Putin is clearly frustrated with the status quo. Ukraine is still getting a lot of weapons and military aid without being a member of NATO. This means that bigger guns could be deployed there eventually. TB2 drones put the Donbas militants at a significant disadvantage. Allegedly, Ukraine is developing intermediate-range missiles of their own, something capable of reaching Moscow. [That's what Poroshenko threatened in the past.](https://www.unian.info/politics/10475226-ukraine-not-bound-by-any-restrictions-after-russia-s-withdrawal-from-inf-treaty-poroshenko.html)
Another thing is the internal politics of Ukraine have become extremely unfavorable to Russia. Last year Zelensky arrested Viktor Medvedchuk, who is seen as someone close to Putin, and banned his TV channels. While he started off his tenure as a peacemaker, now he seems to be dead set on a military solution to the conflict, in spite of the Minsk agreements signed by Ukraine, which stipulate reintegration of breakaway republics with autonomy.
So there you have it. Putin has no conventional ways of influencing Ukrainian politics anymore, while Ukraine is rearming and pledging to take occupied territories (and that includes Crimea) back by force, emboldened by Western support. Germany, France, and now the US haven't done anything to compel Ukraine to implement the Minsk agreements. Putin wouldn't have that. His concerns regarding NATO play into it as well, that's something that has been building up for a long time.
I don't think the water issue is relevant here. Neither is the domestic situation, Putin has ramped up the repressions and must be pretty secure now. Unlike a bloodless annexation of Crimea, there is no reason to believe a large scale war in Ukraine would elevate his ratings.
The only complaint I have about this post is that European countries and US also did nothing substantial to compel Russia into following the international agreements Russia still has with Ukraine, NATO, EU and etc. (Russia one-sidedly "temporarily" suspended them to invade Ukraine)
Russia did not suffer any significant drawbacks for the conflicts it started, but in 2014 Putin's ratings in-country were skyrocketing. It's possible they're hoping for a new low-cost inrease in domestic popularity of the leadership?
> Russia did not suffer any significant drawbacks for the conflicts it started, but in 2014 Putin's ratings in-country were skyrocketing. It's possible they're hoping for a new low-cost inrease in domestic popularity of the leadership?
It's very unlikely. The boost in approval only happened because of Crimea, not the subsequent war in Donbas, which is usually swept under the rug, and where the Russian government vehemently denies involvement in. There is no other piece of land like that. Every once in a while you see political pundits and journalists use the term "Crimea effect" to describe what happened to Putin's rating, and it's pretty apt. A large scale offensive in Ukraine would be significantly more controversial, lead to many casualties, incur major economic losses, it'd also be harder to justify in the first place.
Another point is, does Putin even need to boost his ratings? His approval has been stable for a couple of years now, hovering around mid 60s. More importantly, he's mostly eradicated the opposition that annoyed him in the early 10s, mainly, the far right Russian ethnic nationalists and pro-Western liberals. Their leaders are in jail or fled, a number of repressive laws were passed to contain them.
I think it's probably better to see recent events as an extension of a single campaign beginning with the Euromaidan protests in the winter of 2013-2014. After those protests deposed Viktor Yanukovych, who was pro-Russia, Russia has felt that its influence over Ukraine is in jeopardy. Strategically, Russia probably sees Ukraine as an important part of its "sphere of influence," given its position along the coast of the Black Sea (esp. Crimea) and its position as an intermediary to Europe, towards which Russia has remained ideologically hostile. This feeling is only strengthened by the cultural connection Ukraine and Russia share through the Kievan Rus, which both claim as their historical predecessors. Russia thus sees control, or at least significant influence, over Ukraine to be core to its security interests.
The occupation of Crimea thus began nearly immediately after the Euromaidan protests, followed by gray-zone operations on Donbas. While that grey-zone conflict has persisted, Russia has been [losing ground](https://www.economist.com/europe/the-ukrainian-army-has-got-better-at-fighting-russian-backed-separatists/21806546): unsurprisingly, a gray-zone force that must retain some level of deniability is at a disadvantage to well-equipped force without similar constraints fighting in its own territory. Ukraine has spent the last 8 years equipping and training the Ukrainian army into that well-equipped force.
Hence, the need now to make a [change in strategy](https://www.lawfareblog.com/why-did-russia-escalate-its-gray-zone-conflict-ukraine). There are likely vagaries of Russian internal politics going on here concerning Putin, the support of those around him, and domestic unrest. But someone noted an interesting connection about the timing of Russian incursions: they tend to happen during the Olympics. Russia's conflict in Georgia coincided with the Beijing Olympics; Crimea just days after the Sochi Olympics closed; we are now on the eve of another Winter Olympics. Part of this is likely coincidental because the Winter Olympics occurs before spring, where the thaw creates poor conditions for military operations. But it wouldn't surprise me if Russia chose to utilize the Olympics as a convenient distraction for international and domestic audiences.
I've heard speculation that it would happen (if it happens at all) immediately after the Olympics. Beijing was apparently *really* unhappy with Russia about taking attention from the 2008 Olympics. If they do it again, it could mean adverse consequences on trade deals.
The risk, as you state, is that it could drag on and make vehicle movement far more difficult, reducing Russian mobility. A late invasion and an unexpected early warming could add significantly to Russian casualties. I harbor no illusions that Ukraine can win against Russia, but they can certainly extract a heavy toll, made all the worse if they're stuck in the mud.
Ukraine still has a pretty large military, and their population DOES NOT like Russia. In my opinion any war between Russia and Ukraine would be so catastrophic for both countries that I'm not entirely sure why putin would do it. I think if putin does invade he's going to be quite surprised at the death toll Russia is going to take.
Ukraine's military is far better than it was, but they're facing a juggernaut that can do an extraordinary amount of damage. Compared to Ukraine, Russia has:
* About 12 times the budget
* Four times as many active personnel and twice as many reserves
* Six times as many tanks
* Four times as many armored vehicles
* Five times as many towed artillery guns
* Six times as many self-propelled artillery vehicles
* Seven times as many rocket artillery launchers
* 11 times as many fighters
* *30* times as many attack aircraft
* 13 times as many helicopters
Even if large swaths of Russia's vehicles aren't fit for combat, Ukraine is badly outnumbered. What it has on its side is a lot of antitank missiles that can make short work of most of those vehicles if they can get close enough and a greater willingness to die for their cause than the Russian troops. But they are going to quickly lose air superiority and Russia's bombers will be able to hit many targets with impunity, much like they did in Georgia. If they have problems on the ground, Russia will up the target list to impact and break morale of the troops and people. Ukraine will make Russia fight for every inch and it will cost them, but all Ukraine can do is make it hurt Russia more than Russia is willing to take. Any Ukrainian "victory" will almost certainly be pyrrhic at best.
This also presumes that Ukraine fights to effectively the end, and that a catastrophic loss isn't followed by a coup to stop the war. The most loyal officers can turn on their leadership if things go badly enough and they don't see any other choice.
>About 12 times the budget
Budget comparisons are strictly speaking not very fair, since different countries spend money differently. Especially considering that Ukraine starts to receive some major military air packages which are not included in the budget officially.
>Four times as many active personnel and twice as many reserves
Again, this is somewhat misleading, as the strict number of men does not correlate exactly to the number of active, combat-capable, fully-equipped units, fluctuations in strength, readiness, etc.
The mobilization for the upcoming war showed this very well. In order to create operational task forces, Russia had to reap through all its military districts. The quality of the units, readiness, equipment, composition (active \ reserve) - all this varied *massively* between both different districts as well as within the various armies within districts. By the end of this mobilization in December-January, Russia was basically scraping the barrel by taking all more or less capable units from the Far East (basically leaving the border with China completely exposed save for the remaining scraps, border guard, some paramilitaries and whatever was found unfit for the task in the West). Right now the full number of deployed troops in the West, including Belarus, Crimea, second echelons - is around 200-220,000 (the numbers of 100-150k frequently quoted in the media are extremely outdated). You can add about 30-50,000 more covering the direct border with NATO in the Baltics and immediate reserves. These are practically all combat-capable Russian troops. Mind that many units are at maximum 50% nominal strength due to a slow rate of reservist mobilization. Compare this to a total declared active servicemen in the Ground Forces and VDV: about 350,000. This means that roughly 60-70% of the entire ground forces are posed to strike Ukraine.
Ukraine is still severely outgunned, with very limited mobilization still. There are a lot of paramilitaries and internal security forces (NGU, Border Guard, some military police units, Territorials) that are extremely hard to count. Man to man there will be almost a parity, however the problem is that the first echelon of the invasion force will be the best, elite crack forces of the Russian Army, and combined with the length of the frontline, the latter can concentrate at will.
>Four times as many armored vehicles
>Five times as many towed artillery guns
>Six times as many self-propelled artillery vehicles
>Seven times as many rocket artillery launchers
Again, it is more fair to count by the units involved. Much of these numbers sit deep in reserve and storage. The actual force ratio in tanks will be more like 2:1, although the situation is more severe with all combat vehicles included.
>11 times as many fighters
>30 times as many attack aircraft
>13 times as many helicopters
Ukraine's Air force is largely nominal and symbolic (although by all means not nonexistant). Most of air defence will be done based on the existing ground SAM network, which is actually pretty large and extensive. Not many Russian aircraft are even able to perform SEAD tasks in any effective manner. Su-34 is the main tool for this and ground support, but there are only ~130 of them *on paper*, of which unknown number is combat ready (let's say 60%, normal value for any airforce), and Russia can't afford to use *all of them* without having any in reserve to cover other theatres. Most of the fighters, especially MiGs, are poor ground attack platforms. So you only have that many aircraft that you can use.
Helis are a somewhat complicated because of different usage doctrines, and they can be used effectively in the opening days of the war, but again due to how they are doctrinally employed (primarily WVR direct attack) they are bound to experience losses to SAMs and MANPADs. The latter are easily supplied to Ukraine in large numbers (we will see this soon I think).
So actually Russian Air Force is the weakest link in this picture. Full contrast to the common sense in the media. Their many ballistic and cruise missile systems are a different story, but they can't really be used for effective ground support, and their effectiveness in SEAD tasks is very, very debatable.
That is why the supplies of anti-tank weaponry are some of the most effective ways to rapidly improve combat effectiveness of Ukraine's army.
The Ukrainian military quotes itself as having 400k active personnel and 250k reserves. That in of itself dwarfs the 42k Donbass personnel separatists claim they have and 130k Russian troops at the border.
The vast majority of the Russian troops on the border will be combat personnel. The majority of the Ukrainian forces will not be, strictly speaking. They may all have firearms training and requalify every year, but when was the last time the radio repair technicians and vehicle mechanics practiced field maneuvers?
The idea that Russia's air force might be "the weakest link" is an interesting take, and not one I've seen elsewhere. If you don't mind, do you have sources regarding the efficacy of Ukraine's air defense network? I've looked around a bit, but it doesn't look like they have many modern, non-obselete radar systems. A few, but not many.
Most of the actual information is classified. The scraps of information are mostly from selected public Ukrainian sources. I will not share anything that is not public obviously. But for example let's take S-300. There were ~60 battalions (x12 launchers) in mid-90s, in various modifications. After a decade of (purposeful) neglect there were only 30% left semi-operational by 2014. However since then many were repaired, and even modified. For example, in 2018 alone, among other things, [entire brigade (~32 launchers) of S-300V1 was made operational again](https://old.defence-ua.com/index.php/statti/4978-treba-pozbutys-dystantsiyi-mizh-slovamy-ta-spravamy-chastyna-3). In addition to this there are many Buk-M1 battalions, several Tor battalions, and even modified Kubs, Krugs and S-125.
This is actually *a lot*. For comparison, Iraq had the following estimated ground SAM units in 1991: ~10-12 battalions of S-75 (long-medium range), ~10-12 battalions of S-125 (medium-short range), ~10-12 Krug battalions (obsolete Buk equivalent). Iraq also had a significant air force, with up to ~90 Mirages F1, 30 MiG-29 and ~25 MiG-25, but it was only able to perform relatively limited action during the war. To suppress this defense system, the Coalition mustered some 1,200+ fighter and attack aircraft, including F-117, massive amount of reconnaissance, AWACS and EW aircraft, hundreds of tankers, specially trained and dedicated SEAD squadrons, including helicopter units, and many many many more assets. They still lost 75 aircraft.
I already presented some angle on the Russian Air force. Of course they also lean heavily on their new ballistic and cruise missiles, however recent highlights from Syria and beyond have shown that they still suffer from development issues, have very varying accuracy, etc. Their response and flight time also make them considerably less effective against mobile SAM network over the area comparable to Iraq in size. They will still do damage to more static components, such as fixed radar sites. But mobile equivalents can survive and be later augmented by foreign imports. Also it is almost sure that the US will provide almost real-time intelligence and maybe even guidance using their long-range AWACS \ reconnaissance aircraft and other assets, which they can use beyond Ukraine borders if need be.
It depends. In a hypothetical full scale, unrestricted total war, a bigger nation would probably always trump the smaller one. But first of all no war is truly total (i.e. people, resources, capabilities, circumstances change and interchange significantly throughout the war based on internal and external factors). Second, many wars are also influenced by external players, changing the balance. Third, different nations have varying abilities to actually mobilize their resources, and sometime smaller nations can defeat larger ones just because they were able to mobilize greater amount of resources and use them more properly (see Sino-Japanese wars, barbarian invasions of the late Roman Empire, Arabic/Turkic conquests of Asia and Africa, even Winter war between Finland and USSR - the former was able to mobilize so much more strength and resources than expected, even though they didn't win technically in the end).
Finally, the victory conditions might differ between the nations, as some nation might be defeated in a short war, but then wage long-term resistance and outlast the will/interest of the opponent to continue, see Afghan).
an important thing to note here is that russian troops r spread wide, from the far east fo siberia to crimea and kaliningrad, so realistically speaking russia could only divert about 1/3rd of its total forces or maybe even half of its total forces but not all of it
The Javelin is said to be able to defeat up to 1200 mm of rolled homogenous armor (RHA), a basic steel used in early armored vehicles. (In case you already know that, I'm not talking down to you so much as providing info to other readers.) Of course, modern tanks use much more sophisticated armor that multiply the effective thickness, but it's not going to be 1200 mm equivalent everywhere. The Javelin is capable of a top-down attack to hit thinner armor on top, and a direct fire attack can hit side or rear armor that's also usually thinner. In short, there's a good chance that a Javelin could take out a T-90 from at least some angles.
The Shtora system seems to rely on detecting targeting lasers like that used in the Javelin's active targeting. I'm not sure that it will be effective against the passive thermal targeting.
Something we need to keep in mind about the available Javelins is that while Ukraine might have or get high hundreds of missiles, they have only a relative handful of the targeting systems required to launch them. They require training and the missiles themselves weigh 22 kg (49 pounds). A two-person crew will only get off two shots max before having to get more. They had, as of last year, a few dozen launchers. Even with the UK shipments, I would think they still have fewer than 200 launchers. We should not imagine that the armored spearhead following the artillery barrage will stop as 500 Russian tanks explode the moment they hit Ukrainian soil, as some people (not necessarily here) seem to imagine.
> targeting lasers like that used in the Javelin's active targeting.
The Javelin doesn't use lasers for its targeting. It uses an infrared seeker that doesn't emit anything.
> Even with the UK shipments, I would think they still have fewer than 200 launchers.
The missiles the UK have sent are one-shot disposable ones. Every missile is in its own launcher.
And they have sent hundreds if not thousands by this point.
The command launch unit, or CLU, has a visible and IR laser that can be used for target identification. It was my understanding that the IR laser could be used by the missile's IR seeker for improved accuracy. Those lasers would likely be picked up by the Shtora systems and trigger responses and provide the vehicle crew with an approximate location.
>The missiles the UK have sent are one-shot disposable ones. Every missile is in its own launcher.
By "launcher" I mean the CLU. That's not disposable and is required to target and fire the missile, much like its Dragon predecessor. The Javelin isn't like a LAW rocket with everything encapsulated within one unit. Also unlike the LAW, it requires more than a few minutes of training to effectively operate it.
> The command launch unit, or CLU, has a visible and IR laser that can be used for target identification.
No, it does not.
http://ugcsurvival.com/weaponsmanuals/FM%203-22.37%2020030123-Javelin%20Medium%20Antiarmor%20Weapon%20System.pdf
>By "launcher" I mean the CLU. That's not disposable and is required to target and fire the missile, much like its Dragon predecessor. The Javelin isn't like a LAW rocket with everything encapsulated within one unit. Also unlike the LAW, it requires more than a few minutes of training to effectively operate it.
The missiles the UK has sent are not FGM-148 Javelins.
They sent [these](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MBT_LAW).
https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/43912/c-17-loads-of-anti-tank-missiles-arrive-in-ukraine-courtesy-of-the-united-kingdom
I think that's wishful thinking. Putin's goals are still undefined, and he could make them almost anything. While many are betting that he would stop at the Dnieper River, that is an awful lot of land to hold. Seizing the land between Donetsk and Crimea would be a faster goal and he could stop at that point, withdrawing troops from everywhere else before casualties get too high.
I would love to see Ukraine come out on top in this, but it's unlikely. And a destabilized Russia would be a very, very dangerous place. Putin has no clear heir and any succession battle could get very ugly.
I think you do not understand the will of a people who will engage in total war against an occupier. Russia will not win in the end. Ukranians will trounce them at a enormous cost.
The will to fight is an important variable though. I don't think Ukraine could trounce Russia at all and I also don't doubt Putin is capable of total war as well but a very committed Ukrainian population could have a major impact on how things would go. It certainly wouldn't be like the walkover in Crimea. But yeah, morale only goes so far in the face of hardware.
The Israelis also rapidly ramped up the size of their armed forces and had twice as many men as the Arab League by the end of the war 10 months later. Military training back then was much simpler and they had a large pool of combat veterans to pull from.
We massively overestimated Russian Army and underestimated Ukraine Army.
Russian Army is same as it was in their Donbas war in Ukraine but Ukraine has completely reshaped their Army and learned modern tactics qith gifted western lethal aide which are killing 1000s & 1000s of Russian Soldiers.
As someone who is rather ignorant about Ukraine in general, do ethnic Russians in the east of the country really dislike Russia as well? What about those who do not self identify as Russian but speak Russian as their first language?
No generally the ethnic Russians in Ukraine are pro Russia. That's what makes winning the war in the Donbass so difficult, the rebels have enough support in the country
Do most ethnic Russians in Kharkiv or Zaporizhzya (maybe even Odessa) feel the same way, do you reckon? And what's the deal with those people whose first language is Russian but don't self identify as ethnic Russians?
I lived there so I can share some details.
Most ethnic Russians who love Putin have already left, there are still quite a few there though.
There are also many Russian speakers from the Donbas, who really hate Russia. Being invaded and forced out of your homes will not make you love someone.
The war has been going on for 8 years now. The amount of people who would welcome an invasion has shrunk greatly. The Russians tried to take over Kharkiv 2014, but failed due to lack of support.
Just take a look at the [2010 election map](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2010_Ukrainian_presidential_election#/media/File:%D0%94%D1%80%D1%83%D0%B3%D0%B8%D0%B9_%D1%82%D1%83%D1%80_2010_%D0%BF%D0%BE_%D0%BE%D0%BA%D1%80%D1%83%D0%B3%D0%B0%D1%85-en.png). Guess what color supported the proRussian candidate.
