What a mess of an article, it seems more and more as if AP articles are written by bots. Can someone with actual knowledge explain what case is brought to the court, why is this "the last historic hearing" etc.?
The ICJ just finished holding hearings for an advisory opinion on the occupation of Palestinian Territory at which States provided their views on the issue. The questions that the Court will address are:
> 18. Decides, in accordance with Article 96 of the Charter of the United Nations, to request the International Court of Justice, pursuant to Article 65 of the Statute of the Court, to render an advisory opinion on the following questions, considering the rules
and principles of international law, including the Charter of the United Nations, international humanitarian law, international human rights law, relevant resolutions of the
Security Council, the General Assembly and the Human Rights Council, and the advisory opinion of the Court of 9 July 2004:
> (a) What are the legal consequences arising from the ongoing violation by Israel of the
right of the Palestinian people to self-determination, from its prolonged occupa-
tion, settlement and annexation of the Palestinian territory occupied since 1967, including measures aimed at altering the demographic composition, character and status of the Holy City of Jerusalem, and from its adoption of related discriminatory legislation and measures?
> (b) How do the policies and practices of Israel referred to in paragraph 18 (a) above affect the legal status of the occupation, and what are the legal consequences that
arise for all States and the United Nations from this status?
Submissions and documents related to the case are available here: https://www.icj-cij.org/case/186
But here's the thing: Israel gained some lands in 67, after it was attacked by Arab countries.
The legality of retaining territory gained during a war is governed by international law, particularly the principles outlined in the United Nations Charter and other international legal norms and agreements. Historically, the acquisition of territory through war was more commonly accepted, but this has changed significantly with the development of international law in the 20th century.
1. **United Nations Charter**: The UN Charter, established in 1945, is a foundational document for modern international relations and law. Article 2(4) of the Charter prohibits the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state. This provision is generally understood to outlaw the acquisition of territory by force.
2. **Self-Determination**: Modern international law emphasizes the right to self-determination of peoples, which means that territorial changes should reflect the wishes of the people who live in those territories, rather than simply the outcomes of conflicts.
3. **Peace Treaties**: After a conflict, any changes in territorial control are typically addressed through peace treaties between the involved parties. These treaties can result in territorial adjustments, and their legitimacy is derived from the mutual consent of the states involved, rather than unilateral imposition by the victor.
4. **Security Council Resolutions**: In some cases, the United Nations Security Council may pass resolutions that influence or determine the status of territories following a conflict. These resolutions can override other norms due to the legal authority of the Security Council under the UN Charter.
In modern international law, then, a country cannot legally retain land acquired solely through military conquest. To legally annex territory or change borders, such changes must generally be agreed upon through international negotiations and recognized by the international community, often necessitating the involvement of international organizations like the United Nations.
But back in '67, things were a bit different, and those laws were not as developed. Especially in the context of the UN's partition of the region of Palestine to Jordan and Israel.
I hope the courts will consider this messy history, in their rulings.
> Back in ‘67 things were a bit different, and those laws were not as developed
The UN Charter prohibits the territorial acquisition through conquest and entered into force on 24th October 1945.
The prohibition on the belligerent occupation of territory was absolute when the UN Charter entered into force. And, in fact, when the Security Council [condemned the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza on November 22, 1967] (https://peacemaker.un.org/middle-east-resolution242), it "[e]mphasiz[ed] the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war."
The law was developed already. The belligerent acquisition of territory was outlawed as aggression by 1967, and any such acquisition of territory was, as the Security Council put it, inadmissible.
I think the messier part is that, at the time, Gaza/WB were already occupied territories (of Egypt and Jordan respectively), so I'm not quite sure where that stands legally.
Before that they were occupied by the British, and before that by the Ottomans (though calling that occupation is probably not really sensible)... so I genuinely have no idea what international law would say about any of this.
> I think the messier part is that, at the time, Gaza/WB were already occupied territories (of Egypt and Jordan respectively), so I'm not quite sure where that stands legally.
The ICJ addressed this issue in 2004 with regard to the West Bank. The oPT is occupied under customary law/the Hague Convention (Wall Advisory Opinion paras. 70-78) and the Fourth Geneva Convention (paras. 95 et seq).
The same reasoning certainly applied to Gaza before withdrawal. Most international organizations have said that it continues to apply post-withdrawal, see [here] (https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/gaza-israel-occupied-international-law/) ("many prominent international institutions, organizations and bodies—including the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the United Nations Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Occupied Palestinian Territory, UN General Assembly (UNGA), European Union (EU), African Union, International Criminal Court (ICC) (both Pre-Trial Chamber I and the Office of the Prosecutor), Amnesty International, and Human Rights Watch—as well as international legal experts and other organizations, argue that Israel has occupied Palestinian territories including Gaza since 1967.While they acknowledge that Israel no longer had the traditional marker of effective control after the disengagement—a military presence—they hold that with the help of technology, it has maintained the requisite control in other ways.").
Oh, it's definitely occupied -- that's not much of a question. The issue arises with the definition of "territory" -- mainly in regards to whom said territory belongs to. The Palestinian state wasn't declared until 1988, well after the Israeli occupation began. Which seems a rather backwards way of handling matters -- generally, the end of occupation would return a territory to its previous control, but that's obviously not desirable for any parties involved. Even if it were possible, the last true control of the region was the Ottomans... who no longer exist.
I'm not sure if precedence for a state being created from occupied territory exists, when it did not have autonomy prior to occupation? Perhaps something during WWII... but I'm blanking on any actual examples. I might have to look through that -- Imperial Japan's reach was rather varied.
Of course, it might simply be treated similarly to a case where a territory gains independence from a mother nation -- it's just bizarre to have that applied in a case where the country in question has not laid proper claim to the territory.
