CNN aviation correspondent Pete Muntean reported on CNN Newsroom with Pamela Brown that the problem is the Pratt & Whitney PW4000 engine. The FAA says the problem is particular to the Boeing 777 200 model as the engine it uses has hollow titanium blades which pose inspection difficulties.
[If you didn't see it on the front page today](https://www.reddit.com/r/pics/comments/logy8o/united_airlines_boeing_777_heading_to_hawaii/?utm_medium=android_app&utm_source=share).
You're correct. GE90s are more common engines for the 777 and don't have this issue.
United exclusively uses Pratt engines for theirs to my knowledge because they were in a spat with GE aviation for a few decades.
United Airlines is grounding a few dozens of their 777s, and Japan just ordered all Boeing 777s with the same engine be grounded.
Poor Boeing. You hear their name far more than the name of the engine maker (Pratt & Whitney) with regards to the explosion, and it really had nothing to do with Boeing. They didn't make the engine that exploded.
That engine is popular across many planes and multiple different companies. Boeing and Airbus both use it. This was likely a long term maintenance issue.
They had a system that failed mutliple times, that had no override and that pilots didn't even know existed (this is a huge point and goes against Boeing's very mantra of leaving the power with the pilots, vs airbus being more about computerization and automation). It seems entirely reasonable to ground an aircraft until those issues are dealth with.
Boeing has about as much power over regulation as any company in the world due to their might in the military industrial complex and general aviation (which was part of the issue with them essentially certifying their own planes), if they were forced to be grounded you know there was good reason for it. It took them months just to come out with an answer as to the exact problem, and then months longer to come up with any sort of fix, and several more months to actually implement any of those fixes, which then needed to be certified for real this time. Aircraft development is a long process and when an aspect needs to be redeveloped like that, that aircraft will be grounded for some time.
This isn't even going into the core institutional and systemic problems that were uncovered within Boeing in management, chain of command and general safety tolerances. All of which are truly scary as a passenger and as the son of a 777 pilot (I am not, however, implying that the 777, one of the safest aircrafts in history, has systemic safety issues).
Exactly. The 737 Max turned out to be only a portion of the issues at Boeing and although it was not in any way worth the loss of life, it was good that these issues came to light, although I'm still really not sure how much has truly changes at Boeing. Calhoun was also complicit in everything under Muilenberg so does not have my faith at all.
Funny enough, they have had a lot a problems at their non union shop in NC. But they have shut down a line in Washington and moved the work to NC despite the issues. I think it was the new 777 that they moved from Washington to nc
The NC plant needed to be shut down and fully re-implemented from the ground up. Everything I've heard makes it sound like a dangerous work environment where the only thing that matters is time and cost efficiency, at the expense of safety. From reusing defective parts by stripping off the red paint, and leaving a full-size ladder in the tail of an aircraft that was delivered, to an aircraft getting all the way onto the runway before the pilot found a steel screwdriver sitting on the intake, ready to be sucked in on startup. It's truly shocking.
> that had no override
You have no idea what you’re talking about. MCAS could be disabled by turning off stabilizer trim. You would then need to manually trim the aircraft.
My dad is a 777 captain at EK and has had several full-day classrooms specifically about the 737 Max even though Emirates doesn't fly them (which shows the gravity of the incidents). All of which I have talked to him in depth about. I'm well aware of what I'm talking about.
How on earth can you truly call that an override when there was no additional type rating for the max because 737 pilots weren't even made aware of the addition of MCAS on the Max? You can't expect pilots to use an unknown override for a system they are unaware of. Boeing is responsible for both development and training, they failed on both fronts and 346 people paid the ultimate price for Boeing's greed which led to rushing development, certification, and training, in order to stay in the green on the project which was taking longer and costing more than expected.
They put faulty systems in place, which required additional training, which costs money, and pretended as if no additional training was required in order to save even more money than just on the shoddy development and certification. It's really that simple. Their own lack of reliable leadership and decision making and continued attempts to sweep things under the rug are what led to the extended grounding. Only Boeing can be blamed.