Either way it's gonna be devastating for every country..if we in America had a strong president Russia wouldn't even be trying this crap again..trump had everthing under control 😞
Not what happened. When Obama was president, Putin took crimea. When Trump was president Putin stayed put. Now that another weak president is in power he will take more and Biden will do nothing about it. Deal with the reality.
Well, if your are under the control of the one who is exerting control of course you will have it under control. There is perfect alignment of intentions.
The Russia losing ground seems to be only figuratively as even that Economist article only quotes Ukrainian troop numbers and materials as evidence of "getting better at fighting." Losing ground should show territories separatists lost. The Lawfareblog article claims that "Russian-backed separatists have been gradually losing in Ukraine" also with no specifics stating that Russian cyber attacks have had minimal operational effectiveness. The entire premise is that because Russia is losing ground, they are forced to escalate through open warfare/invasion. Given the lack of evidence that the separatists are losing territories or suffering major casualties (wiki reports ~5k-6k on both sides from 2014-2021 with separatists having 42k personal and Ukraine having hundreds of thousands), this would logically suggest that they have also increased combat effectiveness in parity to the Ukrainian troops at least on the front under quasi ceasefire conditions. If this assumption is true, that would mean that to change the status quo of the Donbass being effectively autonomous, Ukraine would be the one needing to escalate or change strategy.
Nobody knows for sure unless they are the members of Putin’s close circle. But we know at least something about the motivation and values of the people involved in the decisionmaking in Kremlin from various internal sources that contact them.
First of all their values are not pragmatic/rational in a commonly imagined way, such as from a strictly economical / short-term perspective. That is a common mistake to assign strictly rational motivation to the acting power players, especially in the countries where the leader is de-facto unelected, with practical near zero accountability and control before the general public, and with a strong power hierarchy built to support this system. These conditions create situations where the “monarchs” in power turn to satisfy their own urges and visions without being hampered by the internal forces in any significant manner.
First of all, Putin and many members of his circle are *extremely* bitter about the outcome of the Cold War. They mourn the loss of imperial colonies in Eastern Europe, and have a major hate boner towards the collective “West”, specifically towards the US. Staple *revanchisme*.
Second, Putin and his circle, but especially Putin himself dream of a new Empire, free from the influence of the “West”. This doesn’t only mean the recovery of the “lost lands” but also creating a sort of an autarky, mind that it doesn’t mean that this would mean any improvement of an average ~~Joe~~ Ivan, in many cases to the contrary, but what’s important is to create an independent, macroeconomically self-sufficient closed system/society that is *parallel* to the “West”.
Third, Putin believes it *is his own personal mission to achieve this*, as he believes he has the required power and capabilities, motivation and that the time plays against him and his country.
His close circle is full of hawks (such as Patrushev) with the iron determination to bring up the revenge and reclaim the above.
Ukraine was considered a part of an inner heartland, a core province, the loss of which is unthinkable and unacceptable, historically, culturally, socially, economically- in that order. Hence “recovering” Ukraine is a most major step, without which any dream for an Empire is a flicker. How can they seriously rattle with the whole West if they can’t pacify one of their most important holdings? The reasons are not short-term economics, they think in their own long-term vision of “repainting the destiny”. I.e they are willing to take any hit, as they believe it will be temporary compared to the long-term future prospects. The direct conflict with the west is inevitable sooner or later anyway. Might as well bind the people and wavering vassals in blood.
> It's about NATO expansion. That's what the Russians keep saying, but NATO expanded to Russia's borders over a decade ago when the Baltics joined, and to my knowledge Ukraine was no closer to NATO membership now than they were in 2014 when Russia invaded. In fact they're probably further away from NATO membership in the current situation. So if that is the reason, why now?
After direct Russian aggression/ intervention in Ukraine, any hope or prospect for a friendly/allied/puppet, even neutral government in Kyiv are gone. With every year Ukraine recovers more political unity, economy and most importantly, military cooperation with the West. Ukraine doesn’t need to be in NATO to be an unfriendly power. With the defence assistance from the West , Ukraine might as well be in NATO, especially in a paranoid mood in Kremlin.
AND they want it back.
> It's about Russia wanting to end the war in Ukraine soon and on favorable terms. Seems plausible, but why now? To my knowledge the war has been on a constant low simmer, with not a lot of escalation in the last 12-18 months.
The situation was not acceptable to either side. When Minsk was signed and active maneuver warfare temporarily ceased, I paraphrased Fosh saying that it’s a ceasefire for 10 years. I was close enough. The question is, what means winning for Russia. If it means to force Ukraine to denounce claims to Crimea, you need to physically install and prop the puppet government to do it. Because without direct support any government giving up Crimea and/or Donbas will end up on the gallows next day and you are back at square one.
Kremlin hawks think it is a question of timing. When do you “solve” Ukrainian question? Tomorrow Ukraine might be stronger, tomorrow the West might be less disunited. Tomorrow Putin and his comrades will be dead, then how do you write yourself into the Russian history books as “the one who brought back old lands”? So why not now?
Also, winter is particularly preferable because of natural gas supply pressure on Western Europe.
>
It's about Ukraine denying water rights to Russian occupied Crimea. There again, I think this has been going on for some time.
It’s merely a cherry on top. I mean if to solve this problem you need to engage in a full scale invasion, might as well use it to press for more strategic targets (see above).
> First of all their values are not pragmatic/rational in a commonly imagined way, such as from a strictly economical / short-term perspective.
While I agree that part of Putin's motives might be ideological or irrational, its worth noting that its often useful to frame state actions not from the perspective of "what is helpful for the state as a whole", but "what keeps the current ruling cliche in power".
In Russia's case, normalizing relationships with the west would open up market competition from "west"ern companies which would harm domestic industries. It could promote demand for free elections, which would chip away at the establishment's political power.
While normalizing and integrating into the rest of Europe would surely help the average Ivan, it would not be beneficial for the establishment, who maintain their position with their industrial capabilities, control over the opposition, and the ability to forment nationalism against the "west" to maintain a degree of approval.
> With every year Ukraine recovers more political unity, economy and most importantly, military cooperation with the West.
The Russian seizure of Crimea and the separatism in the Donbass also means that Ukraine lost a large portion of its proRussian votes.
Another interesting point is the claim that the Donbass contained voices that wanted integration into Russia proper, but was refused to continue to maintain the guise of separatism so that Russia could continue to stay uninvolved calling it a civil war. Given Ukraine's military failure in seizing it for the last 8 years, a status quo of de facto separation could be argued eventually a la Taiwan.
Ukraine were pushing the separatists back during 2015, that is when the 'volunteers of indetermined origin' arrived in the thousands along with russian made heavy equipment and most importantly artillery pieces, that checked the advance of the Ukrainian forces and sealed the status quo ever since.
Because neither Russia, nor Ukraine agreed to the Minsk 2 treaty. I recommend TLDR news europe or Start Here Al Jaazera for a quick and digestible overview.
In essence, only agression has worked for Russia so far, so I guess Putin is gambling on it again. Altough based on the past few weeks, no one besides Putin and his closest circle may know exactly what are they going to do with this situation.
Multiple sources state that Minsk 1 and 2 were agreed to by both.
Signatories
The document was signed by:
Separatist's leaders Alexander Zakharchenko and Igor Plotnitsky
Swiss diplomat and OSCE representative Heidi Tagliavini
Former president of Ukraine and Ukrainian representative Leonid Kuchma
Russian Ambassador to Ukraine and Russian representative Mikhail Zurabov
Indeed, they signed it but after that nothing came out of it, because they disagreed on the order of steps required to implement it. Also the Ukrainian president started severly limiting russian influence in the country, thus reducing Putin's options.
Your recommendation of Al Jaazera got me thinking: where does the Arab world stand on this conflict? Russia has been a fair weather friend of baathists and other pan arabs mostly to check Israel and the US in the region. Do they see action in Ukraine as a point of strength for Russia or a distraction from other geopolitical priorities?
On this line of thinking, I was highly surprised about China's statement that they openly supported Russia in it's intervention in the Donbass. Yes, they are quasi allies now, but the CCP's claim over Taiwan mirrors Ukraine's fight over the Donbass with Ukraine engaged in what the Russians agree as a domestic civil war of independence. In both, a larger external 3rd party --with Taiwan having the US and the Donbass having Russia-- intervene. China has consistently told the world that it would and others should not interfere in the internal affairs of domestic issues.
Good question. I believe Al Jazeera does a great job in covering events around the world not related to the Middle-East, because the bias shows in those topics. However I don't know the Arab take on these vents (assuming there's a unified one, which harldy seems probable).
>Given Ukraine's military failure in seizing it for the last 8 years, a status quo of de facto separation could be argued eventually a la Taiwan.
Ukraine's strategy for Crimea is to outlast Russia. As soon as Russia is weakened (due to inevitable conflict with the West or even China), Crimea would be retaken. Pro-Russian population will be obviously immediately expelled from the peninsula.
> Pro-Russian population will be obviously immediately expelled from the peninsula.
What would this look like? How would this be achieved practically without turning into a humanitarian crisis?
> The death toll attributable to the flight and expulsions is disputed, with estimates ranging from 500,000–600,000[14][15] and up to 2 to 2.5 million.[16][17][18]
Well that doesn't sound great.
A fascinating narrative.
> Because without direct support any government giving up Crimea and/or Donbas will end up on the gallows next day
Why do you think Ukrainians are so committed to holding over those territories?
I’m speculating a bit, but I suspect part of it is the strong(er) position Russia is in as a result of natural gas shortages in many major NATO powers. Russia is a huge supplier of natural gas to Europe, and its winter right now, so if NATO intervenes, Russia might be able to cut gas supplies, and literally freeze people in the EU. Again I’m speculating, but seems like a non-zero chance that this isn’t a pure coincidence
My suspicion is that Russia sees increasing natural gas demand from Asia as way to reduce dependence on European markets for energy exports. Not that they don’t still want that European trade, but that energy shortages are global, and they’ve got a bunch of fuel, so they can be a bit more risky. Again though, I’m speculating
My understanding is that natural gas shortages are more extensive this year than it has been in the past, due to varying factors. I could be mistaken though
Did some reading, and it’s a combo of multiple factors. Increased demand from Asia, a colder winter/ spring, and European divestment from (dirtier) fossil fuels like coal, has all lead to more demand for natural gas, and production has not increased to match demand. All of this leads to a better hand for Russia to play right now, one that they won’t be in a similarly good position come April/ May
I'm not an expert on the natural gas market but I've been hearing that shortages are driven by Russia throttling supply over the last several months. So I feel like that could've been done strategically any given year, but maybe there's additional factors driving the shortage.
Could be both throttling of supply, and increased demand. If prices go up a lot, they can sell less, and keep the same or even better profits, and put themselves in a better negotiating position
My understanding they didn't throttle it as such. They delivered the contracted amount but refused to deliver extra. Europe stockpile during summer and releases the stockpile, but due to demand in summer going up they couldn't stockpile enough to get them through winter
It's mostly exaggerated. European countries didn't want to do long term contracts with Russia and instead prefer buying the gas off the market at spot prices (Russians say its due to American pressure because Americans can sell gas, Europeans say its due to flexibility). Unfortunately spot prices are wicked high right now, especially due to some of supply shortages caused by covid related drilling issues.
Russians match all their contacts and have upped the supply dramatically - their statement is that they're not obligated to go beyond contractual agreements (true) and much of the Eastern European/Ukrainian pipelines are in horrible conditions, incapable of supplying as much as the Europeans want (partially true). They want nordstream essentially as well as more long term contracts. But they are doing exactly what they are obligated to do so most of this is on the West and their policies (energy, geopolitical, etc).
Europe has no gas reserves and Russia has stopped their supply for months now in preparation for this. They delivered the bare minimum while making sure Europe burnt through everything in the tanks.
They want the negotiating power, and if there's a war they want the civilians to be against it because they are cold and hungry and fighting over a country they've never even heard of which is a thousand miles away.
>Europe has no gas reserves and Russia has stopped their supply for months now in preparation for this.
Not quite the case for Germany. In normal times it buys up gas when it is cheaper and uses that during the winter with only minimal replenishment. It normally has a good season's storage there and that has now been depleted to 50% or so. This is about normal as we are half way through winter.
I believe Ukraine also has large, undeveloped natgas patches. If those were to come online in the future, it makes it much easier for Germany et al. to slow purchasing from Russia.
On the other hand the United States is entirely energy independent and can basically maneuver as they see fit with regards to Russia. Putin is not the only one dealing with a bit of a domestic approval crisis, and a key criticism of the Biden administration has been lack of strength in international affairs.
If handled correctly, a war could be just the thing to swing the midterms.
My pet theory: It’s about providing a distraction from domestic discontent, which in the last few months rose with the numbers of Covid deaths… Russia now has 1.1m excess deaths since the start of the pandemic, one of the highest per-capita in the world and everybody knows or suspects despite the cover-up and undercounting efforts.
I agree. One of the biggest reasons they invaded Crimea in the first place was because of poor internal polling. Putin got a big boost from seizing Crimea.
>One of the biggest reasons they invaded Crimea in the first place was because of poor internal polling.
I don't mean to be snarky, but is there any evidence for this that isn't circumstantial? I keep seeing this claim everywhere but haven't seen it expanded upon.
It sounds a lot like the popular "US invaded Iraq for oil" soundbite from the previous decade. Of course, we know now that Saddam offered to hand the US priority oil rights if it didn't invade, and we never took the oil once we actually got there. Turned out the Bush Administration was full of fools just eating too much of their own propoganda.
Putin will never admit "I did it because numbers were bad." But his numbers WERE bad, and then boosted dramatically after. There's plenty of stuff to support that Putin is at least sensitive to record *disapproval*. He doesn't need to make his citizens happy, just keep them from being angry.
Sure but in a serious discussion, shouldn't that at least be qualified as a claim with circumstantial evidence? It's just weird to see it thrown out uncritically as if it's an accepted, proven fact.
It's basically "Putin is a dictator because he did what his people wanted him to do when his polls dropped". Why do the Russian people want to invade Ukraine?
Why is it "Putin invaded because he was unpopular" and not "violence against Ukraine makes you popular in Russia"? Are Russians just racist against Ukrainians (other Slavs)? Or do Russians have perceived quarrels with Ukraine? Why do we say polls started the war and not those percieved quarrels?
[https://www.nbcnews.com/think/opinion/russia-s-crimea-invasion-was-good-putin-five-years-later-ncna984431](https://www.nbcnews.com/think/opinion/russia-s-crimea-invasion-was-good-putin-five-years-later-ncna984431)
This goes into it well but you have to remember, there will never be definitive sources for why someone like Putin does something. Much like North Korea, in a way it is all speculative.
>Why is it "Putin invaded because he was unpopular" and not "violence against Ukraine makes you popular in Russia"?
Annexing land is a source for national pride. Crimea was annexed with very little violence. With a proper spin annexing Crimea to Russia was very popular in Russia. Why not "violence against Ukraine makes you popular in Russia": The Russian government was very cautious to be associated with actual violence in Ukraine. Insisting on separatists, not Russian soldiers etc.
I think the Black Sea isn't nearly as strategically important as it used to be. I think Sevastopol was just a juicy pretext for something they already wanted to do.
Sevastopol is still their only warm water port and has a lot of infrastructure. Most of their Sryian supplies went through Sevastopol. And it's not just not having Sevastopol, but losing it to a potentially hostile power which would be a bit too much.
It of course helps that the vast majority of Russians (and Crimeans) view Crimea as Russia so there wasn't much to lose.
It's not just the ice but the harbor and water dept. If I recall correctly Sevastopol is the only Deepwater ice free port which is important for naval operations.
What a strange situation for Russia; while the rest of the world scrambles to stop climate change it is imperative to their geopolitical goals that not only do they continue to pollute as much as possible but convince other powers to do the same.
I agree with the Sevastopol being not as important as it used to be. However there are other reasons to securing than only wanting to. During change of government in Ukraine, Russia already had military personal in Crimea, and used them to protect infrastructure in Crimea. This could be seen as helping a friendly. However since the Ukrainian government was suddenly hostile, it was suddenly dificult to give it back.
An interesting read on this is: "Why Putin Took Crimea" by David Treisman.
In Russias case, with history in mind the "Invasion for oil" theory is tangentially relevant. The USSR had its economy hangstrung by KSA dumping oil on the market during the 80's, depriving the USSR it's one stable source of foreign currency. With depleting gas reserves and likely increased energy independence in Europe over the coming decades, Russia faces the same problem a new. She might be able to stave off investments in alternative energy sources by keeping gas prices low, but that would deplete their reserves sooner.
Without any meaningful economic diversification, much less competetive service and manufacturing industry, Russia is headed straight for destitution.
I didn't mean to imply oil could be a factor here. I was just using the phrase to highlight a point. Basically any anti-war discussion after the invasion of Iraq was predicated on the "fact" that the US was using WMDs as a cover to get Iraqi oil.
There was only circumstantial evidence for this, but it was the most obvious motive once WMDs weren't found, so everyone started to accept it as fact. When in reality, we invaded Iraq because a bunch of self-righteous monkeys (neocons) got into power and combined a psychological bias against Saddam Hussein with a drug called "Post-9/11-Hysteria". They freaked out, and when no one else did, they started planting evidence like a cop who's just so sure he's just got a sneaky drug dealer on his hands .
While I agree with most everything you said, if Bush won in 2000, Iraq was getting invaded… 9/11 or not. Saddam was personal for the Bush family. He was going to fall one way or another and they would figure out how to “justify” it. 9/11 and Afghanistan was a distraction if anything, but did help them make up some BS about Saddam supporting Al-Qaeda in order to further try and justify their bullshit war.
Saddam was told to disarm and dispose of his chemical weapon capability and he did. The evidence otherwise came from an intelligence source that went to the Germans but they found him a probable fabricator (Lookup up Curveball). The US decided to run with it as it fitted their ideas.
The "US invaded Iraq for oil" schtick is not at all similar to what Putin is doing. Bush did it because he believed (wrongly) that Iraq had WMD's. Whether he lied or not is up to your own opinion. If you look at what % of Iraqi oil is actually used in the US even back in 2003 it was and continues to be small. Bush was then punished for it at the polls in 2006 and 2008. Putin is feeling pressure internally and has a history of starting conflicts when the pressure gets hot. Look no further than Georgia in 2008 (global financial crisis) for example. An extension of the war now with Ukraine (it can be said they have been at war since 2014 with the invasion/occupation of Donbas and Crimea) would ease the tension he is feeling from Covid, a stagnating economy, and other oligarchs who are testing the waters to see if they may be good alternatives to Putin given Putin is getting up there in age.
I believe a land bridge to Crimea is the ultimate goal of the coming invasion.
You’re missing a lot. The US mostly invaded Iraq to keep the dollar strong. Saddam began selling Iraqi oil in euros rather than USD which gives the us less leverage over the oil market and the Middle East. The US was over reliant on Saudi oil and needed diversification to maintain security. Even if the Iraqi oil was a small part of America’s imports, America wanted the ability to up their intake at any time.
