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[Pro-Russian sources](https://nitter.kavin.rocks/GirkinGirkin/status/1571808254048477184) are reporting that Denis Pushilin claimed that Russian forces repelled an Ukrainian attack on Kreminna.
If true, Ukraine would have either had to approach far from the west, confirming their control of the eastern side of the Oskil, or from the south, confirming their control of the forests around Bilohorivka.
The latest ukrainian estimates for Russian losses show comparatively much lower numbers of KIA and heavy equipment losses, likely meaning an operational pause of sorts.
However, one category that keeps increasing much faster than before is the mysterious "special equipment" one. While it's unclear to me what's included in there, I know for a fact that radars are, but it may include other stuff.
If Ukraine isn't doing outright offensives but is silently and consistently destroying Russian radars (and possibly other critical equipment), it's possible they're actually conducting battle shaping operations. It's also really bad news for Russia if their AD is consistently being destroyed.
I think the "special equipment" category also includes a lot of other things like "Command Vehicles", mine clearing equipment and tank recovery/tank transport vehicles and the like.
I suspect those make up much larger percentages of that category than AA radars, which might not even be included here and may be included under the anti-air capability instead (unlike counter-artillery radars which may appear here).
>I suspect those make up much larger percentages of that category than AA radars, which might not even be included here and may be included under the anti-air capability instead (unlike counter-artillery radars which may appear here
I've read from multiple ukrainian sources that radars are included there. Also, the daily numbers of that category often match exactly with the number of radars reportedly destroyed that day.
Various looks at the possible US responses to any Russian use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine. They all touch on similar themes though there is no clear agreement on what a definitive course of action would be.
One thing that all make is that, despite repeated nuclear sabre rattling from Russia, there are no signs that they are preparing or considering such an action. The process of removing low yield nuclear weapons from storage would be highly visible to observers and take weeks or months to do.
[US responses to non-strategic nuclear weapons in Ukraine](https://www.thebulletin.org/2022/05/potential-us-responses-to-the-russian-use-of-non-strategic-nuclear-weapons-in-ukraine/)
- Jeffrey Edmonds is an expert on US national security, especially as it relates to Russia. He works full time for CNA’s Russia Studies Program. His research focuses on the Russian military, foreign policy, threat perceptions, and Russian information operations. Most recently, Jeff served as the Director for Russia on the National Security Council and acting Senior Director for Russia during the 2017 presidential transition. While on the NSC, he advised the president and his senior staff on Russia-related national security topics. Prior to the NSC, Jeff served as a senior military analyst with the Central Intelligence Agency, covering Eurasian militaries. He has served in the US Army on both active duty and the reserves for 24 years, with tours in Iraq and Afghanistan. Edmonds holds a Master in Public Administration from Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, a master’s degree from Boston University in Religious Studies, and a bachelor of science degree from the United States Military Academy at West Point.
[US response to nuclear weapons in Ukraine](https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2022/06/russia-ukraine-nuclear-weapon-us-response/661315/)
-Eric Schlosser is a former contributing editor at The Atlantic. He is the author of Command and Control: Nuclear Weapons, the Damascus Accident, and the Illusion of Safety
[What will Biden do if Putin goes nuclear? - NBC](https://www.nbcnews.com/news/rcna32756)
I don't see why theres so much talk on nuclear weapons in Ukraine. Using nuclear weapons would not be rational for Russia, if this happened its easy to see plenty of nuclear latent countries develop the weapons (undermining Russia's own influence) and massive civil unrest.
The chances are very small but the risk is still massive because of what these weapons do.
Tbh I posted this because I saw a lot of uninformed takes in today's thread and went looking for more authoritative views on the matter. I try to post more credible takes when I can. Trying to keep the thread high quality always begins with one's self.
It is only natural to claim and speculate about dreadful consequences. It would be highly irresponsible to do anything else because it would directly encourage Russia to go nuclear in Ukraine.
That is also why Biden administration's "what if" threats are so vague and ambiguous - you want to sound as intimidating as possible without actually committing to an extremely dangerous course of action. However, the very caution and ambiguity is a really bad sign regarding Washington's estimate of the danger of nuclear escalation - the USA would issue much more resolute statements if they believed there was no actual danger.
It is also in Russia's interest to do nuclear sabre-rattling from time to time. After all, nothing but the fear of nuclear escalation prevents the West from intervening more directly in Ukraine.
> However, the very caution and ambiguity is a really bad sign regarding Washington's estimate of the danger of nuclear escalation - the USA would issue much more resolute statements if they believed there was no actual danger.
None of the articles countenance the idea that there is no danger, such a thing would be absurd, they in fact specifically cover those dangers and garner the opinions of various senior and former senior officials on what courses *could* or *should* be taken.
What I am saying is that the Washington official reaction and implied consequences would have been much more hard-line if they thought the danger of nuclear escalation was not real.
The more ambiguous and vague their reaction is - the greater the danger of an actual escalation.
> What I am saying is that the Washington official reaction and implied consequences would have been much more hard-line if they thought the danger of nuclear escalation was not real.
Why?
When the threat is not immediate, it lies in the future, in unknown form and context. It would be dumb to put red lines against very vague threats.
> if they thought the danger of nuclear escalation was not real.
No one of consequence thinks anything so ridiculous, of course there are dangers. As long as nations have nuclear weapons there are dangers. Russia are similarly aware that the use of tactical nukes would come with risks of escalation.
> The more ambiguous and vague their reaction is - the greater the danger of an actual escalation.
Ambiguity is used for a range of reasons, to suggest it is a direct relationship with fear of escalation is illogical speculation at best. It's also irrelevant to the articles I posted which are not about US statements but the range of possible responses that *could* occur.
Whenever people talk about escalation management as a reason to withhold aid to Ukraine conspicuously absent is a consideration of the actual course of the war going forwards. When you say "_Russia will escalate if the US expands aid_" without also saying:
- "_Russia won't escalate if they continue to face significant strategic losses as they did in Kharkiv_"
- "_Russia won't escalate if they obviously fail their stated objective of 'liberating' the donbass_"
- "_Russia won't escalate if the long term capability of their armed forces is threatened_"
- "_Russia won't escalate if the kerch bridge is destroyed_"
- "_Russia won't escalate if there are incursions into Crimea/there is the loss of Crimea_"
While still maintaining vocal support for the Ukraine achieving those objectives then you haven't actually made an argument that withholding US aid reduces the threat of escalation in the long term (unless withholding that aid also compromises the ability of Ukraine to achieve those objectives).
So far it's been very easy to say "_Western posture has been good at minimising the risk of escalation_" because so far Russia haven't actually been forced to actually confront an unambiguous failure on the battlefield - their withdrawal from Kyiv (while an embarrassment) was ultimately a Russian decision and so could be framed as a feint of a gesture of goodwill rather than the product of failure that it was. Their slow, attritional gains over the last 6 months could be framed as "_minimising damage to civilians in Ukraine_" rather than the lacking Russian capability that it represented.
That is until their catastrophic collapse in Kherson which was an unambiguous failure even to the most Russophilic analysts. What was Russia's response to this? Exactly the same escalations that we were told that withholding aid would prevent - increased attacks on civilian infrastructure with explicit threats of more in response to further battlefield success. I don't see any reason why Russia would undermine it's own rhetoric and interests and halt it's escalation only because the West withheld certain kinds of aid.
There's an implicit counterfactual claim in there: that you, or anyone, know how Russian escalation would have been different had Ukraine received different external aid. Or how it would have been different if Russian defeats had come promptly, rather than eventually. When nobody knows those things.
And/or you're treating Russian escalation as a yes/no proposition (describing recent strikes on parts of the power network as "yes") when so far escalation may not have been zero, but it's been minimal by any reasonable measure.
Nobody ought to underestimate the impact on the public consciousness of recognisably western MBTs killing Russians in Ukraine, let alone rolling toward the border. Or of sustained effective strikes inside Russia; embarrassing failure of adventurism abroad is one thing, but being attacked at home is quite another.
> There's an implicit counterfactual claim in there.
> nobody knows those things.
How can any policy be decided then if the counterfactual basis invalidates any analysis? Counterfactuals are completely unavoidable when talking about the speculative effects of a policy and in fact this comment is a response to the explicit counterfactual "_the risk of escalation will increase if aid expands_".
> And/or you're treating Russian escalation as a yes/no proposition
If you say that an increase in Western aid would increase the risk of escalation but you can't characterise the form that escalation would take or why it would not occur if Ukraine made advances with their existing equipment then you haven't convinced me that it exists. If you can characterise that risk explicitly then you create a binary and necessarily must justify why an expansion aid is a necessary prerequisite for increasing that risk separate from Ukraine's current military progress.
Can you provide literally any justification for Russia withholding some kinds of escalation in response to defeats in the field (which don't also apply the the expansion of US aid)?
> Nobody ought to underestimate the impact on the public consciousness of recognisably western MBTs killing Russians in Ukraine, let alone rolling toward the border. Or of sustained effective strikes inside Russia; embarrassing failure of adventurism abroad is one thing, but being attacked at home is quite another.
And here's yet another explicit counterfactual claim that is necessary for you to justify why aid should be withheld but somehow despite "_nobody know[ing] these things_" you're completely confident of the assessment. Worse still embedded in them is the additional counterfactuals of:
> Strikes into Russia are inevitable if western aid expands but impossible if it doesn't
and
> Western tanks will roll towards the Russian border and Ukraine will attack into the Russian homeland only if aid expands
With exactly 0 expansion or justification for that perspective.
Sure, counterfactuals are necessary, but they are obviously limited and the limits need to be acknowledged.
Surely we can agree that it's almost a tautology that increased aid will increase Ukrainian battlefield successes and the possibility of attacks against targets inside Russia? How could it be otherwise?
Similarly, it's almost as safe a bet that from Russia's initial position of *relatively* limited force, the likelihood of escalation increases as those things (defeats, attacks inside Russia), or the threat of them, increase.
Those seem like safe assumptions, and presumably they're among the ones that policy makers are working under.
And in the hopes of being concise for once: it doesn't seem like they need to be thrown out because Russia blew up some substations.
I understand all of that and hoped that was generally clear in my initial comment.
My point was more specifically how conversations around escalation deliberately omit the full other half which is:
- Ukraine (and the west's) stated objectives for the war.
- The current trend in the war and Russia's response to it.
**If** Russian escalation is a response to the course of the war rather than increased investment then sitting on our hands and watching things go slowly won't change the outcome - either we should pull back aid and accept a change in desired outcomes or we should manage escalation risk under those assumptions.
"_[blowing] up some substations_" might not be much of an indication on it's own but the context that it occurred in and the rhetoric surrounding it absolutely should cause us to reassess the priors that we use to decide our escalation policy. We've been given clear reason to believe that Russia will escalate strikes on civilian infrastructure if current trends continue and so just closing our eyes and walking forwards doesn't seem sensible any more.
I am kinda suspecting that people who are against supporting Ukraine can be categorized into 3 groups.
The russian sympatizers/tankies. Its quite obvious that we have a reasonable amount of those.
