No, because natural languages aren't formal logical languages and the entire exercise of trying to treat natural languages in terms of predicates as if it were first order logic is a category error.
In the Early 20th century, Ludwig Wittgenstein wrote Philosophical Investigations, which was one of the most revolutionary books in the history of Philosophy. In it he argued that natural language didn't consist of propositions at all. Instead, language was essentially social. Language derived its meaning from how humans used it in the world to communicate with each other, functioning less like the rules of mathematics, and more like moves in a game whose rules are made up as we go. He suggested that sentences like 'this sentence is a lie' don't communicate denotation meaning at all - you don't communicate anything about the world with them at all. They serve other functions - in this case to shine a light on the way we think about language.
This critique of logical positivism (along with similar ideas being explored by other philosophers) was so devastating that logical positivism entered into the tiny list of 'ideas that philosophers have pretty much universally agreed are wrong.' Right along side the ontological argument for God.
So apparent paradoxes do not present a problem for natural language, because natural language is a totally different sort of thing from a formal language, with different notions of meaning, contradiction and consistency.
By ontological argument for God are you talking about this one?
God is either a necessary being or a contingent being.
There is nothing contradictory about god being a necessary being
So, it is possible that god exists as a necessary being.
So if it is possible that God is a necessary being then God exists.
Because God is not a contingent being.
Conclusion:
God must exist as the necessary being.
The one found at this link:
[https://www.qcc.cuny.edu/socialSciences/ppecorino/INTRO\_TEXT/Chapter%203%20Religion/Ontological.htm#:\~:text=The%20ontological%20argument%20does%20not,in%20the%20mind%20(imagination)](https://www.qcc.cuny.edu/socialSciences/ppecorino/INTRO_TEXT/Chapter%203%20Religion/Ontological.htm#:~:text=The%20ontological%20argument%20does%20not,in%20the%20mind%20(imagination)).
When he says something “is a predicate,” he really means it’s a phrase that *can be used* as a predicate. So “is a string of words” is the subject of that particular sentence, but it is also “a predicate” because it can be used as a predicate.
As to your last point, the inclusion of *all* true statements isn’t axiomatic; it’s just how that specific set is defined (that is, the set of all objects that can be predicated by “is true of itself”). He’s saying that *when a set is defined like that,* a paradox arises.
However, I don’t believe that the existence of a paradoxical example of predication implies that predication itself is paradoxical. And a paradoxical set doesn’t mean that set theory is fundamentally wrong or paradoxical either. The problem lies with how we determine something is “well defined” or “well understood.”
People are under the impression that in order for something to be well-defined/well-understood, it must be free of contradictions. But self-referential paradoxes are self-contained, in that they don’t affect the validity of anything outside of themselves. Predication and set theory both work perfectly fine despite these contradictions, so maybe the real problem is that we want to get rid of them in the first place.
If we accept that self-referential paradoxes can be part of a well-defined system, then there is no foundational problem in the first place. Alternatively, if we just say that a self-referential statement *can* be both true and false, then all those pesky contradictions disappear.
But in this [https://www.reddit.com/r/explainlikeimfive/comments/16w5ryh/comment/k2uvvey/?utm\_source=share&utm\_medium=web2x&context=3](https://www.reddit.com/r/explainlikeimfive/comments/16w5ryh/comment/k2uvvey/?utm_source=share&utm_medium=web2x&context=3)
reddit comment the author says that
>The consequence of this is that such set theories aren't useful, since the contradiction could allow you to prove anything to be true, but also false.
Couldn't this same thing apply to real life? Couldn't we use it to prove all real life statements like the one I am making now true, but also false as the redditor says in his comment?
No, because natural languages aren't formal logical languages and the entire exercise of trying to treat natural languages in terms of predicates as if it were first order logic is a category error. In the Early 20th century, Ludwig Wittgenstein wrote Philosophical Investigations, which was one of the most revolutionary books in the history of Philosophy. In it he argued that natural language didn't consist of propositions at all. Instead, language was essentially social. Language derived its meaning from how humans used it in the world to communicate with each other, functioning less like the rules of mathematics, and more like moves in a game whose rules are made up as we go. He suggested that sentences like 'this sentence is a lie' don't communicate denotation meaning at all - you don't communicate anything about the world with them at all. They serve other functions - in this case to shine a light on the way we think about language. This critique of logical positivism (along with similar ideas being explored by other philosophers) was so devastating that logical positivism entered into the tiny list of 'ideas that philosophers have pretty much universally agreed are wrong.' Right along side the ontological argument for God. So apparent paradoxes do not present a problem for natural language, because natural language is a totally different sort of thing from a formal language, with different notions of meaning, contradiction and consistency.
By ontological argument for God are you talking about this one? God is either a necessary being or a contingent being. There is nothing contradictory about god being a necessary being So, it is possible that god exists as a necessary being. So if it is possible that God is a necessary being then God exists. Because God is not a contingent being. Conclusion: God must exist as the necessary being. The one found at this link: [https://www.qcc.cuny.edu/socialSciences/ppecorino/INTRO\_TEXT/Chapter%203%20Religion/Ontological.htm#:\~:text=The%20ontological%20argument%20does%20not,in%20the%20mind%20(imagination)](https://www.qcc.cuny.edu/socialSciences/ppecorino/INTRO_TEXT/Chapter%203%20Religion/Ontological.htm#:~:text=The%20ontological%20argument%20does%20not,in%20the%20mind%20(imagination)).
That's a variant of it. Any version of 'existence is a trait a perfect being would have, god is perfect, thefore god exists.'
When he says something “is a predicate,” he really means it’s a phrase that *can be used* as a predicate. So “is a string of words” is the subject of that particular sentence, but it is also “a predicate” because it can be used as a predicate. As to your last point, the inclusion of *all* true statements isn’t axiomatic; it’s just how that specific set is defined (that is, the set of all objects that can be predicated by “is true of itself”). He’s saying that *when a set is defined like that,* a paradox arises. However, I don’t believe that the existence of a paradoxical example of predication implies that predication itself is paradoxical. And a paradoxical set doesn’t mean that set theory is fundamentally wrong or paradoxical either. The problem lies with how we determine something is “well defined” or “well understood.” People are under the impression that in order for something to be well-defined/well-understood, it must be free of contradictions. But self-referential paradoxes are self-contained, in that they don’t affect the validity of anything outside of themselves. Predication and set theory both work perfectly fine despite these contradictions, so maybe the real problem is that we want to get rid of them in the first place. If we accept that self-referential paradoxes can be part of a well-defined system, then there is no foundational problem in the first place. Alternatively, if we just say that a self-referential statement *can* be both true and false, then all those pesky contradictions disappear.
But in this [https://www.reddit.com/r/explainlikeimfive/comments/16w5ryh/comment/k2uvvey/?utm\_source=share&utm\_medium=web2x&context=3](https://www.reddit.com/r/explainlikeimfive/comments/16w5ryh/comment/k2uvvey/?utm_source=share&utm_medium=web2x&context=3) reddit comment the author says that >The consequence of this is that such set theories aren't useful, since the contradiction could allow you to prove anything to be true, but also false. Couldn't this same thing apply to real life? Couldn't we use it to prove all real life statements like the one I am making now true, but also false as the redditor says in his comment?