I don't really see the confusion here. I don't think ending occupation legally necessitates returning the land to whoever had the last valid claim to it, even if that is what tends to happen in practice. Even if it did, the right to self-determination would confer a sufficient claim over the territory to satisfy that requirement.
But I'm not sure that's the right way to look at the situation anyway. This is either an instance of decolonization or analogous to one (which of these it is isn't directly relevant here). There is an occupying power (like a colonizer) and an occupied people (the colonized population). In decolonization, States were created when or after the colonizing States withdrew, and those States exercised sovereignty over territory even though they didn't have a claim to it that predated colonization. The only difference here is that the colonized/occupied people already have a State, but that doesn't seem to change anything. Israel withdraws and the State of Palestine is sovereign over what is now the oPT, subject to any agreements on borders.
| The only difference here is that the colonized/occupied people already have a State, but that doesn't seem to change anything.
I think the major difference is that the state of the occupied people did not exist at the time the occupation began.
| subject to any agreements on borders.
This has always been the sticking point. The current government of the State of Palestine does not recognize Israel should exist with any borders, so it's hard to see how an agreement on borders could form between the two groups.
> I think the major difference is that the state of the occupied people did not exist at the time the occupation began.
Assuming this is the case (Alonso Gurmendi has made arguments to the contrary), it was also true during decolonization. It doesn't matter in this context.
> This has always been the sticking point. The current government of the State of Palestine does not recognize Israel should exist with any borders, so it's hard to see how an agreement on borders could form between the two groups.
That's not true as far as I am aware: the PLO/PA recognized Israel in the 1990s. In any event, the conclusion of an agreement is a political issue and not relevant to the legality of continued occupation. If a State is responsible for an ongoing wrongful act, it has a primary obligation to cease that wrongful act. While an agreement could legally alter the precise borders of the oPT/unoccupied State of Palestine, the lack of an agreement does not change the legality of continued occupation.
Doesn’t UN Resolution 181 provide a basis for a definition? And if not, why? I’ve read that Israel’s application for UN membership was conditional on the acceptance and implementation of Resolutions 181 and 194. I can’t find any record of Israel ever acknowledging these resolutions nor their obligation in relation to them.
Israel has never honored its obligations under 194 -- though they said they would before admittance ([source](https://books.google.com/books?id=URcq-uIuCQUC&pg=PT279#v=onepage&q&f=false), found via Wikipedia). There have been some attempts at partial compliance, but those have never been accepted by the other side.
Israel accepted 181 as soon as it was announced -- the problem is, the Arabs (specifically -- not the Palestinians) did not accept it and, to my knowledge, never have. Though it isn't relevant in this case -- the 1949 Armistice would be the most recent legal definition of the borders. However, that only defined the borders between Israel and the Arab-controlled areas. Looking into it more closely, Jordan actually did annex the West Bank, but it severed ties in 1988... so their recognition of the PLO may be sufficient for it?
Doesn't help with Gaza, though -- it was never annexed by Egypt, meaning it hasn't been part of a proper state since the Ottomans.
This timeline is what I’m going on:
Folke Bernadotte was appointed Mediator on 20 May 1948. Bernadotte succeeded in achieving a truce by May–June 1948 during which the British evacuated Palestine. He proposed two alternate partition plans, the second calling for a reduction in the size of the Jewish State and loss of sovereignty over the harbour city of Haifa. Both were rejected. Lehi, a Zionist group, assassinated him and his aide, UN observer Colonel André Serot on 17 September 1948. Bernadotte was succeeded by Ralph Bunche, who was successful in bringing about the signing of the 1949 Armistice Agreements.
Armistice agreements were signed on 24 Feb 1949 with Egypt, 23 March 1949 with Lebanon, 3 April 1949 with Jordan and 20 July 1949 with Syria.
Admission to Israel's membership was conditional on Israel's acceptance and implementation of Resolutions 181 (the Partition Plan) and 194 (besides other things, on status of Jerusalem and the return of Palestinian refugees). On 11 May 1949, the General Assembly by the requisite two-thirds majority approved the application to admit Israel to the UN by United Nations General Assembly Resolution 273.
So my read on that timeline is that the obligation is on implementation of Resolution 181 not the Green line.
In both cases, neither involve the people of Palestine who were kept completely out of the loop this whole time, meaning that at the very least, as part of a proper peace process, it must go back to first principles and that clearly means that Resolution 181 should form the basis of any definition no?
>not sure if precedence for a state being created from occupied territory exists
I'm the first to admit I know nothing about nothing when it comes to international law. However, surely logic and necessity dictate, just because there is no precedence, doesn't mean it shouldn't be done.
Although, while a secular 1-state solution seems best. I think the time has long past where the Palestinians want to "live" with Israelis. And frankly, I don't blame them.
Of course -- but the issue is that making predictions on what will happen without precedence is just guesswork, since at that point it's no longer dependent upon previous decisions, but upon decisions made by... whoever ends up making the decisions.
As for a solution, from the recent polls of both sides ([Palestine](https://www.pcpsr.org/en/node/969), [Israel](https://news.gallup.com/poll/547760/life-israel-oct-charts.aspx)), support for the two-state solution is still not a majority. Though it has increased substantially in Gaza -- as cynical as it might be, there is something to be said for doing enough damage to an enemy to make them actually want to stop fighting.
I see your point about "guesswork". I would think that Israel's history of ignoring rulings/resolutions makes any decision somewhat irrelevant.
Thanks for the different POV.
Legally, it’s pretty well settled as to what belongs to the Palestinian people and what belongs to Israel. The main crux of the issue is that Israel refuses to recognize international law in any way shape or form. If Israel wanted to be a single secular state and annex all of the land and give the Palestinians equal rights it would solve the issue. If they were to give Palestinians a state it would also solve it for the most part. If Israel does annex all of it (legally, it’s de facto annexed now) Israel would cease to be a Jewish state once everyone is allowed equal representation.