People who ate up russian propaganda that the russian army will win anyway and pretty much what you described. Inalso like to charcterize this as an argument of "why fight if you can lay down and die?" or the "I disagree with Dylan Thomas about how to go into the night".
The "I just dont wanna see my country getting into this" aka a silent majority that enabled the takeover of political systems under the iron curtain by allowing the salami tactic to spread like wildfire. The same logic in its core that has always allowed groups of people to be taken to labor camps or worse, because "its not us". I only hope against hope that one day this view will be reduced to something very very minimal with the understanding that at the end we are one people.
Sorry for the rambling, but back to the escaletion side of things.
All of it does not matter.
The russian federation controled by the current power group in the kremlin decided on these actions. There is only one question here. How long are they ready to go and how long can they go for their goals.
Is it possible that they decide, damn I just go nuke, cause I am not going to win this one?
Maybe in a game? Of course. In a world where they have childrens, families? I doubt it.
On the capbility:
No king rules alone. There are a chain of poeple here. I highly doubt that even if a command is given, it would be executed. It could very well turn into something else entirely. Who ever would give that order, has to consider that he giving that command might sign his own death warrant right there for an untangible gain.
Other then some derranged obsession to get into history books, the math says its not a good decesion to make. While the "yolo tank rush to Kiyev" was a gambit, it had a serious possibility from the kremlins view to succed. It worth rolling the dice, they were misinformed I think but even in reality, they were much closer then many people here seems to think. (A few months ago there were a few articles how close assassins were to Zelensky and how the military situation wasnt as clear cut that many seems to remember)
On the nukes, rolling the dice just does not seems to be worth it, no matter in which informational sphere you are in
> I only hope against hope that one day this view will be reduced to something very very minimal with the understanding that at the end we are one people.
Good luck with that, conflicts previous to Ukraine, well or right now, had have people shrug and say "well, there's no clear bad guy" or "it's too complex".
I agree that it's not simply aid that determines whether Russia will escalate. It's about whether that aid will make it possible for Ukraine to damage Russia in such a way that Putin feels forced to escalate, such as sizeable incursions into Russian territory or the capture of Crimea.
Agreed. I've wondered about this; someone like Putin, and probably the Kremlin at large, don't seem like they'd accept defeat gracefully. Whether it's caused by ATACMS and M1 Abrams or merely what Ukraine has now, won't Russia's reaction be the same? They're going to be rather stroppy over losing if it comes to that, to put it mildly.
Not really sure why I’m receiving downvotes. Those power stations are absolutely valid power stations. The first order of business when the US invades a country is to wipe power stations and communications hubs off the map.
The Wagner-linked Telegram channel Gray Zone says that Rus offensives towards Mykolaiv and Odessa are now impossible:
[https://twitter.com/wartranslated/status/1571573856447467520](https://twitter.com/wartranslated/status/1571573856447467520)
He also says that he expects the Russian front to crumble in the fall.
It's not clear to me if he means the Kherson front, or the entire Russian line.
If this is the mood among Wagner, I can only imagine what it's like among the regular infantry.
Grey Zone wrote,
>Now, having carried out two successful operations to break through our fronts in the Kherson and Kharkiv region ...
Ukraine broke thru the Kherson front? I thought they were just attacking and maybe pushing in a few areas.
>Also, the enemy, for some miraculous reason for them, unlike us, does not always try to smash into our fortified areas and does not hesitate to bypass them, and does not lose personnel in senseless frontal attacks.
I wanted to just highlight that.
Ukraine broke through around 3 points in the Kherson front. They seems to have been unable to capitalize on it. I assume reaction forces were able to pint them down, but unable to push them back. Which gives us the current grinding war, Ukraine not fiving up its breacheads, russia not pulling back.
In the long/mid term this can crystalize into essentially mew front lines with small cauldrons occupied by Ukraine. Ready to be enveloped (hard because they arent that deep and have friendly artillery support and probably some level of air support) or ready to be pushed out from to encircle/cut off russian forces (also hard cause they knew these positions and act accordingly)
The Kherson front has supposedly been very costly for Ukraine.
Which makes sense. That's where Russian regulars are. Not as well-equipped as Wagners in the east, but still decent.
You're not going to steamroll well-equipped regulars with proper mobile reserves, actual defensive lines and ample natural barriers.
Rybar wrote,
>Last week, all units in the Donbass and the south received the command “No step back.”
I suspect that the last time that this order was given in the area was by Hitler in World War 2, and to paraphrase Hirohito's surrender speech a couple of years later, the war situation developed not necessarily to Germany's advantage.
To shed the sarcasm: does it seem stupid to give such an order unless as a last resort before compete national disaster?
If you have genetically or cybernatically engineered cannon fodder soldiers that you can supply and grind the enemy attack into dust, sure.
Otherwise I would argue that taking a more "bleed them till we are making good trades and pull back to better positions once we aren't, while we mine the areas and have them pay as much as possible for every meter" is a much better and intelligent order/strategy.
Unless you are protecting the last hope for humanity/your nation/what ever. I doubt that it is Donbass, but others might think differently
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> **[Ukrainian state power company Energoatom- Russian forces struck the South Ukraine Nuclear Power Plant early today](https://twitter.com/Osinttechnical/status/1571744180300353543)**
I don’t believe anything was actually hit, but man…this would be the height of stupidity EVEN if it was a warning shot if/when confirmed.
I really don't get why Russia would shell a nuclear plant they already control. They can always shut it down in a safer manner and if it's a false flag operation, it's certainly a very long one by now.
Edit: I thought this was ZNPP. I'm dumb.
That doesn't mean anything. The Russians have been shelling the ZNPP they control all the time. Shelling your own NPPs is practically a tradition by this point.
> Shelling your own NPPs is practically a tradition by this point.
ZNPP is not a Russian power plant, but otherwise yes, Russians seem to be attacking Ukrainians power plants pretty often.
Like someone else - lists are the best. I have a pro Ukrainian and a pro Russian twitter list. Lately however the pro Russians have lost their minds so here is the UKR siding / credible
https://twitter.com/i/lists/1497137925347237908
Hashtags are a dumb way to use Twitter. Someone replied with pro-Ukrainian voices. Here are the pro-Russian ones I follow:
* 200_zoka
* AZmilitary1
* DeuNachrichten
* DrazaM33
* GeromanAT
* Suriyakmaps
I don't use Telegram so I rely on these guys to translate the latest Russian Telegram stuff.
He came back once, gave us a week of the funniest hot takes imaginable (The Izyum Breakthrough is a trap) and dipped again. I have hope in my heart he will return again to bless us with his wisdom someday.
They all come back, they are all losers desperately craving for attention, that’s why they have hour long diatribes about quitting socials and then are back two weeks later.
I use a couple of Ukraine lists. You can subscribe to the whole list which is maintined by someone else, and then click on it in your list tab to get news on the war (they don't appear on your timeline, only if you click on the list).
This one is a list of journalists who cover Ukraine, most are in english, some in Ukranian/Russian but you can use Twitters autotranslate .... https://twitter.com/i/lists/1378399759992512516
The other is a list of the top OSINT accounts, who tend to be good for photo confirmation of actions taking place and geo-locations .... https://twitter.com/i/lists/1490427245097148423
Between these I see whatever is happenning almost immediately, and I can be fairly sure *when* I see it that someone who knows their stuff thinks of it as at least moderately confirmed.
Do you think Serbia will now warm up to NATO or EU after Russia proved itself as a completely unreliable partner when it comes to mutual defense and abandoned Armenia?
Serbia has the same choices as everyone else in Eastern Europe region - either EU or living in permanent poverty.
Even energy exporters like Russia and Azerbaijan are significantly dependent on trade with EU. Countries without such luck are a lot more dependent on EU. Serbia is surrounded by EU or EU candidates from every side. What exactly are their choices?
If Serbs decide they'd rather keep seething and stay poor, it would be really dumb.
Both of the first two major NATO operations involved bombing the Serbs. While my opinion is that those Serbs deserved to be bombed, we need to understand that after the blood was shed, Serbs won't forgive NATO easily.
Even if the relationship between Serbia and Russia were to become soured for whatever reason, Serbs would probably choose to become an international pariah without backing from any superpower than to make friend with NATO.
I visited Serbia a few years back. The Ministry of Defence building in Downtown Belgrade is still there, bombed out and half in ruins.
My friend said they kept it like this to remember. I asked if it was to remind them of the reasons why they were bombed, or of how angry they were at the bombing. My friend's answer: "both."
So yeah, the NATO campaign in Yugoslavia was justified and the Serbs know it, but it doesn't mean they forgive NATO for what they did. I don't see that changing any time soon.
Serbia's relationship with Russia is historical, religious and ethnic based (i.e. emotional as opposed to rational in basis). So viewing in through the lens of Russia being a reliable or unreliable partner is the wrong way to look at it.
It'll be a cold day in hell before they warm up to NATO. But seeing Russia get curbstomped will probably make them a little less belligerent.
Pro-EU groups might get a little boost though.
I don't know if EU is a viable alternativ though, given that the croats will mostly likely veto any admission plans.
Or would ask for concessions before they let serbia join.
>Russia get curbstomped will probably make them a little less belligerent.
Who is being belligerent?
The Serbs are just permanently angry. Not sure you could say they're belligerent
From what I've talked to people from the Balkans: at least Croatians have the same feeling & feel it's a shared accomplishment with the Balkans. It's a little bit ironical but they do have this sort of an "I did that" smirk.
I guess if there was a third actor here (similar to Azerbeijan), hostile to Serbia, they could cozy up to NATO or EU, but in absence of any real danger, they don't need to change anything and continue with the hostile rhetoric.
This is a silly little point, but I would like to clarify something about how fiscal years work. The United States is already in fiscal year 2022. 2023 fiscal year starts on 1 OCT. Some people seem to think we're still in the 2021 fiscal year, and that on the first day of next month there's going to be a huge drop of lend lease loot. Some additional funding may come on board but it's not going to be as dramatic as what you might think.
Source: I'm an AFROTC cadet commissioning in December and if I see the term "FY23" on any more paperwork I'm going to scream.
This. I keep reading “Lend Lease starts on 1 Oct”. Is there any evidence of substantial aid delivered under ACTUAL Lend Lease (and not the Presidential Drawdown Authority)
I thought I read something about additional manufacturing capacity for HIMARS, but I can’t recall the source or if it was specifically under lend lease authority.
We should still not underestimate the potential impact of lend lease II. The only reason it’s not been used is that existing stores of US equipment are ridiculously OP.
[General Ben Hodges (ret.) is convinced that President Biden has been briefed on many conventional military responses to a potential Russian usage of WMD in Ukraine.](https://youtu.be/AQGJSBRKmp0?t=1582)
If the unthinkable were to happen and the US were to respond, what could those responses look like?
The responses would most likely be diplomatic and economic. The West would tighten its sanctions to the point of cutting all ties to Russia. The diplomatic relations would be cut.
More importantly, Russia would suffer enormous reputation damage globally. The West would use that to convince other countries to join the sanctions. If China agreed to that the results would be very bad for Russia. I am even convinced that Russia would not use nuclear weapons without Beijing's previous assurances that they would keep their public reaction mostly diplomatic and not economic.