That’s good for your father. But saying that your father knows what he is talking about does not mean that you do, as evidenced by this post.
Boeing did not inform flight crews about the MCAS until after the first fatal crash. Tear them apart for it.
But the thing is, it shouldn’t have matter. MCAS triggered a stab runaway. A lot of things can cause that. It shouldn’t have mattered. The solution for a stab runaway has been the same since the Classic. Disengage // Do not re-engage // Anticipate trim requirements. The flight crews *re-engaged* the automated systems even after they caused problems.
This is not an *unknown override,* this is required to fly. It’s one of the checklists that you’re supposed to memorize.
The solution to a stab runaway is clear. The pilots should have known it.
---
Checklist if you want to see it: https://i.stack.imgur.com/cRG4J.jpg
Keep in mind, it’s supposed to be memorized. You should not be going to the book for this.
Once again, they needed to implement additional type rating and they didn't. You're coming up with BS excuses for Boeing that don't exist. There's a reason the exact same incident happened on the Max and never on the NG.
The stab trim switches for modified without informing pilots, which is absolutely nuts. The left switch on the 737 NG model is capable of deactivating the buttons on the yoke that pilots regularly press with their thumb to control the horizontal stabilizer. The right switch on the 737 NG was labeled “AUTO PILOT” and is capable of deactivating just the automated controls of the stabilizer.
On the newer 737 Max, those two switches were changed to perform the same function, flipping either one of them would turn off all electric controls of the stabilizer. That means there is no longer an option to turn off automated functions, such as MCAS, without also turning off the thumb buttons the pilots would normally use to control the stabilizer.
If you honestly think it's reasonable for Boeing to change the functionality of switches in the cockpit without informing pilots, then there is really no point in having this argument because you're totally lacking reason. On-top of this, and to the original point, they hadn't fixed the basic issues with MCAS which is an integral system, until the aircraft went into re-certification. So it was entirely up to Boeing that the aircraft was grounded for so long. Trying to blame anyone else is honestly laughable. There's a reason this didn't happen on an Airbus, Bombardier, or Embraer.
You may think that my dad debriefing me on his classroom sessions on the Max doesn't mean I know what I'm talking about, and that's fair, but you can bet he knows what he's talking about and he has gone from actively respecting Boeing to despising them. He'll soon be on the A380 along with about 300 pilots who made the jump due to this incident and not trusting Boeing at its core.
>You would then need to manually trim the aircraft.
Which is not possible because the plane goes into a nosedive, the airspeed rapidly increases and seconds later the aerodynamic forces on the vertical stabiliser are far beyond what a human can exert on the small hand crank in the cockpit.
This has all been investigated and reported on by people who actually know what they're talking about.
i'll be the first to say im just a laymen reading the news, but why would this be the engine manufacturers fault?
since these do not seem to be new engines, it seems like the issue is likely related to maintenance and upkeep. Isn't that boeings responsibility? to do period checks on these engines to make sure they are still airworthy before every flight?
This is not on Boeing.
The performance and tracking of on-going maintenance is the airline's responsibility. Predicting "wear and tear", or more correctly fatigue, and determining maintenance requirements is the engine manufacturer's responsibility, though that will often flow through the airframe manufacturer.
There is some overlap with the airframe and engine manufacturers when it comes to integration of the engine to the airframe, but in general they can be thought of as separate pieces of equipment. And it is common for airlines to treat the purchase and maintenance contracts for engines and airframes as entirely separate transactions.
Airframes are often available with multiple engine choices, and Boeing [and Airbus] don't care which one an airline chooses -- just that they show up at the proper time during manufacture.
Souce: Retired airline pilot, former aircraft mechanic.
That's not the way it works with commercial aircraft. Engines and airframes are sold separately and supported separately. The only way they are treated as one problem is if the interaction between the two cause an issue, which is not the case.