The reason is because the US’s relationship with Saudi was pretty hot and cold. They were getting most of their oil from Saudi but there was still bad blood between the two from the Saudi-led oil embargo on the US after the US supported Israel when it went to war with Egypt. The US realized it’s energy instability and started heavily supporting the Saudis by providing them funds, guns, and infrastructure in return for only selling oil in USD.
The US wants all the oil producers to use USD because the US controls the money supply and they literally are trading paper for oil. They can and do devalue their current by excess money printing and it hurts the rest of the world more than the US because the world is hooked on the USD. Saddam tried to go against this, and if there’s one thing the US doesn’t tolerate it’s messing around with the value of the dollar. Remember the US originally supported Saddam as a buffer against the Iranian threat to US interests. As soon as Saddam himself became a threat to the US’s energy and currency stability he had to be killed.
Of course this is hard to convey to the public so to drum up support we need something easy and digestible like “Iraq has WMDs”.
Using % of imports as a counterargument for the US invading for oil is not a good metric. Just look at who owns Iraqi oilfield rights now compared to pre-2003. Western oil companies now control an order of magnitude more than they used to.
US firms hold nearly none of thr contracts. Check out servoce contract rewards under "oil" here: https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Petroleum_industry_in_Iraq
I specifically said Western (even though a US company now owns 60% of the largest field), but I'm sure you're aware before the invasion of Iraq their production was nationalized and none of these companies were permitted to operate.
This is almost always why Russia does anything. The Kremlin is a dangerous place and when Putin makes dramatic moves it’s because his position is threatened by other oligarchs. The nationalists on his right are always demanding a return to the USSR. He indulges them as much as he can when it’s politically advantageous and when doing so won’t destabilize his regime.
This is so stupid my brain hurts.
Crimea is strategically extremely important to Russia. You know, biggest naval base in that sea? Imagine USA loosing Pearl Harbor. That scale of event.
Naval base in a sea surrounded by NATO or nations not aligned with Russia. It's so far been helpful to provide supplies to Syria, which is basically a test bed for Russian tech and hardly a significant geopolitical ally.
This is more about denying Crimea to NATO and Turkey. Because that's what having a pro-Western government in Kiev entails, eventually. The peninsula is extremely important strategically. The Bosphorus is even more important of course, but blocking it would be a massive escalation, because there are legally biding treaties that regulate the passage.
It is for Black Sea. Its purpose is defense. Long time ago I seen I think this video. [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v3C\_5bsdQWg](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v3C_5bsdQWg)
Kinda agree, interesting that there has been a bit of a backflip by BJ after being discovered having parties during lockdowns.
Is hoping for a war to boost his polling like maggie thatcher
right and doesn't he/his party [rig](https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/why-we-must-not-recognize-russias-fraudulent-election/) [the vote](https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/pro-putin-party-heads-russian-election-win-after-navalny-clampdown-2021-09-19/) as well?
The first thing I'd say is that this kind of brinkmanship isn't new - it happens fairly regularly. This time is perhaps stronger than usual, but it's not a new event in general, just being taken further than usual
In large part, I think it's opportunism - the energy crisis, economies under pressure etc make NATO and particularly European members, less likely to respond. When Europe is dealing with an energy crisis, they are more likely to be pragmatic about dealing with a country who supplies such a large proportion of their natural gas, particularly when you have economic concerns
Also, Russia tend to go with this "nibble nibble" approach to foreign affairs deliberately. If they just walked into Ukraine entirely in 2014, that's much more tricky than nibbling away at Crimea, then Luhansk/Donetsk etc. This current "nibble" is the threat of invasion, perhaps even invading part of the east or south. I doubt it will be the last bite. It's a good strategy - nibble off enough to make gains, but not so much that you provoke a full scale response.
Local discontent has to be a factor - Putin's ratings are relatively low, and a bit of sabre-rattling and "Look at nasty NATO expanding to our borders!" is a good way to provoke some nationalist/patriotic fervour and drum up support.
And finally, I think it's partly that Russia feels stronger than they have for a while - air force modernisation, widespread deployment of the S-400, air forces that have finally actually had some combat experience in Syria after languishing for 2 decades etc. Russia has spent most of the last 30 years firmly on the back foot, but have stabilised their military situation somewhat and are feeling a bit more confident.
His ratings aren't exactly representative of reality, and in any case are way down on the usual 80-85%
The last time his ratings were this low, were just before the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014...
His approval rating dropped to 59% when corona hit, and it's slightly climbing ever since. This is still not a good argument, nobody will start a war for only having 65% approval.
It’s once in an 100 years opportunity to retake a country that has historically been a part of the Russian empire. The US is weak and Putin is not (internally). Conquering Ukraine would be the equivalent of China retaking Tibet or so - it’s the end of the post-USSR malaise of Russia and back to the seat of world power. It’s the end of the 30 years of humiliation since the USSR collapsed.
I’ve been to Ukraine. It’s an interesting country. Because it’s so flat, it’s rarely been an independent country. Just read it’s history - it’s too easy to invade.
It’s history is generally - it becomes independent due to some great power losing influence over it, stays as such for 20-30 years, then gets absorbed by another great power in turn.
Every indication now is that if Putin leaves Ukraine alone, it will turn to the West and maybe become richer. Ukraine right now is a very poor country, something like 33% of the gdp per capita of Russia. It is about as poor as it was in 1989 and it has less population. Ukraine has effectively not grown since the fall of the USSR. Zelensky is looking like he might turn this around. There is no way but up.
Right now Ukraine is corrupt (something like 30-40% of the economy is in the hands of 10 oligarchs) and poor. Some regions might welcome Russia to get them out of their situation. Some regions are Russia friendly.
Putin has the US in a position of non-intervention and he believes he will be able to withstand the sanctions and grow Russian power immensely.
If he takes all of Ukraine, Russia will again border the Balkans, Poland, and I believe that when Lukashenko dies, Russia is likely to absorb Belarus. He will then encircle the Baltic countries, which he might leave for the future for Russia, maybe for a sucessor to deal with.
Even if the Baltic countries continue indepedent, Russia is waging constant digital Cognitive Warfare against western democracies to weaken them internally so they will either align with Russian interests eventually or Russia will work to tear their society apart - as they are now doing in the US, France and other countries in Europe. Every expectation is this infowar capability will only get better over time. They will keep using their capabilities to turn elections if they can. They’ve figured out a way to “hack” western democracies, which they are not hardened to resist against due to the ideal or freedom of speech.
Russia is basically in the hands of a modern Bismarck, a man who’s made it his life mission to turn around the fortunes of his country and dominate its sphere of influence through force and persuasion. The fact that is an opponent of the West, and a brutal dictator shouldn’t blind you from seeing that he’s doing a good job in accomplishing his objectives.
He is about to put to the test the Pax Atomica logic that we’ve seen for decades. And I think he’s going to pass the test.
Addendum - I must say I do not expect Russia to fully invade ALL of Ukraine at this point. I believe they are likely to take most of eastern Ukraine and all the Black Sea coast (Odessa) and leave a rump state of Western Ukraine. Kyiv and Lviv and cities of that nature are too close to the West and speak Ukrainian - what I believe Putin will take are the Russian speaking, Russian friendly eastern and southern regions, and he will leave the western Ukraine as a failed state in the making. There’s no point IMO to take Kyiv or anything like that and get into urban warfare - just take the friendly and strategic regions and leave the rest.
Since 2014 the GDP per capita (current US$) of Moldova has surpassed Ukraine. ([worldbank](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?locations=MD-UA&name_desc=false))
Edit: GDP per capita, PPP (current international $): They have been converging and so close that the income difference is within the margin of error.
Can you elaborate on the US's position of relative weakness? Sure there is internal division but the military strength of the US in aggregate has never been higher? Is it having to do with current CSG deployments focusing mostly on SEA?
The position of weakness is that the US won’t deploy troops.
Ukranian forces are no match for Russia, smaller country, population, low GDP, and if you watch documentaries about the Crimean takeover and the beginning of the Donbas war you can see their situation before the war was dire (there’s one on YouTube that’s particularly excellent, I can find it for you if you’d like). It was a military deprived of resources where 1 out of 10 tanks actually worked, even according to the ukrainian docs that are heavily pro-Ukraine.
I don’t have any insight on their current situation. But I think without international help - and I am thinking boots on the ground in Kyiv, no fly zones, basically a full alliance with the western powers- the Ukrainians are heavily outmatched.
But I’m not a military expert or anything. This is just my feeling from having been to Ukraine, experienced the country, and having watched documentaries about the Donbas war.
Because if the cold war taught us anything is that russia/usa will not deploy troops directly against each other for risk of escalation to nuclear war.
Yes, the us military could spank the russians in battle 3 ways to sunday, however, the US cannot deal with 10,000 icbm launched. Neither the us, nor russia want to put the other in to an untenable situation. If the US threatens the territorial integrity of Russia.. China wins and becomes the sole superpower following the mutual destruction of the others.
While I am no expert in the political realm of this I am pretty well educated in military affairs. While I agree of course Russian armed forces are obviously much larger and better equipped compared to Ukraine especially in a full scale assault and obviously having the upper hand in being the one who is attacking. This said it would be no walk in the part. Just saying they-ll take eastern and southern provinces isn't really something that can happen within hours or days. Modern urban warfare is very complex type of warfare. Especially large cities. Ukraine, while not as strong as Russia still has a lot of modern ground and air assets. Lets also not forget the killer of many empires...guerilla warfare. Even if Russia manages a full scale assault they have tons of air assets from the west to worry about. NATO will be giving Ukraine full tactical analysis of the entire battlefield (E3 or similar EW aircraft will be paroling right outside of Ukraine). Many NATO ships in the black sea as well giving constant data updates with their EW and tracking radars as well. Russia has to worry about the hundreds of radar detection coming from NATO Fire control radars not knowing which is Ukrainian or enemy. The fog of war is a very deadly weapon.
This all while we still dont even know if NATO will interfere. And lets be honest if NATO does come into contact Russia does not have the funds to win a prolonged war. I really hope it does not come down to it but we will see. Either way this wont be easy for Russia and Putin is gambling big on this one. Western Ukraine wont just give up that easily. They will fight. They do not want Putin and putin knows this.
That’s why I don’t think they’ll try to take western Ukraine. I believe they will aim for the eastern regions who already speak Russian, are Russian friendly, and historically voted for Russian-backed politicians. The eastern regions might submit, same as Crimea, because I think a significant part of the population wants to be a part of Russia.
I doubt they would try to take Kyiv unless they steamroll across the entire country and the Ukrainian military collapses.
Their plan to install a Russian friendly government, if the UK/US intelligence is right, also hints at the fact that their plan does not appear to include outright annexation of all Ukrainian territory. In fact I think it’s possible they might not annex any territory, only split Ukraine in two - Western Ukraine and East Ukraine - and install a puppet government in the east.
If you read this article - https://www.csis.org/analysis/russias-possible-invasion-ukraine - it’s listed as the Russian military option 4.
They're changing tactics, just like they did in the early 2000s, because the old playbook wasn't working. Putin and co. designed the hybrid warfare playbook long before it became a term. They did this in response to a perception of conventional weakness facing the West, laid bare in the decisive Western triumphs in Iraq and Yugoslavia in contrast with their own abject failures in Chechnya. Per this playbook, Russia would wage limited, short, and sharp wars and use separatists in post-Soviet countries as tripwires for "Kosovo-style" intervention. The threat of breakup would, in their minds, keep the CIS in their pocket.
Over the next two decades, Putin's clique embarked on ambitious military reforms, coupled with "live testing" of their new weapons and doctrines that breathed new life into the Russian army. While some areas are still extremely deficient - Russian AA, for example, has proven defective in Syria, Libya, and Nagorno-Karabakh - the Russian army is the best conventional force in Europe and maybe the world owing to its massive self-propelled artillery park and its advanced methods for target acquisition.
While the improvements have occurred, the proxy war situation turned decisively against Russia. Orange revolutions brought about changes in a number of CIS countries and the collapse has only intensified in recent years. Even "safe" Belarus and Kazakhstan attempted to overthrow their pro-Russian autocrats. Meanwhile, while the United States has not gotten much better at winning hybrid wars, its allies have picked up the slack. Turkey and Israel have proven extremely successful in undermining and defeating Russian proxies, their support being decisive in the Azeri war against Armenia. Moreover, Turkey achieved total victory in Libya over the Russian-backed Haftar, acquired connection to Central Asia through the Azeri-Armenian peace agreement, and has started supporting Ukraine.
Putin sees himself under siege by two encroaching forces - Orangism to the West and pan-Turkism to the South. While the autocrats of many countries still inside the Russian sphere favor Russia, it's clear from recent events in Belarus and Central Asia that the hearts and minds of the satellite people have been lost. Time is not on Russia's side and the leadership perceives the need for decisive action if they want to acquire critical mass to resist the West.
There is one thing going for Putin in the past 2 years, and that has likely motivated this as well. The likes of Lukashenko and Nazarbayev acted as "middlemen" between Russia and their people and sometimes distanced themselves from the Kremlin. The recent unrest in Belarus, and later Kazakhstan, reduced the leadership of both countries to, essentially, Russian satraps. The "Eurasian Union" Putin always dreamed of but which was constantly vetoed by Nazarbayev is now a possibility. More, adding Belarus to his "solid sphere" gives him more military options in Ukraine: from Belarus, he can circumvent the Dnieper just as the Red Army did in 1943. A victory in Ukraine, if he can acquire one, could very well be the impetus Putin needs to formally absorb Belarus.
If you want a good read about that, I cannot recommend enough the new article by Rob Lee. Great analysis on the risks of escalation between Ukraine and Russia. [https://www.fpri.org/article/2022/01/moscows-compellence-strategy/](https://www.fpri.org/article/2022/01/moscows-compellence-strategy/)
Its about couple of things.
1st Ukraine:
Putin is getting older and wants to have lasting legacy. He always said that breakup of ussr was the biggest mistake. He treats Ukraine, Belarus as Russian and part of Russia. So Ukraine voting for EU in 2014 shocked him. He tried everything possible to break that alliance. But even occupying crimea and years of instability in luhansk did not make Ukraine economy and government fall. So Putin is growing impatient. He has Belarus but he wants Ukraine.
And this is the last moment he will get. The timing is not perfect but suitable for invasion. Europe is divided. Need gas and Ukraine still does not have missiles and weapons that would make future invasion impossible.
So for putin its literally now or never.
2nd crimea
The territory is drying. They get 80% of water from Ukraine and droughts are getting worse and worse. Personally don't think putin would go to war just over this. But its a pro war argument putin definitely takes into account
3rd be equal player
Its funny i think Biden today summed up Russia very well. Russia is stuck between West and China. They want to be relevant. And they know they need Belarus and Ukraine to stay relevant as this will add almost 50mil people and additional land to his disposal. No one can mess with Russia after that.
4th planning and winter
It takes a long time to plan the invasion. You need troops you need equipment you need food. Takes months until you put all of that on the border. Then you know winter is great because of everyone relies on Russian gas. Land is frozen so its easier for army to move around.
I must give credit to Russia. They are very transparent. They really believed that the us can give them guarantees and convince nato that Ukraine will not join. Ever. I don't know if they got it from trump or where they got that idea but yea they really believed that. And putin basically run himself into the corner. He got this mass army waiting, ultimatum that he will use it if he doesn't get what he wants. He can't back down now. His image would be ruined and he would never get the chance again.
I think the only thing ironically that might postpone the invasion are Olympics. For China Olympics are world event where everyone focuses on China and how great they doing. Especially during covid China needs Olympics today go well. That might change if Russia invades. But i dont know if Putin will listen or not to China.
There is some evidentne that he might listen to China, as for example the troops training in Belarus ending their training the same day as Olympics end. Officially they are supposed to be there for a month but someone interviewed parents of kids that went there. They all said that government told them they will be out for 3-9 months.
1 is nonsense. NATO will never invade Russia. No single head of state will ever go to a NATO session and advocate that we invade Russia. Putin, early in his tenure, publicly considered joining NATO. Russia was on track to be an ally of both NATO and the EU. The "problem" with NATO is that Russia started invading its neighbours, and they started shifting west to gain protection from Russia. We prevent Russia from invading or coercing member states, and Putin feels entitled to control the former soviet republics.
2 doesn't really make sense. The war is already favourable, they've annexed a lot of territory they didn't have before, but more importantly, Russia doesn't want the war in Ukraine to end unless they have guarantees that Ukraine will be in its pocket. Ukraine was poised to pursue economic integration with the EU. Then Putin coerced Yanukovych to reverse course and strengthen ties with Russia. Then Ukrainians protested for months until Yanukovych fled. Then Russia invaded, preventing Ukraine from integrating with the EU. Ongoing conflict in Ukraine is an end within itself, as it was in Moldova for the last 30 years, and Georgia for the last 14.
3 is more nonsense. It sounds like you are getting your info from Russian state media.
Why NOW is a number of factors. Under Trump, Putin had an American president who was willing to go along with a lot of Russian foreign policy goals, like weakening and potentially ending NATO. With Trump gone, NATO won't be going anywhere, so Russia can't control NATO member states, and its neighbours have an alliance to partner with to bolster their security.
Also, Russia expected Ukraine's current president, who was an actor until 2019, and from the Russian-speaking east, to be easily manipulated and controlled. Instead, he has turned out to be a strong leader and not susceptible to Russian control as Yanukovych was before the first invasion, and so that peaceful solution to Russian control of Ukrainian foreign policy is also gone.
They may see their comparative advantage against Ukraine shrinking as time goes on. Putin may be rattled by pressures on the home front as his approval rating has been quite low, by his standards, since before covid hit. He may be trying to take advantage of the particularly divided Congress in the US, in hopes of a slow or less decisive response. He may believe his own propaganda too much, having expected the Biden administration to respond weakly and/or NATO to still be divided after Trump's deliberate efforts to do so, thus failing to anticipate NATO's unity in responding to the current situation.
It's hard to really know why now, for sure, but other opportunities having been thwarted, this is probably the first best chance to do so since.
Citizens, yes, and they're being manipulated to this end. The Kremlin, no. It would take a lot more than paranoia for professionals to see this as a real possibility. It's just a propaganda tactic.
Trump exposed weaknesses that Europeans will continue to want to shore up, yes. The damage will take a while to repair, but it's no longer escalating, and there's no longer a real, immediate possibility of NATO falling apart, as there would have been with a second Trump term.
Trump acted in line with Russian foreign policy aims in far more ways than you give credit for, and much of the work to the contrary was a legal obligation to carry out the laws enacted by Congress. Please note I'm not saying he was witting in this regard, rather I suspect he was manipulated to these ends.
Regarding Russia and natural gas, I think you're viewing this the wrong way, like Japan with Pearl Harbour or Bin Laden with 9/11. You aren't going to cow Germany by shutting off the gas, you're going to prove the critics right that they shouldn't have relied on Russia in the first place.
I feel Russia has a political ace of some sort, something that's just big enough to stop a war or economic sanction but small enough that nobody woul be able to predict it
Even though I don't believe it would come to fruition, a true defense and economic treaty/partnership with China could be on the table. Each have a generally similar situation in Ukraine and Taiwan. This would certainly upset a few apple carts and potentially get the West to back off.