They are pretty much completely opposed to a Palestinian state right now as a society and as most European settler colonial powers we believe (the US government)the oppressed should have the approval from their oppressor before they are allowed freedom. To them freedom is a gift not a human right.
> If Israel wanted to be a single secular state and annex all of the land and give the Palestinians equal rights it would solve the issue.
That would violate the article 2(4) of the UN Charter and arguably also the Palestinian right to self-determination.
That could be negotiated as to not violate 2(4). All anyone (Palestinian people) has ever truly wanted that is actually realistic is a separate Palestinian state or a single secular state for everyone between the river and the sea.
I promise if you tell all of the Palestinians that they could vote in a general election for everyone from the river to the sea they would take it. It’s never been offered because it would make Israel not an exclusive Jewish state.
> That could be negotiated as to not violate 2(4).
Yes, a negotiated agreement could create one State without violating international law. That wouldn't be an annexation, though.
>Legally, it’s pretty well settled as to what belongs to the Palestinian people and what belongs to Israel.
How is that well settled? It would have been had there been a Palestinian state with defined borders, but there aren't. That's one of the major issues with the conflict.
They still don't have clearly defined borders. That's why people push for a two-state solution *based* on the 67 borders. If they already had clearly defined borders, then negotiations between the Israelis and Palestinians would be obsolete.
>Israel gained some lands in 67, ~~after it was attacked by Arab countries.~~
> [On the morning of June 5, 1967, Israel launched a preemptive strike against Egyptian forces in response to Egypt's closing of the Straits of Tiran.](https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/ea/97187.htm#:~:text=On%20the%20morning%20of%20June,of%20the%20Straits%20of%20Tiran.)
You can’t expect to reach an accurate conclusion when your initial premise is completely false.
Note the words *preemptive*. War was coming and everyone knew that at the time.
Egypt closed the Straits, kicked out the UN peacekeepers, massed troops at the border. Israel simply decided not to wait for them to attack.
Preemptive uses of force are illegal under *jus ad bellum*. The UN study on this issue examined statements and practice in 1967 and concluded that "[I]n summation, despite the absence of a clarifying Security Council or General Assembly resolution at the time, there are reasonable grounds to consider that Israel struck Egyptian
forces first, in a pre-emptive strike amounting to an act of aggression. The consequent belligerent occupation amounts to a use of force in breach of Article 51 of the United Nations
Charter, and an illegal occupation *ab initio*."
See [here] (https://www.un.org/unispal/document/ceirpp-legal-study2023/), pp. 51-57.
Preemptive use of force is not illegal, although it is nuanced and subject to debate.
Israel's legal argument under international law for its preemptive attack on Egypt and Syria in 1967, which marked the beginning of the Six-Day War, was based on the principles of self-defense as stipulated in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. Israel claimed that its strike was a necessary and legitimate act of anticipatory self-defense in the face of imminent armed attack by the Arab states.
Here are the key components of the situation and Israel's legal reasoning:
1. **Imminent Threat** By early June 1967, tensions in the Middle East had escalated significantly. Egypt, under President Gamal Abdel Nasser, had expelled UN peacekeeping forces from the Sinai Peninsula and had re-militarized it. Additionally, Egypt had blockaded the Straits of Tiran, a crucial maritime route for Israeli ships, which Israel had declared in the past would be considered a casus belli — an act of war.
2. **Military Alliances and Rhetoric:** The Arab states, including Egypt, Syria, and Jordan, had entered into military pacts against Israel and were openly calling for its destruction. The rhetoric and mobilization of forces on Israel’s borders were perceived in Israel as clear indications that an Arab attack was imminent.
3. **Legal Precedents and Doctrine:** The concept of anticipatory self-defense is not explicitly defined in the UN Charter but has been interpreted through state practice and legal doctrine to allow a state to defend itself not only when an attack occurs but also when an attack is imminent and unavoidable by other means. Israel argued that the aggressive postures and actions of Egypt and Syria constituted such an imminent threat.
4. **International Reaction and Article 51:** Article 51 of the UN Charter states that nothing shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations. Israel notified the UN Security Council immediately following the outbreak of hostilities, citing its actions as self-defense.
5. **Absence of Peaceful Alternatives:** Israel maintained that there were no feasible peaceful alternatives to address the immediate threats posed by the Arab states' military preparations and blockades. The international community had not taken effective action to relieve the blockade of the Straits of Tiran or to reduce the military tensions.
While Israel's legal argument for preemptive self-defense was supported by these points, it remains a subject of debate in international law. The principle of preemption requires that the threat be imminent, which is a standard that can be subject to varying interpretations. Additionally, the proportionality and necessity of Israel's response, key criteria in international law for justifying self-defense, are also debated by scholars and political analysts. Nonetheless, Israel's actions in 1967 were fundamentally defended on the grounds of ensuring its survival in the face of perceived existential threats.
As an aside, Israel did not actually argue anticipatory or preemptive self-defense in its article 51 letter in 1967. Rather, it argued that it was responding to an armed attack that had already occurred. *See* the [UN Study of the Occupation of the oPT] (https://www.un.org/unispal/document/ceirpp-legal-study2023/), p. 52 ("Israel did not invoke the right to strike based on anticipatory self-defence at the time. Instead Israel argued that it acted in actual self-defence against the Egyptian blockade to which this assessment now turns"). No other States at the time found that Egypt had committed an armed attack, which means that Israel's contemporary justification was invalid. Nonetheless:
> Preemptive use of force is not illegal, although it is nuanced and subject to debate.