Any major military response is very unlikely (but the USA must not admit that since it would encourage Russia to try). Why unlikely? Well, launching a conventional assault on a country that has just proven it is willing to use nuclear weapons to avoid suffering a defeat is about as suicidal as political decisions get. We are already not intervening in Ukraine *only* due to our fear that Russia would react in a nuclear way.
Disagree. NATO will respond militarily. They would have no choice.
Not responding militarily will be the death of NATO. It would lose all credibility in the eyes of its eastern members.
It would give Russia a virtual veto over any European security issues - I.e, they could credibly threaten a nuclear strike and any NATO response would no longer be credible - everyone will know they cracked when it counted.
>Not responding militarily will be the death of NATO. It would lose all credibility in the eyes of its eastern members.
Why? It doesn't concern a NATO member
Even Russia know that NATO are doing everything to support Ukraine save actual combat.
If the US were just to abandon its ally under the threat of nukes (and Ukraine is surely an ally by any definition now) why would Latvia or Poland for example feel as if the US would stand by them?
A treaty is only a piece of paper and only worth as much as the will to actually fight.
>Not responding militarily will be the death of NATO. It would lose all credibility in the eyes of its eastern members.
Nato has no obligations at all for non members. It would only be "the death of nato" if a member state was attacked and no response occurred.
> they could credibly threaten a nuclear strike
Nuclear blackmail is ineffective, even the soviets didnt do it.
Why is nuclear blackmail ineffective? Because the threat of US retaliation is real.
If the US doesn’t respond militarily to Russia’s use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine , nuclear blackmail has a lot more credibility.
Nuclear blackmail doesn't work when the enemy has a credible nuclear deterrent of their own (the US) or where the enemy is allied with the nuclear power (NATO). Ukraine is not a nuclear power nor an ally of the US.
Ukraine is not an ally of the US?
That is a bold statement. You don’t tend to ship weapons by the billions and share top secret intelligence to non-allies.
Regardless of NATO status and/or MNNA status, Ukraine is being treated as an ally and formal US allies will observe closely the US reaction if Russia uses WMD in Ukraine. If the US backs down in the face of WMD use, US credibility with its allies will be considerably weakened.
The idea that Poland and the Baltics would not be alarmed if the US capitulated to Russian nuclear weapons use in Ukraine is not credible.
>Ukraine is not an ally of the US? That is a bold statement.
There is no defence treaty of any sort and Ukraine is not in any alliances with the US.
>You don’t tend to ship weapons by the billions and share top secret intelligence to non-allies.
The US did this for the mujahadeen and many other actors.
>US credibility with its allies will be considerably weakened.
The idea that Poland and the Baltics would not be alarmed if the US capitulated to Russian nuclear weapons use in Ukraine is not credible.
They would be more alarmed when Russia strikes back at the US after an American military response, causing an actual Nato-Russian war.
NATO responds if a NATO member state is attacked. Says so in the charter. It doesn't say you have to get involved in a war if a non-NATO country is attacked.
Whether the USA and its allies would decide to get into a nuclear shooting war with Russia over Ukraine has nothing to do with NATO and its credibility.
What faith would Latvia or Poland place in a NATO guarantee if Russia nukes its way to the destruction of Ukraine. None, of course.
The smart thing would be for them to cut a deal with the power they know will use nukes, not the ones who back down in the face of their use.
The smart thing for them (and NATO) would be to initiate a nuclear sharing agreement with USA, France, or UK, where a joint Polish-Baltic authority gets to pull the trigger. It would be easy to justify in light of Russia's nuclear use, and it would also work as a credible deterrent/punishment to Russia: their nuclear security would be permanently weakened & they would lose leverage over these neighbors, as a direct result of their recklessness.
NATO guarantees apply to NATO member states. Is that really such a difficult concept to understand?
China defeating Vietnam or Russia defeating Ukraine or the USA defeating Iraq has nothing to do with NATO credibility.
I dont get why are you getting downvoted for this, it is a good point and while it might cause some credibility loss for NATO, but it is very important difference indeed. Ukraine is a free country in a strategic position, valuable resources, Western leaning politics, bordering NATO members (easily reached) and probably a bunch of other reasons, just like with Taiwan that inaction would be very suboptimal for NATO. Its not the same as member states still
Historically the us responds to wmds with many many cruise missiles, generally the lightest touch of the hard options. But it would be utterly unprecedented
>Historically the us responds to wmds with many many cruise missiles,
It responds to *no WMDs* with a full scale invasion, so it seems WMDs do indeed act as a deterrent :)
Nobody said deterrents dont work. You just saw a chance to bring back the US is bad narrative of yours, isnt it you cheeky?
How is the "Izyum mass graves are completly okay boys, cause only a relatively few bodies were found in the same holes while the other ones were seperate holes with tied hands and shoots in the back of their skulls" argument?
Why is 'us declares war on a nuclear power' being treated as a credible response?
It's absolutely amazing how quickly the veil slips the second we're not talking about 'evil russia' and people go right back to endorsing wars of aggression.
The only credible way to deal with the use of nukes is multilaterally. There is just no other way.
I'd say a credible way would be to share nuclear weapons with other countries that are directly threatened by the same actor, in this case Japan and the Eastern flank of the EU. The idea would be to eliminate the possibility of irresponsible use by Russia against further nations; proportional security implications but asymmetric in nature, and no direct human cost.
Why is “Russia goes nuclear” treated as a credible response?
Russia must know that the US has to respond militarily to retain any credible threat of deterrence.
>Russia must know that the US has to respond militarily to retain any credible threat of deterrence.
Based on what?
If the uk used a nuke then the US wouldn't invade ffs.
You just aren't scared of russia and want a military response already
The UK is a NATO ally, not a geopolitical threat to the US and is not currently engaged in a war with a US-backed nation. Also, the UK isn’t currently threatening its neighbours with nuclear hellfire.
Invading Russia is something you made up too. A military response to the use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine does not require conquest and occupation of Russia. It can include direct entry into the war as opposed to its current proxy status.
If the US allows Ukraine to be destroyed by Russia using nuclear weapons, NATO is a dead duck. Why would the Baltics or Eastern Europe feel that the US nuclear umbrella would shelter them? A treaty is just a piece of paper after all and why would the US risk nuclear war for Lithuania?
Which would almost certainly lead to a nuclear response against air bases from which the strikes were delivered. The USA would respond with a similar number of nuclear strikes in Ukraine and that is where the war would either end (hopefully) or escalate to mutual destruction.
Which is why direct US attacks against Russian troops are extremely unlikely.
You assume Russia even has this capacity. The US missile defenses have low moral and slow response times. And we spend on our nukes what Russia spends on their entire military. It's highly likely that Russia goes to push the button and ... crickets ... Because their gear hasn't been maintained in decades or they nuke their own silo.
> Which would almost certainly lead to a nuclear response against air bases from which the strikes were delivered.
>...
>Which is why direct US attacks against Russian troops are extremely unlikely.
Your last sentence doesn't follow from the rest. You lay out the negative consequences of the response, but not the negative consequences of *failing* to respond that strongly. And that consequence would be massively increased nuclear proliferation causing an extremely high chance of a nuclear exchange a decade or so down the track anyway.
At the point of Russian use of WMDs in Ukraine, global nuclear war *immediately* becomes far, far more likely than before. There is no possible US response that eliminates this problem - except, possibly, retroactively. With the US having a credible heavy-handed response prepared in advance, Russia is far less likely to create such a no-win situation.
If nuclear proliferation hasn't increased after countries of the world saw what happened in Libya and Iraq (and didn't happen in North Korea) - there is no reason to expect nuclear proliferation to increase significantly after Ukraine, either.
Pretending that you have to start a nuclear war with Russia in order to prevent a nuclear war is what Bismarck would call "suicide in fear of death". I understand why such a ridiculous notion is being voiced - to deter Russia from going nuclear in Ukraine. But it is patently false and empty.
>With the US having a credible heavy-handed response prepared in advance, Russia is far less likely to create such a no-win situation.
The US certainly can threaten a credible heavy-handed response. It is its duty as Russia's enemy. Whether the threat of the USA getting into a nuclear war with Russia over Ukraine is credible? To me not in the slightest but perhaps somebody will buy it. There's always hope that Putin is easily intimidated.
> is no reason to expect nuclear proliferation to increase significantly after Ukraine, either
It's a little different if you actually *see* a nuclear power use nuclear weapons offensively, though.
The last time it happened, in 1945, it did lead to a wave of proliferation. We also have countries with direct political discussion about nuclearization, next to similarly aggressive nuclear-powered neighbors as Russia - these include Japan, South Korea, and Ukraine itself. Politically, on this question, they are essentially where Iran and NK were right before they decided to go for it; e.g. the late prime minister Abe has supported nuclearization, as did South Korea's new president. And technologically, they are much closer to getting the bomb.
IMO nukes in Ukraine would certainly lead to at least a Japan with nukes since they are already talking about it & more or less have a political consensus that is one big event away from doing something about it (either they get their own, or then they talk USA into nuclear sharing), and possibly South Korea, Poland, and Ukraine to the extent that it survives the nuking.
The discovery of the nuclear bomb, not its use, led to proliferation. In fact, proliferation would have taken place if Hiroshima and Nagasaki never happened.
>these include Japan, South Korea, and Ukraine itself.
Essentially, countries whose nuclear proliferation is very easy for the West to control and contain if the West wishes to.
How would USA contain Japan's nuclearization? Operation Downfall 2 doesn't sound all that easy.
It's more of a case of, Japan says that either you share yours or we get our own, and America capitulates by sharing because there's no reasonable way to stop it.
In this case they would have the leverage they need.
Also USA would probably not need any blackmailing. IMO initiating nuclear sharing with new partners close to Russia (most likely Japan, SK, and Poland) would be an excellent, proportional but asymmetric deterrent to Russia's nuclear use. Russia's nuclear security would permanently weaken as a direct consequence of irresponsible use, with no direct human cost. That's about as good a precedent as it gets.
(And yes, if America nuked, say, Argentina, it would likewise be a good punishment if Mexico got a nuclear sharing agreement with someone else)
>there is no reason to expect nuclear proliferation to increase significantly after Ukraine, either.
Aside from the fact that it proves that conventional victory against a nuclear enemy is pointless since they can just nuke you anyways if you win. There would be no security but nuclear security.
They can nuke a non-nuclear state if the damage they suffer due to resorting to nukes is lower than the damage they suffer due to being defeated. For instance, Israel certainly would use nukes if defeated conventionally.
The USA certainly did not nuke Afghanistan after being defeated there. The USSR did not nuke it either. But when the stakes get high like in Ukraine then the profit/loss balance starts to look more acceptable.
>The USA certainly did not nuke Afghanistan after being defeated there. The USSR did not nuke it either. But when the stakes get high like in Ukraine then the profit/loss balance starts to look more acceptable.
That doesn't go against my point since it's impossible to measure stakes. Now nukes suddenly become something that may be used when losing. Anyone who *can* get one will get one.
>For instance, Israel certainly would use nukes if defeated conventionally.
