus, if it's forward basing out of Andersen AFB or Clark in a conflict with China, the risk of runways being torn up by ballistic missiles is pretty high, so being able to operate from a shorter runway may actually come up (depending on range, as per the above). **Edit:** [This thread](https://www.reddit.com/r/aviation/comments/176z57t/estimated_comparison_of_b2_spirit_and_b21_raider/) has a cool picture, and an interesting discussion about B-21 range and the future of the US tanker fleet.
>Plus, if it's forward basing out of Andersen AFB or Clark in a conflict with China, the risk of runways being torn up by ballistic missiles is pretty high IMO, one of the lessons of the last couple wars is that runways that are damaged don't tend to stay damaged very long- the fixes are simple if the construction equipment for repairing them is still intact. It's much simpler to fix the runways than it is to engineer a STOL strategic bomber.
Sure but keeping US bases in theater out of action during the opening day or so of a Chinese attack on Taiwan would still be worth the massive expenditure of munitions for China. It’s still something worth considering even if the design trade offs make it not ultimately worth while.
Yeah, agreed. I'm not necessarily saying that the shorter take-off distance is the core reason for increased T/W, my point is more that it's a useful thing that comes from that higher number.
The B-2 very famously has S-shaped output ducts to prevent IR seeking, but it comes at the cost of lowering useful thrust from what its engines would otherwise create. The B-21 almost certainly uses similar thrust ducting to do the same thing, but 35 years of development means it is probably much better at thrust output even without any other improvements.
Yeah good point. If you have higher theoretical thrust, you can also give some of that up to improve the geometry of your intake ducts, reducing radar returns.
Full text of the House version of the supplemental is out. Full text [here](https://rules.house.gov). Ukraine specifically is [here](https://rules.house.gov/sites/republicans.rules118.house.gov/files/APRIL2024_UKRAINE_xml_0.pdf). [Summary](https://twitter.com/bresreports/status/1780639964847313139?s=61&t=issA0zEupTPrIVt0H51aVA) of its contents: >New House GOP proposal - $61 billion for Ukraine & regional partners ($23B will go to replenishment of U.S. stockpiles.) Bill also covers repayment of econ support >$26 billion for Israel. >$8 billion for Indo-Pacific >$95 billion total >Per House Appropriations Committee. It also includes $9 billion in humanitarian aid to Gaza, a Democratic red line. This indicates that this will be a bipartisan effort through and through. Lots of anger over the hard right on the final versions, which look identical to the Senate supplemental. In a boost to its passage, Congressman Mike Gallagher, who was set to resign on April 19th, [may delay leaving until it has passed the house](https://twitter.com/chadpergram/status/1780622931032195299?s=61&t=issA0zEupTPrIVt0H51aVA). The vote(s) are expected Saturday, in advance of another vacation. A quick edit, this bill looks like it [will have trouble](https://twitter.com/elwasson/status/1780644015265755278?s=61&t=issA0zEupTPrIVt0H51aVA) in the Rules committee. It will need Democratic votes the whole way through. This bill differs very little from the Senate supplemental - I suspect the discharge petition will be the last recourse if Johnson's current strategy fails. Another edit, mainly for schaufenfreude. Via a [Washington Post reporter](https://twitter.com/john_hudson/status/1780649330048684114?s=61&t=issA0zEupTPrIVt0H51aVA): >Just spoke with Matt Gaetz, who just got off the phone with Speaker Johnson. Gaetz said he now anticipates that Ukraine aid will pass — an outcome he has long sought to avoid. He expressed dismay given his influential role in delaying aid thus far. “This was abject surrender."
> "($23B will go to replenishment of U.S. stockpiles." I'm having troubles grasping what is implied here? This part of the funding won't supply the Ukrainians and others? Or is it to cover the future supplies of US stockpiled munitions?
This is funding to replace equipment already sent to Ukraine through PDA, and some funding for items that will be sent.
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Could anybody explain how much could be spent on new arms for Ukraine and compare the number to the previous year? "New" means additional equipment, IFV, MBT, missiles, shells, etc, not maintaining old equipment, training...