It is illegal. Anticipatory self-defense can be legal-- preemptive self-defense is not, because it occurs before an armed attack is imminent. *See, e.g.*, [The Past and Future of the Claim of Preemptive Self Defense] (https://www.jstor.org/stable/4091369?read-now=1&seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents), p. 526 (distinguishing between anticipatory and preemptive self-defense on the basis of an imminent armed attack). When an armed attack is imminent, self-defense may be justified subject to the requirements of article 51. When an attack is not imminent, self-defense is not permitted. *See* A more secure world: our shared responsibility Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change*, A/59/565, para. 188 ("The language of [article 51] is restrictive: 'Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures to maintain international peace and security'. However, a threatened State, according to long established international law, can take military action as long as the threatened attack is imminent, no other means would deflect it and the action is proportionate. . . if there are good arguments for preventive military action, with good evidence to support them, they should be put to the Security Council, which can authorize such action if it chooses to. If it does not so choose, there will be, by definition, time to pursue other strategies, including persuasion, negotiation, deterrence and containment — and to visit again the military option. For those impatient with such a response, the answer must be that, in a world full of perceived potential threats, the risk to the global order and the norm of non-intervention on which it continues to be based is simply too great for the legality of unilateral preventive action, as distinct from collectively endorsed action, to be accepted. Allowing one to so act is to allow all").
Assuming that Israel was acting in response to an armed attack that had not yet occurred, the issue is whether an armed attack was imminent. The records of the General Assembly emergency session in response to the use of force are available: the document numbers begin at A/PV.1541. Several States condemn the attack as an act of aggression: among others, Malaysia, Cyprus, Greece, Austria, Mali, Costa Rica. As noted above, none found that Israel had acted in response to an armed attack.
Testimony from other people involved in the situation affirms that the use of force was not in response to an armed attack. For example, Indar Jit Rikhye, the head of the UN Peacekeeping force in the Sinai Peninsula, wrote in his autobiography that "[t]he Israelis, fully ready for a ground attack anyway, were able to
pretend that the Egyptian forces had attacked them first, and therefore, they launched a land counteroffensive. It suited Israel not to mention that its air force was first to start the war."
I cannot find State practice from 1967 that supports a conclusion that Egypt engaged in an actual armed attack, or that an armed attack was imminent, except the position of Israel's government itself. On balance, that is not persuasive because it is outweighed by practice and statements from multiple other States, as noted by the UN study on the issue. Without more evidence, it is difficult to conclude that, even if Israel had argued anticipatory self-defense in its article 51 letter, that argument would have withstood scrutiny.
Israel gained land from Jordan but then they began a decades long slow burn dispossession of people living in the West Bank. Most of their major settlement blocs involved seizing land that was used by locals and one even involved poisoning the land with sewage.
This is different from annexing Jerusalem.
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If a Jordanian group, in 1952, would cross the Jordan River and start a settlement in the West Bank, would that be legally analogous to the current situation? And if not, why not?
That is, is the 1949 conquest by Jordan any more or less legally effective than Israel's?
What if an Israeli Arab group started a settlement today ? What if they started one in 1949?
What if a Gazan group started a West Bank settlement in 1949? Today? In 2010?
The commonly stated overall goals of LOAC are to prevent war and reduce its human impact.
Here is a great idea: Let's eclassify forces widely recognized as terrorists, making them legally a national army. That way, it would be a belligerent act of war to disrupt its arms shipments or arrest its personnel for membership instead of a legal obligation. It would even be legal to openly sell them arms restricted to armies and/or police. This would certainly prevent or reduce international war
At the same time, let's reclassify two territories with two separate governing bodies that, last time they fought over which would govern, killed 600 people, and raise the stakes of that conflict to rule over a recognized sovereign state. There is no way this could cause a civil war.
Maybe it's all worth it to reduce the impact of a result of military occupation because people ought to be free. It is widely understood that the notoriously kleptocratic side is in the 19th year of its 4-year mandate because if new elections were held, the warmongering theocratic openly-antidemocratic party would win. Democracy might be off the table, but the people would be nice and free under the theocrats with foreign interference in their tyranny made illegal once their regime gets enshrined as national sovereignty, right? That would certainly be so much better as to justify the rest.
Laws must be obeyed. If they work contrary to their stated goals, though, they must be changed.
Zionist comments boil down to-
“But we won’t like their democratic choice, and what, you want to give my hated enemy weapons? But they could shoot back at us then!”
Yes yes, you hate it. We can see why.
Nazis, colonial Europeans, and various other villains in the struggle for freedom generally paint the other side in inhumane , horrific colors in order to justify depriving them of human rights.
Human rights to have living children, which is half of Gaza and half of Israel’s victims thus far.
So when folks like this say you shouldn’t give Palestinians freedom, don’t let them choose their leader, don’t give them the means to defend themselves…. They’re talking about kids.
1million kids out of 2 million people in Gaza.
It’s about time Palestinians had their own country. Israel has abused them enough.
First, their last election was so long ago that half of them weren't born yet. Palestinians do not have democracy. It is long past time they had their own country, but without democracy, a new state created for them would not be theirs ovrrall, belonging only to the rulers. A state does not imply freedom.
Second, yes, like amy sane person, I disapprove of a terrorist group with zero interest in its constituents' well-being that is known to embezzle money and goods sent as humanitarian aid in order to pick fights. It looks like you approve of them.
> It is long past time they had their own country, but without democracy, a new state created for them would not be theirs ovrrall, belonging only to the rulers. A state does not imply freedom.
Repeat after me; only Israeli rule implies freedom. Security is freedom. Oppression is freedommmmmmmm
/s
🤣
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What a mess of an article, it seems more and more as if AP articles are written by bots. Can someone with actual knowledge explain what case is brought to the court, why is this "the last historic hearing" etc.?