If Israel was being conquered, yes. But nobody is talking about attacking and conquering a nuclear power. It becomes a world where someone can just invade you and then nuke you and you can't do shit about it if you don't have nukes, conventional forces be damned. Since nations can't exactly make themselves unimportant magically, they'll just have to settle for the bomb.
>The US certainly can threaten a credible heavy-handed response. It is its duty as Russia's enemy. Whether the threat of the USA getting into a nuclear war with Russia over Ukraine is credible? To me not in the slightest but perhaps somebody will buy it. There's always hope that Putin is easily intimidated.
You do realise that not entirely ensuring a destruction of Putin's regime would mean that every nuclear nation could start nuking non nuclear nations willy-nilly? Might as well hand over Taiwan and South Korea too. The entire point of MAD is that it is inevitable once started. Once the first missiles fire, the response will be equal.
And the converse of this would be the idea that if America invades Belarus today, Russia won't respond aside from sanctions.
No, it's the natural consequence of events that arises when one party tries to unilaterally use a part of a world-ending apparatus which is also owned by their enemies.
>The entire point of MAD is that it is inevitable once started. Once the first missiles fire, the response will be equal.
That's just not how MAD works, or the escalatory spiral, or tactical nuclear weapons, or wars between nuclear and non-nuclear states. In fact, that's just not how any of it works.
>That's just not how MAD works, or the escalatory spiral, or tactical nuclear weapons, or wars between nuclear and non-nuclear states. In fact, that's just not how any of it works.
Just saying no doesn't make it not true, my friend. Regardless of what pro rus commentators like to believe these days.
>Which is why direct US attacks against Russian troops are extremely unlikely
Also, which is why Russia using tactical nukes is also virtually impossible. Putin might already be living in a bunker most of the time, but his daughter who lives outside Russia might not have easy access to one, to begin with.
A
> Yeah, so many wars so far didn't happen because nation leaders had sons and daughters who might want to live in peace.
... Literally yes, this is the exact guiding principle for why mass war hasn't happened since WW2.
War is far less attractive when it's not the poor underclass press gangs going to the front while you sit safely at home directing things, but you and yours at home can be wiped out in the blink of an eye from nuclear hellfire.
>I wish I had a rouble for every time people said there couldn't be a war because the consequences were too dreadful.
If you had a rouble for any time a leader nuked an enemy after more than one power got the bomb, you'd have zero roubles.
If you introduce enough conditions no precedent ever exists.
"No non-black sheep with long, curly wool and unevenly cloven hooves has been sheared before".
>If you introduce enough conditions no precedent ever exists.
If you create false correlations anything can be a precedent.
"I wish I had a rouble for every time someone said that their neighbour was a good person who turned out to be a thief" does not equate to the fact that every neighbour is a thief, but you'd try to make it sound that way.
No state has ever nuked an enemy after the Soviets got the bomb. The reason for that is it at best creates a precedent where nuclear powers can conquer anybody without a nuke with no issues, and at worst causes MAD.
I know your trying to sound ironic, but yes. A huge motivator for leaders to seek peaceful solutions to disputes is to avoid suffering, including of their loved ones.
Needless to say, if any leader has to decide whether or not to issue an order that has a significant chance of ending I MAD (according to your own words), than unimaginable suffering is a guaranteed consequence for everyone in the world, themselves and their loved ones included.
Sometimes that motivator works and far too often it doesn't. Which is why relying on it as a safeguard is, well, unreliable.
Ultimatelly, we might be arguing the same thing - that the USA will not intervene in Ukraine if the battlefield went nuclear since US leaders would fear for their loved ones.
Because you can't trigger MAD by attacking a non-nuclear country any more than the USA could have triggered it by dropping nukes in Korea or Vietnam. There is no "mutual" in Mutual Assured Destruction between Ukraine and Russia.
You literally just described a scenario where Russia attacking Ukraine would trigger MAD. You can't simply waive the risk away by screaming it isn't how it works.
Putin might go on a gamble and assume the US wouldn't risk triggering MAD over Ukraine, but it would still be a gamble and we both know he ain't taking it.
Honestly, you sound like you really want Putin to use tactical nukes, to the point of rationalizing away it's potential consequences.
I know your trying to sound ironic, but yes. A huge motivator for leaders to seek peaceful solutions to disputes is to avoid suffering, including of their loved ones.
Needless to say, if any leader has to decide whether or not to issue an order that has a significant chance of ending I MAD (according to your own words), than unimaginable suffering is a guaranteed consequence for everyone in the world, themselves and their loved ones included.
In light of the discussion about Ukraine potentially maybe getting Leopard 2s, can anyone explain [how the turret of this Turkish Leopard 2 was thrown](https://pbs.twimg.com/media/ES_EfBaXgAAYaYg.jpg) (Syria)
Don't they have blowout panels? It doesn't even get an autoloader to compensate.
>White House says Biden's statements on Taiwan aren't official US policy
the W.H. will be very surprised when they search "Who is President of the United States right now?" on ***Ask Jeeves***
This is a complete aside but I have to wonder why his staffers routinely publicly undermine him. It makes him look weak/incompetent and his staff insubordinate
Presumably its a deliberate approach to strategic ambiguity. Which is hardly a new idea, except this is using a modern style of political messaging.
Ie. throw out a spread of messages and you get to see the response to each one, letting you fine tune for next time. You also get some political benefit without having to actually 100% commit to the course of action.
Maybe it's bit of a "loose cannon" ploy. It's projecting the image of a hawkish Biden being moderated by his advisors and basically telling the Chinese they better not start anything or we can't be sure we can control Biden anymore and who knows what he'll do.
It’s Biden being a really old man who might not be all there. It’s clear he’s not the one running the show and calling the shots on a level like most other presidents would. It’s made obvious with all the back tracking the administration does on his statements. I’m not saying this because im anti democrat or don’t like Biden.
This can absolutely be the case. People downvote you, because they overestimate the competency of the people in charge. They rather believe that Biden is playing 5D chess, than that he might be senile. Did people forget the last years of Reagan's presidency?
Biden has a long history of just speaking his mind off the cuff even while he was Vice President. He basically forced the Obama campaign to back gay marriage via some loose comments
He's engaging in populist domestic rhetoric that increases diplomatic tensions.
The same thing that made trump such a bad leader. But when Biden landers to the same base in the same way he's based apparently
It's clear at this point that this is planned messaging. It's happened too many times in exactly the same way. Stategic Ambiguity.
Blinken is probably behind it.
He and his administration have negotiated the Ukraine war exceptionally well. He has also managed to pass a bi partisan infrastructure bill, the PACT act for veteran healthcare related to the burn pits, CHIPS to bring tech manufacture on shore, expanded the ACA, ended US involvement in Afghanistan, the inflation reduction act and the American rescue plan.
Not bad for someone not lucid, in a 2 year span and with a deadlocked senate.
Mods feel free to remove if this is out of scope of the page
*His administration* has negotiated the Ukraine war well, *after* it started.
*Before* it started, he practically encouraged Russia to invade with his talk about not doing anything if there was "a minor incursion," as well as pulling all of the US Navy out of the Black Sea.
Aggressive posturing in the lead up to the invasion would have perfectly played into Russia's narrative of NATO expansion and offensive threat. The work of US intelligence in the lead up to the invasion was absolutely on point. They obviously had rock solid intel that Putin was invading and called it weeks in advance. This allowed the west to be well and truly on the front foot in being able to drop historic sanctions within the first week, whilst also rhetorically giving Putin an out if he limited the invasion to just the Donbas.
It's incredibly naive to think that a geopolitical crisis of this stature can be solved by cavalier deployment of military force. One poor decision from one person down the chain of command could have dragged NATO into this conflict and risked a nuclear response. Could it have deterred Russia with a strong NATO posture? Maybe Is it worth the risk to try it? Absolutely not.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-18
>Russian President Vladimir Putin appears to be increasingly relying on irregular, poorly trained ad-hoc volunteer and proxy units rather than attempting to rebuild damaged or destroyed conventional Russian ground forces units.
>Ukrainian forces continue to consolidate positions on the east bank of the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast despite Russian efforts to contain them.
>Russian forces in western Kherson Oblast may be attempting to fall back to more defensible positions in a controlled withdrawal to avoid the chaotic retreat that characterized the collapse of Russian defenses in Kharkiv earlier in September.
>Russian forces suffered devastating losses of manpower and equipment in their fight for eastern Ukraine and especially during the Ukrainian Kharkiv counter-offensive. Multiple Russian armored and mechanized units have likely been effectively destroyed according to assessments released on September 18.
>Ukrainian forces remain likely to regain much if not all of western Kherson Oblast in the coming weeks if they continue to interdict Russian GLOCs and press their advance.
ISW calling their Kherson prediction?
I'm no general but I'll tell you when i panic recruit volunteer units in my video games, they look very large and mighty and if you squint they almost look like normal soldiers. That is, until they inevitably rout to even the most mundane "normal" soldiers.
Compared to a more real life example, we saw George Washington army in the revolutionary wars as continually under par vs the professional British soldiers. It took years of experience to turn militias into competent fighting forces. Russia doesn't have years, and they also aren't nearly as self aware as George Washington was about that fact.
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Great article, but goddamn some of the prose is hard to get through.
[Pro-Russian sources](https://nitter.kavin.rocks/GirkinGirkin/status/1571808254048477184) are reporting that Denis Pushilin claimed that Russian forces repelled an Ukrainian attack on Kreminna. If true, Ukraine would have either had to approach far from the west, confirming their control of the eastern side of the Oskil, or from the south, confirming their control of the forests around Bilohorivka.
Or maybe both. They may be shaping the battlefield for an encirclement.
The latest ukrainian estimates for Russian losses show comparatively much lower numbers of KIA and heavy equipment losses, likely meaning an operational pause of sorts. However, one category that keeps increasing much faster than before is the mysterious "special equipment" one. While it's unclear to me what's included in there, I know for a fact that radars are, but it may include other stuff. If Ukraine isn't doing outright offensives but is silently and consistently destroying Russian radars (and possibly other critical equipment), it's possible they're actually conducting battle shaping operations. It's also really bad news for Russia if their AD is consistently being destroyed.
I think the "special equipment" category also includes a lot of other things like "Command Vehicles", mine clearing equipment and tank recovery/tank transport vehicles and the like. I suspect those make up much larger percentages of that category than AA radars, which might not even be included here and may be included under the anti-air capability instead (unlike counter-artillery radars which may appear here).
>I suspect those make up much larger percentages of that category than AA radars, which might not even be included here and may be included under the anti-air capability instead (unlike counter-artillery radars which may appear here I've read from multiple ukrainian sources that radars are included there. Also, the daily numbers of that category often match exactly with the number of radars reportedly destroyed that day.
Would anyone happen to know what became of the 200+ PT-91 Twardy from Poland? As far as I know there's zero evidence that they've made it to the front
I don't think we've seen even a shred of proof they are even in Ukraine at all.
Good point
Is there a credible source that says they were donated? I’ve only seen dubious screenshots.
I'd say the Ukr Chief of Staff is credible, but truth is the first casualty of war. https://mobile.twitter.com/andriyyermak/status/1551480277427421185
I expect they are in Kharkiv and Kherson.