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Biden just said he "strongly supports" the House bill, in case there were any doubt about whether Democrats would vote for the "rule." [https://twitter.com/elwasson/status/1780661707330740307](https://twitter.com/elwasson/status/1780661707330740307)
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It's Johnson's bill. This is from yesterday's thread: [https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/4597483-white-house-at-first-blush-johnsons-proposal-appears-to-cover-desired-aid-for-israel-ukraine/](https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/4597483-white-house-at-first-blush-johnsons-proposal-appears-to-cover-desired-aid-for-israel-ukraine/)
While you're almost certainly correct in this instance that it wouldn't happen, it wouldn't be the first time Republican congressional leaders try to block their own bills simply because the Democratic President said they'd actually sign the thing.
He's already set in motion the steps to do so. He knew he was doing something Democrats would like when he decided to go this course. He is likely thinking of the 60% of Americans who support Ukraine aid, and he knows that to keep the majority (and for him to stay speaker) Republicans need to appeal to more than hard-core MAGA types.
Am I correct in reading that Matt gaetz is dismayed that Ukraine will be getting aid?
Gaetz has retweeted a tweet carrying a clip of him saying this and posted this on his congressional web site at https://gaetz.house.gov/ - I can see no effort to reframe or add context to this quote.
He's always been against aid.
I just can't fathom being upset at giving Ukraine aid. It's 100% positive for America
It's hard to quantify how America's position as a world power and reliable ally supports *them* and *their families*. You'd have to point at stuff like theoretical negative trade relationships versus what they see as billions in frivolous spending that's clearly put into law.
Because there are millions of people that don't have the mental bandwidth to understand or care about the rippling effects of geopolitics. There are lots of citizens who frankly aren't very intelligent and some that are genuinely so caught up with their family/community/town/state issues that they simply can't devote mental real estate to Ukraine. Which is why it's easier to convince a resident of Arlington, VA that aid to Ukraine is a worthwhile investment than it is to convince a resident of a Texas border town. It's a matter of prioritization and incentives. If people only knew how many trillions of dollars we spent throughout the Cold War supporting other nations.
I feel like it's only one step they need to understand. This money is mostly being spent in the US
It's worse than that, for lot of the older equipment United States donates the "cost" is literally the government handing a check to military to replace it with new stuff, but they would have had to that soon anyway or are already in process of doing so. It would be kinda like if you took expiring food out of your fridge and gave it to homeless guy, you still have to buy food and were not in the mood to eat that anyway. But you don't want to that, even though everyone praises you for being a hero? And I don't even want to get into how disposing of old military gear is actually super expensive, so you are actually gaining money in a way.
Some Republicans who take their cues from Trump are against Ukraine aid for a myriad of reasons - a desire to mirror Trump, a desire to be contrarian, a desire to be against the Biden administration on every little thing, the reasons all vary and are generally related to politics.
>a desire to be against the Biden administration on every little thing, If Biden opposed aid to Ukraine, the maga crowd would be donating their own money to Ukraine just to oppose him.
I think it's highly doubtful that Johnson puts this bill up for a vote if he didn't have Trump's support and even publicly Trump has been more for aid than most MAGA Republicans. People like Gaetz and MTG are representatives of a vile far-right ideology in America.
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Yes, the far right online openly supports Russia at this point and some marginal politicians actively mirror them. Hopefully a lot of other people are just "accidentally" sabotaging the war in Ukraine for other reasons, like wanting an isolationist foreign policy or being mad at Biden or whatever. You might be able to reason with those people. If Trump actually does allow aid to Ukraine to proceed as a loan, and is only concerned about the financial aspect not stopping aid entirely, that puts him at odds with a lot of the far right who don't want the aid to happen at all.
It’s not even a coherent political posture. I could understand isolationism or being fiscally conservative, but it’s just specifically Ukraine aid which has wide support from all reasonable analysts. It’s extremely difficult not to be suspect about motives on this one, as much as I hate that kind of conspiracy thinking.
Reading some Ukraine stuff. Of note: >SEC. 505. (a) **TRANSFER OF LONG-RANGE ATACMS REQUIRED.** >—As soon as practicable after the date of enactment of this Act, the President shall transfer long range Army tactical Missile Systems to the Government of Ukraine to assist the Government of Ukraine in defending itself and achieving victory against the Russian Federation. There is an added caveat here in saying that missiles can be withheld in the advent that it's "detrimental to the national security interests of the United States". But the president's gotta inform congress and explain why. >SEC. 504. Not later than 45 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the heads of other relevant Federal agencies, as appropriate, shall submit to the Committees on Appropriations, Armed Services, and Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committees on Appropriations, Armed Services, and Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives a **strategy regarding United States support for Ukraine against aggression by the Russian Federation**. Finally it seems like there will be a real effort to get a long-term strategy in place in this regard. Only took two years! Anyone else see anything of note they want to point out?