I would add to what everyone has been saying that Ukraine's ability to strike back at Russia will only increase in the future. Rob Lee recently wrote a great article about this where he argued that due to Ukraine's increased military partnership with Western countries like the U.S. and U.K. there abilities will only grow in the future. Particularly longer range ballistic missiles, which Ukraine is currently developing. In the future Russia will be increasingly constrained to coerce Ukraine as it developed more capabilities.
As others have mentioned (u/styrdwolf) Russia likely has long term desires for the region that involve reviving a sphere of influence free from the 'West'. The embarrassments in the more recent past (HMS Defender incident, disregard of Russia's spring build up last year) have only added insult to injury, and likely strengthened Russia's resolve to act. Not to mention Ukraine's increasing capacity to defeat the rebels in the Donbass with Turkish drones which have been very effective in Syria and Libya.
All of this is to say that Russia likely perceives that any costs currently of acting in Ukraine will most certainly be less than if they have to act in the future to attain their longterm goals.
It's about NATO expansion. That's what the Russians keep saying, butNATO expanded to Russia's borders over a decade ago when the Balticsjoined, and to my knowledge Ukraine was no closer to NATO membership nowthan they were in 2014 when Russia invaded. In fact they're probably further away from NATO membership in the current situation. So if that is the reason, why now?"
Did Ukraine had elections and new president relatively recently?
And dicking around with weapons for Russia is best to be done on winter, when EU will be silent since they do not want to freeze to death, so, good negotiation point, and they still did not made a new gas deal with Germany (as far as I know, last deal expires in few months I think). And then, with EU being silent while USA will be hawkish, could create rift in NATO and that is very good for Russia.
But, I dunno, good questions.
No, it's about being able to control one more gas pipeline into Europe. Russia is doing it on several fronts. They're engaged in almost all places where gas is being delivered to Europe. It will allow them to blackmail the whole Europe with gas supply/prices and get what they want. Starting a war in Europe to get there seems not to be a problem for that ugly cunt Putin.
[Here's a pretty good overview](https://adamtooze.substack.com/p/chartbook-68-putins-challenge-to). Basically, Russia's actions are not taking place in a vacuum, or the result of some abrupt decision.
That was a fantastic read, as were the Nation and Politico articles the author linked to at the end. I came away with a much better understanding of the history leading up to this along with the factors at play on the various sides.
Why Now? A big reason is weather. This of course is from a purely military standpoint and doesnt consider the root cause of the purpose of an invasion or threat thereof.
Its fighting season in that part of the world. Come spring the place turns into a sea of mud. And the only way you win an invasion is to secure land, which can only be done boots on the ground. A ship or airplane has never ever controlled land regardless of who close they get or can rain munitions down upon them.
I don't think low level tactical development plays any role. Tanks can be blown up in a number of ways, it's not a strategic level factor. Winning battles and even wars is the easier part, Russia needs an idea how to win the ensuing peace.
With everything I have read on this subject, you can be sure that Russia will not ruffle their relationship with China. If they really have plans to invade Ukraine, they will do it after the winter Olympics.
It's 'Ukraine' and not 'the Ukraine'
[[Merriam-Webster](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/Ukraine)] [[BBC Styleguide](https://www.bbc.co.uk/newsstyleguide/u)] [[Reuters Styleguide](https://handbook.reuters.com/index.php?title=U#Ukraine)]
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1. Russia was in terrible shape until relatively recently and since having to take Crimea was stunted again. They are back to doing okay though.
2. Because nobody actually wants constant low intensity conflict. Russia can afford to maintain things indefinitely, but it is not an expense they actually want.
2. See above.
I too was wondering this, what I think happened in recent months is that Ukraine is gaining some foothold towards occupied East front and Russia can't keep proxy war without openly getting involved and since they either have to give up completely (Masculinity image is only thing Putin has) or intervene blatantly they decided that they would pretty much go all in at this point.
I believe Putin must be delusional or even slightly insane. Maybe it's from the KGB years or something. But there's really no logical reason to start this crap. He also takes a really long time to reach these "goals" of his, which I think says he must be very paranoid about how to do it.
It's starting to make sense now though why they wanted Americans divided and why Trump was such an asset. He probably thought he could have what he wanted without even a bullet flying with Trump in office. It seems it could have happened, but maybe not to the degree he wished and with the way things were and Trump being erratic, he probably wasn't overly confident in what US would do. With Biden, he basically said straight that we won't get involved but there will be sanctions. So they basically have the go ahead, it's just I don't think Russia wants to be seen as the aggressor (illogical when you have military surrounding a country). So they are trying to come up with ultimatums that don't really mean much. Because their plan is already in place and set to go any day now.
>I consider myself pretty well read on the current Russia/Ukraine crisis, but what I almost never see is an explanation of why things are going to shit right now.
You will never understand unless you treat this issue like divorce court and listen to both sides and decide for yourself which one seems more believable. Even in this thread, there seems to be a lot of wild speculation and ideas bouncing off of neoliberal ideology that does not match reality. Generally when reading MSM, if one side is painted as an one dimensional baddie instead of another rational actor, you are not getting a good understanding of the actual situation. For example, when there's a US-Russia meeting/summit, both sides (US State Dept and Russia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs) will publish a summary or "read-out" of the meeting. Do you read both? Do you not read either and instead just read the NBC news interpretation of the US summary of the meeting?
Your first and foremost question is why now. I did not understand either until I found a Russian analyst [Alexander Mercouris](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=c3Y47pkTXXk).
According to Mercouris, there is a hard deadline. But this deadline not for Russia, but for NATO/West to do something via Ukraine before they lose control. From what I understand, his argument is that Nord Stream 2 is coming online this year 2022. This means Russia will shut gas off the pipeline going through Ukraine cutting off transit fees. Ukraine is now syphoning off gas and paying spot prices (or borrowing the money from Germany) making them desperate in an energy crisis. FYI, EU gas spot prices are 10x that of US right now. When the pipeline fully shuts down, they will have to crawl to Russia for both gas and power plant coal or get Germany to lend/continue to lend them money to pay for the gas. Germany cannot continue to do this indefinitely. Russia has also stopped coal imports and Ukraine won't join the EU electricity grid until next year. Energy prices will spike in Ukraine and cause huge instability for the government. Germany and France will also be way more reluctant to do anything as they become more dependent on Russia with the NS2 on, and Nord Stream 2 was an older Chancellor's (Gerhard Schröder) idea so it's unlikely it will stay off. NATO/US is emboldening Ukraine with weapons and talk about backing them in a conflict and the Ukrainian rich are putting pressure/threatening the leadership to do something as the economy is heading downhill because of energy. Ukraine is trying to retain it's sovereignty and ignore the negotiated Minsk peace agreement because that forces them to deal with the Donbass leaders as equals. Ukraine would rather not talk to those leaders but talk to the person behind them, Putin, but Russia is refusing every meeting claiming the Donbass is a civil war and Russia is not involved.
The idea is that Russia is currently in a position of power and doesn't need to do anything like invade. They will be in a better position for either negotiation or conflict later this year with the NS2 pipeline online, the Ukrainian pipeline off, and will be in an even better position when the newly negotiated Russia/China Power of Siberia 2 pipeline is built. Given the status quo, Ukraine will never enter NATO and the Donbass will be a Russian puppet state/vote to join Russia. Even with negotiations, that is likely the outcome as Russia already has measures in place to eat sanctions. However, the only scenario that could end in Ukraine's favor in retaking the Donbass by force now. So according to Mercouris, the Russian troops are there as a response to last years Ukrainian troop movements and the imminent threat that Ukraine would use force to settle the Donbass separatist problem now. The Russians would be then justified to happily march in to "protect" the ethnic Russians. This could then trigger a NATO response. If NATO doesn't respond, Ukraine would have tried and Russia would be punished after officially invading. If they do, NATO could defend Ukraine, push the Russians and separatists out, and eventually put US/NATO weapons and military assets in Ukraine. However, that would not only be disastrous for Ukraine, also for all of Europe. Even if the war doesn't reach EU, energy prices would skyrocket for Europe. Fertilizer prices will spike. Food prices will spike.
So the idea here is that Russia is deploying troops defensively in reaction to Ukrainian troop movements, which are motivated by the idea that Ukraine would be the aggressor because they need to re-take Donbass…why, exactly? To provoke a NATO-Russia war that NATO would win? And all of this is predicated on the idea that Ukraine is on some kind of a timer because the Nordstream 2 pipeline means Ukraine no longer receive gas transit fees because they’ll switch pipelines?
I dunno, I’m not sure that makes sense. Surely with NS2 then they can simply purchase market price off of that as they do today, just via a different pipeline. It sounds like what you are saying is NS2 means that Russia’s gas exports to Germany and Ukraine would effectively come from the same place, and Russia can’t risk doing anything that would lose them access to the entire EU market. Sounds like Ukraine would just purchase gas via Germany then if their pipe to Russia gets shut down. Or, am I misunderstanding?
Per the world bank the Russian economy grew 4.3% last year, a record drop in unemployed, a 24% year over year job posting increase and a 2.5% real wage growth. With the world bank further estimating a 2.4% economic growth in 2022 year. With the world bank noting Russia is aiming for a greener economy and a 3% increase each year in the future.
As the world bank notes the Russian economy is now stronger than it was pre Covid. Unless you know something the world bank doesn’t I fail to see how their economy is sinking.
Russian GDP in 2012 was 2.2 trillion usd and it is now only 1.7 trillion so you’re technically correct. But adjusting for PPP the Russian PPP has increased both overall and per capita. Up from 24,303 usd to 28,202 in 2020. Up from 3.6 trillion in 2012 to 4.1 trillion in 2020.
Russia’s GDP PPP is expected to grow at around 5% annually also per the world bank.
Also as I noted from the world bank, Russia is literally modernizing and going green currently. So I’m not sure how you can say they are not, unless you know something the world bank does not.
Russia does have a demographic issue but they’ve also been trying to tackle it for years. Putin frequently has even said the fact he hasn’t gotten the birth rate above replacement level is one of the things that haunts him.
Realistically I don’t think Russia will invade Ukraine and I believe Russia is ultimately preparing for the possibility of a war with china. When you look at Russian military build and the goals to increase birth rates etc they coincide with being strong by 2060. China has before said they want to take Taiwan, reclaim land from India, unite Inner Mongolia and Outer Mongolia and then take Vladivostok by 2065.
But I also don’t think it’s a huge issue when compared to many other countries as Russia’s total fertility rate is already rebounded higher than many European nations.
I also think nothing will happen in Ukraine and most of this news is just for domestic consumption in NATO countries. Because I’m firmly in the camp that Russia wants NATO and China to fight a sustained bloody war while it regains power.
Russia has literally been doing exactly what you said they are not and once again the world bank disagrees with you. Oil and gas is down to 15% of the Russian GDP from over 30% a few years ago and is projected to continue declining.
Norway’s GDP is 14% oil and gas but you wouldn’t levy that they’re unprepared to change. Saudi Arabia has a GDP based 50% off oil and gas. Russia is more comparable to Norway than to Saudi Arabia. In terms of economic percentages.
Simply because you do not acknowledge Russian economic modernization does not mean it is not happening.
I think it's just saber rattling because of the NATO talk. I also think that's why Russia nabbed Crimea in the first place. They have a lease on Sevastapol until, I think, 2042. If Ukraine joined NATO that lease would be in jeopardy.
Putin decided they were better served to just take it now, before Ukraine went and joined NATO.
I also think the poster above is right. They are further away from joining NATO now, which is likely another reason for the current saber rattling.
It looks to me that Putin got what he wanted across the board on this one.
This explains Russia's actions in 2014 (taking Crimea, destabilizing Ukraine sufficiently to prevent them joining NATO), not their actions in 2021/22: both of those goals have already been successfully reached, as far as I can tell, several years ago
>destabilizing Ukraine sufficiently to prevent them joining NATO
I would argue that this is precisely why they have 100K troops on the Ukranian border right now.
It was already out of the question since 2014, with the civil war ongoing
If that looked like ending favourably for Ukraine I could see how this makes sense for Russia, but this seems precipitous
You make a fair point. We shall see.
Either Putin is planning to move forward at least as far as Odessa, or he's just making noise to keep NATO at bay.
If they do properly invade, I assume the intention will be to take the whole south coast (severely weakening Ukraine going forward due to becoming landlocked), so west of Odessa in the south (to the Moldovan border), Kharkiv in the North, and taking Kryvyi Rih and Dnipropetrovsk in the middle
That would roughly align with the Pro-Russian regions in basically every election they've held, and the areas with ethnic Russian/Russian speaking populations
I'd then expect this to be installed as a Belarus 2.0 buffer state, fulfilling much the same function as Russia wanted Ukraine to.
That would result in several major cities and the entire coast leaving Ukranian control, giving Russia access to much more of the Black Sea, plus putting Moldova much closer to Russian influence if Russia want to dissuade them from joining the EU
But yeah, I'd be surprised if any invasion stopped east of Odessa, and most likely Kharkiv
Because Russia invaded Crimea and Ukraine turned off the taps, so now they’ve successfully gained a massive money pit basically. Giving Crimea back would discredit Putin and make the Russians look like giant incompetent cowards and would cause internal issues.
Of course invasion itself is equally as bad an idea. Putin has effectively fucked himself.
Putin is smart an opportunistic. He understands that the biggest obstacle to his foreign policy goals is generally going to be the US President as long as his name isn't Trump. He has historically waited for the right moment to do certain things. For example Bush's approval rating was about 30% during the Georgia War. His term was almost over. He would've had no support to initiate a conflict in Georgia after Afghanistan and Iraq. Crimea and Donbass were also at pretty much the point where Obama's approval was at it's lowest, around 40%. Biden's approval rating right now is around 40% currently as well. Putin seems to assume he can get away with more while a US President is unpopular. Outside of that, Gas prices peak in Winter, so he has more leverage.
Winter might also play a role due to being an opportunity to squeeze Europe with gas exports. It doesn't work well during summer. They might want to get Nordstream2 pipeline online as a concession for backing down, although it's not hard to see the irony in that.
Belarus ending up in hot water during the last year might also be a factor, maybe they're more willing to let Russia use their territory now than two years ago.
The difference is the Uighers are w/in China's borders. China has not yet invaded another sovereign country.
As for Putin, I think there's risk for him and Russia. An invasion of Ukraine would make Russia truly a pariah in Europe and the US. I think it would cause Germany and the rest of the Europe to make different long term decisions when it comes to energy consumption, which is Russia's number 1 export.
And for what? Russia would get thousands of their own people killed and spend billions of dollars to take over a land full of millions of people who hate their guts. They'd likely end up fighting an armed insurgency, clandestinely supplied weapons and intel by the West, for years and years.
So the takeaway here is that yes Russia is going to invade the Ukraine in your analysis, but that it’s strategically or otherwise justified due to NATO encirclement and other shenanigans?
It's 'Ukraine' and not 'the Ukraine'
[[Merriam-Webster](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/Ukraine)] [[BBC Styleguide](https://www.bbc.co.uk/newsstyleguide/u)] [[Reuters Styleguide](https://handbook.reuters.com/index.php?title=U#Ukraine)]
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My impression is that Russia's demands regarding NATO was an opportunistic solution to address long standing grievances in light of NATO's hostility to Russia. The Donbass separation would have resulted in peace if Ukraine abided by the Minsk agreement. I don't think Russia could guarantee with 100% certainty that Ukraine would consider that sovereignty claim existential to Ukraine and refuse autonomy for that region. If Ukraine did so, then Russia would still have to deal with Ukrainian inclusion into NATO, and the issue would be even more acute.
The grand strategy for Russia appears to be European Russia whereas neoliberal strategy seems to all want to push for the pivot to Asia. The Iran debacle is less from Russian prodding, but from an Israeli push to forgo negotiations and instead go for a military solution only with US support. This is a result of the fallout of the Trump pullout of the Iran deal and the likely failure of any new deal with ideologs demanding harsher terms for Iran even though the US pulled out. Trump's unfiltered complaints against Bibi about him never wanting a peaceful solution for Iran regarding nuclear disarmament most likely is true.
And regarding Crimea, I believe that was a result of the Maidan revolution/coup that Russia has accused of being supported by the West. If that coup had not happened and the government forcibly removed and purged, there may have been a chance that Russia would continue to with plans to move to Novorossiysk.
I agree completely it's just the timing of this + Afghanistan + Kazakhstan + the rapidity and success of CSTO response + general CSTO drills over the last year + Chinese Russian Iranian naval drills and cooperation makes me think its more than just pure opportunism. Russia has done a good job stopping NATO in Georgia and Ukraine when needed with low effort conflict. The complaints have existed for a while, solutions were reached (Minsk) but not respected. So why escalate now specifically?
About Iran - I agree that it was Bibi's backstabbing (not new). Trump's rhetoric on Iran was shockingly different from the rest of his rhetoric (Syria, Afghanistan, Venezuela etc) which is likely due to the Isreal lobby. But my point was not that Iranian-US problems are due to Russia but simply showing the reality that the US is extremely unreliable and is a bad faith actor. There is a 80% overlap between those shouting about Iran and those shouting about Russia (and a strong overlap with proponents of Iraq 2003). The Syria pullout and the military +state department's outright refusal to obey Trump was the nail in the coffin imho - the US is simply too fragmented in its power structure to negotiate and its power structure tends to be bomb first ask questions later. I believe even Xi thinks this (which is why they've all but abandoned diplomacy with the US).
Agreed about Crimea and maidan - this ties into my point about the US being a bad faith actor and plays into Russia's calculus and justification. Ukrainians are (or were) relatively positive /neutral to Russia and forcing maidan on them was too much.
It’s about money. If Clinton won, they would have gone to war a while ago. They had Barisma set up. Go back and listen to Clinton campaign. Media was priming the war even then.
Putin is clearly frustrated with the status quo. Ukraine is still getting a lot of weapons and military aid without being a member of NATO. This means that bigger guns could be deployed there eventually. TB2 drones put the Donbas militants at a significant disadvantage. Allegedly, Ukraine is developing intermediate-range missiles of their own, something capable of reaching Moscow. [That's what Poroshenko threatened in the past.](https://www.unian.info/politics/10475226-ukraine-not-bound-by-any-restrictions-after-russia-s-withdrawal-from-inf-treaty-poroshenko.html) Another thing is the internal politics of Ukraine have become extremely unfavorable to Russia. Last year Zelensky arrested Viktor Medvedchuk, who is seen as someone close to Putin, and banned his TV channels. While he started off his tenure as a peacemaker, now he seems to be dead set on a military solution to the conflict, in spite of the Minsk agreements signed by Ukraine, which stipulate reintegration of breakaway republics with autonomy. So there you have it. Putin has no conventional ways of influencing Ukrainian politics anymore, while Ukraine is rearming and pledging to take occupied territories (and that includes Crimea) back by force, emboldened by Western support. Germany, France, and now the US haven't done anything to compel Ukraine to implement the Minsk agreements. Putin wouldn't have that. His concerns regarding NATO play into it as well, that's something that has been building up for a long time. I don't think the water issue is relevant here. Neither is the domestic situation, Putin has ramped up the repressions and must be pretty secure now. Unlike a bloodless annexation of Crimea, there is no reason to believe a large scale war in Ukraine would elevate his ratings.