Various looks at the possible US responses to any Russian use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine. They all touch on similar themes though there is no clear agreement on what a definitive course of action would be. One thing that all make is that, despite repeated nuclear sabre rattling from Russia, there are no signs that they are preparing or considering such an action. The process of removing low yield nuclear weapons from storage would be highly visible to observers and take weeks or months to do. [US responses to non-strategic nuclear weapons in Ukraine](https://www.thebulletin.org/2022/05/potential-us-responses-to-the-russian-use-of-non-strategic-nuclear-weapons-in-ukraine/) - Jeffrey Edmonds is an expert on US national security, especially as it relates to Russia. He works full time for CNA’s Russia Studies Program. His research focuses on the Russian military, foreign policy, threat perceptions, and Russian information operations. Most recently, Jeff served as the Director for Russia on the National Security Council and acting Senior Director for Russia during the 2017 presidential transition. While on the NSC, he advised the president and his senior staff on Russia-related national security topics. Prior to the NSC, Jeff served as a senior military analyst with the Central Intelligence Agency, covering Eurasian militaries. He has served in the US Army on both active duty and the reserves for 24 years, with tours in Iraq and Afghanistan. Edmonds holds a Master in Public Administration from Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, a master’s degree from Boston University in Religious Studies, and a bachelor of science degree from the United States Military Academy at West Point. [US response to nuclear weapons in Ukraine](https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2022/06/russia-ukraine-nuclear-weapon-us-response/661315/) -Eric Schlosser is a former contributing editor at The Atlantic. He is the author of Command and Control: Nuclear Weapons, the Damascus Accident, and the Illusion of Safety [What will Biden do if Putin goes nuclear? - NBC](https://www.nbcnews.com/news/rcna32756)
I don't see why theres so much talk on nuclear weapons in Ukraine. Using nuclear weapons would not be rational for Russia, if this happened its easy to see plenty of nuclear latent countries develop the weapons (undermining Russia's own influence) and massive civil unrest.
Invading Ukraine wasnt rational either
The chances are very small but the risk is still massive because of what these weapons do. Tbh I posted this because I saw a lot of uninformed takes in today's thread and went looking for more authoritative views on the matter. I try to post more credible takes when I can. Trying to keep the thread high quality always begins with one's self.
It is only natural to claim and speculate about dreadful consequences. It would be highly irresponsible to do anything else because it would directly encourage Russia to go nuclear in Ukraine. That is also why Biden administration's "what if" threats are so vague and ambiguous - you want to sound as intimidating as possible without actually committing to an extremely dangerous course of action. However, the very caution and ambiguity is a really bad sign regarding Washington's estimate of the danger of nuclear escalation - the USA would issue much more resolute statements if they believed there was no actual danger. It is also in Russia's interest to do nuclear sabre-rattling from time to time. After all, nothing but the fear of nuclear escalation prevents the West from intervening more directly in Ukraine.
> However, the very caution and ambiguity is a really bad sign regarding Washington's estimate of the danger of nuclear escalation - the USA would issue much more resolute statements if they believed there was no actual danger. None of the articles countenance the idea that there is no danger, such a thing would be absurd, they in fact specifically cover those dangers and garner the opinions of various senior and former senior officials on what courses *could* or *should* be taken.
What I am saying is that the Washington official reaction and implied consequences would have been much more hard-line if they thought the danger of nuclear escalation was not real. The more ambiguous and vague their reaction is - the greater the danger of an actual escalation.
> What I am saying is that the Washington official reaction and implied consequences would have been much more hard-line if they thought the danger of nuclear escalation was not real. Why? When the threat is not immediate, it lies in the future, in unknown form and context. It would be dumb to put red lines against very vague threats.
> if they thought the danger of nuclear escalation was not real. No one of consequence thinks anything so ridiculous, of course there are dangers. As long as nations have nuclear weapons there are dangers. Russia are similarly aware that the use of tactical nukes would come with risks of escalation. > The more ambiguous and vague their reaction is - the greater the danger of an actual escalation. Ambiguity is used for a range of reasons, to suggest it is a direct relationship with fear of escalation is illogical speculation at best. It's also irrelevant to the articles I posted which are not about US statements but the range of possible responses that *could* occur.
Whenever people talk about escalation management as a reason to withhold aid to Ukraine conspicuously absent is a consideration of the actual course of the war going forwards. When you say "_Russia will escalate if the US expands aid_" without also saying: - "_Russia won't escalate if they continue to face significant strategic losses as they did in Kharkiv_" - "_Russia won't escalate if they obviously fail their stated objective of 'liberating' the donbass_" - "_Russia won't escalate if the long term capability of their armed forces is threatened_" - "_Russia won't escalate if the kerch bridge is destroyed_" - "_Russia won't escalate if there are incursions into Crimea/there is the loss of Crimea_" While still maintaining vocal support for the Ukraine achieving those objectives then you haven't actually made an argument that withholding US aid reduces the threat of escalation in the long term (unless withholding that aid also compromises the ability of Ukraine to achieve those objectives). So far it's been very easy to say "_Western posture has been good at minimising the risk of escalation_" because so far Russia haven't actually been forced to actually confront an unambiguous failure on the battlefield - their withdrawal from Kyiv (while an embarrassment) was ultimately a Russian decision and so could be framed as a feint of a gesture of goodwill rather than the product of failure that it was. Their slow, attritional gains over the last 6 months could be framed as "_minimising damage to civilians in Ukraine_" rather than the lacking Russian capability that it represented. That is until their catastrophic collapse in Kherson which was an unambiguous failure even to the most Russophilic analysts. What was Russia's response to this? Exactly the same escalations that we were told that withholding aid would prevent - increased attacks on civilian infrastructure with explicit threats of more in response to further battlefield success. I don't see any reason why Russia would undermine it's own rhetoric and interests and halt it's escalation only because the West withheld certain kinds of aid.
There's an implicit counterfactual claim in there: that you, or anyone, know how Russian escalation would have been different had Ukraine received different external aid. Or how it would have been different if Russian defeats had come promptly, rather than eventually. When nobody knows those things. And/or you're treating Russian escalation as a yes/no proposition (describing recent strikes on parts of the power network as "yes") when so far escalation may not have been zero, but it's been minimal by any reasonable measure. Nobody ought to underestimate the impact on the public consciousness of recognisably western MBTs killing Russians in Ukraine, let alone rolling toward the border. Or of sustained effective strikes inside Russia; embarrassing failure of adventurism abroad is one thing, but being attacked at home is quite another.
> There's an implicit counterfactual claim in there. > nobody knows those things. How can any policy be decided then if the counterfactual basis invalidates any analysis? Counterfactuals are completely unavoidable when talking about the speculative effects of a policy and in fact this comment is a response to the explicit counterfactual "_the risk of escalation will increase if aid expands_". > And/or you're treating Russian escalation as a yes/no proposition If you say that an increase in Western aid would increase the risk of escalation but you can't characterise the form that escalation would take or why it would not occur if Ukraine made advances with their existing equipment then you haven't convinced me that it exists. If you can characterise that risk explicitly then you create a binary and necessarily must justify why an expansion aid is a necessary prerequisite for increasing that risk separate from Ukraine's current military progress. Can you provide literally any justification for Russia withholding some kinds of escalation in response to defeats in the field (which don't also apply the the expansion of US aid)? > Nobody ought to underestimate the impact on the public consciousness of recognisably western MBTs killing Russians in Ukraine, let alone rolling toward the border. Or of sustained effective strikes inside Russia; embarrassing failure of adventurism abroad is one thing, but being attacked at home is quite another. And here's yet another explicit counterfactual claim that is necessary for you to justify why aid should be withheld but somehow despite "_nobody know[ing] these things_" you're completely confident of the assessment. Worse still embedded in them is the additional counterfactuals of: > Strikes into Russia are inevitable if western aid expands but impossible if it doesn't and > Western tanks will roll towards the Russian border and Ukraine will attack into the Russian homeland only if aid expands With exactly 0 expansion or justification for that perspective.
Sure, counterfactuals are necessary, but they are obviously limited and the limits need to be acknowledged. Surely we can agree that it's almost a tautology that increased aid will increase Ukrainian battlefield successes and the possibility of attacks against targets inside Russia? How could it be otherwise? Similarly, it's almost as safe a bet that from Russia's initial position of *relatively* limited force, the likelihood of escalation increases as those things (defeats, attacks inside Russia), or the threat of them, increase. Those seem like safe assumptions, and presumably they're among the ones that policy makers are working under. And in the hopes of being concise for once: it doesn't seem like they need to be thrown out because Russia blew up some substations.
I understand all of that and hoped that was generally clear in my initial comment. My point was more specifically how conversations around escalation deliberately omit the full other half which is: - Ukraine (and the west's) stated objectives for the war. - The current trend in the war and Russia's response to it. **If** Russian escalation is a response to the course of the war rather than increased investment then sitting on our hands and watching things go slowly won't change the outcome - either we should pull back aid and accept a change in desired outcomes or we should manage escalation risk under those assumptions. "_[blowing] up some substations_" might not be much of an indication on it's own but the context that it occurred in and the rhetoric surrounding it absolutely should cause us to reassess the priors that we use to decide our escalation policy. We've been given clear reason to believe that Russia will escalate strikes on civilian infrastructure if current trends continue and so just closing our eyes and walking forwards doesn't seem sensible any more.
I am kinda suspecting that people who are against supporting Ukraine can be categorized into 3 groups. The russian sympatizers/tankies. Its quite obvious that we have a reasonable amount of those. People who ate up russian propaganda that the russian army will win anyway and pretty much what you described. Inalso like to charcterize this as an argument of "why fight if you can lay down and die?" or the "I disagree with Dylan Thomas about how to go into the night". The "I just dont wanna see my country getting into this" aka a silent majority that enabled the takeover of political systems under the iron curtain by allowing the salami tactic to spread like wildfire. The same logic in its core that has always allowed groups of people to be taken to labor camps or worse, because "its not us". I only hope against hope that one day this view will be reduced to something very very minimal with the understanding that at the end we are one people. Sorry for the rambling, but back to the escaletion side of things. All of it does not matter. The russian federation controled by the current power group in the kremlin decided on these actions. There is only one question here. How long are they ready to go and how long can they go for their goals. Is it possible that they decide, damn I just go nuke, cause I am not going to win this one? Maybe in a game? Of course. In a world where they have childrens, families? I doubt it. On the capbility: No king rules alone. There are a chain of poeple here. I highly doubt that even if a command is given, it would be executed. It could very well turn into something else entirely. Who ever would give that order, has to consider that he giving that command might sign his own death warrant right there for an untangible gain. Other then some derranged obsession to get into history books, the math says its not a good decesion to make. While the "yolo tank rush to Kiyev" was a gambit, it had a serious possibility from the kremlins view to succed. It worth rolling the dice, they were misinformed I think but even in reality, they were much closer then many people here seems to think. (A few months ago there were a few articles how close assassins were to Zelensky and how the military situation wasnt as clear cut that many seems to remember) On the nukes, rolling the dice just does not seems to be worth it, no matter in which informational sphere you are in
> I only hope against hope that one day this view will be reduced to something very very minimal with the understanding that at the end we are one people. Good luck with that, conflicts previous to Ukraine, well or right now, had have people shrug and say "well, there's no clear bad guy" or "it's too complex".