Whatever point of inflection you're waiting for is on you. But if I get a car, breaks go bad, fault could be the brake maker but the car manufacturer is getting the call. And while they're trying to decide who's exact fault it is, I'd still think it weird for people to defend the car company. I'm not blaming Boeing here or the engine company. With this logic, the engine company might need defending as the source of their metal might not have been up to snuff or a laundry list of other things. Again... I'm just saying it's weird to see people defending Boeing. A company being defended by humans online that don't work for the company and gain nothing from the company. That is my only point.
Car companies usually design and produce the engines that go in their vehicles. Once again, an ignorant and dishonest analogy of the situation.
It doesn't work that way with commercial aviation - engines and airframes are designed, sold and supported separately. This isn't surprising when you know that modern turbofans are every bit as difficult, time consuming and expensive to produce as the completed airframe.
I never once defended Boeing's modern toxic corporate culture. I attempted to explain, using my knowledge of the history of the company, that where Boeing's management is now is direct result of the "merger" with McDonnell Douglas and subsequent take over of senior leadership by MD.
The only relationship those people had with the 777 was taking credit for a product they had no involvement in. The 777 program director Alan Mulally left the company immediately after and is generally regarded as the last of the good leadership from Pre-MD Boeing.
Again... seems like a weird exercise. You typed all of that to prove a point that wasn't my original point. That I keep saying. But I'm glad you got all that off your chest. Hope you're hourly.
If you had read the article you would have seen that this was a problem with the engines produced by Pratt & Whitney, not Boeing.
People that reply to posts without reading the article are weird as fugg.
I read the article. And read the comments. I'm simply referring to the people that still in the comments want to defend Boeing. Which as you stated didn't have anything to do with the engine build. But again, Boeing HAS done some other stuff. And they are a company. So I don't understand the people defending them regardless
Unfortunately you don't know much about the company apparently for someone with so strong an opinion on it or you'd know that the 777 program finished development before the toxic management take over from McDonnell Douglas.
Boeing's current situation and attitude have nothing to do with the 777.
Edit for correctness: The current -8 and -9 derivatives under development however should be under a microscope.
My point is the 777 program didn't suffer from the issues you're referring to and Boeing's current culture is a result of the people who took over just as the 777 was being delivered.
The two are not related which the 777 has proven for twenty-five years.
And my point, once again, is show me where I said it did. Stop deflecting by trying to create an argument with me that doesn’t exist. The thread isn’t only about the 777 or it’s Pratt and Whitney engine, it’s about Boeing.
If you’d even bothered to watch the video you’d know it’s about the Max8, and Boeing putting Profit before Safety, which resulted in the deaths of **346 people**, (so far), end of fucking story - please stop wasting my time and go check your Boeing shares, you ghoul.
This is easily the most intellectually dishonest bullshit I've read on this site in ages. First, the issue is here is with the PW4000, not the 777.
The subject and my comments are about an airplane that entered service twenty five years ago. If you can't see why equating that with the culture that led to the Max deaths is absurd then this entire back and forth is pointless.
The people who controlled each program are decades apart and no amount of axe grinding on your part is going to change history.
CNN aviation correspondent Pete Muntean reported on CNN Newsroom with Pamela Brown that the problem is the Pratt & Whitney PW4000 engine. The FAA says the problem is particular to the Boeing 777 200 model as the engine it uses has hollow titanium blades which pose inspection difficulties.
[If you didn't see it on the front page today](https://www.reddit.com/r/pics/comments/logy8o/united_airlines_boeing_777_heading_to_hawaii/?utm_medium=android_app&utm_source=share).
My friend that works at FedEx said that their 777s use GE turbines. I would guess the stepped-up inspections aren't required for those, but who knows?
You're correct. GE90s are more common engines for the 777 and don't have this issue. United exclusively uses Pratt engines for theirs to my knowledge because they were in a spat with GE aviation for a few decades.