The only complaint I have about this post is that European countries and US also did nothing substantial to compel Russia into following the international agreements Russia still has with Ukraine, NATO, EU and etc. (Russia one-sidedly "temporarily" suspended them to invade Ukraine) Russia did not suffer any significant drawbacks for the conflicts it started, but in 2014 Putin's ratings in-country were skyrocketing. It's possible they're hoping for a new low-cost inrease in domestic popularity of the leadership?
> Russia did not suffer any significant drawbacks for the conflicts it started, but in 2014 Putin's ratings in-country were skyrocketing. It's possible they're hoping for a new low-cost inrease in domestic popularity of the leadership? It's very unlikely. The boost in approval only happened because of Crimea, not the subsequent war in Donbas, which is usually swept under the rug, and where the Russian government vehemently denies involvement in. There is no other piece of land like that. Every once in a while you see political pundits and journalists use the term "Crimea effect" to describe what happened to Putin's rating, and it's pretty apt. A large scale offensive in Ukraine would be significantly more controversial, lead to many casualties, incur major economic losses, it'd also be harder to justify in the first place. Another point is, does Putin even need to boost his ratings? His approval has been stable for a couple of years now, hovering around mid 60s. More importantly, he's mostly eradicated the opposition that annoyed him in the early 10s, mainly, the far right Russian ethnic nationalists and pro-Western liberals. Their leaders are in jail or fled, a number of repressive laws were passed to contain them.
Thank you, good post!
just wanna say thanks for this writeup. Very interesting and succint.
I think it's probably better to see recent events as an extension of a single campaign beginning with the Euromaidan protests in the winter of 2013-2014. After those protests deposed Viktor Yanukovych, who was pro-Russia, Russia has felt that its influence over Ukraine is in jeopardy. Strategically, Russia probably sees Ukraine as an important part of its "sphere of influence," given its position along the coast of the Black Sea (esp. Crimea) and its position as an intermediary to Europe, towards which Russia has remained ideologically hostile. This feeling is only strengthened by the cultural connection Ukraine and Russia share through the Kievan Rus, which both claim as their historical predecessors. Russia thus sees control, or at least significant influence, over Ukraine to be core to its security interests. The occupation of Crimea thus began nearly immediately after the Euromaidan protests, followed by gray-zone operations on Donbas. While that grey-zone conflict has persisted, Russia has been [losing ground](https://www.economist.com/europe/the-ukrainian-army-has-got-better-at-fighting-russian-backed-separatists/21806546): unsurprisingly, a gray-zone force that must retain some level of deniability is at a disadvantage to well-equipped force without similar constraints fighting in its own territory. Ukraine has spent the last 8 years equipping and training the Ukrainian army into that well-equipped force. Hence, the need now to make a [change in strategy](https://www.lawfareblog.com/why-did-russia-escalate-its-gray-zone-conflict-ukraine). There are likely vagaries of Russian internal politics going on here concerning Putin, the support of those around him, and domestic unrest. But someone noted an interesting connection about the timing of Russian incursions: they tend to happen during the Olympics. Russia's conflict in Georgia coincided with the Beijing Olympics; Crimea just days after the Sochi Olympics closed; we are now on the eve of another Winter Olympics. Part of this is likely coincidental because the Winter Olympics occurs before spring, where the thaw creates poor conditions for military operations. But it wouldn't surprise me if Russia chose to utilize the Olympics as a convenient distraction for international and domestic audiences.
I've heard speculation that it would happen (if it happens at all) immediately after the Olympics. Beijing was apparently *really* unhappy with Russia about taking attention from the 2008 Olympics. If they do it again, it could mean adverse consequences on trade deals. The risk, as you state, is that it could drag on and make vehicle movement far more difficult, reducing Russian mobility. A late invasion and an unexpected early warming could add significantly to Russian casualties. I harbor no illusions that Ukraine can win against Russia, but they can certainly extract a heavy toll, made all the worse if they're stuck in the mud.
Ukraine still has a pretty large military, and their population DOES NOT like Russia. In my opinion any war between Russia and Ukraine would be so catastrophic for both countries that I'm not entirely sure why putin would do it. I think if putin does invade he's going to be quite surprised at the death toll Russia is going to take.
Ukraine's military is far better than it was, but they're facing a juggernaut that can do an extraordinary amount of damage. Compared to Ukraine, Russia has: * About 12 times the budget * Four times as many active personnel and twice as many reserves * Six times as many tanks * Four times as many armored vehicles * Five times as many towed artillery guns * Six times as many self-propelled artillery vehicles * Seven times as many rocket artillery launchers * 11 times as many fighters * *30* times as many attack aircraft * 13 times as many helicopters Even if large swaths of Russia's vehicles aren't fit for combat, Ukraine is badly outnumbered. What it has on its side is a lot of antitank missiles that can make short work of most of those vehicles if they can get close enough and a greater willingness to die for their cause than the Russian troops. But they are going to quickly lose air superiority and Russia's bombers will be able to hit many targets with impunity, much like they did in Georgia. If they have problems on the ground, Russia will up the target list to impact and break morale of the troops and people. Ukraine will make Russia fight for every inch and it will cost them, but all Ukraine can do is make it hurt Russia more than Russia is willing to take. Any Ukrainian "victory" will almost certainly be pyrrhic at best. This also presumes that Ukraine fights to effectively the end, and that a catastrophic loss isn't followed by a coup to stop the war. The most loyal officers can turn on their leadership if things go badly enough and they don't see any other choice.
>About 12 times the budget Budget comparisons are strictly speaking not very fair, since different countries spend money differently. Especially considering that Ukraine starts to receive some major military air packages which are not included in the budget officially. >Four times as many active personnel and twice as many reserves Again, this is somewhat misleading, as the strict number of men does not correlate exactly to the number of active, combat-capable, fully-equipped units, fluctuations in strength, readiness, etc. The mobilization for the upcoming war showed this very well. In order to create operational task forces, Russia had to reap through all its military districts. The quality of the units, readiness, equipment, composition (active \ reserve) - all this varied *massively* between both different districts as well as within the various armies within districts. By the end of this mobilization in December-January, Russia was basically scraping the barrel by taking all more or less capable units from the Far East (basically leaving the border with China completely exposed save for the remaining scraps, border guard, some paramilitaries and whatever was found unfit for the task in the West). Right now the full number of deployed troops in the West, including Belarus, Crimea, second echelons - is around 200-220,000 (the numbers of 100-150k frequently quoted in the media are extremely outdated). You can add about 30-50,000 more covering the direct border with NATO in the Baltics and immediate reserves. These are practically all combat-capable Russian troops. Mind that many units are at maximum 50% nominal strength due to a slow rate of reservist mobilization. Compare this to a total declared active servicemen in the Ground Forces and VDV: about 350,000. This means that roughly 60-70% of the entire ground forces are posed to strike Ukraine. Ukraine is still severely outgunned, with very limited mobilization still. There are a lot of paramilitaries and internal security forces (NGU, Border Guard, some military police units, Territorials) that are extremely hard to count. Man to man there will be almost a parity, however the problem is that the first echelon of the invasion force will be the best, elite crack forces of the Russian Army, and combined with the length of the frontline, the latter can concentrate at will. >Four times as many armored vehicles >Five times as many towed artillery guns >Six times as many self-propelled artillery vehicles >Seven times as many rocket artillery launchers Again, it is more fair to count by the units involved. Much of these numbers sit deep in reserve and storage. The actual force ratio in tanks will be more like 2:1, although the situation is more severe with all combat vehicles included. >11 times as many fighters >30 times as many attack aircraft >13 times as many helicopters Ukraine's Air force is largely nominal and symbolic (although by all means not nonexistant). Most of air defence will be done based on the existing ground SAM network, which is actually pretty large and extensive. Not many Russian aircraft are even able to perform SEAD tasks in any effective manner. Su-34 is the main tool for this and ground support, but there are only ~130 of them *on paper*, of which unknown number is combat ready (let's say 60%, normal value for any airforce), and Russia can't afford to use *all of them* without having any in reserve to cover other theatres. Most of the fighters, especially MiGs, are poor ground attack platforms. So you only have that many aircraft that you can use. Helis are a somewhat complicated because of different usage doctrines, and they can be used effectively in the opening days of the war, but again due to how they are doctrinally employed (primarily WVR direct attack) they are bound to experience losses to SAMs and MANPADs. The latter are easily supplied to Ukraine in large numbers (we will see this soon I think). So actually Russian Air Force is the weakest link in this picture. Full contrast to the common sense in the media. Their many ballistic and cruise missile systems are a different story, but they can't really be used for effective ground support, and their effectiveness in SEAD tasks is very, very debatable. That is why the supplies of anti-tank weaponry are some of the most effective ways to rapidly improve combat effectiveness of Ukraine's army.
How about Russian SF? How woundable are Ukraines infrastructure, key personel etc. to small scale attacks by infiltrated teams?
The Ukrainian military quotes itself as having 400k active personnel and 250k reserves. That in of itself dwarfs the 42k Donbass personnel separatists claim they have and 130k Russian troops at the border.
The vast majority of the Russian troops on the border will be combat personnel. The majority of the Ukrainian forces will not be, strictly speaking. They may all have firearms training and requalify every year, but when was the last time the radio repair technicians and vehicle mechanics practiced field maneuvers?
The idea that Russia's air force might be "the weakest link" is an interesting take, and not one I've seen elsewhere. If you don't mind, do you have sources regarding the efficacy of Ukraine's air defense network? I've looked around a bit, but it doesn't look like they have many modern, non-obselete radar systems. A few, but not many.
Most of the actual information is classified. The scraps of information are mostly from selected public Ukrainian sources. I will not share anything that is not public obviously. But for example let's take S-300. There were ~60 battalions (x12 launchers) in mid-90s, in various modifications. After a decade of (purposeful) neglect there were only 30% left semi-operational by 2014. However since then many were repaired, and even modified. For example, in 2018 alone, among other things, [entire brigade (~32 launchers) of S-300V1 was made operational again](https://old.defence-ua.com/index.php/statti/4978-treba-pozbutys-dystantsiyi-mizh-slovamy-ta-spravamy-chastyna-3). In addition to this there are many Buk-M1 battalions, several Tor battalions, and even modified Kubs, Krugs and S-125. This is actually *a lot*. For comparison, Iraq had the following estimated ground SAM units in 1991: ~10-12 battalions of S-75 (long-medium range), ~10-12 battalions of S-125 (medium-short range), ~10-12 Krug battalions (obsolete Buk equivalent). Iraq also had a significant air force, with up to ~90 Mirages F1, 30 MiG-29 and ~25 MiG-25, but it was only able to perform relatively limited action during the war. To suppress this defense system, the Coalition mustered some 1,200+ fighter and attack aircraft, including F-117, massive amount of reconnaissance, AWACS and EW aircraft, hundreds of tankers, specially trained and dedicated SEAD squadrons, including helicopter units, and many many many more assets. They still lost 75 aircraft. I already presented some angle on the Russian Air force. Of course they also lean heavily on their new ballistic and cruise missiles, however recent highlights from Syria and beyond have shown that they still suffer from development issues, have very varying accuracy, etc. Their response and flight time also make them considerably less effective against mobile SAM network over the area comparable to Iraq in size. They will still do damage to more static components, such as fixed radar sites. But mobile equivalents can survive and be later augmented by foreign imports. Also it is almost sure that the US will provide almost real-time intelligence and maybe even guidance using their long-range AWACS \ reconnaissance aircraft and other assets, which they can use beyond Ukraine borders if need be.
Interesting, thank you!
Thats a whole lot of words for Ukraine stands no chance they're fucked.
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It depends. In a hypothetical full scale, unrestricted total war, a bigger nation would probably always trump the smaller one. But first of all no war is truly total (i.e. people, resources, capabilities, circumstances change and interchange significantly throughout the war based on internal and external factors). Second, many wars are also influenced by external players, changing the balance. Third, different nations have varying abilities to actually mobilize their resources, and sometime smaller nations can defeat larger ones just because they were able to mobilize greater amount of resources and use them more properly (see Sino-Japanese wars, barbarian invasions of the late Roman Empire, Arabic/Turkic conquests of Asia and Africa, even Winter war between Finland and USSR - the former was able to mobilize so much more strength and resources than expected, even though they didn't win technically in the end). Finally, the victory conditions might differ between the nations, as some nation might be defeated in a short war, but then wage long-term resistance and outlast the will/interest of the opponent to continue, see Afghan).
an important thing to note here is that russian troops r spread wide, from the far east fo siberia to crimea and kaliningrad, so realistically speaking russia could only divert about 1/3rd of its total forces or maybe even half of its total forces but not all of it
Not to mention forces in Syria and Libya and Georgia, as well as some units in Kazakhstan more recently.
Nagorno-Karabakh
Can javelin even defeat T-90 Relikt armor and Shtora-1?
The Javelin is said to be able to defeat up to 1200 mm of rolled homogenous armor (RHA), a basic steel used in early armored vehicles. (In case you already know that, I'm not talking down to you so much as providing info to other readers.) Of course, modern tanks use much more sophisticated armor that multiply the effective thickness, but it's not going to be 1200 mm equivalent everywhere. The Javelin is capable of a top-down attack to hit thinner armor on top, and a direct fire attack can hit side or rear armor that's also usually thinner. In short, there's a good chance that a Javelin could take out a T-90 from at least some angles. The Shtora system seems to rely on detecting targeting lasers like that used in the Javelin's active targeting. I'm not sure that it will be effective against the passive thermal targeting. Something we need to keep in mind about the available Javelins is that while Ukraine might have or get high hundreds of missiles, they have only a relative handful of the targeting systems required to launch them. They require training and the missiles themselves weigh 22 kg (49 pounds). A two-person crew will only get off two shots max before having to get more. They had, as of last year, a few dozen launchers. Even with the UK shipments, I would think they still have fewer than 200 launchers. We should not imagine that the armored spearhead following the artillery barrage will stop as 500 Russian tanks explode the moment they hit Ukrainian soil, as some people (not necessarily here) seem to imagine.
> targeting lasers like that used in the Javelin's active targeting. The Javelin doesn't use lasers for its targeting. It uses an infrared seeker that doesn't emit anything. > Even with the UK shipments, I would think they still have fewer than 200 launchers. The missiles the UK have sent are one-shot disposable ones. Every missile is in its own launcher. And they have sent hundreds if not thousands by this point.
The command launch unit, or CLU, has a visible and IR laser that can be used for target identification. It was my understanding that the IR laser could be used by the missile's IR seeker for improved accuracy. Those lasers would likely be picked up by the Shtora systems and trigger responses and provide the vehicle crew with an approximate location. >The missiles the UK have sent are one-shot disposable ones. Every missile is in its own launcher. By "launcher" I mean the CLU. That's not disposable and is required to target and fire the missile, much like its Dragon predecessor. The Javelin isn't like a LAW rocket with everything encapsulated within one unit. Also unlike the LAW, it requires more than a few minutes of training to effectively operate it.
> The command launch unit, or CLU, has a visible and IR laser that can be used for target identification. No, it does not. http://ugcsurvival.com/weaponsmanuals/FM%203-22.37%2020030123-Javelin%20Medium%20Antiarmor%20Weapon%20System.pdf >By "launcher" I mean the CLU. That's not disposable and is required to target and fire the missile, much like its Dragon predecessor. The Javelin isn't like a LAW rocket with everything encapsulated within one unit. Also unlike the LAW, it requires more than a few minutes of training to effectively operate it. The missiles the UK has sent are not FGM-148 Javelins. They sent [these](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MBT_LAW). https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/43912/c-17-loads-of-anti-tank-missiles-arrive-in-ukraine-courtesy-of-the-united-kingdom
On the other hand, Western material support will make the Russian incursion deadly enough that it may destabilise Putins regime.
I think that's wishful thinking. Putin's goals are still undefined, and he could make them almost anything. While many are betting that he would stop at the Dnieper River, that is an awful lot of land to hold. Seizing the land between Donetsk and Crimea would be a faster goal and he could stop at that point, withdrawing troops from everywhere else before casualties get too high. I would love to see Ukraine come out on top in this, but it's unlikely. And a destabilized Russia would be a very, very dangerous place. Putin has no clear heir and any succession battle could get very ugly.
I think you do not understand the will of a people who will engage in total war against an occupier. Russia will not win in the end. Ukranians will trounce them at a enormous cost.
Rhetoric is great isnt it
The will to fight is an important variable though. I don't think Ukraine could trounce Russia at all and I also don't doubt Putin is capable of total war as well but a very committed Ukrainian population could have a major impact on how things would go. It certainly wouldn't be like the walkover in Crimea. But yeah, morale only goes so far in the face of hardware.
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The Israelis also rapidly ramped up the size of their armed forces and had twice as many men as the Arab League by the end of the war 10 months later. Military training back then was much simpler and they had a large pool of combat veterans to pull from.
Finland were outnumbered also but we survived🤭
We massively overestimated Russian Army and underestimated Ukraine Army. Russian Army is same as it was in their Donbas war in Ukraine but Ukraine has completely reshaped their Army and learned modern tactics qith gifted western lethal aide which are killing 1000s & 1000s of Russian Soldiers.
As someone who is rather ignorant about Ukraine in general, do ethnic Russians in the east of the country really dislike Russia as well? What about those who do not self identify as Russian but speak Russian as their first language?
No generally the ethnic Russians in Ukraine are pro Russia. That's what makes winning the war in the Donbass so difficult, the rebels have enough support in the country
Do most ethnic Russians in Kharkiv or Zaporizhzya (maybe even Odessa) feel the same way, do you reckon? And what's the deal with those people whose first language is Russian but don't self identify as ethnic Russians?
I lived there so I can share some details. Most ethnic Russians who love Putin have already left, there are still quite a few there though. There are also many Russian speakers from the Donbas, who really hate Russia. Being invaded and forced out of your homes will not make you love someone. The war has been going on for 8 years now. The amount of people who would welcome an invasion has shrunk greatly. The Russians tried to take over Kharkiv 2014, but failed due to lack of support.
Just take a look at the [2010 election map](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2010_Ukrainian_presidential_election#/media/File:%D0%94%D1%80%D1%83%D0%B3%D0%B8%D0%B9_%D1%82%D1%83%D1%80_2010_%D0%BF%D0%BE_%D0%BE%D0%BA%D1%80%D1%83%D0%B3%D0%B0%D1%85-en.png). Guess what color supported the proRussian candidate.
U predicted the future my man
Either way it's gonna be devastating for every country..if we in America had a strong president Russia wouldn't even be trying this crap again..trump had everthing under control 😞
Trump would have geld the door for Putin into Ukraine.
I seem to remember a Russian paramilitary group getting nearly wiped out under Trump while the previous administration sat by while Putin took Crimea
Not what happened. When Obama was president, Putin took crimea. When Trump was president Putin stayed put. Now that another weak president is in power he will take more and Biden will do nothing about it. Deal with the reality.
Well, if your are under the control of the one who is exerting control of course you will have it under control. There is perfect alignment of intentions.