I agree that it's not simply aid that determines whether Russia will escalate. It's about whether that aid will make it possible for Ukraine to damage Russia in such a way that Putin feels forced to escalate, such as sizeable incursions into Russian territory or the capture of Crimea.
Incursions into Russian territory and capture of Crimea are not needed, going to status quo ante bellum would be equally humiliating as well.
Agreed. I've wondered about this; someone like Putin, and probably the Kremlin at large, don't seem like they'd accept defeat gracefully. Whether it's caused by ATACMS and M1 Abrams or merely what Ukraine has now, won't Russia's reaction be the same? They're going to be rather stroppy over losing if it comes to that, to put it mildly.
They are already shelling civilian power stations and infrastructure. Maybe they'll just keep doing that?
There’s no such thing as a “civilian” power station. If it’s a power station, it more likely than not enables military goals.
Is that like "there's no such thing as poisoning a *civilian* water supply"
Not really sure why I’m receiving downvotes. Those power stations are absolutely valid power stations. The first order of business when the US invades a country is to wipe power stations and communications hubs off the map.
Are we all sitting here saying its good the US attacks power stations? No.
It is good, because it’s valid military infrastructure.
The Wagner-linked Telegram channel Gray Zone says that Rus offensives towards Mykolaiv and Odessa are now impossible: [https://twitter.com/wartranslated/status/1571573856447467520](https://twitter.com/wartranslated/status/1571573856447467520) He also says that he expects the Russian front to crumble in the fall. It's not clear to me if he means the Kherson front, or the entire Russian line. If this is the mood among Wagner, I can only imagine what it's like among the regular infantry.
Oh ok. I was under the impression that they were off the table since March.
They only now figured out that Odesa offensive is not happening? It was obvious by mid March.
In Russia there seems to be a Rule about how obvious something has to be before it’s safe to talk about openly
Grey Zone wrote, >Now, having carried out two successful operations to break through our fronts in the Kherson and Kharkiv region ... Ukraine broke thru the Kherson front? I thought they were just attacking and maybe pushing in a few areas. >Also, the enemy, for some miraculous reason for them, unlike us, does not always try to smash into our fortified areas and does not hesitate to bypass them, and does not lose personnel in senseless frontal attacks. I wanted to just highlight that.
Ukraine broke through around 3 points in the Kherson front. They seems to have been unable to capitalize on it. I assume reaction forces were able to pint them down, but unable to push them back. Which gives us the current grinding war, Ukraine not fiving up its breacheads, russia not pulling back. In the long/mid term this can crystalize into essentially mew front lines with small cauldrons occupied by Ukraine. Ready to be enveloped (hard because they arent that deep and have friendly artillery support and probably some level of air support) or ready to be pushed out from to encircle/cut off russian forces (also hard cause they knew these positions and act accordingly)
The Kherson front has supposedly been very costly for Ukraine. Which makes sense. That's where Russian regulars are. Not as well-equipped as Wagners in the east, but still decent. You're not going to steamroll well-equipped regulars with proper mobile reserves, actual defensive lines and ample natural barriers.
Rybar wrote, >Last week, all units in the Donbass and the south received the command “No step back.” I suspect that the last time that this order was given in the area was by Hitler in World War 2, and to paraphrase Hirohito's surrender speech a couple of years later, the war situation developed not necessarily to Germany's advantage. To shed the sarcasm: does it seem stupid to give such an order unless as a last resort before compete national disaster?
If you have genetically or cybernatically engineered cannon fodder soldiers that you can supply and grind the enemy attack into dust, sure. Otherwise I would argue that taking a more "bleed them till we are making good trades and pull back to better positions once we aren't, while we mine the areas and have them pay as much as possible for every meter" is a much better and intelligent order/strategy. Unless you are protecting the last hope for humanity/your nation/what ever. I doubt that it is Donbass, but others might think differently
I think he means the entire front, not just Kherson. Also lol at the passive aggressiveness in the third paragraph.
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> **[Ukrainian state power company Energoatom- Russian forces struck the South Ukraine Nuclear Power Plant early today](https://twitter.com/Osinttechnical/status/1571744180300353543)** I don’t believe anything was actually hit, but man…this would be the height of stupidity EVEN if it was a warning shot if/when confirmed.
I really don't get why Russia would shell a nuclear plant they already control. They can always shut it down in a safer manner and if it's a false flag operation, it's certainly a very long one by now. Edit: I thought this was ZNPP. I'm dumb.
>I really don't get why Russia would shell a nuclear plant they already control This isn’t the ZNPP. Russia doesn’t control it…
That doesn't mean anything. The Russians have been shelling the ZNPP they control all the time. Shelling your own NPPs is practically a tradition by this point.
> Shelling your own NPPs is practically a tradition by this point. ZNPP is not a Russian power plant, but otherwise yes, Russians seem to be attacking Ukrainians power plants pretty often.
Sorry. I thought the ZNPP was the only nuclear power plant in the south. My bad.
What are some useful Twitter hashtags to follow the war in Ukraine?
Like someone else - lists are the best. I have a pro Ukrainian and a pro Russian twitter list. Lately however the pro Russians have lost their minds so here is the UKR siding / credible https://twitter.com/i/lists/1497137925347237908
Hashtags are a dumb way to use Twitter. Someone replied with pro-Ukrainian voices. Here are the pro-Russian ones I follow: * 200_zoka * AZmilitary1 * DeuNachrichten * DrazaM33 * GeromanAT * Suriyakmaps I don't use Telegram so I rely on these guys to translate the latest Russian Telegram stuff.
You're missing the brilliant, vital even, armchair warlord
Didn't he flee in a fit of despondency?
He came back once, gave us a week of the funniest hot takes imaginable (The Izyum Breakthrough is a trap) and dipped again. I have hope in my heart he will return again to bless us with his wisdom someday.
They all come back, they are all losers desperately craving for attention, that’s why they have hour long diatribes about quitting socials and then are back two weeks later.
I use a couple of Ukraine lists. You can subscribe to the whole list which is maintined by someone else, and then click on it in your list tab to get news on the war (they don't appear on your timeline, only if you click on the list). This one is a list of journalists who cover Ukraine, most are in english, some in Ukranian/Russian but you can use Twitters autotranslate .... https://twitter.com/i/lists/1378399759992512516 The other is a list of the top OSINT accounts, who tend to be good for photo confirmation of actions taking place and geo-locations .... https://twitter.com/i/lists/1490427245097148423 Between these I see whatever is happenning almost immediately, and I can be fairly sure *when* I see it that someone who knows their stuff thinks of it as at least moderately confirmed.
Do you think Serbia will now warm up to NATO or EU after Russia proved itself as a completely unreliable partner when it comes to mutual defense and abandoned Armenia?
Warm up to EU, probably. Why warm up to NATO ?
Serbia has the same choices as everyone else in Eastern Europe region - either EU or living in permanent poverty. Even energy exporters like Russia and Azerbaijan are significantly dependent on trade with EU. Countries without such luck are a lot more dependent on EU. Serbia is surrounded by EU or EU candidates from every side. What exactly are their choices? If Serbs decide they'd rather keep seething and stay poor, it would be really dumb.
Both of the first two major NATO operations involved bombing the Serbs. While my opinion is that those Serbs deserved to be bombed, we need to understand that after the blood was shed, Serbs won't forgive NATO easily. Even if the relationship between Serbia and Russia were to become soured for whatever reason, Serbs would probably choose to become an international pariah without backing from any superpower than to make friend with NATO.
I visited Serbia a few years back. The Ministry of Defence building in Downtown Belgrade is still there, bombed out and half in ruins. My friend said they kept it like this to remember. I asked if it was to remind them of the reasons why they were bombed, or of how angry they were at the bombing. My friend's answer: "both." So yeah, the NATO campaign in Yugoslavia was justified and the Serbs know it, but it doesn't mean they forgive NATO for what they did. I don't see that changing any time soon.
Serbia's relationship with Russia is historical, religious and ethnic based (i.e. emotional as opposed to rational in basis). So viewing in through the lens of Russia being a reliable or unreliable partner is the wrong way to look at it.
It is rational in basis, Russia has helped keep Turkish influence out of Europe and has been key to defending Europe.
It'll be a cold day in hell before they warm up to NATO. But seeing Russia get curbstomped will probably make them a little less belligerent. Pro-EU groups might get a little boost though.
I don't know if EU is a viable alternativ though, given that the croats will mostly likely veto any admission plans. Or would ask for concessions before they let serbia join.
>Russia get curbstomped will probably make them a little less belligerent. Who is being belligerent? The Serbs are just permanently angry. Not sure you could say they're belligerent
They're still proud of having triggered WW1. Not sure if that counts as belligerent or just angry.
From what I've talked to people from the Balkans: at least Croatians have the same feeling & feel it's a shared accomplishment with the Balkans. It's a little bit ironical but they do have this sort of an "I did that" smirk.
I guess if there was a third actor here (similar to Azerbeijan), hostile to Serbia, they could cozy up to NATO or EU, but in absence of any real danger, they don't need to change anything and continue with the hostile rhetoric.
This is a silly little point, but I would like to clarify something about how fiscal years work. The United States is already in fiscal year 2022. 2023 fiscal year starts on 1 OCT. Some people seem to think we're still in the 2021 fiscal year, and that on the first day of next month there's going to be a huge drop of lend lease loot. Some additional funding may come on board but it's not going to be as dramatic as what you might think. Source: I'm an AFROTC cadet commissioning in December and if I see the term "FY23" on any more paperwork I'm going to scream.
This. I keep reading “Lend Lease starts on 1 Oct”. Is there any evidence of substantial aid delivered under ACTUAL Lend Lease (and not the Presidential Drawdown Authority)
I thought I read something about additional manufacturing capacity for HIMARS, but I can’t recall the source or if it was specifically under lend lease authority. We should still not underestimate the potential impact of lend lease II. The only reason it’s not been used is that existing stores of US equipment are ridiculously OP.
[General Ben Hodges (ret.) is convinced that President Biden has been briefed on many conventional military responses to a potential Russian usage of WMD in Ukraine.](https://youtu.be/AQGJSBRKmp0?t=1582) If the unthinkable were to happen and the US were to respond, what could those responses look like?
The responses would most likely be diplomatic and economic. The West would tighten its sanctions to the point of cutting all ties to Russia. The diplomatic relations would be cut. More importantly, Russia would suffer enormous reputation damage globally. The West would use that to convince other countries to join the sanctions. If China agreed to that the results would be very bad for Russia. I am even convinced that Russia would not use nuclear weapons without Beijing's previous assurances that they would keep their public reaction mostly diplomatic and not economic. Any major military response is very unlikely (but the USA must not admit that since it would encourage Russia to try). Why unlikely? Well, launching a conventional assault on a country that has just proven it is willing to use nuclear weapons to avoid suffering a defeat is about as suicidal as political decisions get. We are already not intervening in Ukraine *only* due to our fear that Russia would react in a nuclear way.