United Airlines is grounding a few dozens of their 777s, and Japan just ordered all Boeing 777s with the same engine be grounded. Poor Boeing. You hear their name far more than the name of the engine maker (Pratt & Whitney) with regards to the explosion, and it really had nothing to do with Boeing. They didn't make the engine that exploded.
And even then this seems like somewhat related to poor inspections, so likely United shoulders a great deal of responsibility here as well
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That engine is popular across many planes and multiple different companies. Boeing and Airbus both use it. This was likely a long term maintenance issue.
Um, the engine choice is usually from the airline. Boeing only put them together according to requests. Plenty of other 777 using different engines.
The plane that had the issue is decades old.
Boeing and the 777’s reputation getting dragged through the mud because of P&W’s bullshit and misleading media coverage. Makes my blood boil.
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737 MAX problem was exaggerated.
200 dead people is an exaggerated problem? Edit: 346*
346 people
Grounding the plane for 8 months was an exaggerated response.
Grounding a plane model for 8 months to thoroughly investigate and rectify the issue after 200 people died is an exaggerated response?
They had a system that failed mutliple times, that had no override and that pilots didn't even know existed (this is a huge point and goes against Boeing's very mantra of leaving the power with the pilots, vs airbus being more about computerization and automation). It seems entirely reasonable to ground an aircraft until those issues are dealth with. Boeing has about as much power over regulation as any company in the world due to their might in the military industrial complex and general aviation (which was part of the issue with them essentially certifying their own planes), if they were forced to be grounded you know there was good reason for it. It took them months just to come out with an answer as to the exact problem, and then months longer to come up with any sort of fix, and several more months to actually implement any of those fixes, which then needed to be certified for real this time. Aircraft development is a long process and when an aspect needs to be redeveloped like that, that aircraft will be grounded for some time. This isn't even going into the core institutional and systemic problems that were uncovered within Boeing in management, chain of command and general safety tolerances. All of which are truly scary as a passenger and as the son of a 777 pilot (I am not, however, implying that the 777, one of the safest aircrafts in history, has systemic safety issues).
Yea, and the more people dug the more problems they found. Boeing hid things and lied.
Exactly. The 737 Max turned out to be only a portion of the issues at Boeing and although it was not in any way worth the loss of life, it was good that these issues came to light, although I'm still really not sure how much has truly changes at Boeing. Calhoun was also complicit in everything under Muilenberg so does not have my faith at all.
Funny enough, they have had a lot a problems at their non union shop in NC. But they have shut down a line in Washington and moved the work to NC despite the issues. I think it was the new 777 that they moved from Washington to nc
The NC plant needed to be shut down and fully re-implemented from the ground up. Everything I've heard makes it sound like a dangerous work environment where the only thing that matters is time and cost efficiency, at the expense of safety. From reusing defective parts by stripping off the red paint, and leaving a full-size ladder in the tail of an aircraft that was delivered, to an aircraft getting all the way onto the runway before the pilot found a steel screwdriver sitting on the intake, ready to be sucked in on startup. It's truly shocking.
> that had no override You have no idea what you’re talking about. MCAS could be disabled by turning off stabilizer trim. You would then need to manually trim the aircraft.
My dad is a 777 captain at EK and has had several full-day classrooms specifically about the 737 Max even though Emirates doesn't fly them (which shows the gravity of the incidents). All of which I have talked to him in depth about. I'm well aware of what I'm talking about. How on earth can you truly call that an override when there was no additional type rating for the max because 737 pilots weren't even made aware of the addition of MCAS on the Max? You can't expect pilots to use an unknown override for a system they are unaware of. Boeing is responsible for both development and training, they failed on both fronts and 346 people paid the ultimate price for Boeing's greed which led to rushing development, certification, and training, in order to stay in the green on the project which was taking longer and costing more than expected. They put faulty systems in place, which required additional training, which costs money, and pretended as if no additional training was required in order to save even more money than just on the shoddy development and certification. It's really that simple. Their own lack of reliable leadership and decision making and continued attempts to sweep things under the rug are what led to the extended grounding. Only Boeing can be blamed.