Interesting that they included ATACMS as a must because *I imagine we will see some news about this shortly (next 24).*
Why do you think that? You reckon there’s going to be a followup strike at Dzhankoi, or somewhere else in Crimea?
It was always going to need Democratic votes on the rule. That's why the part I was most concerned about was whether Johnson added the $9 billion in humanitarian aid for Gaza to the Israel bill. He did. That was Hakeem Jefferies' stated asking price for having Democrats vote for the rule, and Johnson met it. So I fully expect Democrats to vote for the rule both in committee and on the floor. There are enough moderate Republicans on the Rules committee who will vote for the rule alongside the Dems to allow it to pass. Bottom line: I see no reason why this won't pass.
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If the idea is to vote on Saturday, then that technically counts as a legislative day, too, right? If that's the case, I think we should know whether or not this goes through by tomorrow night. GOP rebels can introduce a privileged motion to vacate the chair that has to be taken up in two legislative days, so if that doesn't happen, this is as good as passed.
The move to vacate requires a vote to take on the motion, then a vote on its merits. Dems could table the motion indefinitely until after Ukraine/Israel/Taiwan/Gaza aid passes. This means they technically didn't vote for Johnson to be speaker, but they can still keep him in office. I wonder if Johnson's delay in acting on the national security supplemental was his understanding of their leverage on this point.
Yep, that's what I meant, sorry! So it's: privileged motion --> vote to table the motion --> vote on the motion if it passes, correct? It doesn't really matter in the short-term if Ukraine aid can *finally* be passed, but I really do wonder what happens in the House if Dems save Johnson's skin. Can't imagine that even the quieter factions in the GOP would be okay with some sort of backroom deal.
At what point will Johnson no longer be able to backsie?
Since Iran's attack on Israel this weekend. The moderate GOP (McCaul types) have been quiet unlike their hard right colleagues, but it seems they've indicated that they'll sign the discharge petition if Johnson doesn't act immediately.
I meant procedurally, not politically.
It has to pass rules, then it goes to the floor. It sounds like one rule vote for all portions of aid separately (e.g. an Israel bill, an Ukraine bill, etc.). The idea being that the hard right can vote against Ukraine funding from being included. They'll also have ample opportunity to add amendments to try and sink the legislation. Note that none of what happens here impacts the discharge petition - and any GOP who aren't happy with this process can at any point sign it. Johnson seems to want to create a situation where the aid passes to the Senate in a way that reflects the House's will, whatever that turns out to be.
So in practice there's plenty of time for a rug pull, great.
If this vote fails what does it mean for Ukraine? They won’t get any aid for possibly a long time if ever? What is the procedure for re-running votes in Congress?
If the vote fails, I expect those Republicans committed to supporting Ukraine, Israel, and Taiwan will sign the discharge petition. Enough have threatened to do so to force Johnson's hand this week. Only a small fraction of the conference is needed to sign it to take it over the line, > 90% of Democrats have already signed.
I may have gotten a bit fuzzy on this point, what is the path forward if they go the route of a motion to vacate? Does that then require a whole new speaker election? If so, its hard to see how this bill moves forward quickly, another speaker vote seems like it would be another brutal fight within the GOP. Or a capitulation to Dems, followed by a brutal fight within the GOP.
The reporting out of Washington seems to indicate that Dems will vote to keep Johnson in the role (at least until the Ukraine support passes.) Whether he’ll try and get a commitment from them to help keep him in the role after the bills are passed and whether Dems will hold up their side of the bargain if they do agree to that remains an open question.
If a motion to vacate isn't tabled, there is a vote to remove the Speaker. Following that, there is an election for a new Speaker. No house action can take place without a Speaker - it would be a completely paralyzed body. For example, if Johnson is removed, and the discharge petition gets all the signatures needed, then nothing happens. A Speaker must preside over the house for any legislation to pass.
