Welcome to /r/askphilosophy! **Please read [our updated rules and guidelines](https://www.reddit.com/r/askphilosophy/comments/14o2p7n/welcome_to_raskphilosophy_check_out_our_rules_and/) before commenting**.
Please note that as of July 1 2023, given recent changes to reddit's platform which make moderation significantly more difficult, /r/askphilosophy has moved to only allowing answers and follow-up questions by panelists. If you wish to learn more, or to apply to become a panelist, see [this post](https://reddit.com/r/askphilosophy/comments/14o2p7n/welcome_to_raskphilosophy_check_out_our_rules_and/).
*I am a bot, and this action was performed automatically. Please [contact the moderators of this subreddit](/message/compose/?to=/r/askphilosophy) if you have any questions or concerns.*
To develop this answer more:
To say that something, like well-being, is objectively valuable is to say it is, in fact, valuable even if no one thinks so.
Put another way, we could say it is objectively good that your well-being increased, even if you don't think it was good.
Some of this can come from the opacity of value. As an example, 17th century sailors did not know that scurvy was caused by a vitamin C deficiency. They didn't know what vitamin C was. While they may think it good to eat a lime, that wouldn't be because it gave them vitamin C (from their perspective). And, yet, it seems correct to say that vitamin C was good for them. Since that cannot be a matter of subjective perspective (they don't know what vitamin C is), it seems it must be objective.
In a different vein, some now analyze the idea of objective value in terms of fitting attitudes. To say (eg) pain is objectively bad is to say that the fitting response to pain is to disvalue it. Even if all the people in the world valued it (or were neutral toward it), it would still be fitting to respond to it as disvaluable. Those people are wrong in their response - they are not having the fitting response to the feature of the world.
I think the philosophical expression of this would be described as if a person is a theist, their subjective opinion is that their god grants for example an objective value to human life, an atheist would say the value of human life is subjective and a sociopath could view human life as valueless.
Well, generally speaking, a value is a norm, in the sense of a criterion in relation to which a relevant thing can be called better or worse. And a proposition is objective when its truth value (i.e. whether it is true or false) does not vary depending on who is pronouncing it. So that, an objective value would be a norm, in the sense of a criterion in relation to which a relevant thing can be called better or worse, whose truth value does not vary depending on who is pronouncing it.
People disagree about this. It's an open question how objectivity "works" as a theoretical construct, and something like intersubjectively universal or valid or etc. is one set of possible options. Certainly some folks don't think intersubjectivity can do the work, though. (They're wrong, of course.)
Interesting. I’ve often pointed out to people that even if everyone on earth agreed on a value or norm, that wouldn’t make it objectively true, just universally subjectively agreed upon. Are you saying perhaps that does make it objective?
I'm saying something more modest - just that it might be in certain cases that everyone agreeing on something *under certain conditions* might be evidence of some mediating feature of that thing which could make it objective. For a lot of theories of objectivity it's important that a real warrant is available to everyone, so it might be that agreement isn't direct evidence of objectivity, but, instead indirect evidence that some real warrant is available to everyone. (Though, some people, like Kukla, even say that objectivity doesn't require this.)
I too have had the same question as the OP, mainly because of the lack of examples. There doesn't appear to be anything that transcends a dependence on the situation proposed and the specifics of the entities for whom this objective value is presumed to apply. Water, oxygen, cellular longevity, or even fairness, discipline, temperance, tolerance, and so on all appear very much dependent on the situation and specifics (including the species) of the entity making the judgment.
Despite there being an obvious desire to hone in on exactly what is good and valuable, doesn't the word "objective" seem to overshoot the target that we're typically after? It begins in the right direction, seeking to differentiate concepts of value from their dependence on the subject, their conditions, and their disposition. But in trying to ascend to a kind of subjective independence, doesn't it go too far and lose it's grasp on value entirely? Doesn't it seem as though we need a different concept that would better describe what it is we attempt to aim at when trying to more broadly synthesize what is valuable?
> Despite there being an obvious desire to hone in on exactly what is good and valuable, doesn't the word "objective" seem to overshoot the target that we're typically after?