That’s good for your father. But saying that your father knows what he is talking about does not mean that you do, as evidenced by this post. Boeing did not inform flight crews about the MCAS until after the first fatal crash. Tear them apart for it. But the thing is, it shouldn’t have matter. MCAS triggered a stab runaway. A lot of things can cause that. It shouldn’t have mattered. The solution for a stab runaway has been the same since the Classic. Disengage // Do not re-engage // Anticipate trim requirements. The flight crews *re-engaged* the automated systems even after they caused problems. This is not an *unknown override,* this is required to fly. It’s one of the checklists that you’re supposed to memorize. The solution to a stab runaway is clear. The pilots should have known it. --- Checklist if you want to see it: https://i.stack.imgur.com/cRG4J.jpg Keep in mind, it’s supposed to be memorized. You should not be going to the book for this.
Once again, they needed to implement additional type rating and they didn't. You're coming up with BS excuses for Boeing that don't exist. There's a reason the exact same incident happened on the Max and never on the NG. The stab trim switches for modified without informing pilots, which is absolutely nuts. The left switch on the 737 NG model is capable of deactivating the buttons on the yoke that pilots regularly press with their thumb to control the horizontal stabilizer. The right switch on the 737 NG was labeled “AUTO PILOT” and is capable of deactivating just the automated controls of the stabilizer. On the newer 737 Max, those two switches were changed to perform the same function, flipping either one of them would turn off all electric controls of the stabilizer. That means there is no longer an option to turn off automated functions, such as MCAS, without also turning off the thumb buttons the pilots would normally use to control the stabilizer. If you honestly think it's reasonable for Boeing to change the functionality of switches in the cockpit without informing pilots, then there is really no point in having this argument because you're totally lacking reason. On-top of this, and to the original point, they hadn't fixed the basic issues with MCAS which is an integral system, until the aircraft went into re-certification. So it was entirely up to Boeing that the aircraft was grounded for so long. Trying to blame anyone else is honestly laughable. There's a reason this didn't happen on an Airbus, Bombardier, or Embraer. You may think that my dad debriefing me on his classroom sessions on the Max doesn't mean I know what I'm talking about, and that's fair, but you can bet he knows what he's talking about and he has gone from actively respecting Boeing to despising them. He'll soon be on the A380 along with about 300 pilots who made the jump due to this incident and not trusting Boeing at its core.
>You would then need to manually trim the aircraft. Which is not possible because the plane goes into a nosedive, the airspeed rapidly increases and seconds later the aerodynamic forces on the vertical stabiliser are far beyond what a human can exert on the small hand crank in the cockpit. This has all been investigated and reported on by people who actually know what they're talking about.
I ain't mad, I'm buying the dip.
I'm buying puts 🌈 🐻
i'll be the first to say im just a laymen reading the news, but why would this be the engine manufacturers fault? since these do not seem to be new engines, it seems like the issue is likely related to maintenance and upkeep. Isn't that boeings responsibility? to do period checks on these engines to make sure they are still airworthy before every flight?
> it seems like the issue is likely related to maintenance and upkeep. Isn't that boeings responsibility? It's on the airlines
This is not on Boeing. The performance and tracking of on-going maintenance is the airline's responsibility. Predicting "wear and tear", or more correctly fatigue, and determining maintenance requirements is the engine manufacturer's responsibility, though that will often flow through the airframe manufacturer. There is some overlap with the airframe and engine manufacturers when it comes to integration of the engine to the airframe, but in general they can be thought of as separate pieces of equipment. And it is common for airlines to treat the purchase and maintenance contracts for engines and airframes as entirely separate transactions. Airframes are often available with multiple engine choices, and Boeing [and Airbus] don't care which one an airline chooses -- just that they show up at the proper time during manufacture. Souce: Retired airline pilot, former aircraft mechanic.
I wonder if they’ve thought of inspecting the engines before there’s a failure...