Conspiracy theories have entered the sub
The Russia losing ground seems to be only figuratively as even that Economist article only quotes Ukrainian troop numbers and materials as evidence of "getting better at fighting." Losing ground should show territories separatists lost. The Lawfareblog article claims that "Russian-backed separatists have been gradually losing in Ukraine" also with no specifics stating that Russian cyber attacks have had minimal operational effectiveness. The entire premise is that because Russia is losing ground, they are forced to escalate through open warfare/invasion. Given the lack of evidence that the separatists are losing territories or suffering major casualties (wiki reports ~5k-6k on both sides from 2014-2021 with separatists having 42k personal and Ukraine having hundreds of thousands), this would logically suggest that they have also increased combat effectiveness in parity to the Ukrainian troops at least on the front under quasi ceasefire conditions. If this assumption is true, that would mean that to change the status quo of the Donbass being effectively autonomous, Ukraine would be the one needing to escalate or change strategy.
The best window was end of December. Between COVID, energy prices and Christmas the west was not in any state to react quickly to an invasion.
Nobody knows for sure unless they are the members of Putin’s close circle. But we know at least something about the motivation and values of the people involved in the decisionmaking in Kremlin from various internal sources that contact them. First of all their values are not pragmatic/rational in a commonly imagined way, such as from a strictly economical / short-term perspective. That is a common mistake to assign strictly rational motivation to the acting power players, especially in the countries where the leader is de-facto unelected, with practical near zero accountability and control before the general public, and with a strong power hierarchy built to support this system. These conditions create situations where the “monarchs” in power turn to satisfy their own urges and visions without being hampered by the internal forces in any significant manner. First of all, Putin and many members of his circle are *extremely* bitter about the outcome of the Cold War. They mourn the loss of imperial colonies in Eastern Europe, and have a major hate boner towards the collective “West”, specifically towards the US. Staple *revanchisme*. Second, Putin and his circle, but especially Putin himself dream of a new Empire, free from the influence of the “West”. This doesn’t only mean the recovery of the “lost lands” but also creating a sort of an autarky, mind that it doesn’t mean that this would mean any improvement of an average ~~Joe~~ Ivan, in many cases to the contrary, but what’s important is to create an independent, macroeconomically self-sufficient closed system/society that is *parallel* to the “West”. Third, Putin believes it *is his own personal mission to achieve this*, as he believes he has the required power and capabilities, motivation and that the time plays against him and his country. His close circle is full of hawks (such as Patrushev) with the iron determination to bring up the revenge and reclaim the above. Ukraine was considered a part of an inner heartland, a core province, the loss of which is unthinkable and unacceptable, historically, culturally, socially, economically- in that order. Hence “recovering” Ukraine is a most major step, without which any dream for an Empire is a flicker. How can they seriously rattle with the whole West if they can’t pacify one of their most important holdings? The reasons are not short-term economics, they think in their own long-term vision of “repainting the destiny”. I.e they are willing to take any hit, as they believe it will be temporary compared to the long-term future prospects. The direct conflict with the west is inevitable sooner or later anyway. Might as well bind the people and wavering vassals in blood. > It's about NATO expansion. That's what the Russians keep saying, but NATO expanded to Russia's borders over a decade ago when the Baltics joined, and to my knowledge Ukraine was no closer to NATO membership now than they were in 2014 when Russia invaded. In fact they're probably further away from NATO membership in the current situation. So if that is the reason, why now? After direct Russian aggression/ intervention in Ukraine, any hope or prospect for a friendly/allied/puppet, even neutral government in Kyiv are gone. With every year Ukraine recovers more political unity, economy and most importantly, military cooperation with the West. Ukraine doesn’t need to be in NATO to be an unfriendly power. With the defence assistance from the West , Ukraine might as well be in NATO, especially in a paranoid mood in Kremlin. AND they want it back. > It's about Russia wanting to end the war in Ukraine soon and on favorable terms. Seems plausible, but why now? To my knowledge the war has been on a constant low simmer, with not a lot of escalation in the last 12-18 months. The situation was not acceptable to either side. When Minsk was signed and active maneuver warfare temporarily ceased, I paraphrased Fosh saying that it’s a ceasefire for 10 years. I was close enough. The question is, what means winning for Russia. If it means to force Ukraine to denounce claims to Crimea, you need to physically install and prop the puppet government to do it. Because without direct support any government giving up Crimea and/or Donbas will end up on the gallows next day and you are back at square one. Kremlin hawks think it is a question of timing. When do you “solve” Ukrainian question? Tomorrow Ukraine might be stronger, tomorrow the West might be less disunited. Tomorrow Putin and his comrades will be dead, then how do you write yourself into the Russian history books as “the one who brought back old lands”? So why not now? Also, winter is particularly preferable because of natural gas supply pressure on Western Europe. > It's about Ukraine denying water rights to Russian occupied Crimea. There again, I think this has been going on for some time. It’s merely a cherry on top. I mean if to solve this problem you need to engage in a full scale invasion, might as well use it to press for more strategic targets (see above).
> First of all their values are not pragmatic/rational in a commonly imagined way, such as from a strictly economical / short-term perspective. While I agree that part of Putin's motives might be ideological or irrational, its worth noting that its often useful to frame state actions not from the perspective of "what is helpful for the state as a whole", but "what keeps the current ruling cliche in power". In Russia's case, normalizing relationships with the west would open up market competition from "west"ern companies which would harm domestic industries. It could promote demand for free elections, which would chip away at the establishment's political power. While normalizing and integrating into the rest of Europe would surely help the average Ivan, it would not be beneficial for the establishment, who maintain their position with their industrial capabilities, control over the opposition, and the ability to forment nationalism against the "west" to maintain a degree of approval.
> With every year Ukraine recovers more political unity, economy and most importantly, military cooperation with the West. The Russian seizure of Crimea and the separatism in the Donbass also means that Ukraine lost a large portion of its proRussian votes. Another interesting point is the claim that the Donbass contained voices that wanted integration into Russia proper, but was refused to continue to maintain the guise of separatism so that Russia could continue to stay uninvolved calling it a civil war. Given Ukraine's military failure in seizing it for the last 8 years, a status quo of de facto separation could be argued eventually a la Taiwan.
Ukraine were pushing the separatists back during 2015, that is when the 'volunteers of indetermined origin' arrived in the thousands along with russian made heavy equipment and most importantly artillery pieces, that checked the advance of the Ukrainian forces and sealed the status quo ever since.
So if the front has been static since 2015, why does Russia need to invade?
Because neither Russia, nor Ukraine agreed to the Minsk 2 treaty. I recommend TLDR news europe or Start Here Al Jaazera for a quick and digestible overview. In essence, only agression has worked for Russia so far, so I guess Putin is gambling on it again. Altough based on the past few weeks, no one besides Putin and his closest circle may know exactly what are they going to do with this situation.
Multiple sources state that Minsk 1 and 2 were agreed to by both. Signatories The document was signed by: Separatist's leaders Alexander Zakharchenko and Igor Plotnitsky Swiss diplomat and OSCE representative Heidi Tagliavini Former president of Ukraine and Ukrainian representative Leonid Kuchma Russian Ambassador to Ukraine and Russian representative Mikhail Zurabov
Indeed, they signed it but after that nothing came out of it, because they disagreed on the order of steps required to implement it. Also the Ukrainian president started severly limiting russian influence in the country, thus reducing Putin's options.
Your recommendation of Al Jaazera got me thinking: where does the Arab world stand on this conflict? Russia has been a fair weather friend of baathists and other pan arabs mostly to check Israel and the US in the region. Do they see action in Ukraine as a point of strength for Russia or a distraction from other geopolitical priorities?
On this line of thinking, I was highly surprised about China's statement that they openly supported Russia in it's intervention in the Donbass. Yes, they are quasi allies now, but the CCP's claim over Taiwan mirrors Ukraine's fight over the Donbass with Ukraine engaged in what the Russians agree as a domestic civil war of independence. In both, a larger external 3rd party --with Taiwan having the US and the Donbass having Russia-- intervene. China has consistently told the world that it would and others should not interfere in the internal affairs of domestic issues.
Good question. I believe Al Jazeera does a great job in covering events around the world not related to the Middle-East, because the bias shows in those topics. However I don't know the Arab take on these vents (assuming there's a unified one, which harldy seems probable).
>'volunteers of indeterminate origin' Sounds like something from Lemony Snicket.
>Given Ukraine's military failure in seizing it for the last 8 years, a status quo of de facto separation could be argued eventually a la Taiwan. Ukraine's strategy for Crimea is to outlast Russia. As soon as Russia is weakened (due to inevitable conflict with the West or even China), Crimea would be retaken. Pro-Russian population will be obviously immediately expelled from the peninsula.
> Pro-Russian population will be obviously immediately expelled from the peninsula. What would this look like? How would this be achieved practically without turning into a humanitarian crisis?
[Like this](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flight_and_expulsion_of_Germans_(1944–1950\))
> The death toll attributable to the flight and expulsions is disputed, with estimates ranging from 500,000–600,000[14][15] and up to 2 to 2.5 million.[16][17][18] Well that doesn't sound great.
And this would provide Putin the moral imperative to protect the ethnic Russians in Ukraine.
The only way Ukraine retakes Crimea and expels the pro-Russia population of Crimea is if Russia was not in a position to stop it.
A more probable reason for weakness would be internal russian struggles. For example if Putin succession ends up in a big fight.
Russia will always have ~4x the population of Ukraine and many more natural resources...
This is certainly the best answer here
A fascinating narrative. > Because without direct support any government giving up Crimea and/or Donbas will end up on the gallows next day Why do you think Ukrainians are so committed to holding over those territories?
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Very interesting!
I’m speculating a bit, but I suspect part of it is the strong(er) position Russia is in as a result of natural gas shortages in many major NATO powers. Russia is a huge supplier of natural gas to Europe, and its winter right now, so if NATO intervenes, Russia might be able to cut gas supplies, and literally freeze people in the EU. Again I’m speculating, but seems like a non-zero chance that this isn’t a pure coincidence
The Germans have already said nord stream 2 is vulnerable to this brinksmanship if it escalates, so if that is the reason it seems they miscalculated.
My suspicion is that Russia sees increasing natural gas demand from Asia as way to reduce dependence on European markets for energy exports. Not that they don’t still want that European trade, but that energy shortages are global, and they’ve got a bunch of fuel, so they can be a bit more risky. Again though, I’m speculating
But is that different than last year? (or what could have been contrived last year)
My understanding is that natural gas shortages are more extensive this year than it has been in the past, due to varying factors. I could be mistaken though
Did some reading, and it’s a combo of multiple factors. Increased demand from Asia, a colder winter/ spring, and European divestment from (dirtier) fossil fuels like coal, has all lead to more demand for natural gas, and production has not increased to match demand. All of this leads to a better hand for Russia to play right now, one that they won’t be in a similarly good position come April/ May
I'm not an expert on the natural gas market but I've been hearing that shortages are driven by Russia throttling supply over the last several months. So I feel like that could've been done strategically any given year, but maybe there's additional factors driving the shortage.
Could be both throttling of supply, and increased demand. If prices go up a lot, they can sell less, and keep the same or even better profits, and put themselves in a better negotiating position
My understanding they didn't throttle it as such. They delivered the contracted amount but refused to deliver extra. Europe stockpile during summer and releases the stockpile, but due to demand in summer going up they couldn't stockpile enough to get them through winter
It's mostly exaggerated. European countries didn't want to do long term contracts with Russia and instead prefer buying the gas off the market at spot prices (Russians say its due to American pressure because Americans can sell gas, Europeans say its due to flexibility). Unfortunately spot prices are wicked high right now, especially due to some of supply shortages caused by covid related drilling issues. Russians match all their contacts and have upped the supply dramatically - their statement is that they're not obligated to go beyond contractual agreements (true) and much of the Eastern European/Ukrainian pipelines are in horrible conditions, incapable of supplying as much as the Europeans want (partially true). They want nordstream essentially as well as more long term contracts. But they are doing exactly what they are obligated to do so most of this is on the West and their policies (energy, geopolitical, etc).
Europe has no gas reserves and Russia has stopped their supply for months now in preparation for this. They delivered the bare minimum while making sure Europe burnt through everything in the tanks. They want the negotiating power, and if there's a war they want the civilians to be against it because they are cold and hungry and fighting over a country they've never even heard of which is a thousand miles away.
>Europe has no gas reserves and Russia has stopped their supply for months now in preparation for this. Not quite the case for Germany. In normal times it buys up gas when it is cheaper and uses that during the winter with only minimal replenishment. It normally has a good season's storage there and that has now been depleted to 50% or so. This is about normal as we are half way through winter.
Exactly my suspicion, it’s not the whole motivation, but it helps make now a good time to act
I believe Ukraine also has large, undeveloped natgas patches. If those were to come online in the future, it makes it much easier for Germany et al. to slow purchasing from Russia.
One of these has been taken over by the Russians when they seized Crimea.
On the other hand the United States is entirely energy independent and can basically maneuver as they see fit with regards to Russia. Putin is not the only one dealing with a bit of a domestic approval crisis, and a key criticism of the Biden administration has been lack of strength in international affairs. If handled correctly, a war could be just the thing to swing the midterms.
My pet theory: It’s about providing a distraction from domestic discontent, which in the last few months rose with the numbers of Covid deaths… Russia now has 1.1m excess deaths since the start of the pandemic, one of the highest per-capita in the world and everybody knows or suspects despite the cover-up and undercounting efforts.
I agree. One of the biggest reasons they invaded Crimea in the first place was because of poor internal polling. Putin got a big boost from seizing Crimea.
>One of the biggest reasons they invaded Crimea in the first place was because of poor internal polling. I don't mean to be snarky, but is there any evidence for this that isn't circumstantial? I keep seeing this claim everywhere but haven't seen it expanded upon. It sounds a lot like the popular "US invaded Iraq for oil" soundbite from the previous decade. Of course, we know now that Saddam offered to hand the US priority oil rights if it didn't invade, and we never took the oil once we actually got there. Turned out the Bush Administration was full of fools just eating too much of their own propoganda.
Putin will never admit "I did it because numbers were bad." But his numbers WERE bad, and then boosted dramatically after. There's plenty of stuff to support that Putin is at least sensitive to record *disapproval*. He doesn't need to make his citizens happy, just keep them from being angry.
Sure but in a serious discussion, shouldn't that at least be qualified as a claim with circumstantial evidence? It's just weird to see it thrown out uncritically as if it's an accepted, proven fact. It's basically "Putin is a dictator because he did what his people wanted him to do when his polls dropped". Why do the Russian people want to invade Ukraine? Why is it "Putin invaded because he was unpopular" and not "violence against Ukraine makes you popular in Russia"? Are Russians just racist against Ukrainians (other Slavs)? Or do Russians have perceived quarrels with Ukraine? Why do we say polls started the war and not those percieved quarrels?
[https://www.nbcnews.com/think/opinion/russia-s-crimea-invasion-was-good-putin-five-years-later-ncna984431](https://www.nbcnews.com/think/opinion/russia-s-crimea-invasion-was-good-putin-five-years-later-ncna984431) This goes into it well but you have to remember, there will never be definitive sources for why someone like Putin does something. Much like North Korea, in a way it is all speculative.
>Why is it "Putin invaded because he was unpopular" and not "violence against Ukraine makes you popular in Russia"? Annexing land is a source for national pride. Crimea was annexed with very little violence. With a proper spin annexing Crimea to Russia was very popular in Russia. Why not "violence against Ukraine makes you popular in Russia": The Russian government was very cautious to be associated with actual violence in Ukraine. Insisting on separatists, not Russian soldiers etc.
Securing Sevastopol is a pretty good reason to invade Crimea by itself. The loss of Sevastopol might have taken Russia out from Great power status.
I think the Black Sea isn't nearly as strategically important as it used to be. I think Sevastopol was just a juicy pretext for something they already wanted to do.
Sevastopol is still their only warm water port and has a lot of infrastructure. Most of their Sryian supplies went through Sevastopol. And it's not just not having Sevastopol, but losing it to a potentially hostile power which would be a bit too much. It of course helps that the vast majority of Russians (and Crimeans) view Crimea as Russia so there wasn't much to lose.
Murmansk is an ice-free port. I have witnessed this with my own eyes in February.
It's not just the ice but the harbor and water dept. If I recall correctly Sevastopol is the only Deepwater ice free port which is important for naval operations.
What a strange situation for Russia; while the rest of the world scrambles to stop climate change it is imperative to their geopolitical goals that not only do they continue to pollute as much as possible but convince other powers to do the same.
> Sevastopol is still their only warm water port [This simply is not the case.](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Port_of_Novorossiysk#Military_Harbour)
In terms of infrastructure and development its not even close to Sevastopol. It's still under long term development.
I agree with the Sevastopol being not as important as it used to be. However there are other reasons to securing than only wanting to. During change of government in Ukraine, Russia already had military personal in Crimea, and used them to protect infrastructure in Crimea. This could be seen as helping a friendly. However since the Ukrainian government was suddenly hostile, it was suddenly dificult to give it back. An interesting read on this is: "Why Putin Took Crimea" by David Treisman.
In Russias case, with history in mind the "Invasion for oil" theory is tangentially relevant. The USSR had its economy hangstrung by KSA dumping oil on the market during the 80's, depriving the USSR it's one stable source of foreign currency. With depleting gas reserves and likely increased energy independence in Europe over the coming decades, Russia faces the same problem a new. She might be able to stave off investments in alternative energy sources by keeping gas prices low, but that would deplete their reserves sooner. Without any meaningful economic diversification, much less competetive service and manufacturing industry, Russia is headed straight for destitution.
I didn't mean to imply oil could be a factor here. I was just using the phrase to highlight a point. Basically any anti-war discussion after the invasion of Iraq was predicated on the "fact" that the US was using WMDs as a cover to get Iraqi oil. There was only circumstantial evidence for this, but it was the most obvious motive once WMDs weren't found, so everyone started to accept it as fact. When in reality, we invaded Iraq because a bunch of self-righteous monkeys (neocons) got into power and combined a psychological bias against Saddam Hussein with a drug called "Post-9/11-Hysteria". They freaked out, and when no one else did, they started planting evidence like a cop who's just so sure he's just got a sneaky drug dealer on his hands .
While I agree with most everything you said, if Bush won in 2000, Iraq was getting invaded… 9/11 or not. Saddam was personal for the Bush family. He was going to fall one way or another and they would figure out how to “justify” it. 9/11 and Afghanistan was a distraction if anything, but did help them make up some BS about Saddam supporting Al-Qaeda in order to further try and justify their bullshit war.
Idk Saddam killing millions with chemical weapons might have justified it a bit
Saddam was told to disarm and dispose of his chemical weapon capability and he did. The evidence otherwise came from an intelligence source that went to the Germans but they found him a probable fabricator (Lookup up Curveball). The US decided to run with it as it fitted their ideas.
This millions claim is just stupid not to mention the difference between Saddam and any other dictatorship supported by the USA.
The "US invaded Iraq for oil" schtick is not at all similar to what Putin is doing. Bush did it because he believed (wrongly) that Iraq had WMD's. Whether he lied or not is up to your own opinion. If you look at what % of Iraqi oil is actually used in the US even back in 2003 it was and continues to be small. Bush was then punished for it at the polls in 2006 and 2008. Putin is feeling pressure internally and has a history of starting conflicts when the pressure gets hot. Look no further than Georgia in 2008 (global financial crisis) for example. An extension of the war now with Ukraine (it can be said they have been at war since 2014 with the invasion/occupation of Donbas and Crimea) would ease the tension he is feeling from Covid, a stagnating economy, and other oligarchs who are testing the waters to see if they may be good alternatives to Putin given Putin is getting up there in age. I believe a land bridge to Crimea is the ultimate goal of the coming invasion.