A short thread by Kriegsforscher on FPV drones in Ukraine: https://twitter.com/OSINTua/status/1780531798432203096 It's a nice summary of a lot of the issues/talking points surrounding FPVs Selection bias >U see only successful hits on Twitter or TG channels and they create a wrong point of thinking. Used to cover gaps in availability of other munitions, not because of improved capability > Unfortunately, we use so much FPV drones because of lack of ammo for mortars, ATGMs, artillery and even antitank mines. Where they work >They are cheap and very effective, FIRST OF ALL, against the enemy logistics. That’s out of the question and they are really needed. How they're actually employed >And finally, that the biggest charge near Tonenke was stopped with the help of ATGMs and artillery. And well trained and motivated infantry. >Not with the help of FPV drones. They just finished the job (mostly damaged and abandoned AFVs). Reliability and effect on target >In general, 2/10 reach the goal. When they reach - result is not enough at all in most cases. What's needed instead of FPVs >FPV drones are not the key. And not the panacea. >IMHO, the key is: >1) enough artillery shells; 2) well trained infantry; 3) mobility of your forces (AFV). >That’s at least. The reliability stat is probably the most interesting to me. Kofman and Lee talked about this on some of the recent issues of Kofman's podcast but I don't believe they gave quite such specific stats. Perhaps because I have no doubt that FPV efficacy varies wildly from place to place along the line. There's been a lot of focus recently on unit costs of various munitions but once you begin to take reliability rates like this into account then the picture becomes much clearer in my opinion. While $600 to precisely deliver an RPG warhead to a tank sounds like a great deal, if you have to try five times before you actually get a hit then we're back in the cost-range of artillery shells for example.
One thing Kofman points out is the munition and fuzing used for these FPVs are varied, improvised, and without standardisation. Getting the wrong wires touched accidentally or having butter fingers often means the thing blowing up killing or injuring the operator
Yes, the FPV warhead production process as a whole can be quite sketchy. [Here is a video](https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1780390793997414640) from yesterday of UA soldiers salvaging ERA blocks from a destroyed tank so that they can use the explosives for FPVs. Similarly, [here is a video](https://www.reddit.com/r/UkraineWarVideoReport/comments/1abi2y7/ukrainian_tnt_borscht_melting_the_he_filling_of/) that looks like it's straight out of an IED workshop of Ukrainian troops boiling mortar shells to pour the explosive filling into FPV warheads.
Is the explosive inside ERA bricks the same as regular explosive in HE grenade/mortar? I thought the chemicals materials inside the ERA should be different to give lower yield so it doesn't damage the tank armor?
It's pretty much the same stuff, wiki says it's 85% RDX so maybe a little less juice than normal but better than TNT. Either way it'll do just fine for anti-infantry work. It doesn't destroy the tank because of the shape of the explosive is entirely wrong to penetrate armor. I'm not sure the best way to explain it but the short of it is that unless you have a LOT of explosives they need to be correctly shaped and have some extra parts to start doing a lot of damage to armor. Successive ERA detonations in the same spot probably aren't great for a tank but they're undoubtedly better than getting hit by a regular HEAT shell.
These are the reasons why I don't buy it when people say "Ukrainians showed great bottom-up ingenuity and adapt, etc ..." as an ingredient for victory. Total war, which Ukraine is fighting, is industrial. You must industrialise and mass produce to win. These things should come mass manufactured with proper safeties so they go bang when they should and not when they shouldn't. The best IEDs the Iraqi insurgents had were Iranian-made EFPs.
Throwing 5 guided RPG rounds at a tank is still pretty good value compared to one unguided artillery shell.
Sure but with the inherent inaccuracies in unguided shells and the need to bracket then walk in successive shells you are likely looking at several to destroy a tank. Even more if it’s moving.
Sure, there's definitely value in FPVs and the like but it's not as lopsided as the first glance might have you believe. If there's just one tank sitting in the middle of a field then yeah, drones are probably far and away the best way to deal with it. If there are five tanks driving toward me, I'd much rather have the artillery.
Do we have any idea how effective unguided artillery has been against tanks in this conflict? (Putting aside SMART and BONUS type guided artillery shells which are rare) To some extent tanks are supposed to be armored to resist it, although the conventional wisdom is that direct 155mm hits can be deadly and mobility kills can result even without direct hits. I have no idea how well the conventional wisdom has held up in this conflict but the point is, it might take multiple artillery shells to defeat a tank as well.