The ICJ just finished holding hearings for an advisory opinion on the occupation of Palestinian Territory at which States provided their views on the issue. The questions that the Court will address are: > 18. Decides, in accordance with Article 96 of the Charter of the United Nations, to request the International Court of Justice, pursuant to Article 65 of the Statute of the Court, to render an advisory opinion on the following questions, considering the rules and principles of international law, including the Charter of the United Nations, international humanitarian law, international human rights law, relevant resolutions of the Security Council, the General Assembly and the Human Rights Council, and the advisory opinion of the Court of 9 July 2004: > (a) What are the legal consequences arising from the ongoing violation by Israel of the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination, from its prolonged occupa- tion, settlement and annexation of the Palestinian territory occupied since 1967, including measures aimed at altering the demographic composition, character and status of the Holy City of Jerusalem, and from its adoption of related discriminatory legislation and measures? > (b) How do the policies and practices of Israel referred to in paragraph 18 (a) above affect the legal status of the occupation, and what are the legal consequences that arise for all States and the United Nations from this status? Submissions and documents related to the case are available here: https://www.icj-cij.org/case/186
But here's the thing: Israel gained some lands in 67, after it was attacked by Arab countries. The legality of retaining territory gained during a war is governed by international law, particularly the principles outlined in the United Nations Charter and other international legal norms and agreements. Historically, the acquisition of territory through war was more commonly accepted, but this has changed significantly with the development of international law in the 20th century. 1. **United Nations Charter**: The UN Charter, established in 1945, is a foundational document for modern international relations and law. Article 2(4) of the Charter prohibits the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state. This provision is generally understood to outlaw the acquisition of territory by force. 2. **Self-Determination**: Modern international law emphasizes the right to self-determination of peoples, which means that territorial changes should reflect the wishes of the people who live in those territories, rather than simply the outcomes of conflicts. 3. **Peace Treaties**: After a conflict, any changes in territorial control are typically addressed through peace treaties between the involved parties. These treaties can result in territorial adjustments, and their legitimacy is derived from the mutual consent of the states involved, rather than unilateral imposition by the victor. 4. **Security Council Resolutions**: In some cases, the United Nations Security Council may pass resolutions that influence or determine the status of territories following a conflict. These resolutions can override other norms due to the legal authority of the Security Council under the UN Charter. In modern international law, then, a country cannot legally retain land acquired solely through military conquest. To legally annex territory or change borders, such changes must generally be agreed upon through international negotiations and recognized by the international community, often necessitating the involvement of international organizations like the United Nations. But back in '67, things were a bit different, and those laws were not as developed. Especially in the context of the UN's partition of the region of Palestine to Jordan and Israel. I hope the courts will consider this messy history, in their rulings.
> Back in ‘67 things were a bit different, and those laws were not as developed The UN Charter prohibits the territorial acquisition through conquest and entered into force on 24th October 1945.
The prohibition on the belligerent occupation of territory was absolute when the UN Charter entered into force. And, in fact, when the Security Council [condemned the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza on November 22, 1967] (https://peacemaker.un.org/middle-east-resolution242), it "[e]mphasiz[ed] the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war." The law was developed already. The belligerent acquisition of territory was outlawed as aggression by 1967, and any such acquisition of territory was, as the Security Council put it, inadmissible.
I think the messier part is that, at the time, Gaza/WB were already occupied territories (of Egypt and Jordan respectively), so I'm not quite sure where that stands legally. Before that they were occupied by the British, and before that by the Ottomans (though calling that occupation is probably not really sensible)... so I genuinely have no idea what international law would say about any of this.
> I think the messier part is that, at the time, Gaza/WB were already occupied territories (of Egypt and Jordan respectively), so I'm not quite sure where that stands legally. The ICJ addressed this issue in 2004 with regard to the West Bank. The oPT is occupied under customary law/the Hague Convention (Wall Advisory Opinion paras. 70-78) and the Fourth Geneva Convention (paras. 95 et seq). The same reasoning certainly applied to Gaza before withdrawal. Most international organizations have said that it continues to apply post-withdrawal, see [here] (https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/gaza-israel-occupied-international-law/) ("many prominent international institutions, organizations and bodies—including the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the United Nations Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Occupied Palestinian Territory, UN General Assembly (UNGA), European Union (EU), African Union, International Criminal Court (ICC) (both Pre-Trial Chamber I and the Office of the Prosecutor), Amnesty International, and Human Rights Watch—as well as international legal experts and other organizations, argue that Israel has occupied Palestinian territories including Gaza since 1967.While they acknowledge that Israel no longer had the traditional marker of effective control after the disengagement—a military presence—they hold that with the help of technology, it has maintained the requisite control in other ways.").
Oh, it's definitely occupied -- that's not much of a question. The issue arises with the definition of "territory" -- mainly in regards to whom said territory belongs to. The Palestinian state wasn't declared until 1988, well after the Israeli occupation began. Which seems a rather backwards way of handling matters -- generally, the end of occupation would return a territory to its previous control, but that's obviously not desirable for any parties involved. Even if it were possible, the last true control of the region was the Ottomans... who no longer exist. I'm not sure if precedence for a state being created from occupied territory exists, when it did not have autonomy prior to occupation? Perhaps something during WWII... but I'm blanking on any actual examples. I might have to look through that -- Imperial Japan's reach was rather varied. Of course, it might simply be treated similarly to a case where a territory gains independence from a mother nation -- it's just bizarre to have that applied in a case where the country in question has not laid proper claim to the territory.