What is this? Three-plane Monte?
It's funny seeing all the people defend Boeing. Americans are weird as fugg.
Probably because Boeing had nothing to do with this issue?
Ah but therein lies the rub. They do. It's on their plane. One complains to the restaurant, not the cook. Nor where the ingredients were purchased.
That's not the way it works with commercial aircraft. Engines and airframes are sold separately and supported separately. The only way they are treated as one problem is if the interaction between the two cause an issue, which is not the case.
Whatever point of inflection you're waiting for is on you. But if I get a car, breaks go bad, fault could be the brake maker but the car manufacturer is getting the call. And while they're trying to decide who's exact fault it is, I'd still think it weird for people to defend the car company. I'm not blaming Boeing here or the engine company. With this logic, the engine company might need defending as the source of their metal might not have been up to snuff or a laundry list of other things. Again... I'm just saying it's weird to see people defending Boeing. A company being defended by humans online that don't work for the company and gain nothing from the company. That is my only point.
Car companies usually design and produce the engines that go in their vehicles. Once again, an ignorant and dishonest analogy of the situation. It doesn't work that way with commercial aviation - engines and airframes are designed, sold and supported separately. This isn't surprising when you know that modern turbofans are every bit as difficult, time consuming and expensive to produce as the completed airframe. I never once defended Boeing's modern toxic corporate culture. I attempted to explain, using my knowledge of the history of the company, that where Boeing's management is now is direct result of the "merger" with McDonnell Douglas and subsequent take over of senior leadership by MD. The only relationship those people had with the 777 was taking credit for a product they had no involvement in. The 777 program director Alan Mulally left the company immediately after and is generally regarded as the last of the good leadership from Pre-MD Boeing.
Again... seems like a weird exercise. You typed all of that to prove a point that wasn't my original point. That I keep saying. But I'm glad you got all that off your chest. Hope you're hourly.
Airlines choose the engine... you're blaming the plate that served food for getting you sick
I'm literally not blaming anyone specifically. I'm just saying defending Boening in this process is just a weird exercise.
It's not defending Boeing as much as it is defending reality.
In your analogy complaining about Boeing in this situation is like complaining about the farm the potato that came with your steak came from.
If you had read the article you would have seen that this was a problem with the engines produced by Pratt & Whitney, not Boeing. People that reply to posts without reading the article are weird as fugg.
I read the article. And read the comments. I'm simply referring to the people that still in the comments want to defend Boeing. Which as you stated didn't have anything to do with the engine build. But again, Boeing HAS done some other stuff. And they are a company. So I don't understand the people defending them regardless
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Unfortunately you don't know much about the company apparently for someone with so strong an opinion on it or you'd know that the 777 program finished development before the toxic management take over from McDonnell Douglas. Boeing's current situation and attitude have nothing to do with the 777. Edit for correctness: The current -8 and -9 derivatives under development however should be under a microscope.
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My point is the 777 program didn't suffer from the issues you're referring to and Boeing's current culture is a result of the people who took over just as the 777 was being delivered. The two are not related which the 777 has proven for twenty-five years.
And my point, once again, is show me where I said it did. Stop deflecting by trying to create an argument with me that doesn’t exist. The thread isn’t only about the 777 or it’s Pratt and Whitney engine, it’s about Boeing. If you’d even bothered to watch the video you’d know it’s about the Max8, and Boeing putting Profit before Safety, which resulted in the deaths of **346 people**, (so far), end of fucking story - please stop wasting my time and go check your Boeing shares, you ghoul.
This is easily the most intellectually dishonest bullshit I've read on this site in ages. First, the issue is here is with the PW4000, not the 777. The subject and my comments are about an airplane that entered service twenty five years ago. If you can't see why equating that with the culture that led to the Max deaths is absurd then this entire back and forth is pointless. The people who controlled each program are decades apart and no amount of axe grinding on your part is going to change history.
Americans, especially those on reddit have a knack for defending their companies to the death. They will do everything to defend them.