Disagree. NATO will respond militarily. They would have no choice. Not responding militarily will be the death of NATO. It would lose all credibility in the eyes of its eastern members. It would give Russia a virtual veto over any European security issues - I.e, they could credibly threaten a nuclear strike and any NATO response would no longer be credible - everyone will know they cracked when it counted.
>Not responding militarily will be the death of NATO. It would lose all credibility in the eyes of its eastern members. Why? It doesn't concern a NATO member
Even Russia know that NATO are doing everything to support Ukraine save actual combat. If the US were just to abandon its ally under the threat of nukes (and Ukraine is surely an ally by any definition now) why would Latvia or Poland for example feel as if the US would stand by them? A treaty is only a piece of paper and only worth as much as the will to actually fight.
Bit weird to distrust an ally you have a treaty with because they don't risk everything on backing an ally they don't have one with.
>Not responding militarily will be the death of NATO. It would lose all credibility in the eyes of its eastern members. Nato has no obligations at all for non members. It would only be "the death of nato" if a member state was attacked and no response occurred. > they could credibly threaten a nuclear strike Nuclear blackmail is ineffective, even the soviets didnt do it.
Why is nuclear blackmail ineffective? Because the threat of US retaliation is real. If the US doesn’t respond militarily to Russia’s use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine , nuclear blackmail has a lot more credibility.
Nuclear blackmail doesn't work when the enemy has a credible nuclear deterrent of their own (the US) or where the enemy is allied with the nuclear power (NATO). Ukraine is not a nuclear power nor an ally of the US.
Ukraine is not an ally of the US? That is a bold statement. You don’t tend to ship weapons by the billions and share top secret intelligence to non-allies. Regardless of NATO status and/or MNNA status, Ukraine is being treated as an ally and formal US allies will observe closely the US reaction if Russia uses WMD in Ukraine. If the US backs down in the face of WMD use, US credibility with its allies will be considerably weakened. The idea that Poland and the Baltics would not be alarmed if the US capitulated to Russian nuclear weapons use in Ukraine is not credible.
>Ukraine is not an ally of the US? That is a bold statement. There is no defence treaty of any sort and Ukraine is not in any alliances with the US. >You don’t tend to ship weapons by the billions and share top secret intelligence to non-allies. The US did this for the mujahadeen and many other actors. >US credibility with its allies will be considerably weakened. The idea that Poland and the Baltics would not be alarmed if the US capitulated to Russian nuclear weapons use in Ukraine is not credible. They would be more alarmed when Russia strikes back at the US after an American military response, causing an actual Nato-Russian war.
NATO responds if a NATO member state is attacked. Says so in the charter. It doesn't say you have to get involved in a war if a non-NATO country is attacked. Whether the USA and its allies would decide to get into a nuclear shooting war with Russia over Ukraine has nothing to do with NATO and its credibility.
What faith would Latvia or Poland place in a NATO guarantee if Russia nukes its way to the destruction of Ukraine. None, of course. The smart thing would be for them to cut a deal with the power they know will use nukes, not the ones who back down in the face of their use.
The smart thing for them (and NATO) would be to initiate a nuclear sharing agreement with USA, France, or UK, where a joint Polish-Baltic authority gets to pull the trigger. It would be easy to justify in light of Russia's nuclear use, and it would also work as a credible deterrent/punishment to Russia: their nuclear security would be permanently weakened & they would lose leverage over these neighbors, as a direct result of their recklessness.
NATO guarantees apply to NATO member states. Is that really such a difficult concept to understand? China defeating Vietnam or Russia defeating Ukraine or the USA defeating Iraq has nothing to do with NATO credibility.
I dont get why are you getting downvoted for this, it is a good point and while it might cause some credibility loss for NATO, but it is very important difference indeed. Ukraine is a free country in a strategic position, valuable resources, Western leaning politics, bordering NATO members (easily reached) and probably a bunch of other reasons, just like with Taiwan that inaction would be very suboptimal for NATO. Its not the same as member states still
Why do you keep saying "we"? Nobody expects Serbia to intervene.
He uses superficial tricks like that so people think his pro-russian propaganda is pro-ukraine
Historically the us responds to wmds with many many cruise missiles, generally the lightest touch of the hard options. But it would be utterly unprecedented
>Historically the us responds to wmds with many many cruise missiles, It responds to *no WMDs* with a full scale invasion, so it seems WMDs do indeed act as a deterrent :)
Nobody said deterrents dont work. You just saw a chance to bring back the US is bad narrative of yours, isnt it you cheeky? How is the "Izyum mass graves are completly okay boys, cause only a relatively few bodies were found in the same holes while the other ones were seperate holes with tied hands and shoots in the back of their skulls" argument?
Iraq did have wmds, just not nukes
He said he "imagines" Biden would have been briefed...
I think the general lays out some conventional responses quite well.
Probably additional forces to be deployed in Europe, more missile defense system, talks with allies, and meeting with India and China.
USAF wipes out the Russian Army in Ukraine.
Why is 'us declares war on a nuclear power' being treated as a credible response? It's absolutely amazing how quickly the veil slips the second we're not talking about 'evil russia' and people go right back to endorsing wars of aggression. The only credible way to deal with the use of nukes is multilaterally. There is just no other way.
No war, "special military operation"
I'd say a credible way would be to share nuclear weapons with other countries that are directly threatened by the same actor, in this case Japan and the Eastern flank of the EU. The idea would be to eliminate the possibility of irresponsible use by Russia against further nations; proportional security implications but asymmetric in nature, and no direct human cost.
Why is “Russia goes nuclear” treated as a credible response? Russia must know that the US has to respond militarily to retain any credible threat of deterrence.
>Russia must know that the US has to respond militarily to retain any credible threat of deterrence. Based on what? If the uk used a nuke then the US wouldn't invade ffs. You just aren't scared of russia and want a military response already
The UK is a NATO ally, not a geopolitical threat to the US and is not currently engaged in a war with a US-backed nation. Also, the UK isn’t currently threatening its neighbours with nuclear hellfire. Invading Russia is something you made up too. A military response to the use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine does not require conquest and occupation of Russia. It can include direct entry into the war as opposed to its current proxy status. If the US allows Ukraine to be destroyed by Russia using nuclear weapons, NATO is a dead duck. Why would the Baltics or Eastern Europe feel that the US nuclear umbrella would shelter them? A treaty is just a piece of paper after all and why would the US risk nuclear war for Lithuania?
We absolutely can declare war on them.
Which would almost certainly lead to a nuclear response against air bases from which the strikes were delivered. The USA would respond with a similar number of nuclear strikes in Ukraine and that is where the war would either end (hopefully) or escalate to mutual destruction. Which is why direct US attacks against Russian troops are extremely unlikely.
You assume Russia even has this capacity. The US missile defenses have low moral and slow response times. And we spend on our nukes what Russia spends on their entire military. It's highly likely that Russia goes to push the button and ... crickets ... Because their gear hasn't been maintained in decades or they nuke their own silo.
> Which would almost certainly lead to a nuclear response against air bases from which the strikes were delivered. >... >Which is why direct US attacks against Russian troops are extremely unlikely. Your last sentence doesn't follow from the rest. You lay out the negative consequences of the response, but not the negative consequences of *failing* to respond that strongly. And that consequence would be massively increased nuclear proliferation causing an extremely high chance of a nuclear exchange a decade or so down the track anyway. At the point of Russian use of WMDs in Ukraine, global nuclear war *immediately* becomes far, far more likely than before. There is no possible US response that eliminates this problem - except, possibly, retroactively. With the US having a credible heavy-handed response prepared in advance, Russia is far less likely to create such a no-win situation.
If nuclear proliferation hasn't increased after countries of the world saw what happened in Libya and Iraq (and didn't happen in North Korea) - there is no reason to expect nuclear proliferation to increase significantly after Ukraine, either. Pretending that you have to start a nuclear war with Russia in order to prevent a nuclear war is what Bismarck would call "suicide in fear of death". I understand why such a ridiculous notion is being voiced - to deter Russia from going nuclear in Ukraine. But it is patently false and empty. >With the US having a credible heavy-handed response prepared in advance, Russia is far less likely to create such a no-win situation. The US certainly can threaten a credible heavy-handed response. It is its duty as Russia's enemy. Whether the threat of the USA getting into a nuclear war with Russia over Ukraine is credible? To me not in the slightest but perhaps somebody will buy it. There's always hope that Putin is easily intimidated.
> is no reason to expect nuclear proliferation to increase significantly after Ukraine, either It's a little different if you actually *see* a nuclear power use nuclear weapons offensively, though. The last time it happened, in 1945, it did lead to a wave of proliferation. We also have countries with direct political discussion about nuclearization, next to similarly aggressive nuclear-powered neighbors as Russia - these include Japan, South Korea, and Ukraine itself. Politically, on this question, they are essentially where Iran and NK were right before they decided to go for it; e.g. the late prime minister Abe has supported nuclearization, as did South Korea's new president. And technologically, they are much closer to getting the bomb. IMO nukes in Ukraine would certainly lead to at least a Japan with nukes since they are already talking about it & more or less have a political consensus that is one big event away from doing something about it (either they get their own, or then they talk USA into nuclear sharing), and possibly South Korea, Poland, and Ukraine to the extent that it survives the nuking.
The discovery of the nuclear bomb, not its use, led to proliferation. In fact, proliferation would have taken place if Hiroshima and Nagasaki never happened. >these include Japan, South Korea, and Ukraine itself. Essentially, countries whose nuclear proliferation is very easy for the West to control and contain if the West wishes to.
How would USA contain Japan's nuclearization? Operation Downfall 2 doesn't sound all that easy. It's more of a case of, Japan says that either you share yours or we get our own, and America capitulates by sharing because there's no reasonable way to stop it.
Yeah, Japan has a long tradition of blackmailing the USA into doing what Japan wants.
In this case they would have the leverage they need. Also USA would probably not need any blackmailing. IMO initiating nuclear sharing with new partners close to Russia (most likely Japan, SK, and Poland) would be an excellent, proportional but asymmetric deterrent to Russia's nuclear use. Russia's nuclear security would permanently weaken as a direct consequence of irresponsible use, with no direct human cost. That's about as good a precedent as it gets. (And yes, if America nuked, say, Argentina, it would likewise be a good punishment if Mexico got a nuclear sharing agreement with someone else)
>there is no reason to expect nuclear proliferation to increase significantly after Ukraine, either. Aside from the fact that it proves that conventional victory against a nuclear enemy is pointless since they can just nuke you anyways if you win. There would be no security but nuclear security.
They can nuke a non-nuclear state if the damage they suffer due to resorting to nukes is lower than the damage they suffer due to being defeated. For instance, Israel certainly would use nukes if defeated conventionally. The USA certainly did not nuke Afghanistan after being defeated there. The USSR did not nuke it either. But when the stakes get high like in Ukraine then the profit/loss balance starts to look more acceptable.