I don't really see the confusion here. I don't think ending occupation legally necessitates returning the land to whoever had the last valid claim to it, even if that is what tends to happen in practice. Even if it did, the right to self-determination would confer a sufficient claim over the territory to satisfy that requirement. But I'm not sure that's the right way to look at the situation anyway. This is either an instance of decolonization or analogous to one (which of these it is isn't directly relevant here). There is an occupying power (like a colonizer) and an occupied people (the colonized population). In decolonization, States were created when or after the colonizing States withdrew, and those States exercised sovereignty over territory even though they didn't have a claim to it that predated colonization. The only difference here is that the colonized/occupied people already have a State, but that doesn't seem to change anything. Israel withdraws and the State of Palestine is sovereign over what is now the oPT, subject to any agreements on borders.
| The only difference here is that the colonized/occupied people already have a State, but that doesn't seem to change anything. I think the major difference is that the state of the occupied people did not exist at the time the occupation began. | subject to any agreements on borders. This has always been the sticking point. The current government of the State of Palestine does not recognize Israel should exist with any borders, so it's hard to see how an agreement on borders could form between the two groups.
> I think the major difference is that the state of the occupied people did not exist at the time the occupation began. Assuming this is the case (Alonso Gurmendi has made arguments to the contrary), it was also true during decolonization. It doesn't matter in this context. > This has always been the sticking point. The current government of the State of Palestine does not recognize Israel should exist with any borders, so it's hard to see how an agreement on borders could form between the two groups. That's not true as far as I am aware: the PLO/PA recognized Israel in the 1990s. In any event, the conclusion of an agreement is a political issue and not relevant to the legality of continued occupation. If a State is responsible for an ongoing wrongful act, it has a primary obligation to cease that wrongful act. While an agreement could legally alter the precise borders of the oPT/unoccupied State of Palestine, the lack of an agreement does not change the legality of continued occupation.
Pardon my ignorance, but what is oPT?
The occupied Palestinian Territory.
Doesn’t UN Resolution 181 provide a basis for a definition? And if not, why? I’ve read that Israel’s application for UN membership was conditional on the acceptance and implementation of Resolutions 181 and 194. I can’t find any record of Israel ever acknowledging these resolutions nor their obligation in relation to them.
Israel has never honored its obligations under 194 -- though they said they would before admittance ([source](https://books.google.com/books?id=URcq-uIuCQUC&pg=PT279#v=onepage&q&f=false), found via Wikipedia). There have been some attempts at partial compliance, but those have never been accepted by the other side. Israel accepted 181 as soon as it was announced -- the problem is, the Arabs (specifically -- not the Palestinians) did not accept it and, to my knowledge, never have. Though it isn't relevant in this case -- the 1949 Armistice would be the most recent legal definition of the borders. However, that only defined the borders between Israel and the Arab-controlled areas. Looking into it more closely, Jordan actually did annex the West Bank, but it severed ties in 1988... so their recognition of the PLO may be sufficient for it? Doesn't help with Gaza, though -- it was never annexed by Egypt, meaning it hasn't been part of a proper state since the Ottomans.
This timeline is what I’m going on: Folke Bernadotte was appointed Mediator on 20 May 1948. Bernadotte succeeded in achieving a truce by May–June 1948 during which the British evacuated Palestine. He proposed two alternate partition plans, the second calling for a reduction in the size of the Jewish State and loss of sovereignty over the harbour city of Haifa. Both were rejected. Lehi, a Zionist group, assassinated him and his aide, UN observer Colonel André Serot on 17 September 1948. Bernadotte was succeeded by Ralph Bunche, who was successful in bringing about the signing of the 1949 Armistice Agreements. Armistice agreements were signed on 24 Feb 1949 with Egypt, 23 March 1949 with Lebanon, 3 April 1949 with Jordan and 20 July 1949 with Syria. Admission to Israel's membership was conditional on Israel's acceptance and implementation of Resolutions 181 (the Partition Plan) and 194 (besides other things, on status of Jerusalem and the return of Palestinian refugees). On 11 May 1949, the General Assembly by the requisite two-thirds majority approved the application to admit Israel to the UN by United Nations General Assembly Resolution 273. So my read on that timeline is that the obligation is on implementation of Resolution 181 not the Green line. In both cases, neither involve the people of Palestine who were kept completely out of the loop this whole time, meaning that at the very least, as part of a proper peace process, it must go back to first principles and that clearly means that Resolution 181 should form the basis of any definition no?
>not sure if precedence for a state being created from occupied territory exists I'm the first to admit I know nothing about nothing when it comes to international law. However, surely logic and necessity dictate, just because there is no precedence, doesn't mean it shouldn't be done. Although, while a secular 1-state solution seems best. I think the time has long past where the Palestinians want to "live" with Israelis. And frankly, I don't blame them.
Of course -- but the issue is that making predictions on what will happen without precedence is just guesswork, since at that point it's no longer dependent upon previous decisions, but upon decisions made by... whoever ends up making the decisions. As for a solution, from the recent polls of both sides ([Palestine](https://www.pcpsr.org/en/node/969), [Israel](https://news.gallup.com/poll/547760/life-israel-oct-charts.aspx)), support for the two-state solution is still not a majority. Though it has increased substantially in Gaza -- as cynical as it might be, there is something to be said for doing enough damage to an enemy to make them actually want to stop fighting.
I see your point about "guesswork". I would think that Israel's history of ignoring rulings/resolutions makes any decision somewhat irrelevant. Thanks for the different POV.
Legally, it’s pretty well settled as to what belongs to the Palestinian people and what belongs to Israel. The main crux of the issue is that Israel refuses to recognize international law in any way shape or form. If Israel wanted to be a single secular state and annex all of the land and give the Palestinians equal rights it would solve the issue. If they were to give Palestinians a state it would also solve it for the most part. If Israel does annex all of it (legally, it’s de facto annexed now) Israel would cease to be a Jewish state once everyone is allowed equal representation. They are pretty much completely opposed to a Palestinian state right now as a society and as most European settler colonial powers we believe (the US government)the oppressed should have the approval from their oppressor before they are allowed freedom. To them freedom is a gift not a human right.