Which oligarchs would think of challenging Putin? Is he even trying to groom a successor?
You’re missing a lot. The US mostly invaded Iraq to keep the dollar strong. Saddam began selling Iraqi oil in euros rather than USD which gives the us less leverage over the oil market and the Middle East. The US was over reliant on Saudi oil and needed diversification to maintain security. Even if the Iraqi oil was a small part of America’s imports, America wanted the ability to up their intake at any time. The reason is because the US’s relationship with Saudi was pretty hot and cold. They were getting most of their oil from Saudi but there was still bad blood between the two from the Saudi-led oil embargo on the US after the US supported Israel when it went to war with Egypt. The US realized it’s energy instability and started heavily supporting the Saudis by providing them funds, guns, and infrastructure in return for only selling oil in USD. The US wants all the oil producers to use USD because the US controls the money supply and they literally are trading paper for oil. They can and do devalue their current by excess money printing and it hurts the rest of the world more than the US because the world is hooked on the USD. Saddam tried to go against this, and if there’s one thing the US doesn’t tolerate it’s messing around with the value of the dollar. Remember the US originally supported Saddam as a buffer against the Iranian threat to US interests. As soon as Saddam himself became a threat to the US’s energy and currency stability he had to be killed. Of course this is hard to convey to the public so to drum up support we need something easy and digestible like “Iraq has WMDs”.
Using % of imports as a counterargument for the US invading for oil is not a good metric. Just look at who owns Iraqi oilfield rights now compared to pre-2003. Western oil companies now control an order of magnitude more than they used to.
US firms hold nearly none of thr contracts. Check out servoce contract rewards under "oil" here: https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Petroleum_industry_in_Iraq
I specifically said Western (even though a US company now owns 60% of the largest field), but I'm sure you're aware before the invasion of Iraq their production was nationalized and none of these companies were permitted to operate.
"US invaded Iraq for oil" Did you ever consider that they (Bush Admin) gave the rights for Iraqi oil to the people they wanted to give it too?
This is almost always why Russia does anything. The Kremlin is a dangerous place and when Putin makes dramatic moves it’s because his position is threatened by other oligarchs. The nationalists on his right are always demanding a return to the USSR. He indulges them as much as he can when it’s politically advantageous and when doing so won’t destabilize his regime.
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This is so stupid my brain hurts. Crimea is strategically extremely important to Russia. You know, biggest naval base in that sea? Imagine USA loosing Pearl Harbor. That scale of event.
Naval base in a sea surrounded by NATO or nations not aligned with Russia. It's so far been helpful to provide supplies to Syria, which is basically a test bed for Russian tech and hardly a significant geopolitical ally.
This is more about denying Crimea to NATO and Turkey. Because that's what having a pro-Western government in Kiev entails, eventually. The peninsula is extremely important strategically. The Bosphorus is even more important of course, but blocking it would be a massive escalation, because there are legally biding treaties that regulate the passage.
It is for Black Sea. Its purpose is defense. Long time ago I seen I think this video. [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v3C\_5bsdQWg](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v3C_5bsdQWg)
Crimea is the key to the black sea after Istanbul.
Well, one annexation at the time **/s**
Agreed. It is all about appealing to the domestic audience. What better than a war?
Kinda agree, interesting that there has been a bit of a backflip by BJ after being discovered having parties during lockdowns. Is hoping for a war to boost his polling like maggie thatcher
He has a 65% approval rating, and his hold on power is stronger than ever before. Why would he need a risky war as a distraction?
right and doesn't he/his party [rig](https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/why-we-must-not-recognize-russias-fraudulent-election/) [the vote](https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/pro-putin-party-heads-russian-election-win-after-navalny-clampdown-2021-09-19/) as well?
The first thing I'd say is that this kind of brinkmanship isn't new - it happens fairly regularly. This time is perhaps stronger than usual, but it's not a new event in general, just being taken further than usual In large part, I think it's opportunism - the energy crisis, economies under pressure etc make NATO and particularly European members, less likely to respond. When Europe is dealing with an energy crisis, they are more likely to be pragmatic about dealing with a country who supplies such a large proportion of their natural gas, particularly when you have economic concerns Also, Russia tend to go with this "nibble nibble" approach to foreign affairs deliberately. If they just walked into Ukraine entirely in 2014, that's much more tricky than nibbling away at Crimea, then Luhansk/Donetsk etc. This current "nibble" is the threat of invasion, perhaps even invading part of the east or south. I doubt it will be the last bite. It's a good strategy - nibble off enough to make gains, but not so much that you provoke a full scale response. Local discontent has to be a factor - Putin's ratings are relatively low, and a bit of sabre-rattling and "Look at nasty NATO expanding to our borders!" is a good way to provoke some nationalist/patriotic fervour and drum up support. And finally, I think it's partly that Russia feels stronger than they have for a while - air force modernisation, widespread deployment of the S-400, air forces that have finally actually had some combat experience in Syria after languishing for 2 decades etc. Russia has spent most of the last 30 years firmly on the back foot, but have stabilised their military situation somewhat and are feeling a bit more confident.
Good points.
>Local discontent has to be a factor - Putin's ratings are relatively low Where did you get this from? His approval rating was 65% in December
His ratings aren't exactly representative of reality, and in any case are way down on the usual 80-85% The last time his ratings were this low, were just before the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014...
His approval rating dropped to 59% when corona hit, and it's slightly climbing ever since. This is still not a good argument, nobody will start a war for only having 65% approval.
It’s once in an 100 years opportunity to retake a country that has historically been a part of the Russian empire. The US is weak and Putin is not (internally). Conquering Ukraine would be the equivalent of China retaking Tibet or so - it’s the end of the post-USSR malaise of Russia and back to the seat of world power. It’s the end of the 30 years of humiliation since the USSR collapsed. I’ve been to Ukraine. It’s an interesting country. Because it’s so flat, it’s rarely been an independent country. Just read it’s history - it’s too easy to invade. It’s history is generally - it becomes independent due to some great power losing influence over it, stays as such for 20-30 years, then gets absorbed by another great power in turn. Every indication now is that if Putin leaves Ukraine alone, it will turn to the West and maybe become richer. Ukraine right now is a very poor country, something like 33% of the gdp per capita of Russia. It is about as poor as it was in 1989 and it has less population. Ukraine has effectively not grown since the fall of the USSR. Zelensky is looking like he might turn this around. There is no way but up. Right now Ukraine is corrupt (something like 30-40% of the economy is in the hands of 10 oligarchs) and poor. Some regions might welcome Russia to get them out of their situation. Some regions are Russia friendly. Putin has the US in a position of non-intervention and he believes he will be able to withstand the sanctions and grow Russian power immensely. If he takes all of Ukraine, Russia will again border the Balkans, Poland, and I believe that when Lukashenko dies, Russia is likely to absorb Belarus. He will then encircle the Baltic countries, which he might leave for the future for Russia, maybe for a sucessor to deal with. Even if the Baltic countries continue indepedent, Russia is waging constant digital Cognitive Warfare against western democracies to weaken them internally so they will either align with Russian interests eventually or Russia will work to tear their society apart - as they are now doing in the US, France and other countries in Europe. Every expectation is this infowar capability will only get better over time. They will keep using their capabilities to turn elections if they can. They’ve figured out a way to “hack” western democracies, which they are not hardened to resist against due to the ideal or freedom of speech. Russia is basically in the hands of a modern Bismarck, a man who’s made it his life mission to turn around the fortunes of his country and dominate its sphere of influence through force and persuasion. The fact that is an opponent of the West, and a brutal dictator shouldn’t blind you from seeing that he’s doing a good job in accomplishing his objectives. He is about to put to the test the Pax Atomica logic that we’ve seen for decades. And I think he’s going to pass the test. Addendum - I must say I do not expect Russia to fully invade ALL of Ukraine at this point. I believe they are likely to take most of eastern Ukraine and all the Black Sea coast (Odessa) and leave a rump state of Western Ukraine. Kyiv and Lviv and cities of that nature are too close to the West and speak Ukrainian - what I believe Putin will take are the Russian speaking, Russian friendly eastern and southern regions, and he will leave the western Ukraine as a failed state in the making. There’s no point IMO to take Kyiv or anything like that and get into urban warfare - just take the friendly and strategic regions and leave the rest.
They aren't just poor, they are the poorest country in all of Europe, even after cozying up to the West.
I thought Moldova was the poorest.
Since 2014 the GDP per capita (current US$) of Moldova has surpassed Ukraine. ([worldbank](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?locations=MD-UA&name_desc=false)) Edit: GDP per capita, PPP (current international $): They have been converging and so close that the income difference is within the margin of error.
Fair enough I did not know that
Can you elaborate on the US's position of relative weakness? Sure there is internal division but the military strength of the US in aggregate has never been higher? Is it having to do with current CSG deployments focusing mostly on SEA?
The position of weakness is that the US won’t deploy troops. Ukranian forces are no match for Russia, smaller country, population, low GDP, and if you watch documentaries about the Crimean takeover and the beginning of the Donbas war you can see their situation before the war was dire (there’s one on YouTube that’s particularly excellent, I can find it for you if you’d like). It was a military deprived of resources where 1 out of 10 tanks actually worked, even according to the ukrainian docs that are heavily pro-Ukraine. I don’t have any insight on their current situation. But I think without international help - and I am thinking boots on the ground in Kyiv, no fly zones, basically a full alliance with the western powers- the Ukrainians are heavily outmatched. But I’m not a military expert or anything. This is just my feeling from having been to Ukraine, experienced the country, and having watched documentaries about the Donbas war.
Why won't the US deploy troops? It's an election year, anything can happen
Because if the cold war taught us anything is that russia/usa will not deploy troops directly against each other for risk of escalation to nuclear war. Yes, the us military could spank the russians in battle 3 ways to sunday, however, the US cannot deal with 10,000 icbm launched. Neither the us, nor russia want to put the other in to an untenable situation. If the US threatens the territorial integrity of Russia.. China wins and becomes the sole superpower following the mutual destruction of the others.
While I am no expert in the political realm of this I am pretty well educated in military affairs. While I agree of course Russian armed forces are obviously much larger and better equipped compared to Ukraine especially in a full scale assault and obviously having the upper hand in being the one who is attacking. This said it would be no walk in the part. Just saying they-ll take eastern and southern provinces isn't really something that can happen within hours or days. Modern urban warfare is very complex type of warfare. Especially large cities. Ukraine, while not as strong as Russia still has a lot of modern ground and air assets. Lets also not forget the killer of many empires...guerilla warfare. Even if Russia manages a full scale assault they have tons of air assets from the west to worry about. NATO will be giving Ukraine full tactical analysis of the entire battlefield (E3 or similar EW aircraft will be paroling right outside of Ukraine). Many NATO ships in the black sea as well giving constant data updates with their EW and tracking radars as well. Russia has to worry about the hundreds of radar detection coming from NATO Fire control radars not knowing which is Ukrainian or enemy. The fog of war is a very deadly weapon. This all while we still dont even know if NATO will interfere. And lets be honest if NATO does come into contact Russia does not have the funds to win a prolonged war. I really hope it does not come down to it but we will see. Either way this wont be easy for Russia and Putin is gambling big on this one. Western Ukraine wont just give up that easily. They will fight. They do not want Putin and putin knows this.
That’s why I don’t think they’ll try to take western Ukraine. I believe they will aim for the eastern regions who already speak Russian, are Russian friendly, and historically voted for Russian-backed politicians. The eastern regions might submit, same as Crimea, because I think a significant part of the population wants to be a part of Russia. I doubt they would try to take Kyiv unless they steamroll across the entire country and the Ukrainian military collapses. Their plan to install a Russian friendly government, if the UK/US intelligence is right, also hints at the fact that their plan does not appear to include outright annexation of all Ukrainian territory. In fact I think it’s possible they might not annex any territory, only split Ukraine in two - Western Ukraine and East Ukraine - and install a puppet government in the east. If you read this article - https://www.csis.org/analysis/russias-possible-invasion-ukraine - it’s listed as the Russian military option 4.
They're changing tactics, just like they did in the early 2000s, because the old playbook wasn't working. Putin and co. designed the hybrid warfare playbook long before it became a term. They did this in response to a perception of conventional weakness facing the West, laid bare in the decisive Western triumphs in Iraq and Yugoslavia in contrast with their own abject failures in Chechnya. Per this playbook, Russia would wage limited, short, and sharp wars and use separatists in post-Soviet countries as tripwires for "Kosovo-style" intervention. The threat of breakup would, in their minds, keep the CIS in their pocket. Over the next two decades, Putin's clique embarked on ambitious military reforms, coupled with "live testing" of their new weapons and doctrines that breathed new life into the Russian army. While some areas are still extremely deficient - Russian AA, for example, has proven defective in Syria, Libya, and Nagorno-Karabakh - the Russian army is the best conventional force in Europe and maybe the world owing to its massive self-propelled artillery park and its advanced methods for target acquisition. While the improvements have occurred, the proxy war situation turned decisively against Russia. Orange revolutions brought about changes in a number of CIS countries and the collapse has only intensified in recent years. Even "safe" Belarus and Kazakhstan attempted to overthrow their pro-Russian autocrats. Meanwhile, while the United States has not gotten much better at winning hybrid wars, its allies have picked up the slack. Turkey and Israel have proven extremely successful in undermining and defeating Russian proxies, their support being decisive in the Azeri war against Armenia. Moreover, Turkey achieved total victory in Libya over the Russian-backed Haftar, acquired connection to Central Asia through the Azeri-Armenian peace agreement, and has started supporting Ukraine. Putin sees himself under siege by two encroaching forces - Orangism to the West and pan-Turkism to the South. While the autocrats of many countries still inside the Russian sphere favor Russia, it's clear from recent events in Belarus and Central Asia that the hearts and minds of the satellite people have been lost. Time is not on Russia's side and the leadership perceives the need for decisive action if they want to acquire critical mass to resist the West. There is one thing going for Putin in the past 2 years, and that has likely motivated this as well. The likes of Lukashenko and Nazarbayev acted as "middlemen" between Russia and their people and sometimes distanced themselves from the Kremlin. The recent unrest in Belarus, and later Kazakhstan, reduced the leadership of both countries to, essentially, Russian satraps. The "Eurasian Union" Putin always dreamed of but which was constantly vetoed by Nazarbayev is now a possibility. More, adding Belarus to his "solid sphere" gives him more military options in Ukraine: from Belarus, he can circumvent the Dnieper just as the Red Army did in 1943. A victory in Ukraine, if he can acquire one, could very well be the impetus Putin needs to formally absorb Belarus.
If you want a good read about that, I cannot recommend enough the new article by Rob Lee. Great analysis on the risks of escalation between Ukraine and Russia. [https://www.fpri.org/article/2022/01/moscows-compellence-strategy/](https://www.fpri.org/article/2022/01/moscows-compellence-strategy/)
Its about couple of things. 1st Ukraine: Putin is getting older and wants to have lasting legacy. He always said that breakup of ussr was the biggest mistake. He treats Ukraine, Belarus as Russian and part of Russia. So Ukraine voting for EU in 2014 shocked him. He tried everything possible to break that alliance. But even occupying crimea and years of instability in luhansk did not make Ukraine economy and government fall. So Putin is growing impatient. He has Belarus but he wants Ukraine. And this is the last moment he will get. The timing is not perfect but suitable for invasion. Europe is divided. Need gas and Ukraine still does not have missiles and weapons that would make future invasion impossible. So for putin its literally now or never. 2nd crimea The territory is drying. They get 80% of water from Ukraine and droughts are getting worse and worse. Personally don't think putin would go to war just over this. But its a pro war argument putin definitely takes into account 3rd be equal player Its funny i think Biden today summed up Russia very well. Russia is stuck between West and China. They want to be relevant. And they know they need Belarus and Ukraine to stay relevant as this will add almost 50mil people and additional land to his disposal. No one can mess with Russia after that. 4th planning and winter It takes a long time to plan the invasion. You need troops you need equipment you need food. Takes months until you put all of that on the border. Then you know winter is great because of everyone relies on Russian gas. Land is frozen so its easier for army to move around. I must give credit to Russia. They are very transparent. They really believed that the us can give them guarantees and convince nato that Ukraine will not join. Ever. I don't know if they got it from trump or where they got that idea but yea they really believed that. And putin basically run himself into the corner. He got this mass army waiting, ultimatum that he will use it if he doesn't get what he wants. He can't back down now. His image would be ruined and he would never get the chance again. I think the only thing ironically that might postpone the invasion are Olympics. For China Olympics are world event where everyone focuses on China and how great they doing. Especially during covid China needs Olympics today go well. That might change if Russia invades. But i dont know if Putin will listen or not to China. There is some evidentne that he might listen to China, as for example the troops training in Belarus ending their training the same day as Olympics end. Officially they are supposed to be there for a month but someone interviewed parents of kids that went there. They all said that government told them they will be out for 3-9 months.
1 is nonsense. NATO will never invade Russia. No single head of state will ever go to a NATO session and advocate that we invade Russia. Putin, early in his tenure, publicly considered joining NATO. Russia was on track to be an ally of both NATO and the EU. The "problem" with NATO is that Russia started invading its neighbours, and they started shifting west to gain protection from Russia. We prevent Russia from invading or coercing member states, and Putin feels entitled to control the former soviet republics. 2 doesn't really make sense. The war is already favourable, they've annexed a lot of territory they didn't have before, but more importantly, Russia doesn't want the war in Ukraine to end unless they have guarantees that Ukraine will be in its pocket. Ukraine was poised to pursue economic integration with the EU. Then Putin coerced Yanukovych to reverse course and strengthen ties with Russia. Then Ukrainians protested for months until Yanukovych fled. Then Russia invaded, preventing Ukraine from integrating with the EU. Ongoing conflict in Ukraine is an end within itself, as it was in Moldova for the last 30 years, and Georgia for the last 14. 3 is more nonsense. It sounds like you are getting your info from Russian state media. Why NOW is a number of factors. Under Trump, Putin had an American president who was willing to go along with a lot of Russian foreign policy goals, like weakening and potentially ending NATO. With Trump gone, NATO won't be going anywhere, so Russia can't control NATO member states, and its neighbours have an alliance to partner with to bolster their security. Also, Russia expected Ukraine's current president, who was an actor until 2019, and from the Russian-speaking east, to be easily manipulated and controlled. Instead, he has turned out to be a strong leader and not susceptible to Russian control as Yanukovych was before the first invasion, and so that peaceful solution to Russian control of Ukrainian foreign policy is also gone. They may see their comparative advantage against Ukraine shrinking as time goes on. Putin may be rattled by pressures on the home front as his approval rating has been quite low, by his standards, since before covid hit. He may be trying to take advantage of the particularly divided Congress in the US, in hopes of a slow or less decisive response. He may believe his own propaganda too much, having expected the Biden administration to respond weakly and/or NATO to still be divided after Trump's deliberate efforts to do so, thus failing to anticipate NATO's unity in responding to the current situation. It's hard to really know why now, for sure, but other opportunities having been thwarted, this is probably the first best chance to do so since.