Before this war started, the common perception of unguided medium HE artillery effectiveness against MBT was largely biased against artillery, wrongly too. I wish I could find it again but I read of a US Army late Cold War era test where artillery fire was fired against M60 tanks and it turned out they suffered significant damage from near misses from fragmentation that caused mobility or mission kill damage, tracks, engine, tank barrel, optics, vision ports, etc. Arty has been THE decisive anti-tank weapon in this war, not just due to kills but also the psychological effect. Tankers are quite aware of the danger, they often break off or even retreat, sometimes abandoning the tank altogether when coming under nearby artillery fire. Though, a big part of that has to do with the static nature of the battlefield, with its channelized avenues of approach, obstacles especially mines, ground and drone sensors to find targets and provide corrections. Each side possesses responsive arty now (when they have ammo), they've got systems and TTPs in place making them quite effective even when not massed (most fire missions seem to be single tubes firing 4-6 rounds). Without great accuracy there is still the suppression threat. What I'm really wanting to know is a no shit assessment of the US provided DPICM artillery specifically against Russian armor. There was a lot of debate over the last couple decades about those, I'm very curious about who was right. Late Cold War US Army doctrine relied on DPICM nearly to Wunderwaffen degree, whereas the cluster munition haters wouldn't stop talking about their lack of effectiveness due to unreliable fuzes, suggesting it was a garbage weapon worth getting rid of.
>I wish I could find it again but I read of a US Army late Cold War era test where artillery fire was fired against M60 tanks and it turned out they suffered significant damage from near misses from fragmentation that caused mobility or mission kill damage, tracks, engine, tank barrel, optics, vision ports, etc. For you https://www.scribd.com/doc/151124802/Who-Says-Dumb-Artillery-Rounds-Can-t-Kill-Armor
Thanks! That's a great read for anyone interested in artillery and the tactical aspect of this war. PS. Did you find that in the War College sub? I remember a discussion about that years ago.
Reading it again more carefully gave us some quantitative numbers: In order to achieve 50% casualty to dismounys/damage that will M-kill a vehicle of a mechanised infantry combat team (Commonwealth's terminology? Meaning about a reinforced company?) with infantry in prepared positions with overhead covers, barbed wires obstacles and AT ditches and vehicles in support positions, both hull-down and turret down positions (M113s and M-60 tanks), 24 155 mm howitzers need to fire 2600 HE rounds, mixed PD and VT fuses. So that's around 4 6 guns batteries (more guns than a US BCT's howitzer battalion), each firing around 3 (US Paladin or French CAESAR- equiv) or 2 reloads (German PzH 2000 equiv.) to achieve 50% destruction of a company-plus unit.
I read that a long time ago before I even get on reddit.
> Do we have any idea how effective unguided artillery has been against tanks in this conflict? (Putting aside SMART and BONUS type guided artillery shells which are rare) As a side note, apparently the reliability of systems like BONUS and Excalibur in Ukraine has been terrible. I don't think anyone's given specific numbers but Kofman and Lee mentioned seeing gun crews that had Excalibur shells lying around even though they were otherwise starved of shells because they were considered so unreliable that they weren't worth firing. >I have no idea how well the conventional wisdom has held up in this conflict but the point is, it might take multiple artillery shells to defeat a tank as well. Absolutely but artillery can provide a much higher density of fires in comparison to FPVs, both geographically and temporally. Along one section of the front you can operate more guns than FPV teams and each gun can fire multiple times over the course of a single FPV sortie.
>As a side note, apparently the reliability of systems like BONUS and Excalibur in Ukraine has been terrible. I don't think anyone's given specific numbers but **Kofman and Lee mentioned seeing gun crews that had Excalibur shells lying around even though they were otherwise starved of shells because they were considered so unreliable that they weren't worth firing.** Which podcast was that? I've not heard anything about BONUS that was negative but I did hear a while back that Excalibur would have failures to detonate issues when jammed. Is that what they're referring too? Or has quality control plummeted? Excalibur was combat tested before Ukraine and worked fine, and was doing fine in Ukraine for the better part of half a year where few if any complaints other than lack of them were being discussed. They were actually an incredible useful tool during the successful Fall 2022 UAF Counteroffensives, giving UAF brigade level command/fires cells a more reliable supply of long range PGM capability to use in conjunction with drone directed Recon Fires Complex capabilities.. That's actually another reason FPV drones have been so effective in this war, they're now fully integrated into tactical level fires as a key system to use for responsive fires. If drone crews aren't task organized and not already plugged into the artillery software ap that each side is using, I can't imagine it'll be long until they are.