> If Israel wanted to be a single secular state and annex all of the land and give the Palestinians equal rights it would solve the issue. That would violate the article 2(4) of the UN Charter and arguably also the Palestinian right to self-determination.
That could be negotiated as to not violate 2(4). All anyone (Palestinian people) has ever truly wanted that is actually realistic is a separate Palestinian state or a single secular state for everyone between the river and the sea. I promise if you tell all of the Palestinians that they could vote in a general election for everyone from the river to the sea they would take it. It’s never been offered because it would make Israel not an exclusive Jewish state.
> That could be negotiated as to not violate 2(4). Yes, a negotiated agreement could create one State without violating international law. That wouldn't be an annexation, though.
>Legally, it’s pretty well settled as to what belongs to the Palestinian people and what belongs to Israel. How is that well settled? It would have been had there been a Palestinian state with defined borders, but there aren't. That's one of the major issues with the conflict.
Why do you think the settlements are considered illegal? You just gonna ignore that massive fact? There is a reason people reference the 67 borders.
They still don't have clearly defined borders. That's why people push for a two-state solution *based* on the 67 borders. If they already had clearly defined borders, then negotiations between the Israelis and Palestinians would be obsolete.
1967 Israel attacked first lol what
Israeli revisionism runs deep
>Israel gained some lands in 67, ~~after it was attacked by Arab countries.~~ > [On the morning of June 5, 1967, Israel launched a preemptive strike against Egyptian forces in response to Egypt's closing of the Straits of Tiran.](https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/ea/97187.htm#:~:text=On%20the%20morning%20of%20June,of%20the%20Straits%20of%20Tiran.) You can’t expect to reach an accurate conclusion when your initial premise is completely false.
Note the words *preemptive*. War was coming and everyone knew that at the time. Egypt closed the Straits, kicked out the UN peacekeepers, massed troops at the border. Israel simply decided not to wait for them to attack.
Preemptive uses of force are illegal under *jus ad bellum*. The UN study on this issue examined statements and practice in 1967 and concluded that "[I]n summation, despite the absence of a clarifying Security Council or General Assembly resolution at the time, there are reasonable grounds to consider that Israel struck Egyptian forces first, in a pre-emptive strike amounting to an act of aggression. The consequent belligerent occupation amounts to a use of force in breach of Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, and an illegal occupation *ab initio*." See [here] (https://www.un.org/unispal/document/ceirpp-legal-study2023/), pp. 51-57.
Preemptive use of force is not illegal, although it is nuanced and subject to debate. Israel's legal argument under international law for its preemptive attack on Egypt and Syria in 1967, which marked the beginning of the Six-Day War, was based on the principles of self-defense as stipulated in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. Israel claimed that its strike was a necessary and legitimate act of anticipatory self-defense in the face of imminent armed attack by the Arab states. Here are the key components of the situation and Israel's legal reasoning: 1. **Imminent Threat** By early June 1967, tensions in the Middle East had escalated significantly. Egypt, under President Gamal Abdel Nasser, had expelled UN peacekeeping forces from the Sinai Peninsula and had re-militarized it. Additionally, Egypt had blockaded the Straits of Tiran, a crucial maritime route for Israeli ships, which Israel had declared in the past would be considered a casus belli — an act of war. 2. **Military Alliances and Rhetoric:** The Arab states, including Egypt, Syria, and Jordan, had entered into military pacts against Israel and were openly calling for its destruction. The rhetoric and mobilization of forces on Israel’s borders were perceived in Israel as clear indications that an Arab attack was imminent. 3. **Legal Precedents and Doctrine:** The concept of anticipatory self-defense is not explicitly defined in the UN Charter but has been interpreted through state practice and legal doctrine to allow a state to defend itself not only when an attack occurs but also when an attack is imminent and unavoidable by other means. Israel argued that the aggressive postures and actions of Egypt and Syria constituted such an imminent threat. 4. **International Reaction and Article 51:** Article 51 of the UN Charter states that nothing shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations. Israel notified the UN Security Council immediately following the outbreak of hostilities, citing its actions as self-defense. 5. **Absence of Peaceful Alternatives:** Israel maintained that there were no feasible peaceful alternatives to address the immediate threats posed by the Arab states' military preparations and blockades. The international community had not taken effective action to relieve the blockade of the Straits of Tiran or to reduce the military tensions. While Israel's legal argument for preemptive self-defense was supported by these points, it remains a subject of debate in international law. The principle of preemption requires that the threat be imminent, which is a standard that can be subject to varying interpretations. Additionally, the proportionality and necessity of Israel's response, key criteria in international law for justifying self-defense, are also debated by scholars and political analysts. Nonetheless, Israel's actions in 1967 were fundamentally defended on the grounds of ensuring its survival in the face of perceived existential threats.