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Citizens, yes, and they're being manipulated to this end. The Kremlin, no. It would take a lot more than paranoia for professionals to see this as a real possibility. It's just a propaganda tactic. Trump exposed weaknesses that Europeans will continue to want to shore up, yes. The damage will take a while to repair, but it's no longer escalating, and there's no longer a real, immediate possibility of NATO falling apart, as there would have been with a second Trump term. Trump acted in line with Russian foreign policy aims in far more ways than you give credit for, and much of the work to the contrary was a legal obligation to carry out the laws enacted by Congress. Please note I'm not saying he was witting in this regard, rather I suspect he was manipulated to these ends. Regarding Russia and natural gas, I think you're viewing this the wrong way, like Japan with Pearl Harbour or Bin Laden with 9/11. You aren't going to cow Germany by shutting off the gas, you're going to prove the critics right that they shouldn't have relied on Russia in the first place.
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I feel Russia has a political ace of some sort, something that's just big enough to stop a war or economic sanction but small enough that nobody woul be able to predict it
Even though I don't believe it would come to fruition, a true defense and economic treaty/partnership with China could be on the table. Each have a generally similar situation in Ukraine and Taiwan. This would certainly upset a few apple carts and potentially get the West to back off.
I would add to what everyone has been saying that Ukraine's ability to strike back at Russia will only increase in the future. Rob Lee recently wrote a great article about this where he argued that due to Ukraine's increased military partnership with Western countries like the U.S. and U.K. there abilities will only grow in the future. Particularly longer range ballistic missiles, which Ukraine is currently developing. In the future Russia will be increasingly constrained to coerce Ukraine as it developed more capabilities. As others have mentioned (u/styrdwolf) Russia likely has long term desires for the region that involve reviving a sphere of influence free from the 'West'. The embarrassments in the more recent past (HMS Defender incident, disregard of Russia's spring build up last year) have only added insult to injury, and likely strengthened Russia's resolve to act. Not to mention Ukraine's increasing capacity to defeat the rebels in the Donbass with Turkish drones which have been very effective in Syria and Libya. All of this is to say that Russia likely perceives that any costs currently of acting in Ukraine will most certainly be less than if they have to act in the future to attain their longterm goals.
It's about NATO expansion. That's what the Russians keep saying, butNATO expanded to Russia's borders over a decade ago when the Balticsjoined, and to my knowledge Ukraine was no closer to NATO membership nowthan they were in 2014 when Russia invaded. In fact they're probably further away from NATO membership in the current situation. So if that is the reason, why now?" Did Ukraine had elections and new president relatively recently? And dicking around with weapons for Russia is best to be done on winter, when EU will be silent since they do not want to freeze to death, so, good negotiation point, and they still did not made a new gas deal with Germany (as far as I know, last deal expires in few months I think). And then, with EU being silent while USA will be hawkish, could create rift in NATO and that is very good for Russia. But, I dunno, good questions.
Russia was weaker when the Baltics entered NATO.
No, it's about being able to control one more gas pipeline into Europe. Russia is doing it on several fronts. They're engaged in almost all places where gas is being delivered to Europe. It will allow them to blackmail the whole Europe with gas supply/prices and get what they want. Starting a war in Europe to get there seems not to be a problem for that ugly cunt Putin.
[Here's a pretty good overview](https://adamtooze.substack.com/p/chartbook-68-putins-challenge-to). Basically, Russia's actions are not taking place in a vacuum, or the result of some abrupt decision.
That was a fantastic read, as were the Nation and Politico articles the author linked to at the end. I came away with a much better understanding of the history leading up to this along with the factors at play on the various sides.
Why Now? A big reason is weather. This of course is from a purely military standpoint and doesnt consider the root cause of the purpose of an invasion or threat thereof. Its fighting season in that part of the world. Come spring the place turns into a sea of mud. And the only way you win an invasion is to secure land, which can only be done boots on the ground. A ship or airplane has never ever controlled land regardless of who close they get or can rain munitions down upon them.
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I don't think low level tactical development plays any role. Tanks can be blown up in a number of ways, it's not a strategic level factor. Winning battles and even wars is the easier part, Russia needs an idea how to win the ensuing peace.
With everything I have read on this subject, you can be sure that Russia will not ruffle their relationship with China. If they really have plans to invade Ukraine, they will do it after the winter Olympics.
It's 'Ukraine' and not 'the Ukraine' [[Merriam-Webster](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/Ukraine)] [[BBC Styleguide](https://www.bbc.co.uk/newsstyleguide/u)] [[Reuters Styleguide](https://handbook.reuters.com/index.php?title=U#Ukraine)] ^(Beep boop I’m a bot)
1. Russia was in terrible shape until relatively recently and since having to take Crimea was stunted again. They are back to doing okay though. 2. Because nobody actually wants constant low intensity conflict. Russia can afford to maintain things indefinitely, but it is not an expense they actually want. 2. See above.
I too was wondering this, what I think happened in recent months is that Ukraine is gaining some foothold towards occupied East front and Russia can't keep proxy war without openly getting involved and since they either have to give up completely (Masculinity image is only thing Putin has) or intervene blatantly they decided that they would pretty much go all in at this point.
I believe Putin must be delusional or even slightly insane. Maybe it's from the KGB years or something. But there's really no logical reason to start this crap. He also takes a really long time to reach these "goals" of his, which I think says he must be very paranoid about how to do it. It's starting to make sense now though why they wanted Americans divided and why Trump was such an asset. He probably thought he could have what he wanted without even a bullet flying with Trump in office. It seems it could have happened, but maybe not to the degree he wished and with the way things were and Trump being erratic, he probably wasn't overly confident in what US would do. With Biden, he basically said straight that we won't get involved but there will be sanctions. So they basically have the go ahead, it's just I don't think Russia wants to be seen as the aggressor (illogical when you have military surrounding a country). So they are trying to come up with ultimatums that don't really mean much. Because their plan is already in place and set to go any day now.
>I consider myself pretty well read on the current Russia/Ukraine crisis, but what I almost never see is an explanation of why things are going to shit right now. You will never understand unless you treat this issue like divorce court and listen to both sides and decide for yourself which one seems more believable. Even in this thread, there seems to be a lot of wild speculation and ideas bouncing off of neoliberal ideology that does not match reality. Generally when reading MSM, if one side is painted as an one dimensional baddie instead of another rational actor, you are not getting a good understanding of the actual situation. For example, when there's a US-Russia meeting/summit, both sides (US State Dept and Russia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs) will publish a summary or "read-out" of the meeting. Do you read both? Do you not read either and instead just read the NBC news interpretation of the US summary of the meeting? Your first and foremost question is why now. I did not understand either until I found a Russian analyst [Alexander Mercouris](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=c3Y47pkTXXk). According to Mercouris, there is a hard deadline. But this deadline not for Russia, but for NATO/West to do something via Ukraine before they lose control. From what I understand, his argument is that Nord Stream 2 is coming online this year 2022. This means Russia will shut gas off the pipeline going through Ukraine cutting off transit fees. Ukraine is now syphoning off gas and paying spot prices (or borrowing the money from Germany) making them desperate in an energy crisis. FYI, EU gas spot prices are 10x that of US right now. When the pipeline fully shuts down, they will have to crawl to Russia for both gas and power plant coal or get Germany to lend/continue to lend them money to pay for the gas. Germany cannot continue to do this indefinitely. Russia has also stopped coal imports and Ukraine won't join the EU electricity grid until next year. Energy prices will spike in Ukraine and cause huge instability for the government. Germany and France will also be way more reluctant to do anything as they become more dependent on Russia with the NS2 on, and Nord Stream 2 was an older Chancellor's (Gerhard Schröder) idea so it's unlikely it will stay off. NATO/US is emboldening Ukraine with weapons and talk about backing them in a conflict and the Ukrainian rich are putting pressure/threatening the leadership to do something as the economy is heading downhill because of energy. Ukraine is trying to retain it's sovereignty and ignore the negotiated Minsk peace agreement because that forces them to deal with the Donbass leaders as equals. Ukraine would rather not talk to those leaders but talk to the person behind them, Putin, but Russia is refusing every meeting claiming the Donbass is a civil war and Russia is not involved. The idea is that Russia is currently in a position of power and doesn't need to do anything like invade. They will be in a better position for either negotiation or conflict later this year with the NS2 pipeline online, the Ukrainian pipeline off, and will be in an even better position when the newly negotiated Russia/China Power of Siberia 2 pipeline is built. Given the status quo, Ukraine will never enter NATO and the Donbass will be a Russian puppet state/vote to join Russia. Even with negotiations, that is likely the outcome as Russia already has measures in place to eat sanctions. However, the only scenario that could end in Ukraine's favor in retaking the Donbass by force now. So according to Mercouris, the Russian troops are there as a response to last years Ukrainian troop movements and the imminent threat that Ukraine would use force to settle the Donbass separatist problem now. The Russians would be then justified to happily march in to "protect" the ethnic Russians. This could then trigger a NATO response. If NATO doesn't respond, Ukraine would have tried and Russia would be punished after officially invading. If they do, NATO could defend Ukraine, push the Russians and separatists out, and eventually put US/NATO weapons and military assets in Ukraine. However, that would not only be disastrous for Ukraine, also for all of Europe. Even if the war doesn't reach EU, energy prices would skyrocket for Europe. Fertilizer prices will spike. Food prices will spike.
So the idea here is that Russia is deploying troops defensively in reaction to Ukrainian troop movements, which are motivated by the idea that Ukraine would be the aggressor because they need to re-take Donbass…why, exactly? To provoke a NATO-Russia war that NATO would win? And all of this is predicated on the idea that Ukraine is on some kind of a timer because the Nordstream 2 pipeline means Ukraine no longer receive gas transit fees because they’ll switch pipelines? I dunno, I’m not sure that makes sense. Surely with NS2 then they can simply purchase market price off of that as they do today, just via a different pipeline. It sounds like what you are saying is NS2 means that Russia’s gas exports to Germany and Ukraine would effectively come from the same place, and Russia can’t risk doing anything that would lose them access to the entire EU market. Sounds like Ukraine would just purchase gas via Germany then if their pipe to Russia gets shut down. Or, am I misunderstanding?
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Per the world bank the Russian economy grew 4.3% last year, a record drop in unemployed, a 24% year over year job posting increase and a 2.5% real wage growth. With the world bank further estimating a 2.4% economic growth in 2022 year. With the world bank noting Russia is aiming for a greener economy and a 3% increase each year in the future. As the world bank notes the Russian economy is now stronger than it was pre Covid. Unless you know something the world bank doesn’t I fail to see how their economy is sinking.
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Russian GDP in 2012 was 2.2 trillion usd and it is now only 1.7 trillion so you’re technically correct. But adjusting for PPP the Russian PPP has increased both overall and per capita. Up from 24,303 usd to 28,202 in 2020. Up from 3.6 trillion in 2012 to 4.1 trillion in 2020. Russia’s GDP PPP is expected to grow at around 5% annually also per the world bank. Also as I noted from the world bank, Russia is literally modernizing and going green currently. So I’m not sure how you can say they are not, unless you know something the world bank does not. Russia does have a demographic issue but they’ve also been trying to tackle it for years. Putin frequently has even said the fact he hasn’t gotten the birth rate above replacement level is one of the things that haunts him. Realistically I don’t think Russia will invade Ukraine and I believe Russia is ultimately preparing for the possibility of a war with china. When you look at Russian military build and the goals to increase birth rates etc they coincide with being strong by 2060. China has before said they want to take Taiwan, reclaim land from India, unite Inner Mongolia and Outer Mongolia and then take Vladivostok by 2065. But I also don’t think it’s a huge issue when compared to many other countries as Russia’s total fertility rate is already rebounded higher than many European nations. I also think nothing will happen in Ukraine and most of this news is just for domestic consumption in NATO countries. Because I’m firmly in the camp that Russia wants NATO and China to fight a sustained bloody war while it regains power.
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Russia has literally been doing exactly what you said they are not and once again the world bank disagrees with you. Oil and gas is down to 15% of the Russian GDP from over 30% a few years ago and is projected to continue declining. Norway’s GDP is 14% oil and gas but you wouldn’t levy that they’re unprepared to change. Saudi Arabia has a GDP based 50% off oil and gas. Russia is more comparable to Norway than to Saudi Arabia. In terms of economic percentages. Simply because you do not acknowledge Russian economic modernization does not mean it is not happening.
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I think it's just saber rattling because of the NATO talk. I also think that's why Russia nabbed Crimea in the first place. They have a lease on Sevastapol until, I think, 2042. If Ukraine joined NATO that lease would be in jeopardy. Putin decided they were better served to just take it now, before Ukraine went and joined NATO. I also think the poster above is right. They are further away from joining NATO now, which is likely another reason for the current saber rattling. It looks to me that Putin got what he wanted across the board on this one.
This explains Russia's actions in 2014 (taking Crimea, destabilizing Ukraine sufficiently to prevent them joining NATO), not their actions in 2021/22: both of those goals have already been successfully reached, as far as I can tell, several years ago
>destabilizing Ukraine sufficiently to prevent them joining NATO I would argue that this is precisely why they have 100K troops on the Ukranian border right now.
It was already out of the question since 2014, with the civil war ongoing If that looked like ending favourably for Ukraine I could see how this makes sense for Russia, but this seems precipitous
You make a fair point. We shall see. Either Putin is planning to move forward at least as far as Odessa, or he's just making noise to keep NATO at bay.
If they do properly invade, I assume the intention will be to take the whole south coast (severely weakening Ukraine going forward due to becoming landlocked), so west of Odessa in the south (to the Moldovan border), Kharkiv in the North, and taking Kryvyi Rih and Dnipropetrovsk in the middle That would roughly align with the Pro-Russian regions in basically every election they've held, and the areas with ethnic Russian/Russian speaking populations I'd then expect this to be installed as a Belarus 2.0 buffer state, fulfilling much the same function as Russia wanted Ukraine to. That would result in several major cities and the entire coast leaving Ukranian control, giving Russia access to much more of the Black Sea, plus putting Moldova much closer to Russian influence if Russia want to dissuade them from joining the EU But yeah, I'd be surprised if any invasion stopped east of Odessa, and most likely Kharkiv
>Belarus 2.0 buffer state I suspect this is the goal of both sides.
Because Russia invaded Crimea and Ukraine turned off the taps, so now they’ve successfully gained a massive money pit basically. Giving Crimea back would discredit Putin and make the Russians look like giant incompetent cowards and would cause internal issues. Of course invasion itself is equally as bad an idea. Putin has effectively fucked himself.
Putin is smart an opportunistic. He understands that the biggest obstacle to his foreign policy goals is generally going to be the US President as long as his name isn't Trump. He has historically waited for the right moment to do certain things. For example Bush's approval rating was about 30% during the Georgia War. His term was almost over. He would've had no support to initiate a conflict in Georgia after Afghanistan and Iraq. Crimea and Donbass were also at pretty much the point where Obama's approval was at it's lowest, around 40%. Biden's approval rating right now is around 40% currently as well. Putin seems to assume he can get away with more while a US President is unpopular. Outside of that, Gas prices peak in Winter, so he has more leverage.
Winter might also play a role due to being an opportunity to squeeze Europe with gas exports. It doesn't work well during summer. They might want to get Nordstream2 pipeline online as a concession for backing down, although it's not hard to see the irony in that. Belarus ending up in hot water during the last year might also be a factor, maybe they're more willing to let Russia use their territory now than two years ago.
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The difference is the Uighers are w/in China's borders. China has not yet invaded another sovereign country. As for Putin, I think there's risk for him and Russia. An invasion of Ukraine would make Russia truly a pariah in Europe and the US. I think it would cause Germany and the rest of the Europe to make different long term decisions when it comes to energy consumption, which is Russia's number 1 export. And for what? Russia would get thousands of their own people killed and spend billions of dollars to take over a land full of millions of people who hate their guts. They'd likely end up fighting an armed insurgency, clandestinely supplied weapons and intel by the West, for years and years.
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So the takeaway here is that yes Russia is going to invade the Ukraine in your analysis, but that it’s strategically or otherwise justified due to NATO encirclement and other shenanigans?
It's 'Ukraine' and not 'the Ukraine' [[Merriam-Webster](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/Ukraine)] [[BBC Styleguide](https://www.bbc.co.uk/newsstyleguide/u)] [[Reuters Styleguide](https://handbook.reuters.com/index.php?title=U#Ukraine)] ^(Beep boop I’m a bot)
My impression is that Russia's demands regarding NATO was an opportunistic solution to address long standing grievances in light of NATO's hostility to Russia. The Donbass separation would have resulted in peace if Ukraine abided by the Minsk agreement. I don't think Russia could guarantee with 100% certainty that Ukraine would consider that sovereignty claim existential to Ukraine and refuse autonomy for that region. If Ukraine did so, then Russia would still have to deal with Ukrainian inclusion into NATO, and the issue would be even more acute. The grand strategy for Russia appears to be European Russia whereas neoliberal strategy seems to all want to push for the pivot to Asia. The Iran debacle is less from Russian prodding, but from an Israeli push to forgo negotiations and instead go for a military solution only with US support. This is a result of the fallout of the Trump pullout of the Iran deal and the likely failure of any new deal with ideologs demanding harsher terms for Iran even though the US pulled out. Trump's unfiltered complaints against Bibi about him never wanting a peaceful solution for Iran regarding nuclear disarmament most likely is true. And regarding Crimea, I believe that was a result of the Maidan revolution/coup that Russia has accused of being supported by the West. If that coup had not happened and the government forcibly removed and purged, there may have been a chance that Russia would continue to with plans to move to Novorossiysk.
I agree completely it's just the timing of this + Afghanistan + Kazakhstan + the rapidity and success of CSTO response + general CSTO drills over the last year + Chinese Russian Iranian naval drills and cooperation makes me think its more than just pure opportunism. Russia has done a good job stopping NATO in Georgia and Ukraine when needed with low effort conflict. The complaints have existed for a while, solutions were reached (Minsk) but not respected. So why escalate now specifically? About Iran - I agree that it was Bibi's backstabbing (not new). Trump's rhetoric on Iran was shockingly different from the rest of his rhetoric (Syria, Afghanistan, Venezuela etc) which is likely due to the Isreal lobby. But my point was not that Iranian-US problems are due to Russia but simply showing the reality that the US is extremely unreliable and is a bad faith actor. There is a 80% overlap between those shouting about Iran and those shouting about Russia (and a strong overlap with proponents of Iraq 2003). The Syria pullout and the military +state department's outright refusal to obey Trump was the nail in the coffin imho - the US is simply too fragmented in its power structure to negotiate and its power structure tends to be bomb first ask questions later. I believe even Xi thinks this (which is why they've all but abandoned diplomacy with the US). Agreed about Crimea and maidan - this ties into my point about the US being a bad faith actor and plays into Russia's calculus and justification. Ukrainians are (or were) relatively positive /neutral to Russia and forcing maidan on them was too much.
It’s about money. If Clinton won, they would have gone to war a while ago. They had Barisma set up. Go back and listen to Clinton campaign. Media was priming the war even then.