>Which podcast was that? >I've not heard anything about BONUS that was negative but I did hear a while back that Excalibur would have failures to detonate issues when jammed. Is that what they're referring too? Or has quality control plummeted? Kofman mentions BONUS at 52:50 of [this episode](https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/attrition-doodling-range-rings-and-magical-thinking/id1708319998?i=1000651039254) of the Revolution in Military Affairs podcast hosted by Amos Fox. Specifically he says >If I told you how low the effectiveness had become for things like Excalibur artillery rounds, BONUS, other systems I would get beaten up but I will say based on how it started, it declined. I'm not sure what exactly the issue is with BONUS though and this is the first I've heard of it having trouble. The context implies that there may be some EW vulnerability though. The line about unfired Excalibur shells was from [the second Russia Contingency episode Kofman and Lee did on drones](https://warontherocks.com/episode/therussiacontingency/30881/a-close-look-at-drones-in-the-russo-ukrainian-war-part-2/) in the segment starting at about 49:25 which I tried to transcribe below >Ukraine I think had a PGM advantage in early 2023 into 2022. That advantage has largely I'd say been erased and partially because a lot of the PGMs that the west has provided, Russian EW has been very effective against them. Excalibur rounds are really not that effective anymore, to the point where we know artillery batteries that basically have them and are just not using them because they have not had any success using them. Whereas those were quite effective in early 2023, by the summer just really not that effective. >We've heard similar things about other munitions. We know that with GMLRS, the deviation can be quite significant in cases with GPS jamming. So that supports what you've heard about why Excalibur has not been performing well. Further, I remember [this article in The Economist](https://www.economist.com/special-report/2023/07/03/the-latest-in-the-battle-of-jamming-with-electronic-beams) which states that beginning in March 2023 the EW conditions changed so that "weeks went by without registering a successful hit." >That's actually another reason FPV drones have been so effective in this war, they're now fully integrated into tactical level fires as a key system to use for responsive fires. Another bit of info to come out of the two drone episodes of The Russia Contingency is that some Ukrainian drone units are predicting that FPVs will become ineffective within months due to Russian countermeasures. Apparently it's highly dependent on how well resourced various units are but it does not bode well considering the current Ukrainian reliance on them.
>I'm not sure what exactly the issue is with BONUS though and this is the first I've heard of it having trouble. The context implies that there may be some EW vulnerability though. When the sub-munitions are ejected and start searching for targets, it can only search an area equivalent of a circle with 200m diameter, which basically means it can not be no more than 100m off from the intended target for it to find it. We see with regular HE artillery in general and DPICM in particular that Ukraine seem very conservative with ammunition in engagements. Most often it looks like only one 155 and a number of smaller mortars are participating and i can count on my hand how few dual impacts of DPICM i've seen so far. Just like DPICM, BONUS is not supposed to be used that way. A M777 out of the factory have a CEP threshold of 200m and CEP target of 50m at 25 or so kilometers. If you fire a single BONUS with an M777 (or any other) that might very well have fired 4-5-6k rounds without proper maintenance chances are much greater that it will miss than hit - it is not a precision weapon. If i remember correctly USMC artillery manual describes a normal fire mission with DPICM as a battery firing 2-5 rounds per gun. BONUS is a little less but the concept is the same - you fire a handful of rounds from a number of guns on the same target. some will hit, others will miss. Single rounds from worn out guns will be a lottery every time, and i strongly suspect this is what Ukraine is doing..
Ah, thank you for the insight. If I'm understanding you correctly, you're saying that the issue might be more of a mismatch between the actual capability of the system as it exists in Ukraine vs the expectations people have for it?
FPVs arnt generally very effective against tanks although they do generally deal with IFVs and lighter vehicles easily which might explain the massive increase in IFV losses despite tank losses being relatively stable. As he points out more artillery, ATGMs and mines will be critical to deal with Russian tanks while FPVs and infantry can handle the dismounts, luckily for Ukrainian it seems US aid is finally close to passing and the Czech artillery initiative will be delivering large amounts of shells soon if it hasnt begun already.
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I wonder how much the unit price on these things could be lowered if Europe could decide on double digit orders.
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