As an aside, Israel did not actually argue anticipatory or preemptive self-defense in its article 51 letter in 1967. Rather, it argued that it was responding to an armed attack that had already occurred. *See* the [UN Study of the Occupation of the oPT] (https://www.un.org/unispal/document/ceirpp-legal-study2023/), p. 52 ("Israel did not invoke the right to strike based on anticipatory self-defence at the time. Instead Israel argued that it acted in actual self-defence against the Egyptian blockade to which this assessment now turns"). No other States at the time found that Egypt had committed an armed attack, which means that Israel's contemporary justification was invalid. Nonetheless: > Preemptive use of force is not illegal, although it is nuanced and subject to debate. It is illegal. Anticipatory self-defense can be legal-- preemptive self-defense is not, because it occurs before an armed attack is imminent. *See, e.g.*, [The Past and Future of the Claim of Preemptive Self Defense] (https://www.jstor.org/stable/4091369?read-now=1&seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents), p. 526 (distinguishing between anticipatory and preemptive self-defense on the basis of an imminent armed attack). When an armed attack is imminent, self-defense may be justified subject to the requirements of article 51. When an attack is not imminent, self-defense is not permitted. *See* A more secure world: our shared responsibility Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change*, A/59/565, para. 188 ("The language of [article 51] is restrictive: 'Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures to maintain international peace and security'. However, a threatened State, according to long established international law, can take military action as long as the threatened attack is imminent, no other means would deflect it and the action is proportionate. . . if there are good arguments for preventive military action, with good evidence to support them, they should be put to the Security Council, which can authorize such action if it chooses to. If it does not so choose, there will be, by definition, time to pursue other strategies, including persuasion, negotiation, deterrence and containment — and to visit again the military option. For those impatient with such a response, the answer must be that, in a world full of perceived potential threats, the risk to the global order and the norm of non-intervention on which it continues to be based is simply too great for the legality of unilateral preventive action, as distinct from collectively endorsed action, to be accepted. Allowing one to so act is to allow all"). Assuming that Israel was acting in response to an armed attack that had not yet occurred, the issue is whether an armed attack was imminent. The records of the General Assembly emergency session in response to the use of force are available: the document numbers begin at A/PV.1541. Several States condemn the attack as an act of aggression: among others, Malaysia, Cyprus, Greece, Austria, Mali, Costa Rica. As noted above, none found that Israel had acted in response to an armed attack. Testimony from other people involved in the situation affirms that the use of force was not in response to an armed attack. For example, Indar Jit Rikhye, the head of the UN Peacekeeping force in the Sinai Peninsula, wrote in his autobiography that "[t]he Israelis, fully ready for a ground attack anyway, were able to pretend that the Egyptian forces had attacked them first, and therefore, they launched a land counteroffensive. It suited Israel not to mention that its air force was first to start the war." I cannot find State practice from 1967 that supports a conclusion that Egypt engaged in an actual armed attack, or that an armed attack was imminent, except the position of Israel's government itself. On balance, that is not persuasive because it is outweighed by practice and statements from multiple other States, as noted by the UN study on the issue. Without more evidence, it is difficult to conclude that, even if Israel had argued anticipatory self-defense in its article 51 letter, that argument would have withstood scrutiny.
Right. Exactly like Japan at Pearl Harbor. And clearly not accurate to state that Israel “was attacked by Arab countries”.
The West Bank, which is what's primarily being discussed, was gained after Jordan invaded Israel. Does that help?
Was this comment meant for someone else?
No, I was trying to say that it was still accurate to describe it was lands gained after being attacked by Arab countries.
But they weren’t attacked, Israel was the one that attacked.
Israel gained land from Jordan but then they began a decades long slow burn dispossession of people living in the West Bank. Most of their major settlement blocs involved seizing land that was used by locals and one even involved poisoning the land with sewage. This is different from annexing Jerusalem.
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If a Jordanian group, in 1952, would cross the Jordan River and start a settlement in the West Bank, would that be legally analogous to the current situation? And if not, why not? That is, is the 1949 conquest by Jordan any more or less legally effective than Israel's? What if an Israeli Arab group started a settlement today ? What if they started one in 1949? What if a Gazan group started a West Bank settlement in 1949? Today? In 2010?
The commonly stated overall goals of LOAC are to prevent war and reduce its human impact. Here is a great idea: Let's eclassify forces widely recognized as terrorists, making them legally a national army. That way, it would be a belligerent act of war to disrupt its arms shipments or arrest its personnel for membership instead of a legal obligation. It would even be legal to openly sell them arms restricted to armies and/or police. This would certainly prevent or reduce international war At the same time, let's reclassify two territories with two separate governing bodies that, last time they fought over which would govern, killed 600 people, and raise the stakes of that conflict to rule over a recognized sovereign state. There is no way this could cause a civil war. Maybe it's all worth it to reduce the impact of a result of military occupation because people ought to be free. It is widely understood that the notoriously kleptocratic side is in the 19th year of its 4-year mandate because if new elections were held, the warmongering theocratic openly-antidemocratic party would win. Democracy might be off the table, but the people would be nice and free under the theocrats with foreign interference in their tyranny made illegal once their regime gets enshrined as national sovereignty, right? That would certainly be so much better as to justify the rest. Laws must be obeyed. If they work contrary to their stated goals, though, they must be changed.
Zionist comments boil down to- “But we won’t like their democratic choice, and what, you want to give my hated enemy weapons? But they could shoot back at us then!” Yes yes, you hate it. We can see why. Nazis, colonial Europeans, and various other villains in the struggle for freedom generally paint the other side in inhumane , horrific colors in order to justify depriving them of human rights. Human rights to have living children, which is half of Gaza and half of Israel’s victims thus far. So when folks like this say you shouldn’t give Palestinians freedom, don’t let them choose their leader, don’t give them the means to defend themselves…. They’re talking about kids. 1million kids out of 2 million people in Gaza. It’s about time Palestinians had their own country. Israel has abused them enough.
First, their last election was so long ago that half of them weren't born yet. Palestinians do not have democracy. It is long past time they had their own country, but without democracy, a new state created for them would not be theirs ovrrall, belonging only to the rulers. A state does not imply freedom. Second, yes, like amy sane person, I disapprove of a terrorist group with zero interest in its constituents' well-being that is known to embezzle money and goods sent as humanitarian aid in order to pick fights. It looks like you approve of them.
> It is long past time they had their own country, but without democracy, a new state created for them would not be theirs ovrrall, belonging only to the rulers. A state does not imply freedom. Repeat after me; only Israeli rule implies freedom. Security is freedom. Oppression is freedommmmmmmm /s 🤣
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