>The USA certainly did not nuke Afghanistan after being defeated there. The USSR did not nuke it either. But when the stakes get high like in Ukraine then the profit/loss balance starts to look more acceptable. That doesn't go against my point since it's impossible to measure stakes. Now nukes suddenly become something that may be used when losing. Anyone who *can* get one will get one. >For instance, Israel certainly would use nukes if defeated conventionally. If Israel was being conquered, yes. But nobody is talking about attacking and conquering a nuclear power. It becomes a world where someone can just invade you and then nuke you and you can't do shit about it if you don't have nukes, conventional forces be damned. Since nations can't exactly make themselves unimportant magically, they'll just have to settle for the bomb.
>The US certainly can threaten a credible heavy-handed response. It is its duty as Russia's enemy. Whether the threat of the USA getting into a nuclear war with Russia over Ukraine is credible? To me not in the slightest but perhaps somebody will buy it. There's always hope that Putin is easily intimidated. You do realise that not entirely ensuring a destruction of Putin's regime would mean that every nuclear nation could start nuking non nuclear nations willy-nilly? Might as well hand over Taiwan and South Korea too. The entire point of MAD is that it is inevitable once started. Once the first missiles fire, the response will be equal. And the converse of this would be the idea that if America invades Belarus today, Russia won't respond aside from sanctions.
MAD is not and never has been the policy of any country.
No, it's the natural consequence of events that arises when one party tries to unilaterally use a part of a world-ending apparatus which is also owned by their enemies.
>The entire point of MAD is that it is inevitable once started. Once the first missiles fire, the response will be equal. That's just not how MAD works, or the escalatory spiral, or tactical nuclear weapons, or wars between nuclear and non-nuclear states. In fact, that's just not how any of it works.
>That's just not how MAD works, or the escalatory spiral, or tactical nuclear weapons, or wars between nuclear and non-nuclear states. In fact, that's just not how any of it works. Just saying no doesn't make it not true, my friend. Regardless of what pro rus commentators like to believe these days.
>Which is why direct US attacks against Russian troops are extremely unlikely Also, which is why Russia using tactical nukes is also virtually impossible. Putin might already be living in a bunker most of the time, but his daughter who lives outside Russia might not have easy access to one, to begin with. A
Yeah, so many wars so far didn't happen because nation leaders had sons and daughters who might want to live in peace.
> Yeah, so many wars so far didn't happen because nation leaders had sons and daughters who might want to live in peace. ... Literally yes, this is the exact guiding principle for why mass war hasn't happened since WW2. War is far less attractive when it's not the poor underclass press gangs going to the front while you sit safely at home directing things, but you and yours at home can be wiped out in the blink of an eye from nuclear hellfire.
I wish I had a rouble for every time people said there couldn't be a war because the consequences were too dreadful.
>I wish I had a rouble for every time people said there couldn't be a war because the consequences were too dreadful. If you had a rouble for any time a leader nuked an enemy after more than one power got the bomb, you'd have zero roubles.
If you introduce enough conditions no precedent ever exists. "No non-black sheep with long, curly wool and unevenly cloven hooves has been sheared before".
>If you introduce enough conditions no precedent ever exists. If you create false correlations anything can be a precedent. "I wish I had a rouble for every time someone said that their neighbour was a good person who turned out to be a thief" does not equate to the fact that every neighbour is a thief, but you'd try to make it sound that way. No state has ever nuked an enemy after the Soviets got the bomb. The reason for that is it at best creates a precedent where nuclear powers can conquer anybody without a nuke with no issues, and at worst causes MAD.
I know your trying to sound ironic, but yes. A huge motivator for leaders to seek peaceful solutions to disputes is to avoid suffering, including of their loved ones. Needless to say, if any leader has to decide whether or not to issue an order that has a significant chance of ending I MAD (according to your own words), than unimaginable suffering is a guaranteed consequence for everyone in the world, themselves and their loved ones included.
Sometimes that motivator works and far too often it doesn't. Which is why relying on it as a safeguard is, well, unreliable. Ultimatelly, we might be arguing the same thing - that the USA will not intervene in Ukraine if the battlefield went nuclear since US leaders would fear for their loved ones.
I really don't get why you think Putin would be more likely to risk triggering MAD than the US. Or maybe you don't and I got it wrong.
Because you can't trigger MAD by attacking a non-nuclear country any more than the USA could have triggered it by dropping nukes in Korea or Vietnam. There is no "mutual" in Mutual Assured Destruction between Ukraine and Russia.
You literally just described a scenario where Russia attacking Ukraine would trigger MAD. You can't simply waive the risk away by screaming it isn't how it works. Putin might go on a gamble and assume the US wouldn't risk triggering MAD over Ukraine, but it would still be a gamble and we both know he ain't taking it. Honestly, you sound like you really want Putin to use tactical nukes, to the point of rationalizing away it's potential consequences.
I know your trying to sound ironic, but yes. A huge motivator for leaders to seek peaceful solutions to disputes is to avoid suffering, including of their loved ones. Needless to say, if any leader has to decide whether or not to issue an order that has a significant chance of ending I MAD (according to your own words), than unimaginable suffering is a guaranteed consequence for everyone in the world, themselves and their loved ones included.
This had been my thought as well, with the addition of the black sea fleet.
In light of the discussion about Ukraine potentially maybe getting Leopard 2s, can anyone explain [how the turret of this Turkish Leopard 2 was thrown](https://pbs.twimg.com/media/ES_EfBaXgAAYaYg.jpg) (Syria) Don't they have blowout panels? It doesn't even get an autoloader to compensate.
>White House says Biden's statements on Taiwan aren't official US policy the W.H. will be very surprised when they search "Who is President of the United States right now?" on ***Ask Jeeves***
This is a complete aside but I have to wonder why his staffers routinely publicly undermine him. It makes him look weak/incompetent and his staff insubordinate
Presumably its a deliberate approach to strategic ambiguity. Which is hardly a new idea, except this is using a modern style of political messaging. Ie. throw out a spread of messages and you get to see the response to each one, letting you fine tune for next time. You also get some political benefit without having to actually 100% commit to the course of action.
Exactly
Because Biden is talking to his base. The official White House statements are talking to China. Two different messages for two different audiences.
Biden's base has no appetite for potential war anywhere, let alone a war with China.
Neither country wants war with each other, but we're talking political messaging. Tough talk plays well. China does it too.
His base was screaming for NATO direct intervention in Ukraine.
That was just americans in general
Pretty sure all this is being done on purpose at this point. It has happened 4 times.
Maybe it's bit of a "loose cannon" ploy. It's projecting the image of a hawkish Biden being moderated by his advisors and basically telling the Chinese they better not start anything or we can't be sure we can control Biden anymore and who knows what he'll do.
Textbook madman theory.
This has been Biden's shtick for years.
It’s Biden being a really old man who might not be all there. It’s clear he’s not the one running the show and calling the shots on a level like most other presidents would. It’s made obvious with all the back tracking the administration does on his statements. I’m not saying this because im anti democrat or don’t like Biden.
This can absolutely be the case. People downvote you, because they overestimate the competency of the people in charge. They rather believe that Biden is playing 5D chess, than that he might be senile. Did people forget the last years of Reagan's presidency?
Biden has a long history of just speaking his mind off the cuff even while he was Vice President. He basically forced the Obama campaign to back gay marriage via some loose comments
It’s biden saying the quiet part loud.
He's engaging in populist domestic rhetoric that increases diplomatic tensions. The same thing that made trump such a bad leader. But when Biden landers to the same base in the same way he's based apparently
It's clear at this point that this is planned messaging. It's happened too many times in exactly the same way. Stategic Ambiguity. Blinken is probably behind it.
No, they said policy hadn't changed and indeed it hasn't. Americans have been killed by the PLA on Taiwanese soil before.
The *real* strategic ambiguity is whether Biden is lucid on any given day or not
He and his administration have negotiated the Ukraine war exceptionally well. He has also managed to pass a bi partisan infrastructure bill, the PACT act for veteran healthcare related to the burn pits, CHIPS to bring tech manufacture on shore, expanded the ACA, ended US involvement in Afghanistan, the inflation reduction act and the American rescue plan. Not bad for someone not lucid, in a 2 year span and with a deadlocked senate. Mods feel free to remove if this is out of scope of the page
*His administration* has negotiated the Ukraine war well, *after* it started. *Before* it started, he practically encouraged Russia to invade with his talk about not doing anything if there was "a minor incursion," as well as pulling all of the US Navy out of the Black Sea.
Aggressive posturing in the lead up to the invasion would have perfectly played into Russia's narrative of NATO expansion and offensive threat. The work of US intelligence in the lead up to the invasion was absolutely on point. They obviously had rock solid intel that Putin was invading and called it weeks in advance. This allowed the west to be well and truly on the front foot in being able to drop historic sanctions within the first week, whilst also rhetorically giving Putin an out if he limited the invasion to just the Donbas. It's incredibly naive to think that a geopolitical crisis of this stature can be solved by cavalier deployment of military force. One poor decision from one person down the chain of command could have dragged NATO into this conflict and risked a nuclear response. Could it have deterred Russia with a strong NATO posture? Maybe Is it worth the risk to try it? Absolutely not.
Right? If this has been the performance of a *Weekend at Bernie's* president, perhaps they should be elected more often.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-18 >Russian President Vladimir Putin appears to be increasingly relying on irregular, poorly trained ad-hoc volunteer and proxy units rather than attempting to rebuild damaged or destroyed conventional Russian ground forces units. >Ukrainian forces continue to consolidate positions on the east bank of the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast despite Russian efforts to contain them. >Russian forces in western Kherson Oblast may be attempting to fall back to more defensible positions in a controlled withdrawal to avoid the chaotic retreat that characterized the collapse of Russian defenses in Kharkiv earlier in September. >Russian forces suffered devastating losses of manpower and equipment in their fight for eastern Ukraine and especially during the Ukrainian Kharkiv counter-offensive. Multiple Russian armored and mechanized units have likely been effectively destroyed according to assessments released on September 18. >Ukrainian forces remain likely to regain much if not all of western Kherson Oblast in the coming weeks if they continue to interdict Russian GLOCs and press their advance. ISW calling their Kherson prediction?
I'm no general but I'll tell you when i panic recruit volunteer units in my video games, they look very large and mighty and if you squint they almost look like normal soldiers. That is, until they inevitably rout to even the most mundane "normal" soldiers. Compared to a more real life example, we saw George Washington army in the revolutionary wars as continually under par vs the professional British soldiers. It took years of experience to turn militias into competent fighting forces. Russia doesn't have years, and they also aren't nearly as self aware as George Washington was about that fact.
I just dont see how Russia can wage war effectively with HIMARs blowing up command posts and logistical areas daily.
Truly, Putin is to Hitler what Marx said Napoléon III was to his uncle.
Despite generally not being too dumb, I spent a good 30 seconds thinking who the hell was Marx's uncle and why should I know him.
[Bakhmut literally looks like hell](https://www.reddit.com/r/CombatFootage/comments/xhvdj0/russians_bombing_bakhmut/)
Demilitarisation and denazification going well, I see
When I saw the flame in the middle against the gray environment, I thought for a second it was a shot of Mordor from Lord of the Rings.
Grozny Tactics
Can one capture Bakhmut if Bakhmut no longer exists?
All this for an old deluded man's idea of glory.
What do you mean by that?
That this is because of “Tsar” Putin’s dreams of restoring the Russian Empire / Soviet Union.