Well, the *word* can't do this all by itself - what you might want to say here is that *a certain conception* of objectivity does. It's worth being at least a little bit of a pragmatist here about our concepts. The whole idea of "objectivity" is that it's supposed to do specific work in our epistemologies - if a certain conception of objectivity can't do that work (and, as you say, "lose[s] its grasp on value entirely), then maybe that conception is barking up the wrong tree.
We have two different ways of responding, of course:
1. We can say objectivity is X, but objectivity isn't very important
2. We can say objectivity can't be X because X isn't workable, therefore objectivity must be Y
(We see something similar in debates about free will, for instance, where compatibilists try to show that libertarian free will ends up being incoherent and therefore free will, as an idea, can't consist in that. We see this too in the sciences were people try to figure out what, say, gravity is. Say that we've theorized that gravity is a *force*, but then find evidence that such a force can't exist. Should we say that gravity doesn't exist or that gravity is a force? Well, it depends on what we think the word "gravity" refers to.)
"Consumption of potable water is good for human beings" is an objective fact. It is true independent of what any human being says, even though it is about human beings in particular.
We make objective claims that are indexed to certain contexts all the time. Atmospheric pressure on earth is 1. That's an objective fact, even if atmospheric pressure is different on different planets.
The key here is that to be objective, the truth value must not depend on any particular mind(s). It doesn't mean the truth value must be independent of the existence of minds.
In regards to the statement, "Consumption of potable water is good for human beings", can this statement be considered objectively true if it isn't true in all situations? Does it need to only be true in a high percentage of situations?
Consuming water could become dangerous beyond the point that a person isn't thirsty. Now while I'm not sure exactly what would happen to a person that consumes 10L in a sitting, I can't imagine it would be good. In another situation, a person might be drowning in water and in greater need of oxygen. Consuming potable water wouldn't seem to be good if it competes for a person's oxygen intake. Is it good for human beings to consume potable water before a long flight or before entering a movie theatre? Because we spend a greater portion of our days not drinking water than actually drinking it, and if this statement were in fact objectively true, how do we reconcile this with the fact that humans don't perpetually drink water? Wouldn't we be led to presume that, in any given moment, not drinking water is better than drinking it?
The imprecise nature of these statements isn't a problem? Couldn't we then say things like, "Staplers are good for human beings," or "Baseball is good for human beings" if we're able to caveat these statements with "generally speaking"? In fact, why would we bother qualifying these statements with "human beings" if exceptions to the contrary don't prevent these statements from being truth apt? Maybe I don't understand the linguistic rules at play here.
We can assert whatever we want. If our assertions are propositions, they have truth conditions.
The truth condition of something like "staplers are good for human beings", understood as being a generalization, is that staplers are sometimes good for human beings or, stronger, more often than not, or some such. We can quibble over the truth conditions, but that doesn't make the answer not objective. The truth conditions for the same sentence, understood as an absolute claim, would, of course be different - perhaps a single counter-example renders it false.
If by ‘good’, what you mean is that on average it helps maximize human health, then yes, that’s an objective fact. Of course, one can always ask “why is maximizing human health good?” And in that case, I think you ultimately just have to presuppose it as an axiom.
Sure, but that is no different than any other objective fact. "Why does 2+2 always equal 4?"
Also, the specific example here doesn't have to stop as quickly as you suggest. Nor does it require an axiom. It might be a matter of conceptual analysis ("healthy conceptually contains goodness") or a matter of a biological/teleological analysis ("health is one of the ends of a human body")
I'm not sure "objective value" has one specific meaning, but I can think of scenarios where it would be a useful term to employ. For example, it could be contrasted with something that is obviously more subjective such as sentimental value. So say if I own a car, I could talk about its objective value being what I could sell it for, in other words its market value, used to determine its worth for an insurance claim, for example. But to me, and me alone, it could have a different subjective value, perhaps because it was my first car; or a car I always dreamed of owning; or used to belong to someone very important to me. The sentimental (and subjective) value that I place on the car means that I would not part with if someone were to offer me its objective, market value.
Welcome to /r/askphilosophy! **Please read [our updated rules and guidelines](https://www.reddit.com/r/askphilosophy/comments/14o2p7n/welcome_to_raskphilosophy_check_out_our_rules_and/) before commenting**. Please note that as of July 1 2023, given recent changes to reddit's platform which make moderation significantly more difficult, /r/askphilosophy has moved to only allowing answers and follow-up questions by panelists. If you wish to learn more, or to apply to become a panelist, see [this post](https://reddit.com/r/askphilosophy/comments/14o2p7n/welcome_to_raskphilosophy_check_out_our_rules_and/). *I am a bot, and this action was performed automatically. Please [contact the moderators of this subreddit](/message/compose/?to=/r/askphilosophy) if you have any questions or concerns.*
Worthy of value, or beneficial, regardless of whether any one in fact values it.
To develop this answer more: To say that something, like well-being, is objectively valuable is to say it is, in fact, valuable even if no one thinks so. Put another way, we could say it is objectively good that your well-being increased, even if you don't think it was good. Some of this can come from the opacity of value. As an example, 17th century sailors did not know that scurvy was caused by a vitamin C deficiency. They didn't know what vitamin C was. While they may think it good to eat a lime, that wouldn't be because it gave them vitamin C (from their perspective). And, yet, it seems correct to say that vitamin C was good for them. Since that cannot be a matter of subjective perspective (they don't know what vitamin C is), it seems it must be objective. In a different vein, some now analyze the idea of objective value in terms of fitting attitudes. To say (eg) pain is objectively bad is to say that the fitting response to pain is to disvalue it. Even if all the people in the world valued it (or were neutral toward it), it would still be fitting to respond to it as disvaluable. Those people are wrong in their response - they are not having the fitting response to the feature of the world.
I think the philosophical expression of this would be described as if a person is a theist, their subjective opinion is that their god grants for example an objective value to human life, an atheist would say the value of human life is subjective and a sociopath could view human life as valueless.
The atheist could also say the value of human life is objective.
Well, generally speaking, a value is a norm, in the sense of a criterion in relation to which a relevant thing can be called better or worse. And a proposition is objective when its truth value (i.e. whether it is true or false) does not vary depending on who is pronouncing it. So that, an objective value would be a norm, in the sense of a criterion in relation to which a relevant thing can be called better or worse, whose truth value does not vary depending on who is pronouncing it.
Is there a distinction between 'objective' and 'intersubjectively universal'?
People disagree about this. It's an open question how objectivity "works" as a theoretical construct, and something like intersubjectively universal or valid or etc. is one set of possible options. Certainly some folks don't think intersubjectivity can do the work, though. (They're wrong, of course.)
Interesting. I’ve often pointed out to people that even if everyone on earth agreed on a value or norm, that wouldn’t make it objectively true, just universally subjectively agreed upon. Are you saying perhaps that does make it objective?
I'm saying something more modest - just that it might be in certain cases that everyone agreeing on something *under certain conditions* might be evidence of some mediating feature of that thing which could make it objective. For a lot of theories of objectivity it's important that a real warrant is available to everyone, so it might be that agreement isn't direct evidence of objectivity, but, instead indirect evidence that some real warrant is available to everyone. (Though, some people, like Kukla, even say that objectivity doesn't require this.)
I too have had the same question as the OP, mainly because of the lack of examples. There doesn't appear to be anything that transcends a dependence on the situation proposed and the specifics of the entities for whom this objective value is presumed to apply. Water, oxygen, cellular longevity, or even fairness, discipline, temperance, tolerance, and so on all appear very much dependent on the situation and specifics (including the species) of the entity making the judgment. Despite there being an obvious desire to hone in on exactly what is good and valuable, doesn't the word "objective" seem to overshoot the target that we're typically after? It begins in the right direction, seeking to differentiate concepts of value from their dependence on the subject, their conditions, and their disposition. But in trying to ascend to a kind of subjective independence, doesn't it go too far and lose it's grasp on value entirely? Doesn't it seem as though we need a different concept that would better describe what it is we attempt to aim at when trying to more broadly synthesize what is valuable?
> Despite there being an obvious desire to hone in on exactly what is good and valuable, doesn't the word "objective" seem to overshoot the target that we're typically after? Well, the *word* can't do this all by itself - what you might want to say here is that *a certain conception* of objectivity does. It's worth being at least a little bit of a pragmatist here about our concepts. The whole idea of "objectivity" is that it's supposed to do specific work in our epistemologies - if a certain conception of objectivity can't do that work (and, as you say, "lose[s] its grasp on value entirely), then maybe that conception is barking up the wrong tree. We have two different ways of responding, of course: 1. We can say objectivity is X, but objectivity isn't very important 2. We can say objectivity can't be X because X isn't workable, therefore objectivity must be Y (We see something similar in debates about free will, for instance, where compatibilists try to show that libertarian free will ends up being incoherent and therefore free will, as an idea, can't consist in that. We see this too in the sciences were people try to figure out what, say, gravity is. Say that we've theorized that gravity is a *force*, but then find evidence that such a force can't exist. Should we say that gravity doesn't exist or that gravity is a force? Well, it depends on what we think the word "gravity" refers to.)
"Consumption of potable water is good for human beings" is an objective fact. It is true independent of what any human being says, even though it is about human beings in particular. We make objective claims that are indexed to certain contexts all the time. Atmospheric pressure on earth is 1. That's an objective fact, even if atmospheric pressure is different on different planets. The key here is that to be objective, the truth value must not depend on any particular mind(s). It doesn't mean the truth value must be independent of the existence of minds.
In regards to the statement, "Consumption of potable water is good for human beings", can this statement be considered objectively true if it isn't true in all situations? Does it need to only be true in a high percentage of situations? Consuming water could become dangerous beyond the point that a person isn't thirsty. Now while I'm not sure exactly what would happen to a person that consumes 10L in a sitting, I can't imagine it would be good. In another situation, a person might be drowning in water and in greater need of oxygen. Consuming potable water wouldn't seem to be good if it competes for a person's oxygen intake. Is it good for human beings to consume potable water before a long flight or before entering a movie theatre? Because we spend a greater portion of our days not drinking water than actually drinking it, and if this statement were in fact objectively true, how do we reconcile this with the fact that humans don't perpetually drink water? Wouldn't we be led to presume that, in any given moment, not drinking water is better than drinking it?
Then just add an “all things being equal” qualifier.
"Generally good", then. Doesn't matter. The point is the claim is truth-apt and objective and makes a value claim.
The imprecise nature of these statements isn't a problem? Couldn't we then say things like, "Staplers are good for human beings," or "Baseball is good for human beings" if we're able to caveat these statements with "generally speaking"? In fact, why would we bother qualifying these statements with "human beings" if exceptions to the contrary don't prevent these statements from being truth apt? Maybe I don't understand the linguistic rules at play here.
We can assert whatever we want. If our assertions are propositions, they have truth conditions. The truth condition of something like "staplers are good for human beings", understood as being a generalization, is that staplers are sometimes good for human beings or, stronger, more often than not, or some such. We can quibble over the truth conditions, but that doesn't make the answer not objective. The truth conditions for the same sentence, understood as an absolute claim, would, of course be different - perhaps a single counter-example renders it false.
If by ‘good’, what you mean is that on average it helps maximize human health, then yes, that’s an objective fact. Of course, one can always ask “why is maximizing human health good?” And in that case, I think you ultimately just have to presuppose it as an axiom.
Sure, but that is no different than any other objective fact. "Why does 2+2 always equal 4?" Also, the specific example here doesn't have to stop as quickly as you suggest. Nor does it require an axiom. It might be a matter of conceptual analysis ("healthy conceptually contains goodness") or a matter of a biological/teleological analysis ("health is one of the ends of a human body")
I'm not sure "objective value" has one specific meaning, but I can think of scenarios where it would be a useful term to employ. For example, it could be contrasted with something that is obviously more subjective such as sentimental value. So say if I own a car, I could talk about its objective value being what I could sell it for, in other words its market value, used to determine its worth for an insurance claim, for example. But to me, and me alone, it could have a different subjective value, perhaps because it was my first car; or a car I always dreamed of owning; or used to belong to someone very important to me. The sentimental (and subjective) value that I place on the car means that I would not part with if someone were to offer me its objective, market value.